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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the structure of power and knowledge in the orthodox 
discourses (as the mainstream discourse) in Iran, and its relation to domestic 
violence against women both theoretically and empirically. The focus is to explore 
the theoretical and empirical correlation between the orthodox formulation of 
marriage and the role and place of women in the traditional Islamic order in general, 
and the issue of domestic violence against women in particular, in the context of 
Iranian society. In the theoretical section of this study I employ a novel approach 
based on the economic theory of contract, in order to shed light on the internal logic 
of the orthodox formulation of marriage, how it determines the natural place of 
women in society, and how, in general, it may lead to physical, economic, sexual 
and psychological violence against women as a logical implication of its internal 
structure. The role of orthodox jurisprudence in creating or justifying violence 
against women is investigated at three levels: institutional mechanisms, discursive 
formations and the power/knowledge structure, in the context of a Foucauldian 
framework. I demonstrate how orthodox marriage is organised around a critical 
transaction of sexual submission for economic protection, and how this simple 
formulation creates a series of rights and obligations for both men and women. I 
clarify how this formulation may pave the way for violence against women, which 
turns into a source of perpetual tension in contemporary Iranian society. 
Empirically, by utilising reflexive methodology, a qualitative study was conducted 
on three groups, the first of which consisted of 40 women, the second of 14 men and 
the third of 8 judiciary officials, in Iran, mainly in Gilan province (in the north of the 
country). The purpose of the study is to investigate the social realities on the ground 
(the (situatedness") which account for domestic violence against women. I report 
and reflect on the participants' experiences, their narratives and their explanations of 
the reasons behind domestic violence. Their accounts were thernatised to find the 
answers to the following questions: What constitutes domestic violence against 
women? What set of discourses and narratives is deployed to justify or condemn it? 
What are perceived to be the root causes of domestic violence? What remedies have 
been deemed feasible, and why? The overall patterns that emerged from the 
accounts of the participants are summarised and critically assessed in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. Overall, I believe that my novel approach in deploying 
polyvocality at all levels of the research allowed the complexity and multiplicity of 
the contexts and texts involved in the emergence of domestic violence against 
women in Iran to reveal itself. This will, I hope, help all those involved in the 
analysis and eradication of domestic violence in Iran to avoid fatal simplifications 
and hazardous generalisations. 
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Introduction 
My research is concerned with investigating the local conditions and factors 
leading to violence against women in Iranian society with Islam (in its Shia version) 
as its official religion. My assumption here was that, although violence against 
women is a global phenomenon, it manifests itself in local forms and is rooted in a 
local interplay of factors. My interest was to study the effects of these factors on 
domestic violence against women in Iran. This was done theoretically (by 
introducing epistemological, ontological and methodological discourses) and 
practically (by conducting an empirical investigation). 
According to many criminologists, domestic violence against women is the 
most under-reported crime worldwide. However, data presented to the United 
Nations revealed that violence against women, or gender-based violence, is a 
universal phenomenon that happens across the world, regardless of class, 
nationality, race, religion and socio-economic development (World Health 
Organization, 2005; United Nations Report, 1970-90,1991). It can be argued that 
violence against women is not the result of unaccountable or pathological behaviour, 
but of a learned, conscious and calculated behaviour originating from a social 
system of deep-rooted inequality and patriarchy. Unequal power relationships affect 
some individuals in such a way that they encourage them to exercise their power 
over others and intimidate or control them. Unequal relationships within the family 
on the basis of gender and age have been identified as the main factors generating 
violence, which is not related to specific social class or educational, ethnic or age 
groups (Shipway, 2004). These arguments will be discussed extensively in Chapter 
I of this thesis. The main focus of Chapter 1 is to investigate the roots and causes of 
violence as a universal phenomenon. The aim is to provide an overview of the 
existing literature in relation to the set of factors involved in producing, perpetuating 
and limiting violence. There will be an attempt to apply an interdisciplinary 
approach in reviewing violence against women, in terms of the interplay of a 
complex configuration of factors. A brief outline of the definition and terminology 
of domestic violence is given. I will further present the results of a number of studies 
conducted in relation to domestic violence against women in Iran. Finally, a 
summary of the chapter will be given. 
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The aim of Chapter 2 is to explore the issues surrounding domestic violence 
against women and to address the important questions, more particularly in the 
Islamic context, by investigating the religious sources of the laws of the land, such 
as the Qur'an and the orthodox jurisprudence, to reflect on cultural beliefs and 
practices regarding the prevalence of violence against women in Iran. It is known 
that one of the most significant social-cognitive processes that contribute to levels of 
inequality is a shared belief in discourses that legitimise inequality, exploitation and 
violence. The orthodox jurisprudence (the study of Islamic religious law) in Muslim 
societies acts as an ideology and a collection of legal codes which shape the lives of 
ordinary Muslims. During recent years, Islam has played an institutional role in 
governing men's treatment of women, particularly in determining the legitimacy of 
some orthodox rules regarding women's rights and obligations. It is absolutely vital 
to investigate the effects of these discourses on violence against women in Iranian 
society, and it is useful to understand how Iranian women are being treated under 
the orthodox jurisprudence. Therefore, there will be an attempt to pose and reflect 
upon a number of questions surrounding the issue of domestic violence under these 
rules and regulations: What is the orthodox jurisprudence? How does it shape the 
life of people? Does it in any way legitimise the use of coercive measures against 
women? What is the place of women in the ideal order envisaged by the orthodox 
jurisprudence, and how does it affect the issue of violence against women? How is 
violence against women, in practice, affected by the orthodox jurisprudence? The 
role of foqaha (mainly male jurists, reflecting the male-dominated nature of 
orthodoxy) will be addressed at the beginning of Chapter 2 (in the first section), and 
the discussion will progress to introduce the orthodox jurisprudence's understanding 
of marriage and marital relationships and violence against women (in the second 
section). Consequently, on the basis of the knowledge accumulated in the previous 
sections, the last part will attempt to paint a more complete picture of the place of 
women in the traditional jurisprudence by probing the rules and regulations 
pertaining to the issues of inequality/equality and difference/sameness between the 
sexes in theories addressing gender differences and gender equality in contemporary 
Iran. The study will endeavour to clarify how orthodox discourses perceive 
femininity/masculinity, and how these beliefs manifest themselves in shaping and 
regulating the use of violence against women, by investigating Qur'anic verses and 
sayings (ahadith) about women's and men's sexuality. As feminism pays immense 
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attention to the control of female sexuality as the root cause of patriarchy, this 
analysis will have further significance. 
Chapter 3 will address issues surrounding feminist methodology, 
epistemology and ontology; the main focus of this chapter is to present reflexive 
methodology (at both theoretical and practical levels) as the most appropriate means 
of producing data in relation to this particular research. 
The empirical data is presented in chapters, four, five, and six of this thesis, 
which will be mainly concerned with analysis of the data produced in the field study 
with the three groups (women, men and the judicial officials). I report and reflect on 
the participants' experiences, their narratives, and their explanations of the reasons 
behind domestic violence. The accounts of the participants were thematised to find 
the answers to the following questions: What constitutes domestic violence against 
women? What set of discourses and narratives are deployed to justify or condemn 
it? What are perceived to be the root causes of domestic violence? And what 
remedies were deemed feasible and why? The analysis of the accounts of the judicial 
officials is presented in chapter four, where I discuss the major themes touched upon 
by the eight participants (two female and six male). 
The analysis of the accounts of the judicial officials is presented in Chapter 
4. where I discuss the major themes touched upon by the eight participants (two 
female and six male). 
In Chapter 51 examine different themes drawn from the accounts of 40 
women whose narratives are presented and analysed in this chapter. I discuss 
women') s experiences and understanding of domestic violence, and what they regard 
as the reasons behind their partners' abusive behaviour. 
Chapter 6 is based on the accounts of 14 male participants, their perceptions 
of gender relations and their reasons for using violence against their wives. 
The conclusion to the thesis may be found in Chapter 7, where the repeated 
themes and empirical findings are summarised, and where a number of suggestions 
are put forward with regard to the feasible remedies available to Iranian society. In 
this chapter I will discuss what is accounted for as violence, based on the 
participants' points of view. Moreover, I will discuss the causes of violence by 
critically analysing the accounts of all the participants. I close this chapter by 
presenting short-ten-n and long-term strategies available in dealing with domestic 
violence against women. 
Chapter 1: Theories Regarding the Roots of Violence Against 
Women 
Introduction 
The main focus of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature on the 
set of factors involved in restricting, increasing, or moderating violence against 
women. First, a brief outline of the definitions and terminology of domestic violence 
will be given. An attempt will be made to apply an interdisciplinary approach in 
viewing violence against women, due to the interplay of a complex configuration of 
factors involved in producing, perpetuating, and limiting violence. The discussion 
will be further developed by analysing some of the studies conducted in relation to 
domestic violence against women in Iran. The chapter will end with a summary. 
Definitions and terminology of domestic violence 
The term violence usually has been applied in a broad sense covering a wide 
range of behaviours such as verbal abuse, physical harassment, intimidation, rape, 
sexual assault and homicide, and according to British Medical Association "it may 
be constant or spasmodic, and is experienced by "individuals from every class, race, 
religion and culture the world over" (cited in Shipway, 2004: 2). Although adopting 
an inclusive and broad approach towards violence may have some advantages, a 
more narrow and differentiated definition of domestic violence may sometimes 
increase the clarity regarding the nature and context of a particular form of violence. 
It may be, however, difficult to generalize it across a much broader spectrum of 
violent acts and behaviours. 
Nevertheless, to theorize and conduct a research project on domestic 
violence, obtaining a definition of the term that can shed light on what counts as 
violence and to whom it might apply is necessary. Since identifying the definitions 
and terminology regarding domestic violence and its application in Iranian society is 
the aim of this part of the study, the emphasis is on violence in heterosexual 
relationships. Although the term is widely recognized throughout the world, its 
interpretation and application may vary enormously. Based on the findings reported 
by the World Health Organization (WHO: 2005), women who suffer from physical 
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and sexual violence also experience multiple acts of violence over time. However, a 
large number of definitions do not recognise psychological or emotional abuse or 
financial deprivation as domestic violence. As Shipway (2004: p. 3) points out: 
... the reality is that injuries may well be hidden and the damage virtually 
undetectable to the naked eyes. Growing evidence confirms that countless 
women live their lives in constant fear and degradation, suffering from 
severe psychological and emotional abuse perhaps without the 
accompanying broken bones and bruises ... [i]t is this type of abuse which 
may lead to mental illness and attempts at self-harm including suicide 
attempts, and may never present in physical injury. 
Regarding the wide disparity in understanding the term, it is necessary to 
give an explicit (working) definition of such a broad term as domestic violence. As 
the focus of this thesis is on violence in intimate relationships (between a man and a 
woman), I found the spectrum of abusive behaviours covered by the Home Office 
the most relevant one: 
Any violence between current and former partners in intimate relationship, 
wherever and whenever the violence occurs. The violence may include 
physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse. (Home Office 2003a) 
This definition recognizes different types of violence such as the emotional, 
economic, and sexual, along with physical violence in adult relationships. However, 
the term 'intimate partner relationship' does not make explicit that women are the 
victims. Therefore, for the purpose of this study I use this term to refer to female 
victims of violence. 
In the following sections there will be an attempt to explain the involvement 
of psychological, biological and social factors in the emergence of violence. 
Different approaches towards violence 
In trying to understand different approaches towards violence in general, and 
domestic violence in particular, it is valuable to explore and highlight the potential 
and the limits of various disciplinary approaches towards the topic of violence (its 
causes, continuation and elimination). Expanding boundaries of knowledge through 
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cross-fertilization demands contributions from the disciplines of sociology, 
anthropology, social policy, evolutionary psychology, and criminology which can 
increase the current theoretical knowledge of violent acts, generally, and violence 
against women, in particular (Dobash and Dobash, 1998). For instance, sociological, 
anthropological, and socio-political theories put emphasis on the cultural, structural 
inequalities and institutional factors in trying to explain how societies support or 
tolerate violent behaviours, whereas psychologists have focused on the individual 
and interpersonal relationships (Barnish, 2004). 
Evolutionary psychologists mostly put emphasis on underlying biological 
and psychological factors to explain the roots and causes of violence (Wilson, Daly 
and Daniele, 1995). This model sheds light on violence by trying to explain why 
men use violence in their intimate relationships, why they tend to control women 
sexually and why they feel insecure and afraid of losing their power. Evolutionary 
psychology attempts to trace the origins of male violent behaviour by pointing to the 
predominant violent tendencies in human male ancestors, whose activities were 
mostly based on male-male competition, in different circumstances in such 
aggressive acts as hunting, warfare, access to females, land and food, which required 
coercive and forceful strategies like threatening and assault (Crawford and Symons, 
2001). In criticisms directed at these views it has been argued that evolutionary 
psychology does not indicate why women are so much more passive in their 
relationships with men and accept their coercion and domination. Moreover, this 
interpretation is not able to explain the effectiveness of such coercive acts on 
females' behaviour as a victim in pre-modem social situations, due to the lack of 
empirical evidence (Crawford and Symons, 2001; Wilson, Daly and Daniele, 1995). 
Meanwhile, envirom-nental contingencies play an important role in guiding 
behaviour, in the learning theories. As Bandura (1973, p. 113) points out "human 
nature is characterized as a vast potentiality that can be fashioned by social 
influences into a variety of forms". Learning from role models such as parents, 
siblings, teachers, media personalities and so on is one of the assumptions of 
Bandura's theory, which was called observational learning. For example, emotional 
behaviour, such as aggression, can be learned through observing others acting 
aggressively in the child's environment. In some studies it was found that aggressive 
adolescent boys experienced more physical aggression than those low aggressive 
ones who lived in non-aggressive environments (Bandura and Walters, 1963). Based 
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on this theory, role models provide us with useful information about the 
consequences of their actions and observers can experience vicarious reinforcement 
or punishment through observing their experiences. Bandura and Rosenthal (1966) 
proposed that by observing someone else's experience, i. e. an unpleasant outcome as 
a result of an action, classical conditioning effects could be induced in the observer. 
It is important, however, to note that Bandura's explanation of social experiences 
has different applications in different societies; for instance in the West the role of 
peer groups is considered to be more important than in Eastern societies, such as 
Iran, where family relations still play a major role in shaping the children's social 
behaviour. 
On the other hand, despite emphasizing the role of the environment in 
regulating and evaluating one's behaviours and emotions, as a consequence of the 
mechanism of reward and punishment, learning theories do not address the role of 
4self in regulating the hostile behaviour. These theories cannot explain why some 
children do not go onto perpetrate violence despite being exposed to it. Meanwhile, 
there are abusers who did not experience any exposure to family violence 
(Cunningham et al 2004). The self can monitor whether one's behaviours are in the 
direction of societal and adopted standards. Individuals can practice some degree of 
control over events that affect their lives, through their perceptions of self-efficacy. 
One's sense of self-efficacy can influence his/her responses to perceptions of 
discrepancy between one's own behaviours and that of a model (Bandura, 1986). 
Sociological analyses of male violence emerged in the 1970s, in particular, 
with Amir's (1971) theory of victim-precipitation in rape. Family sociologists' work 
on domestic violence contributed to this literature by trying to explain male violence 
via giving more weight to social factors rather than to individual psychopathology. 
These works are criticized as they not only undermine the central role of sex and 
gender in all male-female relationships and their association with the occurrence of 
violence, they also disregard the power structure or gender relations and sexual 
politics (Clark and Lewis 1977; Smart, 1976; Dobash and Dobash, 1977 & 1978). 
On women's oppression, earlier feminists thinkers, like de Beauvoir (1949), tend to 
disregard the biological or any innate physical and psychological differences 
between males and females, which in her view emphasize biological factors as a 
result of patriarchal ideology. These feminists believe that the source of male 
sexuality is a social construction not biological determination. As Jackson (1978) 
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pointed out: 'the way sexuality is experienced and acted out is socially scripted' 
(p. 20). Social institutions, such as the political, social, economic, and ideological 
structures are very much responsible in defining, shaping, and constraining such 
concepts as masculinity and femininity and in creating a hierarchical society where 
gender stratification is fundamental. The interrelationship between power, violence, 
and sexuality has always been recognized in feminist analyses of male domination, 
in which it is believed that, through sexuality, patriarchal relations were fon-ned and, 
in turn, sexuality is constructed through gender (Coveney et al. 1984; MacKinnon, 
1989). In patriarchal relationships between men and women, especially between 
husbands and wives, it is believed that men have the right to be dominating and have 
control and women, by their nature, are subordinate to men. This relationship is 
regarded as natural and sacred; and consequently the husbands' abusive behaviours 
were deemed inevitable (Dobash, 1979). For instance, in the case of the Islamic 
society of Iran this view is very popular in philosophical debates (Motahari, 2001; 
Amoli, 2000) and, consequently, Islamic laws put unlimited power into the hands of 
husbands as the head of household (this will be discussed extensively later on). 
According to feminist theories, the subordination of women is explicitly 
established in institutional and patriarchal practices and is supported by some of the 
most prominent religious, political, legal, and literary figures. Thus, patriarchy 
encompasses issues to do with cultural values, the public-private divide, and 
sexuality as well as more obvious gendered concerns. Constituted by, and in turn 
constituting, social interactions, processes, and relations, patriarchy benefits men. It 
(advantages' them (Dowding 1996), and facilitates exercising power in different 
ways. Using violence in different forms (sexual, economical, physical) against 
women, feminists argue, might be a way of maintaining and securing the relations of 
male dominance and female subordination in a patriarchal social order (Hamner and 
Maynard, 1989; Eisikovits and Edleson 1989; Hamberger and Hastings, 1993; 
Cuningham et al 1998; Healey et al, 1998; Mauricio and Gormley, 2001). The 
interaction between patriarchy and other forms of power structures, such as class, 
age, race, and social status, feminists recognize, can form women's experiences of 
violence and the reaction of other institutions, like the police and policy makers 
(Hanmer and Maynard, 1989). 
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Using the analysis of gender relations (instead of class relations), violence is 
considered to be a `fgendered phenomenon within the context of patriarchal social 
relations" (Hester, Kelley and Radford, 1996: 4), in which men and women's 
relationship to patriarchy is constructed through a series of historically emergent 
narrations between gender and other social practices. As Hester states 'fýAhe way 
violence is used and acted out in relationships, encounters and institutions is 
specifically gendered and constructed by, as well as a reflection of, the power 
relations which constitutes hetero-patriarchy" (Hester, Kelley and Radford, 1996: 4). 
Although the role of stressors, such as low levels of education, poverty, and 
the number of children, on marital violence are well-recognized (Jewkes, 2002, 
Martin et al., 1999) recent feminist work on male violence against women 
considered force and violence as the main factors in maintaining male power over 
women. They have argued convincingly that male violence against women is not an 
indication of loss of control but rather a means of establishing control (Hanmer and 
Maynard, 1989; Horsfall 1991; Yllo, 1993). Being a universal phenomenon, 
masculinity, and male power can be shaped and lived within a cultural context 
which has commonly recognized features across the world. Violence might be 
intentional, functional and patterned, rather than an impulsive, irresistible, and 
unplanned (Keline, 1998; Baumeister, 1999). Accordingly, violence can be seen as 
socially enacted and constructed and it emerges in the way we relate to the other, so 
it does not reside in our soul. To find out the major roots of violence, it is widely 
believed that a number of factors may influence well-intentional people to commit 
violent behaviour (Baumeister, 1999). One of those factors is the desire for material 
gain, such as money or power, which is called instrumental violence. In this case 
violence in the long run seems to be an effective tool for creating and sustaining 
power relationships (Baumeister, 1999). 
The prevalence of the root-causes of violence in time and space requires it to 
be even more widespread and common than it is. The answer to why violence is not 
as common as it should be lies in the fact that violent impulses are typically 
restrained by inner inhibitions; people exercise self-control to avoid lashing out at 
others every time they might feel like it. The question is "why do some lose their 
self-control"? Is it true that violence happens because of impulses and losing 
control? If it is just an impulse how do they know when to stop and where to use it? 
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(for example, violent men do not show their anger in front of police or authorities 
according to Dobash and Dobash (1998)). Self-control may fail if the upbringing 
and socialisation have not made it strong enough because the capacity for self- 
control is decreased by stress, because being emotionally upset makes people cease 
to care, or because the culture tells them that is appropriate to lose self-control under 
some circumstances (Church, 2000; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). 1 
Consistent with these views, social psychologists also argue that violence 
and aggression may be understood as coercive processes that reflect the aggressors' 
deliberate decision, by using force against the victims and making the decision to 
punish the victims for perceived transgressions or to retaliate against perceived 
wrongdoings. The approaches of feminists and social psychologists highlight the 
fact that the use of force in relation to violence and conflict in the family is a matter 
of choice within the person's control, rather than being an impulsive reaction 
originating from loss of control and that the aggressor's interpretations of the events 
in a family may lead him to use force and punishment against a partner. 
Meanwhile, the role of the social construction of sexuality and 
heterosexuality and their relationship to violence has been recognized by some 
contemporary feminists (Hanmer and Maynard, 1989). According to these feminists, 
the forms and functions of male sexuality, such as rape, sexual harassment, physical 
assaults and so on, in the social control of women, represent the male attitude 
towards women as inferior members of society. Additionally, it is a way of securing 
and maintaining the relations of male dominance and female subordination, which 
are central to the patriarchal social order. (These arguments in relation to Iranian 
women will extensively be addressed in the following chapter). They argue that 
patriarchy is crossed through and is in interaction with other power structures, 
namely those of race, class, age and status regarding disability. Violence in such 
societies plays a big role in the social control of women, both by men and social 
institutions dominated by men (Ham-ner and Maynard, 1989) and shape women's 
experience of sexual and physical violence and the response of the police and others. 
As was stated 25 percent of all reported violent crime is wife battering (Dobash and 
Dobash, 1980). It is through challenging the patriarchal order by, increasing 
' In collectivistic cultures (such as those in Asia), in which a more holistic and sociocentric 
perception of the person exists, a high level of self-monitoring behaviour is expected. In this view the 
person's behaviour is the outcome of being alert to the others with whom one is interdependent, and 
thus, the person is predictable through his/her actions within a social relationship (Church, 2000). 
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women9s autonomy, that men's violence must be confronted (Dobash and Dobash. 
1998). 
Contemporary feminist theory tends to explain male power over women by 
pointing to social and cultural factors in shaping female sexuality as the fundamental 
factor. Marxist-feminists touched upon the role of ideological notions in forming 
both men and women's sexuality and gender relations (in Rich, 1980; Barrett, 1980). 
Such ideas about femininity, masculinity, motherhood, monogamy and other related 
characteristics springing from these concepts are enforced by social institutions and 
practices, such as marriage and family, law Oudicial) and state legislation, divorce 
and economic systems. These, in turn, reassure men's economic, social and political 
power over women and women's dependency, and establishes their submissive and 
docile positions in a patriarchal society (Smart, 1984,1982). The traditional role of 
men as the rule maker at home and the female role as submitting to his power still 
exist in today's marital relationships (Shipway, 2004). Similarly, in Iranian society 
men are believed to be the head of the family and women are supposed to respect 
that supremacy and authority (see Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Environmental contingencies: Modernization, social change and prevalence of 
violence 
The question remains why, despite all the availability of the legitimized and 
formal sources of prevention of violence in society (mostly in the Western 
societies), men still use violence in their relations to women? The twentieth century 
offered human rights and equality to women. The participation of women in social 
and political affairs enabled them to have some rights, such as the right to vote, 
work and so on across society. Nevertheless, their situation has not been drastically 
improved, due to the actual disregard for their rights and needs as individuals. 
Firestone (1970) tried to explain this by giving more weight to the biological 
structure of the female reproductive system, although she does not underestimate the 
role of cultural factors in determining gender order and male power. For instance, 
rape, as Brownmiller has pointed out, is an ideology which is "fuelled by cultural 
values and is not an act of sexual gratification but an exercise in power and 
intimidation made possible by anatomical differences between men and women" 
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(cited in Hanmer and Maynard, 1989: 14). Moreover, it could be argued that women 
in a new area may enjoy the right to work in the labour market as equals to men but 
they also carry on fulfiling their commitments to motherhood and everyday life by 
being perfect mothers, wives, and employees at the same time, which put enormous 
pressure on them, paradoxically. Being unable to maintain the female ideal, a 
woman soon suffers from a sense of guilt and receives punishment from her 
dissatisfied husband for not providing enough comfort. Not surprisingly, she 
perceives herself as imperfect and a failure who deserves to be punished and blamed 
and lets her husband execute his power over her. 
The difficulty may stem from the male perception of female independence 
(Sorensen, 2001). Males are less ready for modem life (in Keline, 1998, Sorensen, 
2001). Such an act as wife beating is readily cast as a symptom of male insecurity. 
The idea that a man is the head of the family and the main breadwinner is the 
dominant determining factor in shaping masculine identity, which is still popular in 
the modem world, even if it does not often match with reality. This ideal is 
considered important to male identity and public status and, thus, to male self- 
representation and any shred of damage to this image, both from inside or outside 
the household can be provocative and result in violent reaction to the source of 
threat (in Keline, 1998, Sorensen, 2001). 
On the other hand, Dobash and Dobash (1998) in their research identified 
four important contexts in explaining the initiation and continuation of violence: 
individual; interpersonal; institutional; and ideological. In their book, they try to 
explain the nature of the phenomenon and its occurrence and continuation, within 
the context of a marital relationship that concentrate on issues such as money, 
children, domestic work, possessiveness, jealousy, sex and male power and authority 
(men's sense of having the right to punish their wives). The main focus is on male 
masculinity and power in relation to perpetrating violent acts, which are socially and 
institutionally organized, structured and exercised at schools and through sports and 
used as demonstrations of friendship, authority and masculine identity. In relation to 
my study I also intend to provide a new understanding of marital relationships in the 
context of Islamic marriage. My questions are: how are the concepts of power, 
femininity and masculinity defined and what are the roles, duties and rights of men 
and women? And, more importantly, how might these contribute to generating, 
20 
sustaining or moderating domestic violence? These will be addressed in Chapter 
Two. 
Interpersonal theories trace the origins of domestic violence within the 
relationship conflict (in Barnish, 2004). It is widely known that conflicts of interests 
are inevitable parts of any interpersonal relationships. It provides opportunities for 
the parties involved to settle their differences, through interpretation, contemplation, 
negotiation, and rational compromise (Keline, 1998; Cunningham et al, 1998; 
Healey et al, 1998). However, contested interests are prone to turn abusive only 
when the contest for power takes precedence over the mutual quest for finding 
rational solutions - an argument central to feminist analyses of violence against 
women. The interplay of interests, interpretations, and power raise some interesting 
questions on the role of socio-cultural beliefs and local communities, and their 
effects on individual identity. 
In a comparative study of different societies, Ross (1993) concluded that the 
evolution of conflict depends on how societies interpret and construct interpersonal 
or intergroup problems, such as the acquisition of scarce resources. Research on 
school boys, who are considered aggressive by their peer group, reveals that these 
boys often interpret accidental collisions in the playground as signs of hostility from 
others to which they feel the need to respond aggressively (Lochman and Dodge, 
1994). Accordingly, feminists emphasize how abusive men interpret their wives' 
behaviour as hostile or provocative, regardless of what their partners are actually 
doing (Dobash and Dobash, 1979). Some research shows that those who beat their 
victims regardless of their actions, view their victim as an appropriate target for their 
hostility (Dutton, 1995c). Most men do not think of their own behaviours as violent, 
even if others regard them as violent. They seem to believe that they are making 
their wives better women; they regard themselves as doing the right thing. The 
victims' views are different; they think that the perpetrator has no reason or he is 
sadistic and his actions are deliberately malicious, arbitrary, or casual. Although the 
person who acts violently may admit that he has done something wrong, he may 
regard his violent actions less evil and less wrong compared to the victim. They 
even blame the victim for provoking them and often believe that their act is not 
violent and that they cannot help it as factors beyond their control affect their 
actions. Perpetrators of violence rarely admit that their courses of actions are unjust 
or self-serving. And they think that they were under attack from others (some studies 
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show that the most aggressive boys tend to see hostility and aggression in others' 
behaviours while there was none). Some studies on family violence have indicated 
that men who beat their wives tend to interpret their wives' ambiguous actions as 
deliberate personal attacks, targeting his pride, his self-esteem and his male ego and 
he responds with violence to teach her a lesson. Self-love and egotism is the 
motivating factor behind most cases of violent acts. One of the most important 
factors in explaining violent behaviour is threatened egotism (Baumeister, 1999). 
Based on a number of well-established studies, those who are aggressive and 
commit violent acts are the ones with high self esteem, contrary to alternative 
studies suggesting that aggressors act violently due to their low self-esteem and poor 
impulse control (Frieze, 1987: 118). Regarding the former, it can be argued that 
violence emerges when a person's favourable image of self is questioned or 
impugned by someone else. Showing disrespect, attacking someone's honour, 
insulting or humiliating someone, or causing a person to lose face will often elicit an 
aggressive response. The people or groups or countries most prone to violent acts 
are the ones who are most susceptible to ego threats, especially those who have 
exaggerated, heighten opinions of themselves (Baumeister, 1999). Moreover, 
violence is usually directed to the source of the ego threat and may often fall short of 
providing proof of the disputed self-worth, but it does intimidate, silence, and punish 
the critic, and it boosts the ego by establishing dominance over the critic 
(Baumeister, 1999). 
Foucault and the structure of power, knowledge and subjectivity and violence 
A number of feminists (Taylor and Vintges, 2004) found Foucault's oeuvre 
extremely inspiring in explaining various forms of oppressive practices, including 
oppression against women. Foucault's life-long work on various social phenomena 
from madness, to crime and sexuality, and the emergence of human sciences, 
demonstrates that any experience, including the experience of violence against 
women, needs to be explored along three-dimensional axes: power; knowledge; and 
subjectivitY2 (Flynn, 2005). 
See Appendix A. 
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Adomo also maintains that "Each particular ... 
is a unique configuration of 
constitutive relations or mediations" (Best and Kellner, 1991: 229). Arkoun points to 
the interconnectedness of violence with the sacred and truth and the relation of the 
latter to revelation and history. All are grounded in the context of the societies of the 
Book (Arkoun, 2002). This is in line with Ricoeur's (1983) history-memory- 
narrative triad constituting human experience. Foucault demonstrates the interplay 
of the force fields of power, knowledge and subjectivity in the constitution of any 
experience (Foucault's example is the experience of sexuality) in the following 
passage: 
[the] history of the experience of sexuality, where experience is understood 
as the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and 
forms of subjectivity in a particular culture (The Use of Pleasure; 4) ... an 
experience that conjoins a field of knowledge ... (with 
its own concepts, 
theories, diverse discipline), a collection of rules (which differentiate the 
permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from 
pathological, what is decent from what is not, and so on), and a mode of 
relation between the individual and himself (which enables him to recognize 
himself as a sexual subject amid others) (cited in Flynn, 2005: pp. 210-11). 
This shows that "experience is not the "primitive" that positivists and others 
were seeking" (Flynn, 2005: 172) and conceptualizes practices "simultaneously as 
modes of acting and thinking" (Flynn, 2005: 171). Furthermore, it highlights "the 
very historicity of the forms of experience" (Flynn, 2005: 172); where the trinity of 
power, knowledge and subjectivity is translated into "different symbolic orders, 
social power practices, and individual meaning perspectives (Kogler, 1996: 13). As 
Davidson (2002) elaborated in his Foucault-inspired 'The Emergence of Sexuality: 
Historical Epistimology and the Formation of Concepts' a form of historical a priori 
makes certain concepts and practices possible, while excluding others. Kogler 
(1996), in his project to merge insights from Gadamer's hermeneutics with 
Foucault's poststructuralism, endeavours to come up with a model of pre- 
understanding to integrate the above three (Kogler, 1996: 13), where symbolic order 
and social-power practices are explicated "as two distinct dimensions of the 
hermeneutic background of the interpreter as well as of the agents (Kogler, 1996: 6) 
specific to the individual and to her position within a particular culture. 
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Nominalism and violence 
One of the main features of Foucault's explication of forms of experience is 
his historical nominalism. 3 According to Foucault's and Hacking's historical 
nominalism and social constructionism: "The [social] categories [like mentally ill, 
the delinquent, the pervert] we employ to tame our experiences are not timeless 
Platonic forms; rather they are grids of intelligibility whose emergence and decline 
can be mapped by Foucauldian "histories". (Flynn, 2005: 33) The logical 
implication of the Foucauldian nominalism regarding the experience of violence is a 
multiplicity of violence rather than the presumption of one essence for violence 
against women. The fragmenting force of nominalism serves to dissolve historical or 
any other "Experience" (Reason, Madness, Sexuality, Crime, Violence) into a 
plurality of "experiences" (reasons, madnesses, sexualities, crimes, violences). One 
of the defining features of Foucault's approach is his nominalism where one finds a 
unity without identity (Flynn, 2005: 32). According to Deleuze: "Foucault's 
nominalism is not a question of distinguishing universals and particulars on behalf 
of particulars (as the standard doctrine holds) but one of drawing the line between 
constants and variables in favour of the latter. " (Flynn, 2005: 33) 
Up to now we have established that, according to Foucault, three 
fundamental elements of any experience are "a game of truth, relations of power, 
and forms of relation to oneself and to others (cited in Flynn, 2005: 214)". This, 
alongside historical nominalism, leads to a multiplicity of any form of experience. 
As Flynn maintains "multiplicity is neither axiomatic nor typological but 
topological ... It 
denotes a multilayered "space" in a relational set. It is a tool of 
spatialized reasoning. "Multiplicity" ... 
denotes "unity without identity" (Flynn, 
2005: 215). The logical implication of historical nominalism is the specificity and 
situatedness of any form of experience; meaning that the interplay and correlation of 
power, knowledge, subjectivity in the constitution of experience of violence against 
women in Iran is unique and different from any other. 
Following Foucault, we can study the archaeology of violence which 
investigates the epistemic and discursive background, paving the way for the 
3 Nominalism is "the traditional epistemological focus on individuals along with a dismissal of would- 
be universal concepts as mere general names. [Nominalism as] One of several anti-Platonic themes 
that recur throughout Foucault's work (Flynn, 2005: 23). 
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generation, justification or mitigation of violence against women. In this framework, 
we encounter a set of conceptual tools, developed largely by Foucault and refined 
further by others, helping us to understand violence against women in its 
knowledge-based and localized infrastructure. The archaeology of an experience 
relies on concepts such as episteme, archive, discursive formations, discursive 
practices, statements, and a regime of truth. Beyond knowledge and alongside it 
social relations of power are involved in any experience, the study of which, 
following Nietzsche, is called genealogy, in this case the genealogy of violence 
against women. Here we encounter a set of concepts, including power (as relation 
rather than an essence), tactic, strategy, normalization/deviancy, dominance, 
resistance, freedom, govermentality and techniques of govermentality (such as 
exclusion, exception, surveillance, examination). 
Alongside the archaeology and genealogy of an experience, Foucault leads 
us to study the axis of subjectivity, calling it problematization. In the realm of 
problematization, Foucault and his followers explore concepts such as subject, 
individual, self, and introduce concepts such as subjectivation/subjectivization, 
emotional economy, techniques of care for self, self-policing, and aesthetics of self- 
creation. Employing the concepts available in archaeology, genealogy, and 
problematization, we are empowered to map the experience of violence against 
women in Iran along three axes of knowledge, power and subjectivity. 
Foucault, as stressed and elaborated by Flynn, views these three realms as 
independent but highly intertwined and mutually constitutive. Along any dimension 
one can detect the presence of the other two; nevertheless, none can be reduced to 
any of the other. Furthermore, the Foucauldian framework allows the active 
employment of a host of other views and theories in the understanding of the 
experience of violence against women, as he sees his work not as a universal theory 
of experience, but as a toolbox, which needs to be employed differently in different 
historical contexts. Foucault's conception of power, knowledge and subjectivity is 
not universal and ahistorical; it is more of an attitude rather than a theory or a 
doctrine or a permanent body of knowledge. Foucault "provides an "analytics of 
power, " rather than a theory of power. This is consistent with Foucault's general 
approach because an analytics of power is contextual and historical, yet still 
generalizable" (Mclaren, 2004: 218). It creates a space where different, diverse, and 
historically-situated forms of interplay of power, knowledge and subjectivity can be 
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displayed. As a result, the Focualdian conceptual scheme is less likely to expose the 
researcher to the cardinal poststructural sin of epistemic violence and encourages 
"idiosyncratic, pragmatic uses of ideas and techniques" (Valverde, 2004: 73). In 
sharp contrast to: 
"feminist concern about contaminated analytical tools, Foucault harboured a 
deep suspicion of all attempts to be original and to cleanse one's mind or 
one's book of corrupting influences . ..., Foucault's work uses tools from a 
number of otherwise incompatible sources and traditions.... Creative 
combinations of tools of diverse origins are, in keeping with Nietzsche's 
spirit, valued rather than dismissed as inconsistent" (Valverde, 2004: 77). 
Following the Foucauldian framework, the research on domestic violence 
against women in Iran needs to be conducted to achieve two main characters of 
situatedness (tailored to the social realities on the ground) and objectivity through 
polyvocality (as developed in the methodology section of this thesis). Polyvocality is 
achieved through the use of different theories to explain and interpret the empirical 
data and also in the active participation of research subjects in the production and 
interpretation of empirical data. In answering the question "what is violence? " and 
"who decides what violence is? ", Kogler (1996), whose formulation of critical 
hermeneutics is heavily influenced by Foucault, offers some interesting insights 
directly taken from Foucault's conception of power. In Foucault's conception, 
power and dominance can take different forms in different historical contexts. To 
know what power, dominance, and suffering in a specific context are the research 
has to rely on egalitarian dialogue between the researcher and the participants. There 
is a strong need for the participants' accounts in order to illuminate the sites of 
violence and suffering in its local and biographical contexts. The researcher has to 
have a strong sense of listening and be receptive to understanding alternative ways 
of being and seeing, otherwise, ironically, she herself may become the source of 
epistemic violence against her participants by imposing preundertandings on her 
participants. 
In the search of how to explain any experience (experience of violence 
against women, for instance) in a culture, Foucault rejects an epistemological 
approach resorting to a "tangled network of influences" (Flynn, 2005: 112). Instead, 
in his archaeological studies, he addresses the epistemic configuration that renders 
the specific experience possible, specifying the condition of Possibility for an 
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experience or "rules of sense-making in a specific field of discourse" (Flynn, 2005: 
113). This puts a heavy demand on the researcher to understand any experience in a 
holistic fashion in its connection with historical formulations and the materiality of 
knowledge, power and subjectivity in a historical community. The Foucauldian 
framework enables us to see violence against women in its historical context as a 
product of a game of truth (encompassing a set of rules for production of discourses 
on gender relations and beyond and a set of historically embedded discourses) and a 
game of strategy (Allen, 2004: 249), based on rules of normativity, and a game of 
subjectivity (rules and forms of selfhood and alterity) (Arkoun, 2002). In this 
framework we may come up with more insightful answers to the question of 'what is 
violence? ', making the difference of the other as illegitimate or inferior. The 
importance of investigating the social context (situatedness) within which violence 
arises is emphasized by a number of studies. (Jewkes, 2002; Nayak et al., 2003; 
Jejeebhoy, 1998) 
The prevalence of domestic violence in Iran: some statistics 
Being a worldwide phenomenon, domestic violence is also prevalent in 
Iranian society. It has, however, its own characteristics in the context of Iranian 
society and history. The US Department of State Report for 2000 states: "Although 
reported cases of spousal abuse and violence against women occur, the statistics on 
such reports are not available publicly. Abuse in the family is considered a private 
matter and seldom is discussed publicly" (Palmer and Smith, 2001). However, 
recently The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Iran 4 has conducted a quantitative study 
regarding domestic violence in twenty eight provinces during three years. However, 
access to these studies is difficult since the organisations related to government 
prefer not to make such a set of sensitive data widely available, mainly due to the 
issue being highly politicised 5. On my trip to Iran I could not get access to the 
'Vezarat-e Keshvar (equivalent to the Home Office in the UK) 
5 The Islamic Republic of Iran is not a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forrns of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). There is much debate in Iran on whether Iran should 
become a signatory or not. Those who are in favour of joining the CEDAW point to the usefulness of 
amalgamation and believe that by doing so they reduce international pressure and nullify propaganda 
against Islamic Republic and Iranian women can enjoy the advantages of such laws. Those who are 
against this argue that joining CEDAW undermines the very essence of Sharia law embedded in the 
Iranian constitution (Majlis representative Mohammad Kazemi reporting to Majlis 342, July 2003). 
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results of the research. However5 I found some information through Internet 
searches. In a report 6 it was stated that 66% of Iranian women were found to be 
abused at least once from the beginning of their marriage. However, significant 
disparities between the twenty-eight provinces were noticed. For instance, the 
number of women in Bandar-e Abbas (in the south-west of Iran) reported to be 
abused from the beginning of their marriage was greater than in any other county in 
Iran. In Zahedan in Sistan and Baluchestan province (south-east of Iran), women 
reported more cases of grievous bodily harm in comparison to other provinces 7 in 
Iran. Dehghani (2005 )8 reported that, according to The Institute of Behzisti, 60% of 
Iranian women are the victims of domestic violence and that psychological violence 9 
(52%) is more widespread than physical violence (37%). This institute accounted 
that in 2005 alone in just six months, 8000 women, were reported to be the victims 
of violence. There are many cases which remain unreported. In her report Dehghani 
(2005) stated that, according to some research in 2003,81/4% of women who were 
referred to the family courts reported to be the victims of economic abuse. They 
complained that their husbands used this method to coerce them into submission and 
to control them. Dehghani (2005) published a report which demonstrated that killing 
in the family was found to be the most severe type of domestic violence, where 
poverty and financial disputes were found to be the determinant factors. More and 
more women were found to be victims of such violence. Based on a report in 
ISNA10 (Jahanfar, 2003), 60% of Iranian women suffer from domestic violence 
during their pregnancy, out of whom 40% endure physical violence, 56% 
psychological violence and 23% sexual violence. 
Moreover, from a few predominantly quantitative studies conducted mainly 
in Tehran, it is clear that women experience a wide range of different forms of 
domestic violence. In one study in Tehran (Amir-Moradi, 1996), 100 women who 
were referred for forensic examination by the judiciary, were investigated. It was 
found that the most prevalent type of physical injuries (99%) were bruises and 
6 Jila Bani-yaghub, February 2005 in BBC Persian site. 
7 For more information refer to: http: //www. bbc. co. uk/persian/iran/story/2005/10/05103 I-shr-iran- 
domesticvio... 10/11/2005 
8 for more information refer to: http: //www. bbc. co. uk/persian/bus ines s/story/200 5 /11/0 51 106-ra- 
iran-violence... 10/1 1/2005 
9 Shahla Ezazi, a university lecturer and expert in doing research on domestic violence in Iran, 
pointed to the prevalence of psychological violence but she admits that there is no adequate 
information about it. See Zanan Magazine U), June 2004. 
'0 Iranian students' broadcast agency 
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contusion. In addition, 43% of women were found to suffer from severe depression, 
and 65% were reported to have low levels of self-esteem. In another study (Shams 
Esfanabad and Emamipour, 2004) in Tehran, the prevalence of wife abuse and 
related factors was investigated among 400 Tehrani women (aged 18-40). 
While 18.3 % of women reported they have never been abused by their husbands, the 
remaining 81.7% reported that they 'sometimes' or 'always' experienced domestic 
violence. On average, the rate of wife abuse among the participants was reported to 
be 48.5% with the standard deviation of 18.62 (Shams Esfanabad and Emamipour, 
2004). 
In Shahr-e Kurd 11 research was carried out on 162 couples (Raeisi 
Sartashnizi,, 2004). In this research, it was found that domestic violence is not social 
or class related. Men still commit violent acts, regardless of their educational or 
social background, and no significant association was found between men's and 
womenýs level of education and employment status and prevalence of domestic 
violence. 
In a study in Zanjan province, the intensity and characteristics of physical 
violence were investigated (Taheri, 2000). Data was collected from two sources: 
interviewing 105 women who had been subjected to physical violence and were later 
admitted to hospitals or other treatment centres 12 and from the content analysis of 
the Iran newspaper. The newspaper reported 9000 cases of wife-abuse, 12 cases of 
abandoning minor age girls and 41 cases of attempting to murder, imprisonment at 
home and torture. Violent acts, such as kicking, punching, and using objects such as 
belts, sticks, and daggers, comprised 40% of the violent behaviours and attacking 
with a knife was counted at 6%. 25% of women were reported to be battered I to 3 
times a day. Almost 52.8% of women and 30% of men were reported to be illiterate 
or less literate. Regarding women's job, 73.6% of them were housewives or carpet 
weavers or dressmakers and 4.4% of them were primary or secondary school 
teachers. 20% of the women reported having a co-wife. 
Meanwhile, according to the UK Home Office Assessment about Iran: 
44violence against women in the family is recognized, with the 'blood money' 
(diyeh) only awarded if the aggrieved party is a man. In addition, families of the 
female victims of violent crimes are reported to have to pay for an assailant's court 
Shahr-e Kurd is a township with 8 towns and 81 villages in the south-west of Iran. 
In the town of Khodabandeh (population 163,068) in Zanjan province in the north-west of Iran. 
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costs. Little detail is known of the degree of domestic violence in Iran, with no 
official statistics on abuse within the family. There is a lack of legislative provision 
to regulate actions against women" (Home office, 2003a). There are no specific laws 
regarding domestic violence in Iranian legislation, since it has not been recognized 
in the criminal code. Lack of clarity in the definition of domestic violence in the 
Iranian legal system has resulted in men using their own criteria and judgment and 
implementing the law. There is a general article regarding inhibiting assault and 
battery, which is a 'qisas' (retribution) crime and women experiencing violence 
could be considered under this category. However, it is not an easy task to convince 
the legal system, such as the police force and the court of maltreatment by the 
husband, since this is related to marital relationships. The husband's managerial 
duties to punish his wife to some extent when is needed has been recognized by the 
court. In addition,, it is to judges' opinions to decide the seriousness of the case 
(Afshar, 1998; Mir-Hosseini, 1999) and not the woman. This is noted by Afshar 
(1998): 
... 
in practice it was much harder for women to convince the court of their 
grievances than it was for men. Violence, for example, was theoretically 
recognized as a case of hardship and entitled women to divorce, but, as 
Mehranguiz Karr explained to a Zanan reporter, there was no definition as to 
what constituted violence and at what level of violence a woman could claim 
the right to divorce her husband. It was left to the judge to decide 'and the 
judge is always a man. 
Karr notes that 'culture' and 'customs' led many to assume that a degree of male 
violence was normal part of everyday life: 
Of course the courts do not consider every sort of violence as being 
maltreatment and causing hardship since rows, rough treatment and 
beating are current in many Iranian families. So in the Family Courts 
the judge uses his own criteria to define violence. (Zanan 111, no 18, 
June-July 1994) 
Meanwhile, even if the court endorses women's rights, the husbands do not 
follow court orders. In this case women have two choices of either staying in a 
violent relationship and hoping to win their husbands' hearts or getting divorced, 
which is very complicated. Lack of official policy to address the issues, and 
deficiencies of public discourse in the mass media, and, moreover, the lack of 
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professional attention paid by scholars, results in domestic violence being often 
confined to the private realm with no help from outside. 
One of the main focuses of this study is to investigate the role of religious 
discourses (the structure of power and knowledge) in moderating, sustaining or 
allowing violence against women in Iran. During recent years, Islam has played an 
especially crucial role in governing men's treatment of women. To understand the 
situation in which the Iranian women are being treated under Islamic laws, it is 
useful to investigate what the Islamic religious sources say about the subject. The 
next stage of the study will be devoted to investigating the implications of the 
Islamic discourses regarding women's rights in the context of marriage and their 
relation to violence against women in Iran. 
Summary 
In trying to find out what are the causes and roots of domestic violence 
against women, different theories provide different explanations. Some theories give 
more weight to the individual level, such as personality. Developmental theories 
draw our attention to interconnected factors, such as early abuse strain, low self- 
esteem, personality disorder, anger, depression, malfunctioned attachment and so on. 
However, they ignore the socio-structural dimension of violence and the power facet 
of abuse. Meanwhile, they fail to explain why men are generally more involved in 
domestic violence against women and why they are not violent in other 
relationships. They can not explain why some men with disturbed childhoods do not 
abuse their partners while those who abuse their partners may not have any 
pathological past (in Barnish, 2004). Social and learning theories tend to explain 
domestic violence by referring to the child's upbringing and a series of learned 
associations, within a specific social context and learning from role models. 
However, they also ignore the power and control dimension of violence and they 
cannot explain the non-aggressive behaviour of those individuals who were exposed 
to family violence but never perpetrate violence against their partners. 
Despite there being a variety of feminist theories and views in trying to 
explain men's violence against women, there is a general consensus among them to 
view and analyse violence against women as a social product, which is legitimated 
by the power structures enshrined in patriarchal attitudes, institutions and gendered 
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power differentiation, rather than the physical and biological reactions of a male's 
innate drive. Thus, sexual, physical, and psychological aspects of women's 
exploitation are regarded as culturally, socially and historically constructed, not 
biologically determined (Myra, 2002). Violence and aggression cannot be fully 
explained by alluding simply to instincts and heredity. Physiological processes, such 
as testosterone levels, have a significant effect on aggressive behaviour (Baumeister, 
1999) but this does not mean that hormones can be responsible for men using violent 
behaviour as there are men who, despite having these hormones, are not violent 
towards others. Moreover, there are violent women who use violence in their 
relationships. As a result of males' self-interested motives, violence against a wife in 
the marital relationship can be a product of satisfying males' needs and priorities by 
limiting and constraining wives' autonomy and wants, even if they have to use 
coercive and violent behaviours (Dobash and Dobash, 1998: 200). 
A better understanding of domestic violence is likely to involve various 
explanations and theories (Cunningham et al, 1998). The logical implication of 
Foucauldian nominalism regarding the experience of violence is the multiplicity of 
violence, rather than the presumption of one essence for violence against women. 
Therefore, through polyvocality, one could employ different theories to address and 
better account for domestic violence. Foucault provides us with an "analytics of 
power", which is contextual and historical (situatedness) and offers us a cohesive 
understanding of the social relations of power, which paves the way for the 
constitution of domestic violence against women in an Iranian context. 
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*i Chapter 2: Power, Knowledge and SubjectIvity in Relation to 
Domestic Violence Against Women in Iran 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the structure of power and knowledge in the 
orthodox discourses in Iran and its relation to domestic violence against women. A 
reasonably good understanding of the orthodox jurisprudence is imperative in 
exploring the dynamic relations between the orthodox jurisprudence-based 
formulation of marriage and laws and domestic violence against women. Since the 
Islamic revolution in 1979, the traditional legal discourse, Sharia law or 'Revealed 
Law' (Mchar, 1977) or 'pathway' 13 is the official source of legality and ethics in 
Iran. Sharia is defined as "the divinely ordained "path" which God knows perfectly" 
(Mottahedeh, 2003: 17), while the orthodox jurisprudence (Fiqh) 14 is defined as "a 
human attempt at knowing the Shari'a"( Mottahedeh, 2003: 17). The orthodox 
jurisprudence is an overwhelmingly powerful force in shaping the minds and lives of 
ordinary people in the Islamic countries, more particularly in Iran, as the mainstream 
discourse. The traditional Islamic order is theorized, propagated and largely 
implemented by the orthodox jurisprudence and its affiliated institutions and 
structures. I present a general picture of the structure of power/knowledge and 
associated discourses in Figure 2.1. For instance, the institution of marriage is based 
on a theory of male/female sexuality and supported by a theory or group of theories 
of gender differences, rooted in theological and ontological foundations of the 
traditional Islamic order. The theoretical justification of violence (physical, 
psychological, economic and social) against women might have roots in theological 
and ontological foundations of traditional Islamic marriage formulated by the 
traditional legal discourse (the orthodox jurisprudence). Due to the importance of 
4orthodox jurisprudence' and its major role in contemporary Islamic discourses and, 
consequently, women's lives in Iran, I will present a brief picture of the nature and 
characteristics of the orthodox jurisprudence and its relation to other factors 
11 -... Muslim scholars called their Eternal Law simply the "pathway" (Sharia)" (in Khadduri, 1984: 
2). 
14 For the purpose of this study I use orthodox Jurisprudence instead offiqh throughout the chapters. 
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involved in Islamic discourses (with particular emphasis on Shia' 5 Iran) in the first 
section of this chapter. Orthodox formulation and definition of marriage as a 
contract and its implications and relation to domestic violence against women in Iran 
is discussed in section two. It will be argued that the contract 
Figure 2.1 The structure of power/knowledge and associated institutions and discourses 
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may be interpreted in ways that justify violence inflicted on women. This will be 
illustrated by investigating the post-revolutionary Islamic legislation in Iran. It will 
be argued that particular jurisprudential interpretations of specific sayings and 
Qur'anic verses can have an influence on the orthodox-based marriage contract 
which condones violence to women. In section three a body of discourses and 
" Shia is one of the main branches of Islam with its stron. 
(1998), Afchar (1977), Khaduri (1984). 
g 
base and popularity in Iran. See Afshar 
Research 
34 
theories regarding gender-difference and gender-equality in contemporary Iran will 
be presented. 
Thus, the focus is to show how Islam, in both its traditional and modem 
forms, prevents, constrains, or permits male violence against female family 
members at both theoretical and practical levels by presenting a collection of sayings 
and verses and their different interpretations. 
The orthodox Jurisprudence: the structure of power/knowledge 
Definition and the importance of the orthodox jurisprudence 
The orthodox jurisprudence is the legal discourse of Islamic civilization. 
Coulson defines it in the following terms: "In short, jurisprudence in Islam is the 
whole process of intellectual activity which ascertains and discovers the terms of the 
divine will and transforms them into a system of legally enforceable rights and 
duties" (Coulson, 1969: 2) or put in other words: "Fiqh is a system of rules and 
methods whose authors consider it to be the normative interpretation of the 
revelation, the applications of its principles and commands to the field of human 
acts. It classifies and sanctions human acts, gives ethical and legal guidance to the 
believers and determines at the same time the rights and duties of the non-believers 
under an Islamic government. " (Baber, 1999: 1) 
The two distinct elements in the fashioning of Islamic law are divine 
revelation and human reasoning of jurists. Divine revelation was collated in the text 
of the Quran. The Qur'an contains suras (chapters) which consists of 6000 verses 
(Afshar, 1998; Mchar, 1977; Mottahedeh, 2003) in a style of unique fusion of prose 
and poetry (Arberry, 1982: X)16 , addressing a wide range of ontological, historical, 
social, and psychological issues in each sura in a manner certain to look as 
"apparently [of] random nature" (Arberry, 1982: xi). Each sura describes reality in 
its holistic nature 17 . The orthodox jurisprudence deals with about 500 verses 
(Afshar, 1998; Mottahedeh, 2003) addressing the personal and social obligations and 
16 The Koran 
17 As put by Arberry, "All truth was thus present simultaneously within the Prophet's enraptured soul; 
all truth, however fragmented, revealed itself in his inspired utterance. The reader of the Muslim 
scriptures must strive to attain the same all-embracing apprehension. The sudden fluctuations of 
theme and mood will then no longer present such difficulties as have bewildered critics ambitious to 
measure the ocean of prophetic eloquence with the thimble of pedestrian analysis. " (Arberry, 1982: xi; 
emphasis added). This interwoven presentation of ideas on apparently fragmented and irrelevant 
issues and matters is compartmentalized in the orthodox jurisprudence. 
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duties of the believers as its subject matter. The collection of these specific verses is 
called the Sharia. Sharia in other contexts may have wider meanings and cover the 
whole religion in its entirety, but in the context of the jurisprudential approach it is 
perceived to apply only to the verses containing some traces of direct legal content. 
Sabbah highlighted the power/knowledge nature of the orthodox 
jurisprudence discourse in the following terms: 
"The legal discourse - that is, Islamic legality, which structures the Muslim 
world and its beings through its laws -, is the discourse of power and 
legitimacy. It has a monopoly on the definition and organization of reality 
and on the evaluation of its component elements .... The orthodox discourse is the determining influence on the Muslim individual's personality, which it 
shapes, molds, and directs at the preconscious level as much as the conscious 
level" (Sabbah, 1988: 3-4). 18 
Different schools and sources of Islamic law 
In the process of historical and geographical development of the orthodox 
jurisprudence, different schools and doctrines were formed (see Baber, 1999, 
Mottahedeh, 2003, Strournsa, 1999) and legitimate sources of inference were 
identified. The science of principles of the orthodox jurisprudence is the logic of 
orthodox jurisprudence in the sense of a set of systematic guidelines of how to 
derive consistent and coherent sets of rulings manifesting the divine will. Sunni and 
Shia are two main fractures of the Islamic jurisprudence 19 . 
18 She continues in the following terms: "The orthodox discourse, source of truth and laws that guide 
the actions and thoughts of the believer, is not the work of humans; it is the work of a supernatural 
force who is God the creator, guardian, and master of the group. The orthodox discourse is the 
discourse of power. It is not simply a discourse on power; it is power. It is as such that it sets up the 
universe and organizes its elements and gives them their values in a global system of precise signs 
and messages - that of the Muslim cultural order. " (Sabbah, 1988: 64) 
19 There are four schools of law in Sunni Islam, which 'were formed through the personal allegiance 
of groups of jurists to a founder-scholar from whom they derived their names of Hanafis, Malikis, 
Shafi'is and Hanbalis. Maliki (in Arabian center of Median) and Hanafi (in Iraqi centre of Kufa) 
were born out of the requirements imposed by different geography with different sets of customs and 
traditions. In this period, a jurist worked in two capacities, one where he discovered and announced 
the rule of law, where there was a ruling in Qur'an or sunna and the other as a mundane lawyer 
inferring the right rulings based on the free personal reasoning in search for the best legal injunctions, 
fitting the needs of time and place according to the history and precedence in each specific 
community. AI-Shafi'i (770-819), regarded as the founder of the Islamic jurisprudence, suggested a 
compromise formula which was based on the subordination of reason to divine will. According to 
him: 
-'reason could not operate as a source of law independent of the divine will, to achieve 
whatever ends or purposes an individual jurist thought desirable. ... [Allah's commands] ... 
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The Islamic legal theory in its classical form recognizes four official sources or 
principles from which Islamic law is derived: "the Koran, the sunna of the Prophet, 
the consensus Qjma: agreement of either the overwhelming majority of the Muslims, 
or of the jurists of one's group on a legal ruling) of the scholars, and reasoning by 
analogy (kiyas), that is to say, two material sources, a method, and a declaratory 
authority. It follows that this last, the ijma, is the decisive instance; it guarantees the 
authenticity of the two material sources and determines their correct interpretation. " 
(Schacht; 1964: 114; Khadduri, 1984). There is a hierarchy of authority perceived 
for the four sources. "Shafi'i had called Koran and Sunna the 'two principles' and 
considered ijma and kiyas subordinate to them" (Schacht; 1964: 60). 
The Shia opposed the principle of qiyas and supported the role of reason 
(aql: rational reasoning) in the process of inference as a source of the law (Afshar, 
1998; Mchar, 1977; Mottahedeh, 2003 andl995: 94-5). The Shia version of the 
legitimate sources of rulings are "the Book (the Koran); Sunna (sayings and deeds of 
the prophet and the Twelve Imams); Consensus (of Jurists); and independent 
Reasoning" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 33). The subordination of Reasoning to the 
revelation and Sunna is, however, ensured and manifested in the rule of "everything 
which is ordered by the divine law (Shari'a) is ordered by reason and everything 
were desirable and right not because the human intellect could assess them to be such, but 
simply because Allah had so ordained. The role of human reason must, therefore, be entirely 
subordinate to the principles established by divine revelation. Its function was simply to 
regulate new cases by applying to them principles upon which the divine revelation had 
regulated similar or parallel cases. This process was known as reasoning by analogy, or 
qiyas (analogical reasoning). " (Coulson, 1969: 6) 
This process led to the establishment of the legitimate sources from which the divine will could be 
inferred. The goal of Muslim Jurisprudence was to reach an understanding (orthodox jurisprudence) 
of the Shari'a. The primary task, therefore, was to formulate the sources from which such an 
understanding might be achieved. "From the tenth century onward the juristic consensus was that a 
rule of law must be derived from the Qur'an or the sunna or by analogical deduction therefrom. " 
(Coulson; 1969: 6-7) After seeing that the application of qiyas may lead to unreasonable outcomes, 
more liberal forms of reasoning were legitimized in the forms of istihsan ("seeking the most equitable 
solution") or istislah ("seeking the best solution for the general interest") in the sunni schools, 
although these forms of reasoning were deemed to lack the binding authority of Qur'an or sunna and 
were ranked as 'controversial principles' (Schacht; 1964: 60). The Hanbali School stood forcefully 
behind the principle of paramount authority of the Prophet's Sunna, which, they maintained, was 
being undermined by the forms of juristic reasoning recognized in the other schools (Coulson, 1969: 
22). The Hanbali School was a reaction to the perceived loosening connection to revelation and 
Sunna and aspired to stick to the original sources. "Since it was held that the Prophet was divinely 
guided, his sayings, actions, thoughts and decisions came to constitute the second source of guidance. 
These were transmitted orally and were later committed to writing in a body of literature known as 
hadith. " (Mir-Hosseini, 1993: 5) 
For more information also refer to Khadduri (1984). 
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which is ordered by reason is ordered by the divine law" (cited in Mchar, 1977: 88). 
The denial of the role of analogical reasoning (qiyas) alongside the rejection of other 
devices employed in Sunni orthodox jurisprudence such as "Equity, Public Interest, 
and so on" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 176) further widened the theoretical rift between 
shia and sunni and gave the political rift a theological and jurisprudential backbone 
as well, although they generally belonged to the same school of legal discourse 
methodologically, and conceptually. 
The orthodox jurisprudence in modern Iran 
After the Iranian revolution, Houzeh Elmiya 20 was exposed to two main 
changes, one organizational and the other doctrinal. The doctrinal change was on the 
notion of authority, the introduction of the thesis of Valayat-e faqih 21 as opposed to 
the traditional institution of Marja'iya ý2 At the time of the revolution, none of the 
other five Marjas 23 in the Shia world "shared Khomeini's vision of an Islamic 
Government built on his concept of Valayat-efaqih" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 13; also 
see Momen 1985: 249). It is worth noting that the institution of Marja'iyat "evolved 
through a tacit consensus between Shi'i masses and clerics" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 
13), while the thesis of Valayat-e faqih was the mental product of one influential 
marja and the child of the revolution, exerting power over and demanding 
"allegiance from all Shi'is. It has no precedent in Shi'i political thought: it invests 
the ruling jurist with the kind of powers and mandate that Shi'i theology only 
recognizes for the Prophet and the twelve Infallible Imams" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 
14, and see also Arjomand; 1988; Mottahedeh, 2003) The thesis of Dynamic 
Orthodox jurisprudence, which opens the hands of the Islamic Ruler to implement or 
suspend the orthodox jurisprudence's rulings, as he deems appropriate, was the main 
implication of the doctrine of Valayat-e Faqih, and the division between the 
dynamic orthodox jurisprudence and the traditional orthodox jurisprudence was the 
mirror image of the division between the two distinct notions of religious authority. 
20 An academy or school of traditional Islamic studies. 
21 Mandate of the jurist; which establishes the authority of one single jurist over all others. 
22 Institution of religious authorities. 
23 Literally means "Reference of Emulation" or "Source of Tradition" and refers to the second highest 
authority on religion and law in Twelve Shia Islam after the Prophet and Shia Imams. 
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The tension between these two notions of authority has plagued orthodox 
jurisprudence discourse in all levels of top orthodox jurisprudence scholarship, 
middle rank clerics, and ordinary people, at the level of belief, law and practice. The 
two uncompromisingly different notions of Shia authority would affect the qualities 
of the Shia leader, the selection process, and the system of payment of religious 
dues. The clerics are divided on this issue and there is no clear prospect of any one 
notion prevailing. 
Some ulema now believed that most Muslims were incapable of interpreting 
the fundamentals (usuý of the faith for themselves; because the ulema were the only 
official spokesmen of the Hidden Imam (the twelve Shia Imam), ordinary folk 
must, therefore, select a mujtahid who had been deemed capable of exercising 
Utihad ("independent reasoning") (Mottahedeh, 2003) and model their behaviour on 
his legal rulings. 
The orthodox jurisprudence's characteristics 
The orthodox jurisprudence has demonstrated a number of characteristics 
and traits in its historical evolution and in its reaction to challenges of time and 
place. The structure of power/knowledge (orthodox jurisprudence) collapses the 
interpretation of the religious sources into the religious sources themselves and with 
this discursive tactic buys a status of unquestionability and sacredness for itself The 
sacredness of the text creeps into the language and methodology of the orthodox 
jurisprudence, the orthodox jurisprudence becomes the only way to understand the 
text through the professional activities and jargon of foghahah (the jurists). That is 
why knowledge reflects power and creates power; and power produces and 
legitimizes knowledge. The historical characteristics of the orthodox jurisprudence 
are as follows: 
Atomism and lack of holistic approach 
Orthodox jurisprudence separates the jurisprudential verses of the Qur'an 
from the rest of it. It analyses this part in its disconnection from the whole. It 
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embarks on compartmentalization and categorization of the Qur'anic verses without 
considering the connection of these verses with the neighbouring non-jurisprudential 
verses and with the whole sura and the whole Quran. The Qur'an has a unique 
holistic interwoven logic, which is not reflected in any way in the orthodox 
jurisprudence's methodology. 
The orthodox jurisprudence, furthermore, does not seek to discover the 
divine will in its historical context in which the verses were revealed to the Prophet. 
These issues are left to the science of exegesis which has no significant 
methodological input into the process of inference, and no educational and 
institutional connection to the process of the orthodox jurisprudence-based inference 
of divine will (Coulson, 1969)24. 
Professionalization of interpretation of religion 
Orthodox jurisprudence makes the interpretation of the religious sources 
solely a matter of professional and technical expertise. This establishes the 
monopolistic right of the orthodox jurisprudence to the custodianship of the religion. 
Any new interpretation has to go through the orthodox jurisprudence's 
establishment, otherwise they are declared as incorrect and heretic. Women, 
intellectuals, ordinary people are deprived of direct face-to-face experience of 
religious understanding. Islamic reformists (Afshar, 1998; Mir-Hosseini, 1999), tried 
to break the barriers of professionalism and take Qur'an and other religious sources 
directly to people and make them dare to form their own understanding of the 
religion from the pillars (Arkan) to branches (foroo). The orthodox jurisprudence 
discourse presses hard on the point that the art of inference is a professional job, and 
from this, it is deduced that the only method to infer properly is that of the orthodox 
jurisprudence and the only ones with the right to inference are the jurists (the sole 
right to custodianship of religion). 
24 Coulson maintains that none of the rules in the Qur'an are legal in the strict sense of the term, the 
society has to decide whether or not and with which interpretation it wants to turn them into laws: "In 
... 
Qur'an, there is no clear or consistent distinction between the moral and the legal rule. As the 
formulation of the Islamic religious ethic, the Qur'an is concerned with fundamentals, ... in general 
the Qur'anic precepts merely indicate those standards of conduct which are acceptable or not 
acceptable" (Coulson, 1969: 8 1). 
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Being male-dominated 
Religious educational institutions, including orthodox jurisprudence, are 
almost totally male-dominated. Male narrative is the source of "truth" about female 
reality. Women have no direct presence and voice anywhere in the educational 
circles of religious establishments, woman is tantamount to silence and obedience, 
rather thanjadal (disputation) and resistance. This is how Sabbah sees it: 
"There are two modes of sacred discourse regarding women. ... first in which 
woman is directly mentioned ... relates to acts of worship where men and 
women are on a level of equality before God ... In the second mode ... - that 
concerning religious laws, ... - woman disappear at the level of discourse, ... . In this mode women are reduced to the status of background figures. They a 
re not spoken to, they are spoken of' (Sabbah, 1983: 70-1). 
The fate of Muslim woman is decided behind the closed doors of the 
orthodox jurisprudence and she is obliged to obedience. In their classroom, male 
jurists talk about her, without her having any representation. Mir-Hosseini addresses 
this issue in the following terms: 
"[The traditionalists"] knowledge of women and their nature comes from 
texts and manuals, all written by men, all constructed with juristic logic, 
reflecting the realities of another age, and different set of interests. " (Mir- 
Hosseini, 1999: 48) 
As women have been given no voice and are expected to be silent, passive 
and recipient, knowledge (the orthodox jurisprudence) and method (the jurist logic) 
becomes power and domination over the definition of female reality. 
Jurists'law versusjudge's law 
Giving absolute priority to the Qur'an and Sunna in determining the laws has 
made the traditional Islamic law a jurists' law rather than a judges' law. In the 
jurists' law, when faced with the challenges of time and place, the first reaction is to 
refer to the manuals and textbooks and the views of the past grand jurists, rather than 
letting the law grow out of social reality with the guide of some general principles. 
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[Judge's law is based on some principles and the needs of time and place, the 
complexity of a situation is considered, rather than conformity with the hypothetical 
speculations of a theoretical jurist]. It is different from jurist's law, which is based 
on the commitment to the inference from the legitimate sources without being 
influenced by the pressures of reality. In Iran the judge is faced with a dilemma. The 
judge has to balance an equation in which the God's law, as elaborated by the jurists 
is on one side of the scale, and on another side is the modernist human law as 
approved by the parliament or the state, which is designed to respond to the needs of 
time and place. The Muslim judge is close-handed against the orthodox 
jurisprudence's authoritative manuals and handbooks and open-handed against the 
progressive bills passed by the parliaments and laws coded in the modem legal 
system. That dynamism acts as a source of uncertainty and tension in how laws are 
formed and implemented in the Islamic countries. 
Blurred distinction between moral and legalfacets 
One of the most important traits of traditional jurisprudence is the blurred 
distinction between the realm of law and realm of morality 25 . Both 
legal and moral 
facets are under the umbrella of the more general concepts of religious duty 26 9 
religious conscience (individual responsibility of each and every member of the 
ummah) and collective responsibility (through Amr-bil-marflf va Nahi-anil- 
munkar 27 and through the collective nature of the pillars of Islam), all centred on 
15 Mir-Hosseini sees this trait of orthodox jurisprudence discourse directly generated by the hard core 
of orthodox jurisprudence: "To ensure the validity of the Shari'a as a Divine Law, valid for all ages, 
the boundaries in law between the moral and the legal not only must remain blurred but must be 
capable of shifting" (ibid; 1993: 9). 
26 Schacht (1964: 200-1) stresses the embeddedness of legality in the more general concept of 
religious duty in the following terms: 
"The central feature that makes Islamic religious law what it is, that guarantees its unity in 
all its diversity, is the assessing of all human acts and relationships, including those which 
we call legal, from the point of view of the concepts obligatory/ recommended/ indifferent/ 
reprehensible/ forbidden [religious duty]. Law proper has been thoroughly incorporated in 
the system of religious duties; those fundamental concepts permeate the judicial subject 
matter as well. ... it might therefore seem as 
if it were not correct to speak of an Islamic law 
at all, as if the concept of law did not exist in Islam. The terin must indeed be used with the 
proviso that Islamic law is part of a system of religious duties, blended with non-legal 
elements. " 
27 "Amr-bil-ma'riif is a Qur'anic commandment to enjoin what is good. This is done by living by the 
rules of God from the Qur'an and hadith. The command to "enjoin what is good" is given in several 
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centralized and decentralized attempts to implement divine commands. Coulson 
maintains that: 
"On the broadest view of Islamic society, therefore, law and religious 
morality are often inextricably merged into a general philosophy of life; there 
is in fact coercion to observe the moral as well as the legal standard. " (1969: 
85) 
As Hegel believed, in a large sea of infon-nal restrictions on behaviour 
(beliefs, norms, customs, habits, conventions], the legal restrictions are just a boat. 
(cited in Paternan, 1988) 
This feature has three important logical implications: lack of distinction 
between public and private spheres (Schacht, 1964), idealism versus realism 
(Coulson; 1969; Schacht, 1964; Mir-Hosseini; 1993 and 1999) and the image 
making and extrajudicial regulatory functions of orthodox jurisprudence (Coulson, 
1969). The most important implication of the blurred distinction between legal and 
moral spheres is the dual function of the orthodox jurisprudence as both law-making 
intellectual apparatus and a knowledge factory in charge of image-making, 
ideological indoctrination and an extra-judicial regulatory body. The orthodox 
jurisprudence as an ideology (rather than a system of law in a strict sense of the 
word) have direct access to the ears, eyes, hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims and 
its influence on their lives is by far more far-reaching and profound than its 
influence as a law-making body of knowledge. Most religious rulings are, as 
Coulson (1969: 53) calls them, are extrajudicial (not requiring any decree from 
courts for their enforcement), like the right of Muslim man to repudiate his wife. 
The realm of morality and the extrajudicial sphere as the sphere of religious duty is 
always the orthodox jurisprudence's main territory of rein. The realm of law has 
never been a homeland and a stronghold for the orthodox jurisprudence. It was in 
the hands of the jurists on and off and even when they were in charge, non-religious 
courts sprang up due to necessities of time and place. The orthodox jurisprudence is 
more than happy to keep the vast province of extrajudicial realm. What ensures the 
cultural and ideological dominance of the orthodox jurisprudence's legal discourse 
Qur'anic verses. Nahi-anil-munkar is a Qur'anic commandment to "forbid what is evil". This can be 
done by refraining from the sins mentioned by Allah in the Qur'an and the sins which the Prophet 
Muhammad stated in hadith. Al-munkar litterally means "the rejected". " Ref. 
http: //en. wikipedia. org, 'wiki/Furoo-ad-Deen#Amr-Bil- 
Ma. 27r. C5. ABf . 28Enjoining_what_is_good. 
29 
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is its direct connection to people and its affecting of their minds and hearts through 
its original (default) rulings. That brings the jurists status, authority, influence, and 
undisputed power in the life of the nation. This may get disrupted by the bad 
reputation created by the political and law-making branches of the orthodox 
jurisprudence. That is why, as Mir-Hosseini reports (1999), the great majority of the 
followers of the traditional orthodox jurisprudence in Houzeh are against the thesis 
of Valayatefagieh. They are afraid of losing their stronghold. 
Regarding women and their role 
Regarding women and their role in the Islamic order, the image-making 
function of the orthodox jurisprudence is very critical. This function refers to the 
image of woman projected by the rulings pertaining to women. The image projected 
by the orthodox jurisprudence's rulings is what is logically inferred from the 
orthodox jurisprudence's rulings on women's rights and status. This is what is 
taught to people and shapes and organizes gender relations, the vast majority of 
which does not reach the legal system. This influence of the orthodox jurisprudence 
is beyond law and beyond any specific legal system. It serves as a philosophy 
informing and organizing gender relations. Mir-Hosseini refers to this function of 
the orthodox jurisprudence when she reports that: 
I inferred it [the premise on defectiveness or inferiority of women] by 
looking at ways in which feqh defines women's legal rights; otherwise, why 
should there be so many restrictions and limitations on women? " (Mir- 
Hosseini,, 1999: 174) 
That is the image sent to the believers, but not directly and openly admitted 
due to the politics of power/knowledge. 
style of orthodox jurisprudence; non-engaging and authoritative style 
As the orthodox jurisprudence is a paradigm, it does not engage with the 
alternative concepts or alternative realities as it wants to create its own reality. The 
traditionalists' style and mode of argumentation matches their belief in immutability 
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and truth of their reading of the religious sources 
28. In this closed ethico-legal 
system the realities of gender relations are given little room for concern (Mir- 
Hosseini, 1999). Madani, a marja in Qom, sees things in the following terms: 
"If we want to adjust Islamic feqh to the conditions of time, then the science 
of feqh will be destroyed and suffer irreparable damage" (Mir-Hosseini, 
1999: 33). 
Not only that, they are actively encouraged to use 'isolation' as a discovery 
method to reach the pure and unaffected Rulings of God. The more isolated the 
jurist is from the social reality and alternative philosophies of life, the more likely it 
is that he can gain access to the truth of the divine will. Madani points to this in the 
following terms: 
"ulema should not pay attention to public opinion or pay regard to non- 
Islamic institutions formed in the present age which create laws in any 
domain. And the ulema of Islam must try to adapt public opinion and the 
laws created by these institutions to Islamic feqh" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 33). 
The jurists are either engaged in rationalizing the default positions of the 
orthodox jurisprudence or extracting new sets of secondary Rulings to resolve 
practical deadlocks of the legal system. The only difference between traditionalists 
and neo-traditionalists is that neo-traditionalists are less authoritative and more 
engaging with modem minds in order to convince them of the truth of the hard core 
and methodology of the orthodox jurisprudence using modem language and sources. 
It is a presentational activity in the protective belt of the orthodox jurisprudence. 
28 Mir-Hosseini refers to this non-engaging property of orthodox jurisprudence's communication in 
the following terms: 
"They consider the model of family and gender relations manifested in fiqh rules to be 
divine and immutable, and they make no attempt to engage with non-religious sources of 
knowledge about the family, or to consider women's position in contemporary society. The 
most they do is to interrupt their texts with an anecdote, or a warning, or a piece of advice to t__ 
keep away from the evils of family life as lived by others" (Mir-Hosseini, 2003: 3). 
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The Orthodoxjurisprudence as a source of tension; dynamism of sharia, the 
Orthodoxjurisprudence, law, and social reality 
I- Tension due to dual nature of orthodox jurisprudence 
The orthodox jurisprudence creates tension due to its dual structure of default 
(primary) rulings and secondary rulings developed historically to keep its link with 
two polar centres of gravity: revelation and social reality. This tension creates, now 
and then, a backlash of puritanism which desires to turn the pure default rulings into 
social reality; we call these reactions puritan movements. 29 
2- Tension inside orthodox jurisprudence due to duality of structure of authority 
This type of tension is created due to the lack of any final and ultimate 
authority in Shia Islam. The institution of Marja'iyat is inherently a decentralized 
structure of authority, allowing multiple Marjas to divide the allegiance of the 
believers among themselves. This is further intensified by the thesis and affiliated 
institutions of Valayat-efaghieh (Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Komeini, 1983). This is about 
a structural contradiction between the two notions of supreme authority - the 
Marja'iyat and the Velayat-e faqih. The first has no overt political claims. The 
second, the child of the revolution, exerts power over people and demands 
allegiance. 
3- Tension between orthodox jurisprudence and law 
The orthodox jurisprudence's rulings are the product of its knowledge 
machine; while laws of the land are codified in the parliaments and the legal system. 
The parliament and the legal system work inside the interests of a nation-state, while 
the orthodox jurisprudence works inside the boundaries of the faith and does not 
theoretically recognize the limits and requirements of nationhood. These two 
29Another type of constant tension is created from those who side with the pressing needs of social 
reality and see the spirit of default positions as backward and regressive, and the secondary rulings as 
an unsatisfactory fudge not located in a consistent and coherent philosophy of modern realities. This 
reaction is secularizing movement, which wants to sweep away the social reality of orthodox 
jurisprudence and make it retreat to a place beyond all social interactions. These two polar 
movements, plus the movements in between, such as Islamic reformists who try to stay inside the 
parameters of religion, without showing any allegiance to orthodox jurisprudence by replacing it with 
a modern orthodox jurisprudence, create a pot of conflicting and contradicting forces in the heart of 
Islamic societies. 
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sources of law, with different agendas and procedures, are likely to differ in so many 
positions. While one tries to manifest the true will of God for the believer, the other 
attempts to reflect the realities of time and place. One bestows divine legitimacy to 
the ummah, while the other provides practicality for the nation. The audience of the 
first is the community of believers beyond and above any physical territory, while 
the audience of the law and legal system is the citizens of a nation. Legal codes are 
most likely to enshrine a compromise, accommodating the interest of conflicting 
groups and the outcome of the politics of pressure groups and the interests of the 
voters, while the orthodox jurisprudence rulings reflect the purely theoretical 
inference of divine will which does not take the facts of social life in a nation-state 
seriously. Even if believers face difficulties with the default rulings, they are 
expected to refer to the orthodox jurisprudence's scholastic circles to attain 
secondary rulings and not the parliaments or other secular procedures 30 . 
4- Tension between the orthodox jurisprudence and Sharia 
This tension arises because of the attempts to break the monopoly of the orthodox 
jurisprudence on the interpretation of religion. This in turn emanates from the 
separation of religion (sharia) from the interpretation of religion (Moosavi 
BqJnoordi, 1996; Katoozian, 1998b) as Saidzadeh (2002) uses it as one of the 
axioms of his "modem feqh". This is a source of tension inside the religious 
community (not inside the orthodox jurisprudence community). The attempts made 
by the Islamist intellectuals and other Islamic reformists to break the monopoly of 
the orthodox jurisprudence were received with suspicion and occasional violence by 
the orthodox jurisprudence's circles (like the disapproval of Shariati by Khomeini). 
The orthodox jurisprudence circles accused the religious intellectuals of betrayal in 
30 The conflict between orthodox jurisprudence and law is fully exemplified in the following case 
highlighted by Mir-Hosseini: 
"According to our [current Iranian] laws, a man must have his first wife's permission to take 
a second wife, and a marriage notary can't register a polygamous marriage without court 
permission. This is the situation at the third level [the level of law]. But at the second level, 
feqh - that is, our understanding of Shari'a - we see that it allows a man to take a second 
wife whenever he wants; there are no conditions or restrictions there. Many men who want 
to take a second wife appeal to this level, that is, they do a temporary or permanent Shari'a 
marriage [as opposed to the legal kind, which requires court permission], and face the first 
wife with a fait accompli. The notary who does the contract for them has done nothing 
wrong, either in the eyes of feqh or in his own religious conscience. If the couples want to 
legalize their union, they go to court and petition for registration of their Shari'a marriage. 
This takes some time, but if there is no conflict between the two parties, the court registers 
the marriage with little fuss" (1999: 181-2). 
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introducing alien Western elements into religion, while intellectuals accused 
orthodox jurisprudence circles of drawing a very dark and backward picture of 
religion (Shariati, 1980,1973; Saeedzadeh, 2002) which makes it unattractive to 
modem mentality and modem life style. 
5- Tension between orthodox jurisprudence and secularist forces 
Non-religious or secular approaches to the organization of life, or secular 
approaches to law, are a serious challenge to the orthodox jurisprudence's monopoly 
not of the interpretation of religion but of the organization of social life. This is a 
source of tension in the society as a nation (rather than the religious community or 
orthodox jurisprudence's circles). To seculars, the orthodox jurisprudence is a 
constant source of archaic laws hindering society's progress towards embracing 
modernity. To the adherents of the orthodox jurisprudence, secularism is a source of 
contamination and pollution to the faith of the ummah; they are seen as a serious 
threat to the spiritual security of the community of believers by planting the seeds of 
'doubt' in the minds of the ordinary people. 31 
Aytolah. Azari, a deceased orthodox jurisprudence scholar in Qom, refers to 
this threat in the following terms: 
"Women are degraded; and through the expansion of the culture of nudity 
they are turned into pretty dolls for the satisfaction of [men's] lust. In order 
to cause the fall of Muslim women too, they have instilled Doubts into their 
minds and have planted seeds of Doubts in Muslim societies" (in Mir- 
Hosseini, 1999: 60). 
Feminism, human rights, and other international conventions are among the 
rivals of the orthodox jurisprudence. 
6- Tension between orthodox jurisprudence and popular culture 
This is a type of tension between orthodox jurisprudence and the community of 
believers. This shows that the community of believers is not fully malleable in the 
hands of orthodox jurisprudence's circles. They, as a community, pick and choose 
what is offered by the orthodox jurisprudence. The best example in Shia Iran is the 
case of temporary marriage (muta), which is a perfectly legitimized institution in 
31 For more information see Daryush Shayegan (1992). 
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ShVi orthodox jurisprudence's legal discourse, while it is rigidly and strictly rejected 
by the popular culture, according to which its legitimacy is questioned both 
theoretically and practically and its promulgation inside the society is resisted 
strongly. The institution of polygamy is frowned upon as well and men who embark 
on using their orthodox jurisprudence-given right are stigmatized and end up losing 
their reputation and respectability. 
Summary 
This section has attempted to clarify the nature, sources, and function of the 
orthodox jurisprudence. In the following section its role on women's lives with 
regard to domestic violence will be discussed. The focus is on the nature of the 
marriage contract, marital relationships, and its associated discourses formulated 
largely by the orthodox jurisprudence. 
Marriage, marital relationship and its affiliated discourses and their 
relation to domestic violence against women 
The orthodox marriage: a civil contract 
As Afshar (1998) points out, marriage in Islam could be considered as a 
4commercial transaction' in which the women rent or sell their sexual services to 
their husbands. There are many examples in the Islamic sources (ahahdith) viewing 
marriage as a commercial exchange, for instance Shaykh Khalil, the most prominent 
Maliki jurist, sees the relationship in marriage as follows: 
"When a woman marries, she sells a part of her person. In the market one 
buys merchandise, in marriage the husband buys the genital arvum mulieris. " 
(in Mir-Hosseini, 1993: 32) 
Such a conception is shared by the Shi'a jurists; Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, the most 
prominent scholar of thirteen century, gives a very similar definition of marriage or 
in its Arabic term nikah: 
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"A contract whose object is that of domination over the vagina, without the 
right of its possession" (Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, 1982). 
Or in another words: 
"That type of contract, aqd, which gives ownership, tamlik, over intercourse, 
vaty, not like buying a slave girl whose ownership entitles her master a right 
to intercourse" (cited in Haeri, 1989: 33). 
According to the contemporary Islamic ulama marriage or "nikah is a 
contract for the ownership, tamlik, of the use of [the] vagina" (Haeri, 1989: 34). The 
Arabic term of 'aqd literally means to coagulate or to knot which is the most 
familiar strand for an agreement in Islamic legal terminology. Haeri argues that 
Hilli's view about marriage as a contract of sale is ambivalent,, although he stated 
that "marriage is a kind of ownership". On the other hand, he argues there is a 
difference between an aqd (marriage) and ownership, milkiyyat, and that one should 
not mix them together. For instance, he argues, a man can have sexual relationship 
with his slave girl without marrying her. Should he decide to marry her he must 
make her a free woman first. Thus, the 'complete ownership' over a slave girl, as 
Haeri (1989) argues, turns out to be a 'partial ownership' of a married woman. 
Marriage or nikah, according to scholars of Islamic laws, is a contract 
between a man and a woman but the type of contract is not clarified. Some defined it 
as "bay or sale, which results in the transfer of an absolute proprietary" (Coulson, 
1964). In this case they argue muta or temporary marriage (which is only practiced 
by Shia) can be defined as an ijareh or lease because the transaction is deeded for a 
limited period of time (Haeri, 1989). Temporary marriage Qjarah or lease) is also an 
exchange contract defined as "the exchange of the usufruct of a specific object for a 
specific sum" (Haeri, 1989). It means what is exchanged here is not the good itself 
but usufruct of the temporary wife. 
Thus, it is important to note that in the Islamic marriage only female 
sexuality is believed to be a tradable commodity and not the woman herself. The 
woman rents her sexual organ to her husband and in return she gets a price 
(mahrieh) which is to be documented in the marriage contract and is also entitled to 
maintenance (nqfagheh). Meanwhileý the Islamic concept of a contract offers some 
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freedom within fixed varieties of contracts, which can be understood as conditions 
mutually agreed upon between the people involved in the contract- A woman has the 
right to demand options at the time of contracting her marriage, as long as those 
options do not dispute the marital requirements (Afshar, 1998). For instance, 
according to Iranian Civil law a woman has the right to choose her living place, 
refuse her husband the multiple marriage right, the right for divorce and other rights. 
But different interpretations of some jurists disregard this option, arguing, for 
instance, that polygamy and divorce according to the Qur'an are a man's unilateral 
rights and are not open to negotiation. The discourses surrounding the marital rights 
and obligations of Muslim couples and their relation to domestic violence against 
women will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Islamic marriage, partial or complete ownership of a woman 
As emphasized by Mir-Hosseini (1993: 36) (although in different terms), 
every aspect (all rights and duties) of the orthodox jurisprudence-based marriage 
follows logically from the central concepts of an exchange; the exchange of sexual 
services for financial security in terms of the economic trinity of mahr, nafaqeh, and 
ojratolmesl (which will be discussed later). Haeri rightly points to the fact that the 
legal requirement for a wife's obedience towards her husband rests on this element 
of exchange in the marital transaction (1989: 37). The specific interpretations of 
these rights and regulations may provide a fertile breeding ground for all types of 
violence from economic, to social, to psychological, and physical. One of the main 
ambiguities surrounding the traditional formulation of Islamic marriage is whether 
the contract leads to the subordination of women; and whether Muslim men own 
their wives partially or totally. The extreme cases of obvious brutality may be easy 
to identify, but there is a vast area of fuzziness in between; and the right to 
reasonable chastisement can serve as a legitimate vehicle for complex and hidden 
brutality. 
Muslim women appear to have been bestowed the status of a contracting 
partner and fully-fledged human being with the right to ownership of her own 
property, as Verma (197 1) puts it, at no stage in the traditional Islamic marriage are 
the personality or material wealth of the Muslim women eliminated by that of the 
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Muslim man nor in a larger legal entity: in the Muslim family the wife's 
individuality is preserved. As Venna argues: 
"in marriage the individuality of the wife is maintained and is not like a sale 
in which the purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the property 
purchased. The rights he acquires are conjugal rights which are strictly 
defined by law. " (Verma, 1971: 16) 
At the same time the ownership of her sexual faculties were transferred to her 
husband after signing the marriage contract. Haeri (1989) elaborates the paradox as 
follows: 
"Although it appears paradoxical at first, in an Islamic marriage the wife is 
not the object of exchange (cf. Levi-Strauss 1969,60,65; 1974). Rather, she 
is perceived to be in possession of the object of exchange (her reproductive 
capacity and sexuality), which in the eyes of the law she 'voluntarily' 
exchanges for some valuables. Ironically, however, the same structure that 
gives a woman the right to exercise her decision-making power deprives her 
of it as soon as she uses it. Prior to signing the contract of marriage, an adult 
Shi'i Muslim woman is accorded a relatively independent legal autonomy, 
but after the conclusion of the contract she is legally associated with the 
object of exchange, and hence she comes under the judicial authority of her 
husband. " 
Haeri directs us to the most likely source of the problem without elaborating 
the details of the dynamism involved: 
"This association of women with the object of exchange [sexual organ] is at 
the heart of the Islamic doctrinal double image of women (naive/cunning; 
sexually insatiable/innocent) as well as the root of the ideological 
ambivalence toward them". (1989: 66) 
The above passage demonstrates that, according to Haeri, a Muslim woman 
is independent at the start of the negotiating process of the traditional marriage 
contract, voluntarily enters a contract in which she approves the legal authority of 
her husband over her sexual organs (the partial ownership) and ends up losing her 
own legal autonomy and authority and residing in the legal authority of her husband 
(complete ownership). 
To understand how this free exchange of sexual services for financial 
protection (partial ownership model) culminates in total ownership (a regime of 
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command-and-control) of all women's faculties and loss of her legal independence, 
we have to distinguish between two types of property: property in person and 
property outside a person. Property in person cannot be separated from the 
individual owner and is forever attached to that person even if he/she contracts the 
possession or usage of it away. The feature of sexual faculties as part of the whole 
human being creates problems for the Islamic marriage, which is an attempt to 
formulate the marital relation in accordance with a contract of sale in which the 
ownership of a thing is unequivocally transferred to someone else. The contract of 
sale can be successfully implemented when a property outside a person is the subject 
of exchange, while part of a person can never be sold away and its ownership is 
inherently inseparable from the person who originally and by creation owns it. Even 
if a person voluntarily agrees to the transfer of the ownership of part of 
himself/herself, he/she never loses the ultimate control over himself/herself. This 
specific feature of property in person culminates in the metamorphosis of Islamic 
marriage from a partial ownership of the woman's sexual faculties to total 
ownership of the woman herself. Pateman demonstrates how this transformation can 
occur by referring to Kant: 
"Kant argues that it is impossible to use only part of a person 'without 
having at the same time a right of disposal over the whole person, for each 
part of a person is integrally bound up with the whole. ... Kant concludes that 
'the sole condition on which we are free to make use of our sexual desire 
depends upon the right to dispose over the person as a whole - over the 
welfare and happiness and generally over all the circumstances of that 
person. " (Pateman, 1988: 170T 
Meanwhile, another reason that may lead partial ownership to total 
ownership could be related to the nature of the contract. The incompleteness of a 
contract, due to the effect of unforseen contingencies, leaves the traditional Islamic 
contract an open contract with no well-defined set of tasks specified for women to 
perform, as reflected in the following passage: 
"According to Islamic laws, foqaha, and the Ayatollah Khomeini the most 
important duty of a wife towards her husband is obedience in matters relating 
to sexual services" (Mokhtari 1996; cited in Afshar 1998: 132). 
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This definition clearly reflects and manifests the complications associated 
with inherent incompleteness of contracts. Despite the definition given by Hilli, the 
prominent Shia scholar, and others about the sexual organ being the subject of 
exchange, a more thorough look at the whole structure of traditional Islamic 
marriage and its set of legal rights and obligations reveals its character as an open 
contract in which a women commits herself to obedience in matters relating to 
sexual services. 'Matters' are not given a clear definition and what constitute 
I matters relating to sexual services' are not unambiguously spelled out. What is 
expected of a wife is not a bounded set of well-defined tasks. The definition offered 
by Khomeini clearly reflects and captures the openness of the marriage contract to 
make it more flexible in order to encounter new eventualities. Matters related to 
sexual services, with its two critical features of exclusivity and promptness, can 
potentially (and in practice) engulf all aspects of life of a woman from her clothes, to 
her job, to her social network and kinship relations, to her freedom of movement and 
freedom of expression. Each and every dimension of a woman's life can have sexual 
meanings and sexual implications in unforseen forms, in novel contexts and new 
eventualities. New unforseen contingencies may give sexual meaning to something 
apparently lacking any obvious sexual facet. If the lawmaker limits the matters into 
well-defined cases, the structure will lose its forward-looking and flexible property. 
Her walking, talking, smiling, and manners can have sexual connotations; therefore, 
it implies that, the designers of the traditional Islamic marriage instinctively felt that 
the structure of the contract should be left open and flexible enough to address 
problems as they arise. Hence, the extension of control on women's behaviour to the 
dress code and to the rest of her being. The enveloping, all-embracing, and forward- 
looking character of the phrase 'matters relating to sexual services' and the 
implications for demands for modesty were manifested in this passage from Kazern 
Musavi: 
"all these musts and must nots which continuously demand of women not to 
speak, not to walk, not to choose the colour of their clothes ... " (1994: cited in Afshar 1998: 205). 
These unending musts and must nots are not a superficial and excessive part 
of traditional Islamic marriage, they are the inevitable and logical implications of its 
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core. The following phrase from Ahmad Azari Qomi, a prominent Iranian clergy, 
can be even more illuminating: 
"... the problem caused by women who show the curvature of their bodies- 
particularly those parts which sexually arouse young men - or wear bright 
colours, or walk with charm and coquettishness or use powerful perfume or 
useless scarves ... " (Afshar; 1998: 199). 
This clearly shows how the dynamism works: due to the inherent inability of 
human cognition to exhaust all cases of 'matters relating to sexual services', the 
marriage contract is incomplete, resulting in an open contract with a general 
categorization of the core duty of a wife, which can potentially stretch to an infinite 
number of behaviours, gestures, and postures. This is the fertile breeding ground for 
the birth of a multi-layered system of command-and-control which ends up 
enslaving women and treating them as objects of complete ownership. The inherent 
ambiguity and generality in the phrase 'matters relating to sexual services' can even 
envelop her mere presence, which can have sexual meaning and be sexually 
provocative, as observed by Afshar: 
44men as an endangered species forever threatened by the prospect of sexual 
arousal from the mere presence of a passing woman" (Afshar; 1998: 199). 
Sabbah (1983) mentions that a woman's bare hands or lips can have sexual 
meaning, indicating the characteristics of her sexual organ; even pilgrimage to 
religious places can create a secure market for sexual exchanges (as observed by 
Haeri, 1988). This is supported by research in social psychology: 
"A casual survey reveals that features as unnatural as clothing and toiletry 
fashions have erotic powers" (Edwards, 1999: 238). 
The all-enveloping feature of 'matters of sexual nature' is further exhibited 
by the following observations made by psychologists: 
"Contact is made with sexual thoughts through all sorts of cues. One can be 
sexually aroused by bits of sensory and cognitive events. It may be a certain 
smile, a twist of a body, a phrase, a sentence of reading, or a familiar smell. 
The list is nearly endless and partially personal" (Edwards, 1999: 240). 
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The two characteristics of sexual sensitivity and arousal; the endlessness of 
the list of things which can provoke and its being partially personal are very 
important in understanding the all-embracing character of the traditional formulation 
of Islamic marriage. Even very innocent and seemingly irrelevant events or things 
can have a sexual nature. The personal aspect reveals that while something may 
have a sexual meaning for one Muslim man, it may not carry any sexual meaning for 
the next. If a Muslim man (or a guardian) sends his wife or daughter to work in a 
public or private office or factory, even if she is fully covered and highly chaste and 
modest, she may turn into prey for the sexual fantasies of men in her workplace or 
men who see her on her way towards her workplace and that is likely to be 
perceived as an invasion of the sexual integrity of the Muslim woman and a breach 
of the exclusivity condition instituted in the marriage contract. Azari Qomi, a 
deceased clergyman in Qom, reveals how this logic works: 
"therefore a Muslim woman's character must be placed within such confines 
[a broader concept of hejab with a meaning far broader than the dress code] 
that she will not be vulnerable to aggression by an unrelated person, even in 
his imagination. " (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 67). 
This example shows how the logic of obedience in 'matters of sexual nature' 
is inherently restrictive and enslaving for women. That is the dynamics underlying 
the transformation of tamkin (submission in sexual matters) into etaat (obedience in 
all aspects of life). Wild and uncontrollable sexual fantasies of men makes home the 
safest place for a woman to live and to work; that is how seclusion is a natural 
product of traditional marriage and its orthodox jurisprudence-based logic. Azari 
follows the same logic: 
"[s]he must in no way expose herself to the eyes of unrelated men and ruin 
her character under their lustful and poisonous gaze. In Fatima's words: 'The 
best thing for a women is not to see and not to be seen by an unrelated man"' 
(Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 64). 
Traditional orthodox jurisprudence produces seclusion. Excessive 
restrictions imposed on women are the natural product of orthodox jurisprudence- 
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based formulation of marriage and not the popular culture. The main theoretical root 
is in orthodox jurisprudence and not in popular culture. 
All in all, it can be concluded that the existing ambiguity in the definition of 
marriage in orthodox interpretations of Islam, whether it is either a partial or 
complete ownership, sale or rent of women's bodies, may provide susceptible 
grounds for exerting the husband's power over his wife's life. Violence against 
women in the traditional Islamic discourse is institutionalized through the marriage 
contract and its auxiliary institutions, norms, and beliefs, which span all dimensions 
of women's lives from birth to death and from the private realm of the family to 
wider public life at community level and society at large, through strict control and 
surveillance exercised on the lives of virgin girls and married women in families and 
communities, and at a societal level. 
Stating that violence against women is institutionalized in the traditional 
Islamic model of marriage does not necessarily imply that there are more incidences 
of violence or more severe cases of violence in Islamic societies compared to non- 
institutionalized societies. It all depends on whether there is an adequate level of 
compliance with the traditional discourse among men and women (the level of 
homogeneity in believing wholeheartedly in the traditional Islamic utopia). The 
more men and women are compliant with their assigned roles, the less the right to 
chastisement is actually utilized. In the next section Muslim women and men's sets 
of rights and marital obligations towards each other will be discussed. The 
implications of some of these rights for domestic violence will be elaborated. 
The exclusive rights of the Muslim wives and Muslim husband's obligations in 
Islamic marriage 
in Shia Iran the signing of the marriage contract by both men and women 
obligates some duties towards each other based on the 1102 - 1107 Civil Codes 
(Hosseini Nik, 2003; Madani Kermani, 2003). In this section I only discuss those 
rights which are closely related to my argument. These sets of rights and obligations, 
designed by orthodox jurisprudence, are all major components of traditional Islamic 
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marriage 32 . The permissibility of 
domestic violence envisaged in these set of rights 
will be illuminated. 
The right to receive mahrieh or mahr (bride-price or marriage price) 
Legally mahr 33 is one of the most important structural components of the traditional 
Islamic marriage and, like the right of polygamy and divorce for men, it is necessary 
for it to be indicated in the contract at the time of drawing it up. Mahr or sadaq is 
something valuable or money which a man pays to his bride at the time of marriage 
in exchange for exclusive access to the wife's sexual services. It can be symbolic or 
actual for "it legitimizes the intercourse" (Tusi, 1964 in Haeri, 1989). 
A woman is entitled to this one-off payment as soon as the marriage is 
consummated (Moosavi Khoiee, 1986) and she can refuse sexual services to her 
f 1134. husband unless he pays it in u Mahr is payable even before the consummation 
of marriage or it can be deferred 35 (Hakim poor, 2003; Najafi, 1987)36 . In Shia Iran, 
by signing the contract, men become obliged to pay half of the mahrieh to woman. 
However, in the case of Iranian women it is normally paid at divorce and if the 
husband does not pay mahr during his life, after his death the woman is legally 
eligible to claim it before the division of the husband's assets among the heirs 
(Moghadam, in Afkhami, 1994). It should be noted that the delay in paying mahr to 
a wife indicates the existing ambiguity, or as Haeri (1989) calls it, 'institutionalized 
misrecognition' in the ulama's view in regarding the marriage as a sale contract and 
the concept of buying and owning a wife (Haeri, 1989). 
In the Shia school, if mahrieh is not stipulated in the marriage contract it does 
not invalidate the contract, whereas, in Sunni schools of Islam, such as Maliki, the 
subjugation of mahr or the denial of any other conditions nullifies the marriage 
contract. Therefore,, to legitimise a contract the mahr must be issued in the contract 
whether it is money or valuables. 
-12 As Araki puts it: "laws regarding the rights of husband and wife cannot be modified by the parties 
at the drawing up of the contract" (1998: 914). 
33 The word 'Mahr' is used in Ahadith texts and not in the Qur'an. Mahr in Qur'an has been meant 
as sadagh and uzor: in Qur'an, 4: 4,24,25; 5: 5; and 60: 10 
-14 for more information see Afshar (1998) 
35 At the time of divorce, if she remains obedient, she is entitled to it. 
36 For instance refer to: Gavaher al-kalam, 11: 3 1; Mohaghegh Sani, Gam al-maghased 414: 2 
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Overall, the main features of the institution of mahr in the traditional Islamic 
marriage are as follows: the receiver is the wife and not the father (bestowing the 
position of contracting partner to the woman); it is an irrevocable and inseparable 
part of the Islamic marriage and cannot be removed from the marriage contract; it 
has to be paid whether the amount was agreed between the partners or not i. e., it 
must be paid on demand unless the couple reach an agreement on this. The 
following references testify to the above characteristics of the mahr: "Islamic law 
recognized the wife - not the father - to be the recipient of bride price" (Haeri, 1989: 
28). The latter according to Coulson, "transfer[red] the wife from the position of sale 
object to that of contracting party ... She is now endowed with a legal competence 
she did not possess before', 37 (Coulson 1964,14)38 . However, there are restrictions 
on the woman's right to act as a contracting partner: 
"According to Khomeini, permission of the guardian (father, brother or 
uncle) is needed for a virgin to enter a contract of marriage" (Haeri, 1989: 
40). 
Regarding the role of guardians, Vertna explains that: 
"An adult male who is of sound mind can contract a marriage according to 
all schools. But with respect to a woman who is adult and of sound mind 
there is a difference of opinions. ... [majority of ulama agree that] A girl who 
arrives at puberty can select a husband for herself without reference to the 
wishes of the father or guardian" (Verma, 1971: 19). 
37 Regarding marriage, Islam tried to reform some of the customs practiced in jahilieh, for instance a 
man could marry up to one hundred women at a time, while Islam reduced it to four wives (the man 
is obliged to treat his wives equally). There are three types of rulings in Islam: ta'sisi - those 
established by Islam, emza'i - those signed and accepted by Islam without modification, eslahi - those 
Islam intended to reform. Most of social and political rulings are in the latter. However, Islam did not 
try to eradicate all the customs and traditions suddenly and change was developing gradually. For 
example, slavery as a principle was not accepted or endorsed by Islam but it was not banned either. 
Rather it was tolerated. However, people were encouraged to free their slaves and in return they were 
promised God's reward in the hereafter. Islam outlawed all the sexual unions practiced in the pre- 
Islamic period so that the only permitted marriage was marriage by contract. Other changes have 
been made, such as the bride price or mahr which the Qur'an designates to the bride rather than her 
father, recognizing her as a party in the contract rather than a sale-object (Coulson, 1964,14). 
38 See: M. Th. Mustafa et. Al. (eds. ), EL Brill's First Encyclopaedia ofIslam 1913-36, vol. V, L-M, 
p. 137. 
59 
Khomeini's fatwa, nevertheless, revokes this right from virgin adult women. 
The guardian in invested with the right to commit his child or other girl relative to 
marriage, even before the age of maturity. His permission is required for the virgin 
girl to get married (Khomeini, 1983,1988). Coulson reported that: 
"It is, for instance, praiseworthy for a marriage guardian to act upon the 
wishes of his ward. He ought to do so. But if he does not do so and 
concludes a marriage contract on her behalf despite her opposition, the 
marriage will nonetheless be perfectly valid. " (Coulson, 1969: 83) 
Coulson maintains that except for Hanafi law which "puts male and female 
basically on the same footing with respect to their legal capacity to conclude 
transactions" (Coulson, 1969: 25), the majority view "rests upon the principle that a 
female's person and property are subject to her guardian's control until she 
marries"(ibid: 26). Only after her first marriage does she gain the right to deal with 
her own property and her consent to any other future marriage; in "some mysterious 
way the quality of being rashid, of having that mature judgment which is the point of 
emancipation, is acquired by a female through the sexual; experience of her 
marriage" (Coulson, 1969: 26). 
Mahrieh and issues surrounding it (its assigning, its paying, and its receiving 
and so on) are often the core of disputes between husbands and wives and their 
families in Iran. 
The right to maintenance or nafagheh 
After consummation of the marriage, the wife gains the right to nafagheh, 
household expenditure. (Hakimpur, 2003; Bohrani, 1409) This consists of the 
provision of food, clothing, housing, and the necessities of life, cleaning materials, 
toiletries and the payment of wages for servants when appropriate. (Article 1107 of 
Civil Code) According to Mir-Hosseini, the traditional understanding of marriage in 
Islam is governed by two preconceptions: "Women render their sexual favours; and 
in return they gain the right to maintenance" (Mir-Hosseini, 1993 p. 36). According 
to Article 1107 of Civil Code in Iran the husband is required to pay nafagheh or 
maintenance for his wife's expenses, the wife is given the right to obtain nafagheh 
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(financial support), in return she is supposed to submit or tamkin to her husband 
(Ebadi, 2002). The husband's failure to pay the maintenance, according to Article 
642 of Islamic Punishment 39 , 
has legal consequence: 
"Those who have the means and refuse to pay the nafagheh, living expenses, 
of their obedient wives ... whom they have the legal duty to support ... will 
be 
subject to three to five months' imprisonment (Ebadi, 2002: 84). " 
As Mir-Hosseini pointed out: 
"The rules that qualify and disqualify a woman for nafaqheh revolve around 
the twin themes of sexual access and compensation. A woman becomes 
entitled to it only after the consummation of marriage and she loses her right 
to claim it if she is in a state of disobedience (nushuz). ... the term nashiza (rebellious) is used only in the feminine form and in relation to maintenance 
rights" (Mir-Hosseini, 1993: 47). 
Nafaqheh is a structural unavoidable obligation on a husband in exchange for 
(sexual) submission (tamkin). In return for the legitimate and exclusive right to have 
access to his wife's sexuality, the husband is obliged to support her financially. 
However, according to the marriage contract, it is only payable when the woman 
obeys (Article 1108 Civil Code). Ayatollah Khomeini indicated that: 
44a permanent wife must not leave the house without her husband's 
permission, and must obey, taslim, herself for whatever pleasure he 
wants ... In this case her maintenance 
is incumbent upon her husband. If she 
does not obey him, she is a sinner, gunahkar, and has no right of clothing, 
housing, or sleeping. " (in Haeri, 1989: 47) 
As reported by Haeri: 
"Hijazi [a scholar] put it parsimoniously: 'sexual pleasure, tamattu is the 
inalienable right of a husband, and maintenance, nafaqih is that of the wife"' 
(Cited in Haeri, 1989: 47). 
Tamkin and good behaviour are conditions of prompt payment of nafaqheh (in 
Haeri, 1989). Tamkin is legally binding on Married women when nafaqheh is paid. 
39 Ghanoon-e niojazat-e Islami 
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The crucial role of tamkin in turning the right to nafaqheh into a legal obligation is 
manifested in the following observation made by Verma (1971: 94): 
"she must be fit for conjugal intercourse; under the Shia law, if the wife is 
too young for matrimonial intercourse she would not be entitled to 
maintenance whether she is living in his house or with her father. " 
She must be accessible for matrimonial intercourse; the obstruction to intercourse on 
the part of the wife alone would disentitle her to maintenance: 
"In Shia law, the ground for liability for maintenance is the tamkin, i. e., such 
placing of herself by the wife in the power of her husband as to allow his free 
access for her at all time.... an unjustifiable refusal to allow sexual 
intercourse at any time, ... would disentitle her to maintenance" (Verma, 1971: 94). 
This could lead to economic and sexual violence (marital rape). The nature of the 
traditional Islamic marriage as a fully-fledged sexual-economic transaction is 
furthermore revealed in the following rule. Shia law dictates that: 
"If a husband has intercourse with his wife who is below nine years of age 
and such intercourse results in rupture of the private parts, the husband 
would be liable to pay maintenance during her entire lifetime" (Verma, 197 1: 
95). 
This ruling, by normalizing child marriage, may pave the way for sexual violence. 
There is a huge argument in Islamic literature regarding nafagheh and the conditions 
which qualify or disqualify a woman for it. It is important to notice that the concept 
of nafagheh plays a major role in Islamic marriage. As it was mentioned above, 
according to the Civil Code if the wife can prove to a court that her husband does 
not pay the maintenance, she can put him in jail and often women use this law to 
apply for a divorce or to escape from their husband's violent behaviour. As one of 
the Islamists argues, the woman can always challenge her right to nafagheh in court 
in terms of the prevailing custom and practices (in Afshar, 1998). Moreover, other 
ulama argue that total submission is not the case with tamkin (obedience) and this 
term is used only about ftilfiling the husband's sexual requirements. However, as is 
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the case most of the time, the traditional sharia law, as a male dominant institution. 
often sympathizes with men. The husband has the upper hand and he can claim that 
his wife does not tamkin or submit (this will be elaborated further in the following 
sections). Thus, it makes it very difficult for women to prove their claim. In practice, 
however, women are mostly advised by judges to try harder and tolerate the 
husbands' behaviour. Their justification is that if they put the husband in jail so that 
he, as a sole provider, will not be able to work and this may result in the poverty of 
the family and make things even more difficult. 
In Iran, as was mentioned earlier, mahrieh is normally payable at the time of 
divorce. If the woman does not want to get the money at the time of marriage, she 
still cannot refuse her husband's sexual demands and she legally loses her right to 
nafagheh or maintenance money which her husband is obliged to pay to her in the 
case of tamkin and obedience (these legal terms and their importance in marital 
relationships, as well as their relation to violence, will be discussed further). Some 
young and educated brides and grooms found the custom of getting mahr at the time 
of marriage degrading and demeaning for women (Haeri, 1989). In the post- 
revolutionary Iran, young couples often married without specifying any amount of 
money, only implementing the symbolic version of it in their marriage contract. 
They believe that the model presented by sharia law, paying money (as mahr) to the 
wife by the husband in exchange for her sexual services, denies the fact that a 
woman is an independent and autonomous person, the same as a man, who is able to 
support herself financially in modem days, and can enjoy this mutual relationship. 
For them, accepting the money constrains her to obey her husband's desires and 
commands and this results in the loss of her freedom and independence. More 
importantly, they believe that the consequence of not obeying (tamkin) can be forms 
of physical, psychological and economic punishment (as a result of not acting 
according to the contract). In response to criticisms of this model, one of the 
prominent ulama, Motahari, in his discussion regarding the origin of mahr in 
history, specified that the existence of mahr is a good indication of the natural 
difference between a man and a woman. Based on the nature and nurture argument, 
he believes that: 
, -Islamic law always follows the rule that the man is the one who is in need, 
and the woman is not. Islam recognizes men as buyers of the commodity that 
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women own. In a conjugal relationship, it is the man who benefits from the 
relationship, and he should therefore pay for it. [Regarding love Motahari 
argues] ... Men and women 
have different roles according to their nature, 
and marriage can only be strong and enjoyable when both act according to 
their natural roles" (Motahari, 1999: 208). 
These roles are women's dependency on men's physical, economic and 
cognitive strengths and their strengths in controlling their sexual desire, which make 
men even more romantic about them. 
The main reason for the necessity of nafagheh, Motahari (Motahari, 1999) 
argues, is that according to nature it is the woman who gets pregnant. It is her 
responsibility to looking after the baby. All of these troubles constrain her physical 
strengths, making her weak and, therefore, she not able to work like a man and 
maintain herself. Women, according to Motahari, cannot earn as much money as 
men and this may result in poverty. Thus, women are naturally born to be dependent 
on men financially, who, on the other hand, need women psychologically. He 
continues that women desire to beautify themselves and, as such, need more money 
because they spend more. Motahari argues that because women need to remain 
beautiful and delightful they should rest more, work less and remain at home. Only 
in this way can a woman make her husband cheerful and happy. Nafagheh, in his 
view, is the money which a husband pays to his wife to make herself and the 
husband's nest beautiful. Motahari's views about the natural differences between 
men and women, which are recognized in Islam and therefore have some reflections 
in the implementation of Islamic laws, are largely shared among some ulama 
(Afshar, 1998; Mir-Hosseini, 1993). However, others believe differently. This will 
be more elaborated later on in the section on gender equality in Islam. 
Overall, according to some specific interpretations, the superiority of men 
over women is justified by the fact that men provide women with mahr and 
nafagheh. Nevertheless, one should always bear in mind that the interpretations of 
the Quran and ahathith were/are always under the influence of male jurisprudence, 
particularly regarding women's rights and wrongs (Mir-Hosseini, 1996a, 1999). For 
instance, it is true that nafagheh was a progressive design in the traditional pre- 
capitalist order. However, throughout Muslim history it was used to sustain 
dominance of men over women. In a world in which women have many options 
available to them staying at home is just one among many, the propounded model 
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needs to be reconsidered. Repaying maintenance to women by men, regardless of its 
positive affects, provides the context for men to have authority over women and 
exercise their power (even using violence). Consequently, this enables them to put 
some restrictions which can affect women's freedom of movement, seeking 
employment and being submissive. 
The right to hire servants or receive paymentfor housework (ojratolmesi) 
Consistent with the logic of Islamic marriage as a sexual-economic contract, the 
wife is not, theoretically, expected to do housework or to take care of her child 40: 
"A mother is not bound to suckle her child and may lawfully demand hire for 
doing so. The mother may either suckle the child herself or employ another 
nurse for the purpose of retaining the hire" (Verma, 1971: 97). 
Mir-Hosseini stresses the same point that a woman is not expected to suckle her 
child unless it is impossible to feed him otherwise (Mir-Hosseini; 1993: 35). As 
Afshar pointed out, Montazeri4l: 
44 ... exempted women 
from doing any unpaid housework. Montazeri is of the 
opinion that what women earn is theirs and to make them do housework a 
man must pay extra ... payment for 
housework. Ojratolmesle, is an inherent 
right of women ... "(Afshar, 1998: 165-66). 
In addition to these rights women have the right to equal treatment if they are a co- 
wife 42 and the right to visit and receive her close kin. 43 
40 The wife is entitled to keep control of the wealth she accumulated before marriage or income 
earned during the marriage. As Verma maintains: "One of the most important effects of the reforms 
introduced by Islam for amelioration of the conditions of women was that it did not allow the 
personality or property of the wife to be merged in that of the husband. ... all the personal civil rights 
of the parties remain unaffected by marriage. ... the husband has no power of control over her 
property... " (Verma, 1971: 84) 
41 One of the leading religious figures in Iran 
42 Equality of treatment with co-wives (Verma: 197 1) is one of the core rights of women in traditional 
Islamic discourse, which entitle her to the sleeping right every four nights. 
43ViSitS to and from relations; every Friday for the parents and once a year for other relations (Afshar, 
1998, Ven-na, 1971) are the quota of freedom of movement and social networking allocated to 
Muslim wife. 
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The exclusive rights of the Muslim husband and wife' obligations 
In this section the husband's rights are discussed, however, it has to be said 
that some of these rights are contested, for instance divorce and polygamy. As a 
result of some movements from Islamist feminists and other women activists, some 
amendments have been made in the marriage law. However, doors remain open for 
traditional interpretations of the sharia and there is neither coherence nor 
homogeneity in employing progressive laws in favour of women. 
The pre-marriage right (the interview session with future bride) 
Interestingly, the ban on any sexual interaction between the sexes before marriage is 
relaxed for the marriage-proposal session. In line with the transactional spirit of 
orthodox jurisprudence-based marriage, men are allowed to check the quality of the 
service they are buying. 44 According to orthodox jurisprudence, potential male 
candidates, who are on the verge of considering proposing marriage, can demand to 
see the physical characteristics of their prospective wives and the girls are obliged to 
reveal their sexual beauties through wearing revealing clothes: 
4ý only when [a man] intends to marry ... 
is he permitted to see [the woman's] 
face and part of [her] features, and if [a woman] intends to marry and have a 
family according to Islamic Rulings [she] must submit to such things" (Mir- 
Hosseini, 1999. P. 77). 
'Permission to look' prior to marriage is a doctrinally legitimate action to take: 
"Shi'i hadith that permits a man to look at the entire body of a woman he 
intends to marry, he [Sheikh Ansari] argues for women to be permitted the 
same. ... this permission 
is granted [by jurists] on the grounds that in 
marriage a man is like a buyer and is paying a high price (mahr, dower), so 
he must see what he is buying" (From Saidzadeh cited in Mir-Hosseini, 
1999: 252). 
44 Sheikh Qavam Vashnavi in his book "Hejab in Islam" stated: "the man is the buyer of the woman, 
therefore when one wants to buy something he must see it for not to be cheated in business. But this 
is not applicable to women [because] women are the goods, thus, women must not be compared with 
men in this case. " Translated by Ahmad Mohseni Gorgani (1352: 169), fourth eds. Hekmat 
Publication, Qom- 
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The right to headship of thefamily 
The husband by committing himself to the economic trinity (mahrieh, 
nafagheh, qjratolmeso gains the headship of the family. It manifests itself in the 
exclusive possession of the products of the marriage contract: material wealth as 
well as children. The right to custody of children and exclusive ownership of the 
wealth accumulated during the marriage period are examples of the right to headship 
of the family. Traditional Islamic marriage lacks a common ownership regime (Mir- 
Hosseini, 1993). The underlying assumption is that since a contract of marriage 
establishes ownership of the wife's sexual and reproductive organs, any products of 
this relationship also belong to the father (Haeri: 1989, p. 43). The fact that the father 
(or guardian) has the right to make a marriage contract for a child (Haeri: 1989, 
p. 38) is a potent and direct sign of the right to ownership (of children and material 
goods and property) of what is produced in the marriage, exclusively reserved for 
Muslim men, consistent with the logic of the sexual-economic contract: "the right to 
domestic authority [was preserved for men] because of pecuniary burden and 
presumed superior judgment and discretion" (Verma, 197 1: P 89). 
Demanding Women's Tainkin (Obedience, Submission) 
As Afshar (1998) states, women in Islam, as in most other cultures, are 
supposed to be obedient and submissive to their husband as the head of family. She 
argues that there is a textual support quoted in the Qur'an for treating disobedient 
women, which Iranian men benefit from to justify domestic violence. It is quoted in 
the Qur'an that: 
"Men are in charge of women because Allah hath made the one of them to 
excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of 
women)" (Qur'an, IV: 34). 
If the women don't follow the rules then their husbands have the legitimacy 
to punish them, either financially (by stopping supporting them) or psychologically 
(by deserting them) and physically (by beating): 
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"Good women are obedient .... As for those 
from you fear disobedience, 
admonish them and send them to beds apart and beat them. Then if they obey 
you, take no further action against them" (Qur'an, IV: 34). 
Islamic feminists and other investigators have increasingly questioned such 
interpretations. As Afshar (1998, p. 19) suggests: "to admit to the legitimacy of 
violence within marriage would be to admit that the very foundation of the social 
unit in Islam is inherently flawed". Meanwhile, the dominant interpretation of verse 
34 of Sura Nisa in the Quran has been challenged by Mohsen Qa'eni. He suggests 
that: 
44menýs leadership of the household is a male construct, and, like other male 
privileges which are attributable to shari'a laws, actually has its roots in the 
culture and customs of the time of revelation ... in the sphere of the family as 
elsewhere, the Qura'n's aim was to introduce change gradually ... the 
absolute authority of men, and the maltreatment of women, were among the 
customs of Arabs" (Mir-Hosseini, 1996, p. 166). 
Qa'eni argues that many Qur'anic verses are descriptive statements of the 
status quo rather than commandments. He believes that the real purpose of this 
particular verse is to create conciliation and teach hostile men ways of controlling 
their anger towards their wives. That is why the Qur'an advises them to consult their 
wives and seek separation for a while as it was hoped that during these slow 
procedures tension between the couples reduces. 
It was mentioned earlier that the interpretation of Qur'anic verses was 
always deeply under the influence of male jurisprudence over the centuries. Islam is 
one of the few religions which remained almost intact in confrontation with recent 
modernization. However, there has been a critical trend in modem thinking 
demanding reinterpretations of Quranic verses, and one should always bear in mind 
that as every interpretation has a human dimension it cannot be considered as divine. 
The interpretation of verse 4: 34 by a feminist theologian, Riffat Hassan, reveals that 
her understanding of the verse is totally different from her male counterparts. She 
argues that: 
"Another very important term in the Qur'an which occurs in chapter 4 
(called Women chapter) in verse 34 is the word qawwamun. This is the 
plural form of a word which is translated as lord, master, ruler, governor, 
manager. Once you make the man the ruler, obviously you make the woman 
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the ruled. You've established a hierarchical relationship. In fact, this word 
doesn't mean ruler at all. There are many authorities on the basis of which I 
can say that it means 'bread-winner' and it is an economic tenn. If we 
translate that word as bread-winner the interpretation of entire verse changes. 
It's talking about division of functions, that while women have the primary 
responsibility of being child-bearers, during that time when they are 
undergoing the process of child-bearing, they should not have the obligation 
of being bread-winners, and therefore men should be bread-winner during 
this period" (cited in Engineer, 1996: 46). 
Other Islamists feminists' (Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 2004) 
arguments are in line with Riffat Hassan. They agree that the word qawwamun 
means provider and it points to the managerial role of men in the household. 
Sheikh al-tabarsi (1973) in "Majma al-bahrain" translates the word 
qawwamun 45 as: men should take charge of the women's affairs, this is partly due to 
men having some advantages over women and partly due to men paying nafagheh 
and mahrieh (in Hosseini Tehrani, 1997). 46 The question as to what extent exactly a 
woman should obey her husband in order to be entitled to maintenance rights has 
provoked many arguments. The term tamkin is used in two different ways in feqh: 
tamkin-e aam and tamkin-e khas. The former is when a woman willingly accepts her 
husband's authority over every aspect of her life and the latter refers to her sexual 
submission to her husband (Mohammadi, 2004). Araki defines tamkin-e khas as the 
woman's readiness to sleep with her husband whenever he demands (Araki, 1998). 
Hilli (Mohaghegh) (1982) defines tamkin-e khas as removing any obstacle between 
a man and a woman to have a sexual relationship without any burden in terms of 
time and place. 
Some of the ulama argue that the wife can only be offered the maintenance 
right if she admits her husband's authority and provides his sexual needs (tamkin-e 
khas). Hence, the woman should submit totally to her husband's demands or in 
another word to tamkin: 
45 The root of the word is qama. It means to support something; to hold something up. It is mainly 
used in the economic sphere; it means breadwinner, the supporter. Different interpretations of this 
word are given as: in charge of, protectors, hakim, rulers, managers, supporters. Hakim (ruler) is used 
mostly by Urdo, Farsi and Turkish translations. 
46 It is said that God made men more rational, logical and physically stronger than women. Thus they 
can perform acts of worshiping, prophecy, leadership, supremacy, iihad, and their credibility in 
witnessing and their greater share of inheritance and blood money and their rights of polygamy and 
divorce are the signs of their superiority to women. It seems that women's monthly menstrual is a 
huge disadvantage for women. For more information see to Hosseini Tehrani (1418) (Arabic zn 
calendar). 
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"[the wife] places or offers to place herself in the husband's power so as to 
allow him free access to herself at all lawful times [the Arabic word is 
tarnkin] and... obeys all his lawful commands for the duration of the 
marriage" (Nasir, 1990: 60-1, cited in Afshar, 1998). 
The traditional understanding of tamkin, these ulama argue, is not only in 
relation to satisfying the husband's sexual needs but in that a wife is obliged to obey 
her husband in every aspect of her life and he, therefore, controls her outside', 
activities, and demands that she respects his family. 
The right to reasonable chastisement in the case of nushuz (disobedience) 
How is the conflict of interests in marriage conceptualized? How is it 
resolved and who are the judge and jury? How does orthodox jurisprudence 
conceptualise marital conflicts and what are the internal and external mechanisms of 
conflict resolution devised by orthodox jurisprudence? The chief concept emerging 
in this context is nushuz. The legal term for both a wife's disobedience and a 
husband's refusal of support is nushuz, meaning disobedience of one's marital duties 
(Afshar, 1998; Naser, 1990; Haeri, 1989: 48)47. Muslim commentators, as Mernissi 
argues, define nushuz as women's rebellion against their husband's demand to 
satisfy their sexual desires. As Al-Tabari puts it in this way: 
"Al-nushuz means that the wife treats her husband with arrogance refuses to 
join him in the marital bed; it is an expression of disobedience [al-ma'siya] 
and an obvious unwillingness to any longer carry out what obedience to the 
husband requires. It is a way of showing hatred [bughd] and [i'rad] to the 
husband" (Mernissi, 1991: 156). 
Mir-Hosseini gives us some clues as to how the conflict of interests is 
conceptualized: 
"the rules that qualify and disqualify a woman for nafaqa evolve around the 
twin themes of sexual access and compensation. A woman becomes entitled 
to it only after the consummation of marriage and she loses her right to claim 
it if she is in a state of disobedience. Nushuz literally means 'rebellion' and it 
implies the abandonment of marital duties. ... Manifestations of nushuz are 
For more information refer to Langarudi (1967: 173); Imami (197 1). 
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defined as acts which hamper the purpose of marriage .... These acts can 
range from overt denial of sexual access to covert ones, such as not being 
physically available by leaving the marital home without the husband's 
permission; or not removing a condition which creates aversion in him" 
(Mir-Hosseini, 1993: 47). 
No other forms of rebellion, such as her refusal to do housework or her 
neglect of the husband and children are mentioned as manifestations of a womanýs 
nushuz. 48 Mir-Hosseini,, 1993: 47). Once, nushuz has been defined, consequently, its 
proof and then punishment in courts has given rise to some arguments which vary 
within religious authorities. Muslim law confers the right of the husband to chastise 
the wife moderately: 
"The husband is entitled to beat the wife for nushuz (rebelliousness or 
disobedience to reasonable commands) ... The husband could beat the wife in 
the case of positive nushuz (disobedience) only so far as it was necessary for 
her return to obedience and was by no means to extend to violent blows or to 
effusion of blood" (Verma, 1971: 108). 
Arguing that nushuz should be regarded as submission rather than obedience, 
some ulama, believe that once the husband claims his wife did not submit, his 
saying should be enough for a court without even presenting any evidence and the 
wife's saying is not accepted. Khomeini asserts that the authority to claim nushuz is 
the husband's - the wife should prove submission (Afshar, 1998; Haeri, 1989, p. 48). 
However,, in contrast, some other Islamists argue that, if the wife accounts that she 
has submitted, it is her saying that should be considered as fact and, in order to 
prove her wrong, the husband should provide some evidence for his claim (Afshar, 
1998). Consequently, if the wife is proven to be nashezeh then the court punishes 
her by following a process starting with preaching righteousness to her, followed by 
permitting the husband to deprive her (not paying her nafagheh according to 1108 
and 1106 Civil Codes), and isolate her and, finally, if these actions do not lead the 
woman to the right path (to submission), then the court has the right to punish her 
and not the husband (Afshar, 1998). 
In summary, according to Islamic traditionalist views of the mainstream 
discourse, for women nushu- has two main implications: disconnection of economic 
4' For more information refer to : Abd Al'Ati (1977: 169); Imami (1363/1984: 435), Lapanne- 
joinville (195 1 b: 100) and Khomeini (1366/1987: 362-3) 
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support (nafaqeh) 49 and being subject to reasonable chastisement. The authority to 
judge whether a case is nushuz is the husband himself (husband as judge and jury) 
and he is enforcer of the judgment and the main party to the conflict. It should be 
emphasized that the excessive use of force 50is prohibited in the traditional Islamic 
discourse and treated as legal cruelty and can be used as a ground according to 
which women can ask for divorce. Verma defines legal cruelty in the following 
terms: 
64actual violence amounting to endangering personal health or safety or 
reasonable apprehension of it. ... actual injury to her mental or bodily health 
or as to raise to reasonable apprehension . ... Anything causing disgrace to the wife or subjects her to a course of annoyance and indignity would 
amount to legal cruelty. ... 
keeping of a mistress with the wife would cause 
mental pain to her, which may lead to be classified as legal cruelty or a 
charge of immorality and adultery which cannot be substantiated" (1971: 
111-112). 
Economic cruelty would entail preventing the wife from exercising her rights 
over her property or disposing of her property. Verma (197 1) points to legal cruelty 
as one of grounds on which restitution may be refused. The grounds on which 
restitution may be refused are as follows: the husband being guilty of cruelty in the 
legal sense; the husband being guilty of misconduct towards the wife; and prompt 
bride price (mahrieh) of the wife not being paid. 
The right to control the place of residence 
Verma maintains that: "The Muslim wife is under duty to reside with the 
husband, subject to the payment of prompt mahrieh. The husband cannot, therefore, 
prevent the wife from visiting her friends until the prompt mahrieh is paid, because a 
husband's right to confine his wife at home is solely for the sake of securing to 
49 Alameh Hilli (1989), Ghaved al-ahkam, vol. 2 p. 52; Shahid Sani (1986), Sharhe Lomeh, vol. 5 p. 
465; Terablosi (1982), A]-mazhab p. 347; Tabatabai (1980), vol. 2 p. 165 
50 There are a number of Ahadith which refer to the symbolic act of beating just to show one's 
dissatisfaction. According to these Ahadith, beating should not exert any pain, for instance, beating 
with a tooth brush (MaJ lesi, 1403, Bahar a]-anvar, vol. 10 1, second edition, Al-vafa Institute, 
Bayroot; Sheikh Mofid, 1989: 516, A]-moghanaeh; Hilli, Ahmed Ben Mohammed Ben Fahad, (1986: 
264) Al-mazhab Al-bare. 
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himself the enjoyment of the person and his rights to such enjoyment does not exist 
until after the payment of the return for it" (Verma, 1971: 88). 
The right to control her outside activities (permission, restriction on freedom of 
movement) 
The exclusive right to control women's activities, manners, and behaviours is 
the most important logical implication of the specific conceptualization of marriage 
in traditional Islamic discourse. A wide set of control and surveillance mechanisms 
were legitimised as the legal rights of a husband who pays for the sexual services of 
the wife through the economic trinity of mahr, nafaqeh, and ojratolmesl and in 
return expects submission (tamkin) and sexual availability at all times (fulfilment of 
promptness condition). The social networks of the wife should be kept to a 
minimum to ensure maximum fulfilment of the marital duties. Haeri implies that: 
"A permanent wife must not leave the house without her husband's 
permission, and must submit, taslim, herself for whatever pleasure he wants 
... 
if she does not obey him, she is a sinner, gunahkar, and has no right of 
clothing, housing, or sleeping" (Haeri, 1989: 47). 
Verma reiterated the same points utilizing a more informative and direct 
language: 
"A wife is bound to observe strict conjugal fidelity from the time of the 
marriage contract ... She must refrain 
from improper familiarity with 
strangers and from any unnecessary appearances in the public" (Verma, 
1971: 87). 
The ethico-juristic code of mahrameeit 51 is bom at this crucial theoretical 
point. The concept of mahram (legitimate circle of people) versus non-mahram 
(strangers) gains importance in this context. According to the codes of mahrameeat: 
"A woman can be seen unveiled only by other women, by the legitimate owner of 
her sexuality, or by those men with whom she can only have a sex-neutral 
relationship" (Moghadam, 1994: 87). The contact circle of a woman should 
preferably be limited to mahrams. Separation of space between sexes is the natural 
product of the code of mahrameeit. It has far-reaching impact for the architecture of 
A woman can only be seen by those who are mahram to her according to the description given in 
the Qur'an. 
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gender relations and social space. The husband has a right to a reasonable control of 
the personal behaviour of the wife. There is a rule of khalvat52 (private space) as 
well representing the other side of the coin of mahrameeat: 
"The husband may not allow her to receive or return the visits of strangers 
and to go out to marriage feasts or to bathe in public places. ... the husband would not be guilty of wrongful confinement or restraint if he prevents her 
from doing so" (Verma, 1971: 89). 
This may logically lead to social violence. Entirely consistent with the logic 
of sexual-economic marriage contracts, an important set of concepts in the army of 
control mechanisms in traditional Islamic discourses are the closely interrelated 
concepts forming effat-gheirat discourses, with concepts such as gheirat (sexual 
honour and jealousy), namous (sexual honour and reputation), effat (chastity), and 
haya (modesty). Gheirat is the protective and possessive shield constructed around 
women who are perceived as carrying and personifying honour (namus) of the 
Muslim man. 53 Gheirat (sexual jealousy) is the right of the owner of the sexual 
faculties to passionately and sometimes aggressively defend his territory. It is a code 
of behaviour entitling and obliging men to ensure the fulfilment of the exclusivity 
condition in the marriage contract. Women are expected to internalise the 
monopolitistic right of the man to their sexuality by observing the codes of chastity 
(effat) and modesty (haya). If they do not observe the effat-haya codes they are 
punished at different levels of society by the codes of gheirat. 54 
""The rule of khalvat, which prohibits two people of different sex who are unrelated to each other 
from being alone together in an enclosed space" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 28). 
53 One of Shia Imams believed that: "Imam Baqir said: God has not intended ghairat for women but 
for men, because for men He has made licit four permanent wives and slave girls but for women only 
one husband. If a woman shows affection for another man, she is considered zina-kar (adulterous) in 
the eyes of God. Women who show ghairat (when their husbands are polygamous) are those who are 
faithless, not those who believe in the rules of God [In another hadith, he said] Women's ghairat is in 
reality jealousy and jealousy is the root of heresy; when a woman's ghairat is aroused, she becomes 
angry, and when she becomes angry she tends toward heresy. Of course, such women are not 
Muslim" (Marriage in Islam, p. 101: cited in Mir-Hosseini, 1993: 4). 
54 The formalization of these concepts is explained in traditional discourse by the following passages: 
ASexual desire (shahvat) in woman is ten parts and in men is one part. God has chained women's 
shahvat with modesty and chastity (haya va iffat). If their modesty is taken away, it is possible that 
every man will be followed by ten women wanting to make love with him. ... Imam Ali said: What 
motivates the beasts of prey is their hunger, and what motivates women and dra"N's them to men is to 
extinguish the fire of their desire (shahvat). Modesty (haya) has ten parts, of which nine parts are in 
women and one part in men. Then, when a woman is asked for in marriage, one part of her modesty 
goes; when she is contracted in marriage, another part goes; when she gives birth, another part goes; 
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The psychology and ethics of manhood and womanhood are discursively 
constructed to serve the requirements of the traditional Islamic marriage (in which 
wives are expected to be sexually available only to a single man at a time and on 
demand) through the discourse of gheirat-effat. This set of concepts is the core 
concepts at the heart of the internal control mechanism embedded theoretically in 
the traditional Islamic marriage. 
Virginity and (forced) veiling are the satellite concepts serving as objective 
criteria gauging and operationalizing the concept of chastity and modesty for girls. 
The code of virginity is a measurement device to ensure subjective concepts such as 
chastity and modesty find objective and measurable realization. The male 
guardianship of virgin females is another institution designed to supervise and to 
ensure the chastity of daughters is preserved through the codes of virginity. In this 
context, veiling is the tangible measure of chastity and modesty and an effective way 
of protecting female's effat-haya designed to prepare women for the vital role they 
are expected to play in the context of Islamic marriage: 
"A woman is told that she should keep herself covered so that her beauty is 
not seen by anyone apart from her husband, and that she should satisfy her 
husband's sexual needs and his other wishes. If not, her place will be in hell, 
as one hadith has it. According to another one, if she refuses her husband at 
night, she will be cursed all night by angels. A man is told to make sure that 
his wife observes the rule of hejab, and to have mercy on her" (Mir-Hosseini, 
2003: 5). 
On the surface these sets of concepts seem to be moral codes, unrelated to 
violence against women, with no legal implications in the marriage contract. But this 
is far from the truth. These concepts are embedded in the legal constitution of the 
traditional marriage contract and are deemed as moral codes obligatory for wives to 
behave chastely (a long and potentially unending list of codes regarding each and 
every part of the body and mind, postures and gestures from veiling, to talking, to 
walking, to smiling, and so on) and if they do not observe the codes to the letter, it 
will have legal implications. This set of concepts is closely connected to the right of 
husbands to control their wives' activities in order to ensure their compliance with 
the terms of traditional Islamic marriage, embodying two pivotal concepts of 
when her husband has intercourse with her, another part goes; she is left with five parts, and if she 
commits the hideous act of zina [adultery], all her haya is removed. Pity the people, when all haya is 
taken from women (cited in Mir-Hosseini, 2003: 4)'. 
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exclusivity and promptness of the availability of sexual services. Exclusivity is 
intemalised through the codes of modesty and chastity (which have extensiýýe 
manifestations in walking, talking, looking (gaze), clothing, beautification,... ) 
externally measured and guaranteed by strict rules of veiling (hejab) (Mir-Hosseini, 
1996a) and virginity (bekarat). We have to remember that sex outside marriage is 
strictly forbidden; then there is no way for young girls to have legitimate sex outside 
marriage unless by compromising their modesty and chastity. The only exception is 
that in Shia laws, young girls can enter a temporary marriage, but with the consent 
of their legal guardian (although there is a difference of opinion on this), while in 
Sunni legal school there is no way for a girl to lose her virginity unless inside a 
permanent marriage (Verma, 1971). Promptness of the availability of sexual services 
is warranted by making sure of the domesticity of wives, a woman residing in her 
home, unless permitted by the head of the family to do otherwise, plus the legal 
implications associated with the notion of nushuz. The ethical code of gheirat-effat 
logically produces strict control and surveillance imposed on women (wives and 
would-be wives (virgin girls)) in all levels of society, from family to community, to 
society at large and directly leads to rulings such as the right to kill the wife (honour 
killing, ghesas (retribution) laws) in situations of indecency (adultery (zena)). While 
the codes of mahrameeiat, veiling and the codes of gheirat-effat are an integral part 
of disciplining, the mechanism of the laws of retribution (ghesas) embodies the 
punishment mechanism which will be discussed in other parts of this study. These 
sets of disciplining mechanisms (ethico-legal codes from mahrameeiat, to gheirat- 
effat, to veiling), and punishment mechanisms (ghesas laws) are designed to ensure 
that the exclusivity condition in the marriage contract is met. 
The right to polygamy 
A Muslim man is entitled to four permanent wives according to all orthodox 
jurisprudence schools, plus indefinite number of temporary marriages according to 
Shia law. The conditions inserted in the contract agreed by the two parties cannot 
deny men such a God-given right, although a woman can use the marrying of 
another woman as a condition for divorce. Verma (1971: 102) pointed out that 'The 
wife may stipulate that she would be entitled to divorce in certain contingencies, for 
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example, if the husband takes another wife ... ' "[T]he 
lack of impartial treatment 
might amount to such legal injury as would give the wife a good ground for the 
judicial dissolution of her marriage" (Coulson, 1969: 93). This could lead to 
psychological violence against women, through the constant threat of taking new 
temporary or permanent wives, or through actually practicing such an orthodox 
jurisprudence-given right. 
The right to divorce (talaq) his wife at will 
The unilateral right to dissolve the marriage contract, even without the 
presence of the wife, is secured for the husband in the traditional model. Talaq or 
divorce, in its primitive sense, means dismission or setting free (Verma, 1971). 
Talaq legally belongs to the category of unilateral acts (iqaat in Arabic). Whereas 
marriage is a form of contract based on mutual consent, divorce is a unilateral 
decision made by the husband (Haeri, 1989: 42; Mir-Hosseini, 1996a). Accordingly, 
he "can divorce his wife any time he wants" (Haeri, 1989: 42). "The same contract 
becomes irrevocable,, lazim, as far as the wife is concerned. ... its termination does 
not necessarily require mutual consent" (Haeri, 1989: 42). The irrevocability of this 
right is emphasized by Verma: "The husband has got the unlimited right to 
pronounce the divorce at any time. ... The right of the husband is absolute and 
cannot be controlled, ... "(Verma, 197 1: 100). The husband is entitled to pronounce a 
talaq at any time at his will without the consent of the wife. Talaq is the mere 
arbitrary act of a Muslim husband who may repudiate his wife at his own pleasure, 
with or without cause. There is no legal restriction of any kind and it may be 
pronounced on mere whim or caprice without any reason. Impropriety of the 
husband's conduct will not affect the legal validity of talaq (Verma, 1971: 141). 
Talaq can be declared even in her absence (Verma, 1971: 158). 
What are the rights of women in the case of divorce? How can a woman get 
divorce from her husband? The conditions under which the wife has the power to 
divorce are: marrying another wife (an agreement that the wife may pronounce talaq 
if the husband marries another wife is valid); ill-treatment of the wife"; non- 
55 According to 113 0 Civil Code a woman can apply for divorce on the grounds of the husband's mal- 
treatment. 
77 
payment of nafagheh 56; other valid conditions 57 ; and "if the husband abstains from 
intercourse for four months" (Verma: 1971: 179; Musavi Khoei, 1986; Tabatabai, 
1988). Furthermore, the arrangement of khula is a way out for women: "It signifies 
an agreement entered into for the purpose of dissolving a connubial connection in 
lieu of compensation paid by the wife to her husband out of her property (Verma, 
1971: 188). A khula is virtually a divorce purchased by the wife from the husband 
for a price: "[A] woman disliking her husband can initiate by buying back her 
freedom" (Haeri, 1989, p. 44) but "it requires the husband's consent" (Haeri, 1989: 
45). 58 Mubarat is another variation on the theme of divorce in which the feeling of 
dislike is mutual and she has to ransom herself by paying (Haeri, 1989: 45). 
Shia law allows annulment (faskh) in one of two circumstances: as a result of 
a fault in the marriage contract itself (either in its substance or in its form) or in the 
absence or presence of a condition in one of the parties (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 162). 
This case was implicitly resorted to by Khomeini to find a way to resolve the plight 
of women in practice. As one of his clergy followers observes: 
"what Imam says; whenever marital life becomes difficult for a woman, and 
we see that she can't continue her marriage, she can annul the contract" 
(Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 162). 
Some others disagree and say: 
"Given that instances in which annulment can take place are limited by 
consensus [of jurists], and [hardship] is not among them, therefore 
annulment is strongly ruled out" ((Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 165). 
Overall, it can be said that: 
"[a]ccording to the consensus of the traditional authorities, a husband's 
power of repudiation is arbitrary and absolute. He may exercise it at will, and 
his motive in doing so is not subject to scrutiny by the court or any other 
official body. His talaq is entirely an extrajudicial process, unencumbered by 
any formalities" (Coulson; 1969: 45). 
56 According to 1129 Civil code. 
57 Refer to 1029,1121,1122,1127 Civil codes. 
58 As Mir-Hosseini emphasizes: "unlike talaq, which a husband can do unilaterally, in khol' a woman 
can obtain a divorce only if her husband gives consent, for which she must compensate him. In effect, 
she must buy her divorce; she must pay for it" (1999: 29). 
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It is important to note that moral warning was used to adjust and modify the 
unilateral patriarchal power of men over women regarding the firing mechanism of 
talaq. The Prophet was supposed to have said: "Of all things legally permissible, 
talaq is the most blameworthy. " (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 84) This unilateral 
extrajudicial right to talaq leads to psychological and economic violence against 
women. 
Mutual rights 
59 
Right to sexual intercourse 
The husband gains exclusive right to access to the sexual services of the wife on 
demand. "The wife is bound to admit the husband to conjugal intercourse at any 
time with due regard to consideration of health and decency" (Verma, 1971: 87). 
The necessity of the full and unfettered, and exclusive accessibility of the wife's 
sexual services and the urgency of promptness of the submissive response (tamkin) 
by the wife is fully captured in this famous saying from the Prophet: "any time a 
husband wants to have intercourse with his wife she should not deny him, not even 
'90ne of the mutual rights is the right to inheritance from each other. The husband and wife inherit 
from each other according to the Islamic law of inheritance. The ground rule is that the male heir's 
inheritance is twice the share of the female, (See Hallaq W B.; A History of Islamic Legal theories; 
1997: 207) The issue of inheritance is one of the divisive doctrinal issues separating Sunni and Shia 
schools. Coulson (32-3) refers to this in the following passage: 
"The most outstanding rift between the two groups [Shia and Sunni schools] lies in their respective 
schemes of inheritance. This was the result of a fundamentally different approach toward the nature 
of the Qur'anic legislation. Sunni jurisprudence regarded the Qur'anic rules as reforming the existing 
customary law in a number of particulars, so that in the absence of any specific modification the 
customary law was deemed to be still operative. In the contemplation of the Sunnis, where the Qur'an 
did not expressly reject a customary rule, it tacitly ratified it. The result of this approach was ... that 
the Sunni law of succession gives pride of place to the tribal heirs of the customary law, the male 
agnate relatives of the deceased. The women to whom the Qur'an gave rights of inheritance for the 
first time are entitled, in appropriate circumstances, to the fractional proportion of the estate which 
the Qur'an allots to them. ... The male agnate, however distant a relative he might be, will step in and 
claim the residue of the estate.... For Shia the Qur'anic legislation was far from being piecemeal 
reforms. They maintained that the Quran laid down the basic elements of an entirely novel legal 
system, including a system of succession. It obliterated completely the pre-existing customary law. 
Any rule of the customary law which was not expressly ratified by the Qur'an was tacitly rejected. 
... On this 
basis Shia law marshals all relatives, male and female, agnate and otherwise, into a single 
comprehensive scheme of priorities based exclusively upon the nearness of their relationship with the 
deceased. Within this scheme any descendant of the deceased, male or female, has absolute priority 
over any collateral-, so that the daughter of a deceased Shia Muslim will totally exclude his brother, 
and, a fortiori, any more distant male agnate such as a cousin, from succession, and will inherit the 
whole of her father's estate. " 
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if she is riding a camel" (Haeri, 1989: 47). Exclusivity and immediacy of the 
availability of sexual services occupies a canonical and structural place in the set of 
the husband's rights over the wife. I have named these conditions the fulfilment of 
which is obligatory on wives the exclusivity condition and the promptness condition. 
On the other hand, the wife's right to sexual intercourse is perceived to be 
neither exclusive nor immediate. "Legally, men are required to spend every fourth 
night with one of their wives. This is known as the right of sleeping arrangement, ... 
[however] he is not required to have intercourse with her', 60 (Haeri, 1989: 47). "Hilli 
in his Sharay, [specifies] that a man should not abstain from intercourse with his 
wife for more than four months" (Haeri, 1989: 59). Unlike her husband's, the wife's 
right to sexual intercourse inhabits a marginal place in the set of the wife's rights 
over the husband. The husband has the immutable right to polygamy (up to four 
permanent wives common to all schools of Islamic laws plus unlimited temporary 
wives according to the Shia laws), indicating no element of exclusivity; and sexual 
intercourse is seen as a right for the wife and an obligation for the husband only 
once in four months, indicating no element of promptness. This asymmetry in terms 
of the right to sexual intercourse (securing exclusivity and promptness conditions for 
men and negating both of them for women) is a canonical part of the traditional 
Islamic marriage. 
One of the other manifestations of asymmetric treatment of male and female 
sexuality in the traditional Islamic marriage is the rule regarding intermarriage, 
according to which Muslim men are allowed to marry either permanently (in Sunni 
laws) or temporarily (unique to Shia laws) with the women of the Book, while 
Muslim women are strictly forbidden from such an exercise in all schools of Islamic 
laws. As Haeri indicates "many ulama sanction[ed] intermarriage between Muslim 
men and the women of the book - Christians and Jews (and some even included 
Zoroastrian 61 women) but without hesitation rule[d] out intermarriage between 
Muslim women and non-Muslim men" (Haeri, 1989: 36). Verma refers to this 
ruling: "a Muslim male may ... contract muta (temporary marriage) with a 
60 Some reported that if the man avoids his conjugal duties for eight months divorce can be requested. 
Four months is from the woman's first reference to the court. See Tusi, "Al-nahayafil Mojarad al- 
feqh va al-fatavi " vol. 2, translated and edited by Sayed Mohamad Bagher Sabzevari, (1983). 
61 Zoroastrian are the follower of Persian Prophet Zarathushtra the founder of Zoroastrianism in Iran 
around 6,000 BCE. He advocated the worship of Ahura Mazda, the (Lord of Wisdom). According to 
this religion the world is governed by two forces: the Spirit of Goodness (Spenta Mainyu) and the 
Spirit of Evil (Angre Mainyu). 
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kitabia [woman]" (Verma, 1971: 118). This reveals an underlying philosophy about 
the place of women in Muslim consciousness, directly or indirectly producing 
violence against women (communal ownership of women, or seeing women as the 
honour of the family, community, nation, and the whole Islamic Ummah). 
The right to good behaviour 
Based on the 1103 Civil Code, both husband and wife are obliged to act with 
good behaviour. According to a famous saying from Imam Ali, Muslim men should 
treat their wives like flowers (Feiz al-Islam, 1972) 62 . In this context, good masters 
are those who do not abuse their absolute power as the head of the family (see 
Mchar, 1977). In response, loyal wives are those who faithfully and whole-heartedly 
serve their masters. 
Summary 
These sets of rights and obligations are based on gender difference 
discourses implemented, supported and justified by orthodox jurisprudence. This 
will be discussed in the next section. Due to some limitations in this thesis I only 
discuss the nature theory which is widely supported by traditionalists. 
Gender-difference and Gender-equality Theories in Contemporary Iran 
In different sections of this chapter the attempt is to locate violence against 
women in the wider traditional Islamic discourse. The focus is on providing an in- 
depth analysis of the roots and origins of the orthodox jurisprudence-based 
discourses which could mediate in the emergence or justification of violence against 
women. One of the branches of the knowledge structure which institutionalises 
violence against women is the gender-difference discourse constructed to support 
the image of women reflected in the mirror of traditional Islamic marriage. In 
reaction to the Qur'anic injunctions with a seemingly strong tone of inequality - 
62 Nahjol-balagheh 
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indicative of a lower status for women and suggestive of various restrictions being 
imposed on women -a patriarchal reading was the most likely in terms of testimony, 
inheritance, marriage and marital sexual relationships, divorce, retribution, veiling, 
etc. Ironically, the same verses which came to symbolize the liberating spirit of 
Islam, in a gradual refashioning of the harshness of the pre-Islamic patriarchal order 
in the eyes of modem Islamic reformists, became fuel for a patriarchal reading of the 
holy text and an impetus for the revival of the same patriarchal order. In a 
patriarchal reading, all of these verses reflected an image of women as second-class 
citizen in the Islamic order, who were expected to perform a pre-deten-nined specific 
set of roles. 63 The first Imam of the Shia Ali Ibn Abu-Talib's harsh views on 
women, contained in a sermon delivered after the Battle of Camel, led by Ayesha, 
the Prophet's widow, provides a good example for this type of reading of the 
Qur'anic verses. It reads: 
"0 people! Women are deficient in Faith, deficient in shares and deficient in 
intelligence. As regards the deficiency in their Faith, it is their abstention 
from prayer and fasting during their menstrual periods. As regards deficiency 
in their intelligence it is because the evidence of two women is equal to that 
of a man. As for the deficiency in their shares that is because of their share in 
inheritance being half of men. So beware of the evils of women. Be on your 
guard even from those of them who are (reportedly) good. Do not obey them 
even in good things so that they may not attract you to evils" (Feiz al-Islam, 
1972, Nahj ol-Balagheh, sermon 78: 150-52). 
Imam Ali further exemplifies this type of reading in the following passage from his 
will to his son, Imam Hasan: 
"Do not consult women because their view is weak and their determination is 
unstable. Cover their eyes by keeping them under veil because strictness of 
veiling keeps them [good]. Their coming out is not worse than your allowing 
an unreliable man to visit them. If you can manage that they should not know 
anyone other than [you. ] do so. Do not allow a woman matters other than 
those about herself because a woman is a flower, not an administrator. Do 
not pay her regard beyond herself. Do not encourage her to intercede for 
others. Do not show suspicion out of place because this leads a correct 
woman to evil and a chaste woman to deflection" (Nahj ol-Balagheh, Letter 
31 (Will): 434-35). 
63 These misogynistic ideas are widespread in sayings, poems, metaphors, ahadith and ravayat. 
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It was further reported from him saying that: "Woman is evil, all in all, and 
the worst of it is that one cannot do without her. " (Nahj ol-Balagheh, Saying 235: 
539) The contrast with the famous saying of the Prophet could not be greater, when 
he said I love three things from this world, woman, fragrance, and prayer. 
Sorush, an influential religious reformists, refers to the image of womanhood 
derived from those Qur'anic injunctions based on orthodox jurisprudence reading: 
"The majority of our ulama - even men of politics - when talking about 
women, their guide is orthodox jurisprudence, that is, their ideas, their 
images come from a set of Rulings they have in mind, then they create an 
image of women to reflect it" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 241). 
A post-hoc gender-difference discourse is constructed to justify and 
naturalize the orthodox jurisprudence reading of the Qura'nic injunctions. The 
important point is that orthodox jurisprudence rulings inevitably create an image in 
the minds of each and every believer about the value, worth, place and position of 
women in the family, community and larger society. Orthodox jurisprudence mostly 
works largely through this mechanism of image-making. The image sets the terms of 
gender relations and structures the bargaining power in a relationship and this acts as 
the major factor in systematic and justified suppression of women in all walks of life 
and in all aspects of social reality. The orthodox jurisprudence-based mentality 
discovers a unifying essence behind the Rulings and extends it into a fully-fledged 
discourse on gender difference. As Sorush puts it: "put together, these statements 
[from Imam Ali] suggest that seeking women's advice and involving them in affairs 
of society should be avoided; that is, it's Muslim men's duty to keep their women 
secluded, to control them, and not to allow them a say. If we add orthodox 
jurisprudence rulings, the picture that emerges is even more devastating for women" 
(Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 222). Islamic marriage bestows women a specific place in the 
Islamic order. This positioning needs to be justified by a theory of gender difference 
naturalizing gender relations and a division of labour enshrined in the traditional 
marriage. Post hoc explanations were sought to justify the orthodox jurisprudence- 
based formulation of marriage. As explained by one of the defenders of orthodox 
jurisprudence in the debate with Mir-Hosseini: 
"This is what we call a post hoc explanation. Many things have been taken 
for granted in Islam, for instance the ban on women acting as judges, and 
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then reasons have been sought. If you see that there's a consensus among 
Jurists, and none of them has said explicitly that a woman act as a judge, it is 
because, in giving a fatwa, a Jurist must provide his own reasoning and can't 
say that he follows others. To find reasons, he appeals to anthropological 
arguments, such as difference in nature between men and women, ... " (1999: 176). 
A fixed notion of gender roles is constructed to legitimise the role and place 
envisaged by the traditional formulation of Islamic marriage. The basic strategy in 
all its versions (traditionalist, neo-traditionalist, and even modemist versions) is that 
men and women are bom to be different in their human capacities. Despite sharing a 
common level of humanity, nature designed them differently to perfon-n different 
roles in the human society. In summary, the order of events unfolds as follows: 
Islam emerged in a strictly patriarchal society, with strong tribal ties, which 
suffocates individuality and choice; it tried to reform it in a gradual manner, 
according to a modem reformist reading. However, the Qurdnic Rulings revealed to 
improve the fate of women were hijacked by the agents of the old order, and 
interpreted to indicate the perpetual inferiority of women; the image of woman as an 
inferior being was then supported by a series of attempts to construct a rational 
theory of gender difference. 
The institution of marriage was constructed based on a patriarchal reading of 
the text. The traditional structure of marriage presumed and further solidified the 
division of labour inferred from the Qura'nic injunctions. To rationalize the position 
of women in the traditional Islamic marriage, a gender-difference discourse was 
constructed to elaborate on the initial image reflected in the patriarchal mind. To 
rationalize the apparent inferior position of women in the holy text, several 
elaborations were offered, with a few exceptions, almost all of them with a 
patriarchal spirit. The following variations of formulations of gender-difference 
discourse have evolved in the Islamic context. It should be remembered that none of 
these discourses are seen as truth or as immutable per se. They are constructed to 
serve the patriarchal reading of Qur'anic injunctions. Thus, they may change if and 
when the audience of these theories rises above them and finds them unconvincing 
and even offensive. They have presentational values and not substantial values. 
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Nature theory (Motahari) 
Nature-theory versions of gender difference are an innovative attempt by the 
adherents of the traditional orthodox jurisprudence to meet the challenges of 
modernity which made the two previous discourses untenable. The traditional 
orthodox jurisprudence-based gender-difference discourse reformulated itself in the 
form of a complete natural theory. The principles of this view are as follows: 
Spiritual equality 
This property was developed to clean up the face of orthodox jurisprudence- 
based gender-difference theory from stigmas of overt belittlement of women's status 
and worth in old discourses. The old argument needed a face lift centred on a denial 
of inhumanity and inferiority of women, which are deemed unpleasant for modem 
tastes. The common humanity of man and women was acknowledged but not in 
terms of human rights, rather in terms of spiritual equality which interpreted as (and 
common possibility of achieving) spiritual growth through obedience to God. This 
spiritual equality was given by the neo-traditionalists as a chance to put a human 
face on the orthodox jurisprudence-based discourse of gender difference and, at the 
same time, allowed them to keep the idea of social gender inequality intact and 
repackage it in the form of complimentarity and balance. 
Principle of independence 
In terms of this principle, the adherents of nature theory maintained that 
women are not born of and for men. This principle sought to replace the slavery 
theory. They have their individuality and freedom of choice; but their individuality 
is manifested in their capacity for spiritual growth and not in terms of choosing a 
social path for individual falfilment. Their individuality was not allowed to embrace 
the right to seek pleasure and fun and to attain socio-economic and political status. 
They were deemed to have fixed set of roles to play in the traditional Islamic order, 
justified in terms of their biological make-up. The right to ownership was not 
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understood as an active participation in the economic life of the nation, rather only 
as a passive receiver of inheritance and windfalls. 
Principle of natural gender difference 
This principle amounts to natural division of labour in which women's chief 
task is to create peace and serenity for men and the rest of the family. Women's 
delicate constitution required a delicate role for them. In this essentialist discourse 
femininity and masculinity were constructed as two opposite poles embodying fixed 
characteristics. Motahari, a very influential deceased clergyman, argued that the 
physical, psychological and sexual differences between men and women inevitably 
translate into different obligations and rights, including different systems of sanction 
and punishmen (Motahari, 1979). Motahari maintains that "men's nature is totally 
different from women's. Women want to be loved, men want to love; women want 
to be possessed, men want to possess; women are the hunted and men are hunters... 
(Motahari, 1979: 164-5). This theory, he argues, is based on nature. The 
characteristics attributed to the dichotomy of man/woman are as follows: 
"Men are stronger, more rational, more aggressive and more in control of 
their emotions. Women are weaker, more easily excited, more emotional and 
less emotionally stable, although they are more in control of their sexual 
desires. Men are slaves of their sexual instincts, they want to appropriate and 
dominate women's bodies. Women are slaves of their love and want to 
dominate men's hearts. Men's passion is primitive and aggressive; women's 
passion is passive; man by nature is the embodiment of desire and demand, 
and woman is the embodiment of the beloved and the desired" ((Motahari, 
1979: 173-5). 
Ayt Azari Qomi, a deceased clergy in Qom, adheres to the same line of reasoning in 
the following passage: 
"It is in women's nature to be intimate with only one man, and this is a 
prized quality that compensates for her other weaknesses. ... The internal 
affairs of the home, which revolves around pure emotions and feelings, are 
entrusted to someone who has them [women], and affairs outside the home, 
which involves reason and wisdom, are entrusted to men. And because the 
general management of the family needs reason, wisdom, and management 
skill, man is the ultimate decision maker and woman is the adviser in the 
86 
intemal affairs of the family and what relates to them" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 
63-4). 
This leads to the ultimate logical conclusion that men are naturally inclined 
to be in charge and women are predisposed to be subservient. Men have rights and 
duties corresponding to their natural call and women have rights and duties 
harmonious with their delicate nature. This theory manages to restore the natural 
patriarchal order of things, not based on inhumanity or inferiority of women but 
based on respectable scientific theories of biology and nature. 
One of the major implications of this theory is to declare that what, at first 
sight, is perceived to be unjust is just on deeper reflection. The set of rights and 
obligations of a Muslim woman which is seen as discriminatory is justice in 
disguise. The women are told to re-evaluate their doubts and acknowledge the 
deeper harmony embedded in the traditional Islamic order between society and 
nature. Women are invited to discard the empty lure of a Western way of life and 
feminist propaganda: 
"Motahari stresses that dissimilarity of rights as between men and wornen,, 
within limits set by nature, is compatible not only with justice and natural 
laws but also with the well-being of the family and society" (Mir-Hosseini, 
1999: 117). 
According to this reading, Islam granted women all their rights and apparent 
disparities in rights and duties between men and women are natural and reflect the 
essence of divine justice. 
Conclusion 
What can be inferred from the above set of rights and responsibilities 
regarding the rules and regulations related to marriage and post marital obligations is 
the philosophy and vision underlying and informing the traditional Islamic marriage; 
the Property model (the legal model) does not conceive of a shared matrimonial 
regime. 64 The marriage contract establishes the man's authority over his wife. It is 
his duty to provide for her and it is hers to submit to him. Haeri rightly points to the 
64 -Marriage creates no common area of ownership. The husband, as the head of the household, is the 
sole owner" (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 119). 
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fact that the legal requirement for a wife's obedience towards her husband rests on 
this element of exchange in the marital transaction (1989: 37). Thus, it becomes his 
prerogative to punish his disobedient wife financially, psychologically and even 
physically. This explains why the wife's grievances against her husband (being 
physically and verbally abused, locked in the house, and unable to see her parents) 
were regarded as insufficient grounds for divorce. As Haeri maintains "... the court 
disregards psychological cruelty and requires tangible evidence of physical violence, 
... "(1989: 71). The nature of a woman's obligatory duty is entirely sexual and 
is 
summarized in sexual submission or tamkin, which is the core duty of a wife. As 
Afshar pointed out, "There is a degree of agreement that tamkin involves the 
willingness of wives to remain in the husband's domicile and only leave the house 
with his permission" (1998: 136). Her fully acknowledged right to own property and 
to keep her assets and income under her own name, even after marriage, in addition 
to her entitlement to mahr, maintenance and ojratolmesl are strong indications that 
the Muslim wife in traditional Islamic discourse, at a theoretical level, is not 
perceived or exploited as cheap labour. Her work was recognized in private domain. 
This may well explain the assumption that if she works she can be paid. 
Theoretically, her economic function was not deemed to be a core defining 
component of a Muslim woman's place in the Islamic order. Consequently, we can 
draw the conclusion that a Muslim woman is not a vital part of the system of 
production of physical goods and services. Furthermore, as argued before, 
traditional Islamic marriage must be understood separately from reproduction; 
reproduction is a by-product of marriage and not the main purpose of it (as quoted 
from Langarodi and others earlier (cited in Haeri, 1989). It is, thus, safe and logical 
to conclude that a Muslim woman's main function is not reproduction either. Ayat 
Azari Qomi, a deceased clergy in Qom, "states his view that women's primary role 
is to satisfy their husbands' sexual needs; if these are unsatisfied then men become a 
danger at work or in society. " (Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 72) Hence, if, for instance, one 
hires a person as a cook, one cannot demand housecleaning as well, unless otherwise 
agreed upon (for details see Schacht, 1964). Thus, in traditional Islamic order 
marriage is an institution mainly designed to release the believer to worship God, 
after being satisfied sexually in an organized and orderly fashion. It is to control a 
male's wild and volcanic sexuality by satisfying it in order to free him to perform 
God's will on earth (Sabbah, 1988). Orthodox discourse constructs sexuality as a 
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seemingly boundless source of impulsive energy caught within a dynamic of 
creation and destruction. Through the mediation of the institution of the traditional 
marriage, it can create sexual pleasure for men and financial security for women 
(Motahari, 1879) and, as a by-product, allow the Muslim community of believers 
(Ummah) to reproduce itself and to worship God in an orderly fashion. All in all, 
when regulated, it can create a perfectly harmonious society manifesting the glory of 
God and ensuring Heavenly eternal life for its residents (Motahari, 1879). If left 
unregulated, it can cause death and destruction, and bring the whole Islamic order 
into disrepute. The intense erotic pull of sexuality when unregulated can become the 
sole obsession of men and make them forget their eternal life and submerge 
themselves in the myopic world of sexual pleasure, making them stray from the 
divine path. The ideal traditional order in the family best manifests itself in a 
husband who exercises his God-given right of mastery with kindness and utmost 
care and vigilance and a wife who serves her master faithfully. She, according to the 
contract, must satisfy her master's desires and obey him in every aspect of her life 
which is directly or indirectly related to making sure of his exclusive access to 
women's sexual services. Most ulama agree that women are naturally different from 
men and this attitude strongly overshadows every aspect of both men and women's 
life and automatically results in some resolutions about women's rights. As Mir- 
Hosseini pointed out, the design of mahr and maintenance right might have been a 
progressive one in a traditional society, where women had less chance to access to 
some resources, but nevertheless, for modem days they need to be modified and 
reconsidered or women should be offered choices over their life (her autonomy 
verses marital obligations). The power imbalance between women and men, with 
women as second-class citizens or half human beings (regarding the share in the 
legal system), may have some implications in using violence against women in a 
family environment in practice. The important question is how do men extract 
sexual services to fulfil promptness and exclusivity conditions? There have been 
some attempts to ensure that women fulfil their duties. This is done with the help of 
institutions such as marriage, and discourses employed to ensure their compliance. 
Women are offered "reward"' discourses such as motherhood, while a punishment 
package (the unilateral right of men to divorce, custody, polygamy, mahrameeit as 
segregation of space, veiling, permission, tamkin, nushuz, seclusion, the institution 
of guardianship and the ethico-legal discourse of gheirat-effat) is also in place, with 
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the purpose of disciplining them. The problem of extraction is prevalent wherever the 
human element is the subject of transaction and it has profound effects on the gender 
relations and violence against women. Veiling and mahrameeat make the marketing 
of female sexuality prohibited at all times. After marriage it violates the exclusivity 
condition (the husband is the sole owner) and before marriage it creates chaos and 
corruption in Islamic order 65 . The role perceived for women in the traditional 
orthodox jurisprudence model of marriage naturally and logically reflects itself in a 
set of theories of gender difference, according to which a powerful and rational 
masculine being is in charge of the social world versus a fragile, emotional, and 
irrational feminine being, who is in constant need of protection and who can 'only 
provide emotional services to the Muslim family, besides her main task as provision 
of sexual services to the Muslim husband. After the logical progression of the 
Muslim woman from an autonomous agent to a subservient entity in the contractual 
framework of traditional Islamic marriage, her subservient position had to be 
justified by an essentialist discourse of gender difference in all aspects of life. 
Women had to be portrayed as inherently inferior to men to make their intrinsic 
position as obedient to men intelligible. This explains why the gender inequality 
discourse emerged in the context of the traditional Islamic discourse. In the main 
body of these discourses woman is always made of man 66 and for man, in one form 
or another. As Sorush puts it: "What we find at the root of Islamic thought is that 
men and women's roles are assigned, defined, and not interchangeable; in this view 
woman fulfils her role in society through man, that is, she restores to men, the main 
actors in society, their lost balance and peace" (in Mir-Hosseini, 1999: 236). The 
inadequacy of the legal system in recognizing women as whole human beings who 
should be given the same rights as their male counterparts has no positive result in 
admonishing physical, psychological and economic violence against them. 
Therefore, there should be some attempts to destroy the existing discriminations in 
the legal system and provide a safe ground for women who are suffering in a violent 
relationship. 
65 Moghaddam (1994: 87) points to this important function of veiling: "A woman can be seen 
unveiled only by other women, by the legitimate owner of her sexuality, or by those men with whom 
she can only have a sex-neutral relationship. " 
66 Refer to the creation of Eve from Adam's rib. 
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The discourse of motherhood was constructed as a reward mechanism to 
motivate Muslim women to continue to perform their socially inferior roles. 
Motherhood could bring Heavenly rewards for women (we have to remember the 
fact that the traditional discourse always accepted the spiritual equality of men and 
women, despite denying social gender equality). As Haeri puts it: "because of the 
inherent assumptions of ownership and purchase in an Islamic contract of marriage, 
although both men and women are assumed to be partners in the contract, only men 
are automatically and ideologically perceived to be complete, 'full' individuals: 
biologically, legally, socially, and psychologically. They are considered to be 
independent, superior, and dominant" (Haeri, 1989: 67). Gender difference is a 
discourse constructed to naturalize the outcome of total ownership and total 
obedience in the framework of traditional Islamic marriage which was designed to 
control the powerful force of sexuality. As Mackinnon argued "sexuality is the 
linchpin of gender inequality" (1982: 533). How can playing an inferior and 
obedient role in marriage be justified other than by resorting to an essentialist 
discourse depicting women as naturally different and inherently unequal to men? 
The Muslim woman is born into a specific position and then she has to be of a 
specific type fitting her God-determined place in the Islamic order. The orthodox 
jurisprudence-based formulation of marriage and its associated army of sexuality 
discourses, gender-difference discourses, motherhood discourses, honour-chastity 
discourses attempts to create a woman who freely opts for the path of self-sacrifice 
for the bigger good of the men and the whole 'Ummah'. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
The concern of this study was to explore the local conditions and factors 
leading to violence against women in the Iranian society with Islam (in its Shia 
version) as the mainstream discourse. Violence against women is a global 
phenomenon; it, however, embodies itself in local patterns and is rooted in regional 
interplay of factors. Broadly, I was interested to find out what are the factors 
involved in causing violence against women in the Iranian society and to ground it 
in the complex reality of the lived experiences of Iranian women and to investigate 
domestic violence from the varying perspectives of the main parties involved, 
namely women, men and the judicial system. The nature of my study prompted me 
not to reduce my study to physical violence but instead investigate violence against 
women in its more subtle and diverse forms of social, economic, and psychological 
violence as well. Bearing in mind that the relevant literature (ref, chapter 1) shows 
that violence against women is institutionalized and functions regardless of class, 
age, ethnicity, level of literacy, personality characters and local culture. I made an 
attempt to select my informants from different social and economic background. 
I designed my study to investigate domestic violence against women in Iran 
by applying reflexive methodology. Reflexive methodology, as Alvesson and 
Skoldberg (2000: 5) stated, is "a reflexivity that constantly assesses the relationship 
between 'knowledge' and "the ways of doing knowledge. " The two basic 
characteristics of reflexive methodology are 'careful interpretation' and 'reflection'. 
I attempted to practice pluralism inherent in reflexive methodology and to be an 
example of Haraway's (1991) cyborg (which I will address later) to enable me to 
construct a richer and fuller picture of the reality of the experience of violence 
against women and to increase the odds of achieving a set of more objective 
research outcomes (objectivity as defined by feminist philosopher of science, 
Longino (1990) which I will address later on). In the following sections of this 
chapter I will introduce research design and methods and the methodology I adopted 
to collect data and different stages of analysis of data. The limitations of the study 
will be discussed as well. 
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Reflexive Methodology 
Feminist methodology tries to create a connection between ideas, women's 
experience, and reality (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 2003). Regarding violence against 
women, I believe reflexive methodology, with its subtle and complex structure, 
manages to achieve this aim (connecting the ideas about why there is violence 
against women and how people construct their discourses regarding violence, with 
the lived experiences of women, and what really causes violence against women 'out 
there') by incorporating the best of modernist tradition (some form of realism, 
critical or historical) and postmodernist insights (regarding the critical role of 
language in the process of knowledge production), without falling prey to obvious 
and disruptive contradictions. This is quite consistent with what feminist 
methodology is trying to achieve, incorporating the insights of poststructuralism and 
postmodernism, without losing connection with reality of women's lives and 
experiences (Ramazanoglu & Holland, 2002). Reflexive methodology as formulated 
by Alvesson and Skoldberg (2002) contains four levels of interpretation (quadri- 
hermeneutics): handling of the empirical material (constructing and extracting 
participants' interpretation of their own experience), discursive interpretation of 
those materials (addressing 'how' question), critical interpretation (addressing 
'what' question) and reflection upon the researcher's authority and role in the 
research process and outcomes. It presumes that there is no method to access the 
reality or experience as 'they really are' except through interpretations. Scott (1992: 
37) offers a classic statement in this regard when she comments that "experience is 
at once always already an interpretation and is in need of interpretation. " Reflexive 
methodology as an interpretive methodology relies on a theory of understanding in 
which "Knowledge of what others are doing and saying always depends upon some 
background or context of other meanings, beliefs, values, practices, and so forth. 
Hence, for virtually all postempiricist philosophies of the human sciences, 
understanding is interpretation all the way down. " (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000: 531-2) 
This manifests that there is no way to runaway from interpretations and gain 
access to the extra-discursive and extra-interpretive reality. It is interpretation all the 
way down. Awareness of the ubiquitous presence of interpretation in all stages of 
research is an integral part of reflexive methodology. 
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"Reflexive interpretation is the opposite of empiricism and theoreticism (the 
use of a single abstract framework offering a privileged understanding) ... Reflexive interpretation also breaks with postmodernism, as this is usually 
formulated. The idea of reflexive interpretation is to allow room for elements 
other than the problematization or privileging of the rhetorical -textual 
relations, and to avoid the latter dominating. A totalization or privileging of 
the rhetorical -textual dimension is rejected, not least because empirical 
material does not get an adequate chance. " (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000: 
249) 
In this framework I will have the scope to reconcile my feminist impulse 
regarding keeping connection with the women's pains and suffering as a result of 
violence (keep my research grounded in the social reality of violence against 
women) and insights from the 'language turn' in poststructuralism via preserving "a 
concern with what interviewees are saying as well as with how they get to say it" 
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000: 249). 1 was not forced to leave all types of truth 
claims behind, while at the same time, my level of awareness regarding the 
discursive nature of knowledge is kept high. I was able not only to deconstruct the 
discursive structure of the interview materials, but to "show how what is being said 
relates to the experiences and lives being studied. " (Silverman, 2001: 97) 
What primarily determines the value of reflexive methodology is not the 
following of set procedures but in on awareness of the various interpretive 
dimensions at several different levels, and the ability to handle these reflexively. 
"The kernel of rationality is a question of reflection [in the sense of] addressing a 
multitude of levels of domains rather than procedure" (Silverman, 2001: 289). 
Reflexivity occurs in the interfaces of different levels as the researcher learns to look 
at the same materials from different angles to demonstrate that "data can be analysed 
to show the dynamic interrelatedness of the what and the how" (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 1997: 127). The freedom to reflect emerges from the interplay of different 
levels of interpretations against each other. 
The following sections will address each of the four levels of quadri- 
hermeneutics in turn. I am quite aware that this stage by stage analysis is only for 
analytical representation, otherwise they are interwoven levels of analysis at each 
and every moment of research process. At first, I will discuss the methods and 
procedure of gathering the participants' accounts. 
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First level: Participants' interpretation of their own experiences 
Methods 
To do my research I employed qualitative methods. Qualitative methods suit 
the nature of my subject matter and my research questions as they allowed me to 
have access to the meanings attached to violence against women. 67 A long-standing 
tradition (Schwandt., 2003) in social science (neo-Kantian historians and 
sociologists, such as Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel, Weber, and Collingwood) has 
indicated that what distinguishes human action from the movement of physical 
objects is that human action is meaningful and thus can be grasped only in terms of 
the system of meanings to which it belongs. Furthermore, qualitative inquiry avoids 
objectification and homogenization of women and allows me to act as a midwife for 
their diverse voices and their narratives to emerge alongside a full expression of 
emotion - rage, sorrow, affection, and ambivalence. Qualitative inquiry, in addition, 
allows practicing care and compassion in addressing highly sensitive (Lee and 
Renzatti, 1990), private, unofficial and invisible (Oakley, 1974,2000) subject 
matters such as violence. The rich and diverse set of materials obtained through 
qualitative inquiry paves the way for a more comprehensive and holistic picture of 
violence against women to emerge, which has roots in the lived experiences and 
everyday lives of women. Sandra Harding (1987: 2; as quoted in Seale, 1998: 38) 
"argues that all methods, or evidence gathering techniques, within social science fall 
into one of three categories: listening to or interrogating informants, observing 
behaviour, or examining historical traces or records. Feminist research may use any 
or all of these. " 
To generate data I applied mainly in depth face to face interviews (Oakley, 
1974 & 198 1)68 with most of my participants. Additionally, I used other qualitative 
methods such as life history and focus groups whenever appropriate and possible. I 
employed the life history (or 'life stories', 'life narratives', 'oral histories') 
69 
technique (Plummer, 2001) to generate rich data, mainly in relation to women 
67 As De Vault (1996) and Reinharz (1992) argue feminists choose the approaches to research that 
suit their diverse perspectives and satisfy their objectives. 
6' Feminists believe that the indepth interview, which involves direct contact with the participant, is 
one of the best methods for generating rich data. 
69Like Plummer (200 1)I use these terms interchangeably. 
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farmers. 70 The popularity and suitability of the biographical method in studies of 
womenýs lives is 'for reading a social "group" that does not often speak on the social 
stage, more precisely, whose discourse has not, until recently, been perceived as 
legitimate'(Chanfrault-Duchet, 1991: 77). This method assisted me to construct a 
reciprocal relationship with the participants (Harding, 1987; Personal Narratives 
Group, 1989) and smooth the progress of the communication. Women were happy to 
tell me the story of their life and their lived experiences and I was pleased that I was 
"listening to, recording and understanding women's own descriptions and accounts" 
(Maynard, 1994: 11). 1 was giving 'a voice' (De Vault, 1996: 32) to 'previously 
voiceless' women (Gluck, 2002) or 'mistranslated women' (Behar, 1993). 'It is 
particularly valuable for uncovering women's perspectives' (Anderson and Jack, 
199 1: 11 in Gluck& Patai (ed. ), 199 1). 
I found the experience of my focus groups very useful, although I was fully 
aware of those who highlight the disadvantages of focus groups, as they argue that 
the participants with dominant characters can overshadow the more inhibited 
participants and manipulate their views (Litoselliti, 2003). Doing this research made 
me realize that the main issue is to choose the right and appropriate method that can 
fulfil the aim of the study. The highly sensitive subject matter of this research 
required a flexible approach in employing different qualitative methods with 
different types of subjects in different contexts. I had to tailor my interview 
techniques and research questions to my interviewees and to the situation in which 
the research encounter occurred. Meanwhile, I found that naturally occurring 
conversations (Silverman, 2001) was a very useful way to produce data. 
I prepared an interview guide 71 and I used tape recorder whenever possible 
and I took notes when it was not appropriate due to the sensitivities of time and 
place. 
The encounter between the researcher and the researched is the site of the 
first level of hermeneutics through which the 'data' is constructed. In this stage, it is 
70 As Plummer put it, 'the gathering of a life history will entail the subject moving to and fro between 
the developments of their own life cycle and the ways in which external crises and situations (wars, 
political and religious changes, employment and unemployment situations, economic change, the 
media and so forth) have impinged on this' (Plummer, 2001: 39-40). 
1 Appendix B 
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assumed that direct access to women's experience is impossible. The binary of 
gathering data and interpretation is not sustainable anymore. As Scott pointed out 
"experience is at once always already an interpretation and is in need of 
interpretation". As Alvesson and Skoldberg put it "The interview is an expression of 
the interpretive work of the subject, both in relation to relevant aspects of life and in 
connection with the interview situation . ..... (2000: 261). The acknowledgment that 
any empirical material is a construction, and consideration of the interpretive 
character of all observations, interview statements, questionnaire answers, and the 
like are important elements in reflective research. At this stage, the main concern 
was to act as a caring and skilful midwife to give birth to the participant's 
interpretation of their own experience of violence. I stayed committed to the spirit of 
empiricist feminism (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000) in making women's experience 
(Oakley 2000) the centre stage of the research without treating it as the foundation 
of true knowledge or essence of reality. I hold the position that there is no way to 
have access to the women's experience of violence in its totality and its pure and 
unmediated form. This is a positivist dream which was shattered after the 'language 
turn'. Skeggs notes that the accounts of her respondents "are just as partial as [her 
own] selections. " (1997: 28,162) The nature of interpretation is always participatory 
and dialogical. Now the question is how a researcher can do the job of midwifery 
well enough to be able to achieve an authentic, honest, and willing account of 
womenýs experience? It is worth noting that, although interpretation is always a joint 
adventure, the authorship of the interpretation at this level mainly belongs to the 
participant, while at the other levels of interpretations, the authorship mainly 
belongs to the researcher. It is also worth noting that authenticity is still important, 
even if we adopt a purely constructionist approach to interview. Authentic accounts 
make the researcher able to have access to the full richness of the interpretive 
repertoire of each participant; a wife may have an interpretive discourse in front of 
her mother which is different from her mother-in-law, both different from when 
talking to other women, still she may take the position of silence when attending a 
session with men. It is important to have access to the full range of strategies and 
narrative versions available to the participant. As Gergen and Gergen put it (2003; 
580) "Once we realize the possibility of multiple voicing, it also becomes evident 
that each individual participant is polyvocal. " It is important to create a fertile 
ground to hear all of these voices. This version of authenticity is independent, 
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although not incompatible, with/from authenticity as true reflection of what 
happened in reality. To get access to different voices of women, in some cases, I had 
a great chance to interview them over a period of weeks in different contexts (e. g. as 
a wife or as a mother-in-law in different settings, either alone or at the presence of 
their family or in the company of their husbands). 
Participants 
Following the logic of polyvocality inherent in reflexive methodology (my 
adopted methodology), I attempted to reflect the voices of victims of violence 
alongside the perpetrators and those who provide religious (implicit or explicit) 
sanctions or prohibitions for such an act. This enabled me to think about the three 
different perspectives separately and in relationship. I interviewed altogether 62 
individuals: 40 women 72 ý 14 men 
73 and 8 people involved in the judicial systeM74 fo r 
the prevalence of domestic violence and their perceptions of the 
legitimate/illegitimate reasons behind all types of act of violence against women. 
Having different groups of the interviewees gave me a fuller picture of both the 
interpretive repertoire and the reality of causes of violence against women. In the 
following sections I will explain the procedures I undertook to get access to these 
groups. 
Participants' location 
My research was based in Gilan 75 province situated in the north of Iran. 
Gillan lies along the Caspian Sea. Due to its humid and moderate climate, with 
plenty of annual rainfall, it is an agricultural region with mainly rice as the most 
important produce. Its unique natural settings - green and forested, mountainous and 
coastal - attract many domestic tourists to the region. The city of Rasht is the centre 
of the province. People mainly speak the local dialect (Gilaki). In spring (the 
plantation period, nesha) and in September (the harvest time, dero) women work 
72 Appendix (C) 
73 Appendix (D) 
74 Due to confidentiality issues I can not provide the judicial official's characteristics. 
75 The province of Gilan has a population of 2,241,896 with 13,952 (km. 2) and 5.387 (Mi. 2) 
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hard in the farm. This is a source of income generation for women. There is a gender 
division of labour in the farms. While women are extremely busy in the spring (for 
plantation), men's main job, the harvest, starts in September. However, sometimes 
both men and women get involved together in doing these seasonal jobs. In my 
interviews with women farmers I realized how the gender division of labour in the 
farm is highly important in the abuse of women by their husbands, their families 
(especially mothers-in-law) and male relatives (these will be discussed in the 
following chapters). My interviewees were mainly from three different towns 76 with 
different backgrounds. There were two interviewees from Tehran one of them was a 
female lawyer and the other was a civil servant. 
Procedure to get access to the women participants 
My research questions guided me to select my participants from all walks of 
life using snowball technique which was proved to be highly efficient. To find the 
interviewees many people helped me. Being a local (knowing the local language) 
and having connection to a variety of people helped me to interview different people 
with different backgrounds. Through my mother-in-law, a house wife, and a fanner 
herself, I could get access to her neighbours and relatives who were willing to talk to 
me. Being a teacher and an academic woman living and studying in the west it could 
be very difficult to get access to these women without experiencing some problems. 
They could trust me and open their hearts and minds because I was acquainted to 
them by my mother-in-law. Through my friends and my family, I could get access to 
middle class and upper middle class women. Most of them were educated or highly 
educated women who were either housewives or professionals. 
A number of the interviewees knew me formally. Some of the younger 
participants were my sister and my former students (in the past). A few of the older 
generation were the parents of my former students. This by itself helped me a great 
deal to gain their trust. A teacher is usually regarded as a respectful and trustworthy 
member of the community. It was fascinating for me to find out that I was held with 
such a high regard in the community. Even those who held office did not feel any 
risk when I approached them. My initial thought was that if I declared my research 
subject, violence against women, they would reject me and even cause trouble for 
76 Due to confidentiality I cannot provide the name of the towns here. 
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me. I however did not experience any major obstacle to my work and enjoyed high 
levels of cooperation. My personal background and connections played a large part 
in paving the way for my smooth landing in the research field. I approached them 
informally through friends who themselves held office. I explained the nature of my 
research and my academic interests and intentions. However, unlike Western 
academic research which gives guidelines in relation to codes of conduct and ethical 
procedures (e. g. Association of Social Anthropologists 1999, British Sociological 
Association 2002), 1 could not fully explain the interviewees' rights and present 
them in the form of consent letters. This had the risk of losing the interviewees' trust 
and comfort and putting them in a formal setting and could damage the entire 
interview or even mean not having any interview at all. I orally explained to them 
the issues needed to be raised such as their right of withdrawal whenever they 
wanted or their right of anonymity and so on. It is very important to note that blind 
application of Western concepts of ethical codes in a different context may produce 
adverse results, compared to what the original intended aims and purposes of these 
codes were. Major rewriting and restructuring of the ethical codes of research is 
required in each and every context to match the historical and contingent 
sensitivities of time and place. Jieyu Liu (2005), in her work in China, pointed to the 
same fact that because China (like Iran) is a relational society, she had to modify 
some of the western ethical issues she found problematic in her research. 
The notion ofpower in relation to the women interviewees 
Finch (1984) argues that being a woman can help greatly in facilitating the 
relationship between researchers and the researched. Other feminist research suggest 
that other factors, such as class, social status, race, age, can play a major role in the 
relationship between the interviewer and interviewee (e. g. Ribbens 1989). 
Throughout my research, I tried to keep a friendly and informal setting, so that my 
interviewees would not feel that they were only part of a research project providing 
research materials for me. The conversational and easy atmosphere of the interviews 
encouraged women to openly tell me things they have never told anyone else, 
especially in relation to their sexuality. However, in such cases they asked me to 
turn off the tape-recorder. 
100 
I relied on empathetic identification in order to create an atmosphere of 
listening and trust, based on avoiding hierarchal relations to attain an authentic 
account of participants' experience of violence. I attempted to disrupt the usual 
epistemological power relation between the researcher and the researched by 
reminding myself that my participants were not only 'knowns' and 'knowables, but 
'knowers'. I treated my participants as co-producers and mines of fresh and new 
insights into the structure of power/knowledge creating violence against women. 
This was useful in terms of providing an opportunity for me to clarify, revise, or 
change any particular preconceptions I unconsciously or consciously carried over to 
my research field. Skeggs (1997: 2) maintains that her study demonstrates "How 
theory can be radically transformed if others [participants] are let in on the 
conversation. " I did my best to organize my interviews in several sessions to stir the 
generation of atmosphere of trust and friendship. I hoped that my empathy, plus my 
honest intention to put the knowledge attained during this encounter to uncover the 
causes of violence against women in order to reduce it in society at large, would 
create an atmosphere of friendship and emotional intimacy where souls are bared 
and pretence is stripped away. 
This personal investment and involvement proved to be crucial in breaking 
the ice and my being allowed entering the different layers of interpretive repertoire 
of each participant; "Personal involvement is more than just dangerous bias - it is the 
condition under which people come to know each other and to admit others in their 
lives. " (Oakley, 1981: 58). As Skeggs (1997: 207) puts it, "The development of 
trusting relationships between researcher and researched and the goal of using social 
research to further the interests of the people who participate in research studies, has 
been the avowed aim of many feminist social researchers. " One example of how this 
caring and feminine approach to the relationship between the researcher and the 
participant would work was given in Oakley's work (1981: 50) when her participant 
says: I could never speak to my own doctor about it. You see I feel like this but I 
can talk to you about it and I can talk to my sister about it. " 
Women were pleased to unload their unhappy experiences, but at the same 
time they wanted me to inform them of my personal opinions in order to find ways 
to achieve peace and harmony in their own social reality. Before the interview, I 
explained to them that I could not do anything except listen to their stories and share 
their pain. I informed them of my duties as a researcher rather than a reporter or a 
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family consultant or a psychoanalyst. It was difficult and frustrating to see some of 
77 them were sobbing and crying throughout the entire interviews . But at the end they 
admitted that they were really happy to have done the interviews. They admitted that 
they felt relief. I met some of them later on at different occasions and I could talk to 
them freely and share my information and opinions about different subjects they 
inquired about. 
Most of my interviewees did not have any problems with, or resistance to, 
the tape recorder. I assured them that their identities would be kept anonymous and 
pseudonyms would be used instead. They were all given the pseudonyms right at the 
interview settings. This created a relaxed atmosphere in which they could share their 
stories with me without being worried about anything. It is interesting to note that 
the older women did not have any problems at all; they were happy to tell me their 
real names and a few of them were thinking that they would subsequently appear on 
the TV or radio programs. They even welcomed it. In one instance, one of them was 
trying to cover her hair and wrap herself tightly into her chador and speak formally. 
I explained to her that I was only recording her voice and that was only for my 
personal use. 
Overall, women were happy to talk to me, both those who were thinking that 
their stories would be broadcast on the media and those who did not feel 
comfortable initially with sharing their intimate problems with me. The subject of 
violence against women and women's rights is not a new subject for Iranian people. 
There are many discussions around. On reflection, although I could make an easy 
relationship with older, illiterate and fanner women and their talkativeness helped 
me to find out more about their experiences, I felt more comfortable with younger 
generation, especially those who were educated. Normally, the duration of the 
interview with these women was longer than the older women. On some occasions I 
had to explain the terms to them, for instance, some of them could not comprehend 
the word 'violence' (khoshoonat) so I had to put it differently to make things 
understandable for them. 
77 1 must confess that there were some occasions where I cried with my interviewees. 
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Procedure to find participants in thejudicial system 
To find the participants in this group I used my husband's connections. 
Through his influential friends I could get access to professional men and women in 
the judiciary, which provided me with a unique and great chance to interview 
judges, lawyers and clients. I was granted permission to read the files and attend and 
observe the natural workings of the court, talk to the staff and a number of my men 
and women interviewees. Had it not been for informal access provided by these 
people I would have needed to go through a set of painful, time consuming and 
hopeless procedures to get access to my participants; especially access to the 
judiciary people could have been hampered seriously. 
The participants comprised of four male judges plus one female consultant, 
two lawyers one male and one female 78 , and one male clergy (he was the 
representative of Velayat-e Faqih 79) and a lecturer in the region of Gilan. Most of 
them were middle age with the exception of a young lawyer in her early thirties and 
all of them had degrees in higher education. 80 In-depth face to face interviews with 
semi-structured questions were conducted in all cases of this group. The duration of 
the interviews varied between 20 minutes to three hours and, in some cases,, three 
days, depending on their time and conditions. I let them ask any questions they had 
about me and my research. I started my interview by asking how the system deals 
with domestic violence in general and then throughout the interview I asked more 
specific questions and finished the interviews by asking them about any personal 
views and opinions they wanted to add. Different places were selected to conduct 
the interviews: the courts, offices, the participants' houses, or a friend's house. 
I conducted one interview with the head of one of the branches of the 
judiciary system in one of the cities in Gilan. I was informed that he was a 
conservative Islamist with strong feelings and views on Islamic values. I met him a 
few times in his office and he let me attend a court hearing and gave me permission 
to interview men and women who were there. After attending a few sessions in his 
office, witnessing a few cases, I requested an interview with him. He accepted but he 
78 She was from Tehran. 
79 Political leadership- in the absence of the divinely inspired Imam - bestows on thefaqih or jurist 
who is the most qualified person to lead the community. This concept was introduced by Khomeini, 
the first leader of post-revolutionary Iran. 
80 The clergy man was also a graduate from Hozeh-e Elmiyah-e Qom in religious studies. 
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was not willing for the interview to be recorded. He asked me a few questions about 
my educational background and when I told him that I studied psychology he 
showed some interest and asked me a few questions. He told me that he had passed 
psychology course at university. We had an interesting conversation which 
facilitated the environment for me to develop my questions. 
I conducted two interviews in the family court in one of the city with two 
individuals, a male Judge (Mr Y) in his early forties and a fifty five year old female 
judicial consultant (Mrs. K. ). I was introduced to them by the head of the family 
court. It was a great opportunity because not only did they let me attend their courts 
but also they dedicated their valuable time (a whole morning) to answer my 
questions. This court was specifically devoted to family disputes. Therefore, it was a 
perfect place for me to interview both staff and clients who were there. Considering 
the little time I had, to make the interviews more productive and efficient, I tried to 
cover certain issues as much as the situation allowed and to keep our conversations 
as friendly and flexible as possible to create a trustworthy environment. The male 
judge asked me about my background and when I told him I had done psychology in 
the past he became very delighted, as he also had a similar background, but he 
explained to me that in the middle of his study he gave it up to study law. We talked 
about our common lecturers and different courses and he was showing great interest 
in my research and he willingly cooperated with me and asked his female consultant 
to participate in my interview as well. 
I interviewed another judge in the criminal court in another town. This court 
mainly deals with criminal cases; they usually refer issues in relation to the family to 
family courts. The judge allowed me to attend his court hearings, interview people 
and read their files. I also was given an opportunity to speak to him at a friend's 
house, where he felt more relaxed and talked freely about his personal views, ideas 
and even his personal relationship with his wife. The other interviews with another 
judge and his friend (a lawyer) took place in the judge's house. I behaved differently 
in different contexts. Flexibility was the key. On the whole, I interviewed four 
judges. On three occasions my husband accompanied me and his presence at those 
meetings facilitated the interviews a great deal. The last interview took place in 
Tehran with a female lawyer in her office. 
104 
The notion ofpower in relation to thejudicial system 
In relation to the power relations between me and the very powerful people 
in the judiciary I must confess sometimes I felt intimidated. I dressed up 
conservatively with no make up exactly like the female staff there. This facilitated 
my entrance and it also helped me to gain the interviewees' trust. I always feared 
being stopped at the entrance door by the security guards or that my mere presence 
in there could raise some questions. However, my anxieties were reduced when I 
was reassured by our friends (whom I relied on from the very beginning) that it was 
'okay' for me to be there. I also reduced my nervousness by thinking positively that 
I was there to investigate and understand 81 legal issues surrounding the victims of 
domestic violence, which could help the system to be more effective in dealing with 
violence against women. 
Procedure to get access to the men participants 
One of the aims of this study was to investigate domestic violence from the 
varying perspectives of the main parties involved: women, men, and the judicial 
system. I believed that the experiences of men would increase my understanding of 
the issues highlighted in my research with women. 
However, finding men and interviewing them proved to be far more 
problematic due to my gender affiliation and the "closed culture" of the town I was 
residing in. Had the research been carried out in the capital city, Tehran, my 
experience could have been different. Talking to strangers, randomly in the street or 
parks, was too risky for me as a woman. In relation to interviewing women, for 
instance, I could talk to them in the streets, seaside and court corridors or sit with 
them alone in prayer rooms. In contrast, I could not do the same thing with male 
interviewees without jeopardizing my situation and my family's reputation". Out of 
81 Due to politicization of the 'violence against women' issue in Iran, conducting research around this 
topic was not risk free, especially when the research was being conducted by someone who was 
studying in the West. The government in Iran is very sceptical about the intentions of research. I was 
aware of the fact and this made my very nervous. Unfortunately, the risks involved in this kind of 
research could have profound implications on women's lives, since scholars avoid addressing these 
sensitive topics in a more critical approach. 
82 Gender segregation policies which were/are being practiced widely in Iran and also culturally any 
men and women's social engagement is regarded as inappropriate and could have serious 
consequences, especially in small towns. 
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the 14 men I had the chance to interview, only three were total strangers. I met and 
interviewed two of these strangers in the courtroom whilst the other was a taxi driver 
I interviewed for about 40 minutes (the duration of travelling from one town to 
another) while he was driving. The most appropriate way to have a relaxed, in depth 
and face to face interview was to do it in the presence of the others, such as family 
members (in a group gathering) or in a family house with the attendance of my 
husband. The II other male participants were recommended to me either by friends 
and family or by their wives (some of whom were my female interviewees). This 
helped enormously in breaking the ice and social taboos, particularly in the context 
of one of the most religiously conservative towns in the northern region. The group- 
gathering interviews proved to be the most useful method in order to elicit 
information and raise more questions. The duration of the interviews was longer 
than any other type of interviews. The duration of interviews was between 20 
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minutes and 3 hours. To conduct interviews I travelled to three different towns . In 
addition to interviewing these men I also had permission to read the files in the 
family court. One of the files was related particularly to domestic violence. 
I started each interview by introducing my research and myself. I explained 
to my male participants what they needed to know about the interview and let them 
ask questions, informing them that they could withdraw from the interview at any 
time. Depending on the contexts and the nature of people (as well as different 
places), I put my questions in different shapes and forms. For example, once, while I 
was introducing the subject of my research to one of the male participants, I asked 
him whether 'it ever happened to him to beat his wife 84' and he angrily responded to 
me that my question was wrong. When I asked him how I should put my question he 
replied: 
"ZT: what should I ask, do you think? 
H: you should ask what she did wrong to deserve to get beaten. 
ZT: so you think she did something wrong and deserved to get beaten? 
H: when a man works all day and comes home tired and his dinner is not 
ready on the table, whose fault is that? If I beat her is it my fault? " 
83 Due to confidentiality I do not cite the name of these towns. 
84 In her interview, his wife also reported had been beaten for not making food ready on time. 
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I learned my lesson and when I met him again in a group gathering with 
others I told my male participants that I was interested to know about family 
conflicts and the reason behind husbands and wives' disputes. I did not see any 
reasons to ask these men whether they beat their wives or not right from the 
beginning. This is firstly, some of them were introduced to me by their wives I had 
already interviewed and who had told me about their husbands' violent behaviour 
and secondly during interviews when the conversation had developed naturally 
enough they eventually admitted to their violent behaviours. However, they tried to 
justify it and to convince me that they had good reason for doing so. 
i o- 
r uwer' in relation to men interviewees 
I must confess here that due to my personality, which I feel is forthright and 
not shy or submissive, I had great difficulties in listening to these men. Nevertheless, 
to my surprise (and those who know me) most of the time, I controlled my emotions 
and did not allow them to interfere with my work. I constantly reminded myself that 
I was in the field doing a research project and my job was to listen to my 
participants and not to make any confrontations. At the end, I succeeded in 
abstracting myself from the emotive situations and used skills learned in the 
methodology course to carry out successful interviews. My experience revealed to 
me that my gender and my participants' gender played a major role in my work. As 
a woman, I had great advantage in approaching women, especially regarding such 
sensitive issue as violence. Regarding the 'power' relation between me and my 
female participants, all my efforts were aimed at reducing it to create less 
hierarchical relationships. However, this was different for my male participants. 
Culturally and socially as a woman I have been situated in a lower position to my 
male counterparts from the beginning. As a woman I am highly educated, mature, 
married and the mother of two children. Each of these characteristics helped me a 
great deal to build up a power relation with the male participants. I needed to assert 
my power in order to be able to control and gain respect from some highly volatile 
men who raised their voices and used aggressive body gestures. I had to be firm in 
order to control my male participants in a group as they all wanted to take control. 
Sometimes their wives (whom I had interviewed previously) were present in these 
meetings and most of the time they quietly listened to the issues raised in the 
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interviews 85 
. Eventually, I built up constructive relationships in which men felt they 
could talk to me with no fear of being judged. From the very beginning I informed 
my participants that I was only there to hear their points of view and ask them 
questions and, as such, they must not try to seek any confirmation from me or put 
me in difficult positions by asking me to judge between them and their wives. 
Apart from one of the participants (who was a builder and had little 
education) the rest were educated or highly educated, professional men. Their ages 
ranged from 21-60 years old. 
The Insider /Outsider issue 
It is true that through empathy and honesty I was able to have access to the 
keys of my participant's world, but was I able to grasp the terms and meanings of 
the participants' narratives pertinent to their experiences? My insider position as an 
Iranian woman (and as a local woman) gave me some advantages to be able to 
decipher subtleties of verbal and non-verbal language (pauses, emphases, laughs, 
signs of doubt, ridicule, body movements, ... ) and what is left unsaid and excluded. 
These delicacies may seem "apparently trivial, but [are] often crucial" (Silverman, 
2001: 33) in reaching to the heart of what participants try to say. Silverman offers 
the example of research being done on cancer patients on whether they had adequate 
understanding of their conditions as being fatal. In this research patients' reactions 
emerged in the very soft utterances (like 'yes' or, more usually 'mm') (Silverman, 
2001: 34). The importance of these subtle forms of expression was initially missed 
by the researcher. As Schwandt (2003: 297) puts it "the idea of acquiring an 'inside' 
understanding - the actors' definition of the situation - is a powerful central concept 
for understanding the purpose of qualitative inquiry. " 
Nevertheless, being insider, in terms of sharing language and culture or 
gender, may not be enough. Skeggs (1997: 209) points out that being a woman is no 
guarantee: "Social class and ethnic differences between interviewer and interviewees 
can put up barriers at least as high as gender differences. " Virginia L. Olesen (2003) 
reports a set of articles regarding problematization of the conceptualization of 
insider/outsider issue. Kath Weston's report of her struggles with these issues 
"These women told me after the interviews about how they enjoyed seeing a woman running the 
meeting and managing their stubborn men. 
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summarizes the problems: "A single body cannot bridge that mystical divide 
between insider and outsider, researcher and researched. I am neither, in any simple 
way, and yet I am both" (1996: 275). 
1 see Gadamer's concept of 'fusion of horizons' as a possible way of creating 
a possible crack in what Weston calls "mystical divide between insider and 
outsider". For Gadamer, to understand others means to understand their worlds, to 
venture into other individuals' meaning-fields. Every world is a 'horizon'. To delve 
into another individual's horizon, one needs empathy, but it is deemed as not enough 
because, for existential hermeneutics, every individual is inevitably enmeshed in her 
own meaning field. What is required is transcendence from our own individual 
horizons. Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 84) point out that "the existential 
hermeneuticians advocate a constant alteration between merging into another world 
and linking back into our own reference system. By means of this movement back 
and forth, we can successively come to an understanding of the unfamiliar reference 
system, something which also leads to the gradual revising and/or enriching of our 
own; there is a 'fusion of horizons' (Gadamer, 1989: 306-307). " By following the 
logic of fusion of horizons as an integral part of reflexive methodology, I was 
hopeful to break some of the walls of unfamiliarity between 'self (the researcher) 
and 'the other' (the researched). Bohman (1991; quoted in Alvesson and Skoldberg, 
2000: 85) believes that we can break the walls of incommensurability and achieve 
fusion of horizons through the power of conscious reflection. 
In order to access the participants' interpretation of their own experiences I 
needed to translate and thematize their body of statements from Persian (Farsi) to 
English. The next section will address these two issues. 
Processing the data and writing up: The procedure to find the themes in 
interviews 
I transcribed all the tapes which took almost a period of 3-4 months. To be 
absolutely accurate, sometimes I had to listen to the tape repeatedly. I referred to my 
notes where I wrote down some of the information my interviewees did not want to 
be recorded on the tape (but were happy with the notes). I assigned the participants 
pseudonyms, as I promised, to respect their trust and observe the codes of 
confidentiality. I translated all the interviews to English which proved to be a very 
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difficult and time consuming task. The result was a huge amount of data. In the next 
stage I read them again and codified the data into some themes. While doing so I 
selected the common themes, however I did not ignore some of the specific cases. 
Some of these common topics emerged as a result of the questions I asked each 
participant and a few others came about as a result of data analysis. The 
thernatization of the participants' accounts is the co-product of the participant and 
the researcher, with the participant having the main role in highlighting and stressing 
the main themes in the process of the research questions. 
The first interpretive stage generated empirical materials for further analysis 
at the discursive level (interpreting participants' interpretation) and critical level 
(critical interpretation). 
In the following sections, I will reflect on the discursive interpretation of the 
participants' accounts. 
Translation 
Birbili (2000) suggested that there is a need for the social researchers who 
translate the data from one language to another to be precise in explaining the 
translation procedures. To translate my questions, topics and instructions from 
English to Farsi and in the translation of the participants' accounts from Persian to 
English I was helped by my supervisor who is fully fluent in both languages. 
Nevertheless, I brought Birbili's points into my consideration to achieve 'conceptual 
equivalence or comparability of meaning' (Birbili, 2000), 1 made an effort to 
produce meaningful and reminiscent translations of my questions and instructions. 
Before conducting the study on my main participants, I did a pilot study on a small 
group of close relatives who were willing to take part. This helped me to acquire 
some useful information about the use of appropriate terms and different ways of 
using the language. For instance, I found that I needed to use different meanings for 
the word 'violence' (or khoshoonat in Persian) to my women interviewees (this is 
explained in another section of this chapter). To translate the participants' accounts 
from Farsi to English I used Persian dictionaries 86 and to translate the metaphors, 
idioms, and proverbs I provided both translation and explanation where it was 
86 Aryanpour Persian Dictionary: http: //www. aryanpour. com/ 
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appropriate. I was careful to take into account the cultural contexts. This will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Second level: Discursive interpretation of participants' interpretation (the 
discursive level) 
At this level, I concentrate on the discursive structure of the participants' 
interpretation of their own experience of violence. I treated the interview materials 
not as mirror image or map of inner or outer world, but as speech acts analysis of 
which preoccupies us. Alvesson and Skoldberg describe the discursive level in the 
following terms: "The discursive level, at which language use and expressive mode 
do not stand for - or are not interpreted as- something else (for example, reflecting 
external conditions or the minds of the language users), but are themselves the 
object of study. What is then interesting ... is the way different people in different 
contexts express themselves on the subject of their ideas, the motives of others, 
events and so on. " (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2000: 209) At this level I focus on 
'how' people construct their arguments and make sense of their own experiences by 
resorting to the interpretive repertoire (the portfolio of discursive resources available 
to them in their culture). Discourse analysis and the Derridian type of deconstructive 
analysis can lay bare the fairly comprehensive picture of the interpretive repertoire 
available to each participant. Discourses which people employ to tell their stories 
about violence they experienced and the commonalities and differences between 
participants can emerge and the full range of influential discourses through which 
women5s experience of violence is formulated can be highlighted and investigated. 
It is interesting to find out how, to what extent and with what different varieties men 
and women or judicial officials replicate or deviate from the traditional orthodox 
discourses of marriage and its ethico-legal, ontological, and epistemological 
discourses (see chapter 2) in their attempts to construct narratives of violence against 
women. In essence, I treat the interview materials as texts in themselves irrespective 
of whether they tell us anything about external or internal worlds. I use a wide range 
of analytical tools such as hermeneutics, discourse analysis, and deconstruction 
analysis to unravel the patterns and regularities, coherence and contradictions and 
binary structures embedded in the structure of power underlying the construction of 
narratives about violence. 
As Alvesson and Skoldberg put it, at this stage "The basic overall rule is to 
treat all empirical material as expressions of culturally standardized discourses that 
are associated with particular social settings" (2000: 234). Accounts of 'experience' 
are understood "as the outcome of a particular textual/cultural history in which 
people learn to tell stories of their lives to themselves and others. Such narratives are 
embedded within the sense-making processes of historically and culturally situated 
communities" (Gergen & Gergen, 2003: 578) 
This discursive interpretation of accounts of experiences should be 
contrasted with the positivist approach to them. In a positivist approach 'accounts' 
are 4simply representations of the world'. By contrast, constructionists are interested 
in documenting the way in which accounts "are part of the world they describe" 
(Silverman: 2001: 95). Following a social constructionist direction, this level of 
analysis involves thinking about how the respondents are using culturally available 
resources in order to construct their stories. As Richardson suggests: "Participation 
in a culture includes participation in the narratives of that culture, a general 
understanding of the stock of meaning and their relationships to each other. " 
(1990: 24; quoted in Silverman: 2001: 100). 
Treating lies, errors, contradictions and ambiguities 
The possibility of lies, deception, errors (Van Maanen, 1979) cannot be 
excluded or totally eliminated. But that is part of human interaction and to some 
extent unavoidable. When I suspected a participant had told me lies or if they are 
inaccurate in their accounts, I attempted to determine what he or she hoped to 
achieve by deceiving me. This type of, discursive investigation transforms lies and 
deceptions into "normal and interesting" data, which could lead me to the 
interpretive repertoire of Iranian culture. If we treat interview material as speech acts 
aimed at achieving something, what image is the person trying to construct, and 
why? This naturally leads me to the historically and culturally legitimate discourses 
of Iranian society. If we treat interview material as speech acts aimed at achieving 
something, what image he/she is trying to construct and why? This naturally leads 
me to the historically and culturally legitimate discourses of the Iranian society. Lies 
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and deceptions have analytical value for the researcher. Errors are unavoidable and 
part of human fallibility and relying on my own cultural self and other sources I 
tried to reduce the effects of errors on my analysis of the data. Regarding how errors 
should be handled in the research, Cicourel (1964: 74; quoted in Silverman; 2001: 
96) argues that we must learn "to conceive of the error as evidence not only of poor 
reliability but also of "normal" interpersonal relations". 
Another even more relevant and sensitive question is how I should treat 
contradictions and ambivalence in the positions and views of individual 
participants? I made an attempt not to press contradictions or ambiguities into 
coherence. This takes us into important ontological realm of polyvocality or 
presumption of cohesive self. One of the strong ontological assumptions 
underpinning the modernist project of progress and positivist social science was the 
perception of self as cohesive, unified, purposeful, and stable (Flax 1995). As 
Gergen and Gergen (2003: 595) point out: "Informed by Enlightenment conceptions 
of the rational and morally informed mind, [scholars] place a premium on 
coherence, integration, and clarity of purpose. ... the conception of singular or 
unified self is both intellectually and politically problematic". I broke away from 
this ontological assumption and embraced the poststructuralist conception of self as 
socially constructed, and divided, contradictory, and decentred. But I tried to avoid 
totalizing such an ontological assumption and saw self as cohesive in some contexts 
(such as against a sworn political enemy) and multiple in others. 
A participant may take contradictory positions regarding violence against 
women when put in a position of wife, compared to the positions of a mother or a 
step-mother. These possible contradictions offers valuable insights (Hurtburn, 2003) 
regarding the nature and content of interpretive repertoire in Iranian society, which 
can be a good guide to the role of the orthodox jurisprudence's formulation of 
marriage and its associated discourses of sexuality, gender difference, and 
motherhood (see chapter 2). William F. Whyte has observed: that "In dealing with 
subjective material, the interviewer is, of course, not trying to discover the true 
attitude or sentiment of the informant. He should recognize that ambivalence is a 
fairly common condition of man - that men can and do hold conflicting sentiments at 
any given time. Furthen-nore, men hold varying sentiments according to the 
situations in which they find themselves" (in Silverman; 2001: 112). 1 attempted to 
be sensitive to the contradictions and ambivalence and act as a midwife when they 
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were about to emerge. Ambivalence and contradictions convey messages to the 
researcher about what the participants are trying to achieve by falling prey to 
ambivalence and contradictions, consciously or subconsciously. In a sense I 
abandoned the positivist ideal of "one man one voice". 
In addition, I attempted to reflect coherence when it emerged as well. I tried 
to be open to embrace individuals as cohesive in some contexts (such as in dialogue 
on the political realm) and contradictory in others (such as dialogue on family life). I 
left the door open for signs of ambivalence, doubts, undecidedness, and playfulness. 
The positivist design of research (experiments, questionnaires, and structured 
interviews) is based on a strong ontological assumption of self as cohesive and 
purposeful, and without ambiguity and contradiction. The poststructruralist approach 
views self as decentred, contradictory and multiple. In the spirit of avoiding 
categorical and binary thinking and fully consistent with reflexive methodology, I 
perceived self as cohesive and cantered, contradictory and decentred, ambivalent 
and doubtful pending on the contexts and realm of dialogue. For example, in front of 
superiors (or in the context of a dialogue about superiors) a person may reveal or 
construct a cohesive self, while in front of subordinates or family and friends an 
individual can let her/his contradictory or ambivalent self emerge. "Postmodernists 
are certainly right in questioning whether 'properties such as unity, identity, 
permanence, structure and essences, etc. are privileged over dissonance, disparisaty, 
plurality, transience, and change. " (Chia, 1995: 58) "Rather than celebrating and 
privileging the second set of concepts, avoiding both forms of categorical thinking 
and being open to the selective use of each of them whenever it seems productive 
may be the most fruitful route to follow" (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000: 196). 
Following the spirit of Derridian deconstruction (Hughes, 2002), 1 also paid 
particular attentions to what is unsaid, unsayable or excluded, as part of Derridian 
deconstruction applies to any text, including the materials obtained in interviews and 
conversations and even during interviews and conversations. 
Third level: Critical interpretation (addressing "what" question) 
At this level an attempt was made to connect the interview materials to the 
experience of violence in social reality. As Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 208-9) 
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put it at this level, the interview materials and other utterances are "used as the 
starting-point for more extensive interpretations of other phenomena ... [such as] 
conceptions (values, ideas, motives and so on) ... and actions and social conditions 
where research aims to say something solid about relations, behaviours, events, 
social patterns and structures 'out there"'. I connected the empirical materials to the 
internal and external worlds of participants regarding violence against women. At 
this level the researcher uses her own interpretation to connect the participants' 
interpreted and narrated experience to the reality of violence against women. The 
researcher uses her own interpretive repertoire to make sense of what is at the roots 
of participants' experience of violence. The concentration is firmly on interpreting 
the interview materials as regard to the "what" question. What causes or justifies 
violence against women in reality. At this level I did not presuppose that my women 
participants had a privileged position to have access to the truth of what causes 
violence against them; they might or might not. Clarifying the issue as to whether 
they indeed provided valid knowledge of the true causes of violence in their narrated 
experience required critical analysis. 
I could not submit to the idea that via being in the position of victim of 
violence or due to their gender identity they had special access to the truth of their 
own situation. They might or might not suffer from false consciousness or they 
might offer only a partial knowledge of what is really at the roots of their 
misfortune. Scholars of standpoint theories view feminist consciousness an 
achievement (Hughes 2002). 1 adopted the position that nobody, the researcher, or 
the researched has any special advantage to have access to the truth; what makes 
research more likely to achieve a degree of objectivity is how well it can achieve 
polyvocality. Due to my academic background, I have naturally access to a larger 
interpretive repertoire (stock of different types of theories) compared to my 
participants, which allowed me to look critically at what they perceive to be the root- 
causes of their pain in terms of the experience of violence. Loosely speaking, my 
original position is a Focualdian analysis of power/knowledge which is the source of 
my ontological position. But I tried to turn the level of critical interpretation into a 
site of polyvocality of interpretations (pluralism) through application of alternative 
theories such as Marxist feminism, liberal feminism, existential feminism or theories 
of psychoanalysis in order to make critical connection between participants' narrated 
experiences and the reality of violence against women. As Gergen and Gergen 
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(2003: 580) point out, "Researchers may reflexively locate a range of conflicting 
interpretations that they find plausible and thereby avoid reaching a single, 
integrative conclusion" and by doing so "potentially providing rich array of 
interpretations or perspectives" (Hertz, 1997). Once again, via practicing 
polyvocality (this time in terms of giving voice to participants and alternative 
theories in creating connection between interpreted experiences and the reality of 
violence against women), I showed my commitment to reflexive methodology. This 
is quite consistent with the poststructural ontology of 'self as multiple. In this case, 
the researcher's self is the centre of attention; a researcher with a multiple self 
carries impulses for different theoretical frameworks. She is not a firm and 
fundamentalist believer in any single one of alternative theories. She sees potential 
and insights in each theory from a set of theoretical repertoires. The researcher who 
follows reflexive methodology is able to give voice to her own multiple self through 
active practicing of what is called perspectivism by Nietzsche or can be an example 
of Haraway's cyborg by looking at the same subject from different perspectives. The 
set of research questions I suggested at the beginning of this chapter further ensures 
the application of Polyvocality and pluralism in my research. 
At this level the questions of objectivity and validity arises. Based on what 
criteria can I claim that my critical interpretation of the causes of violence against 
women reflects the true nature of violence "out there" against women? How can I 
inject trust in my conclusions in order for them to be used in public policy and other 
interventional forms to change the lives of women for the better? In short, the 
multiple voicing, both in my research questions section and in the critical 
interpretation, adds to the likelihood of producing an objective and valid 
representation of the reality of violence against women in Iran. In the framework of 
reflexive methodology, objectivity is reconceptualized as an active practicing of 
polyvocality and pluralism at all levels of research. The concept of objectivity I 
adopted to ensure more likely representation of the real causes of the reality of the 
experience of violence against woman is Longino's concept (which is, in my 
opinion, embodied in Haraway's (1991) cyborg). Obviously, I do not find the 
concept of strong objectivity as conceived by Harding (1987) very helpful in the 
context of reflexive methodology. One of the criteria used to assess the value of 
research is its novelty value in the sense of "developing insights, problematization of 
established ways of thinking" (Alvesson and Skoldberg; 2000: 277). As Bourdieu 
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maintains, "It is a question of achieving an epistemological break with everyday 
knowledge" (see Bourdieu et al., 1991; quoted in Alvesson and Skoldberg; 277). 1 
believe that my research may offer some novel insights regarding the orthodox 
formulation of marriage and its associated ontological, ethical, and epistemological 
discourses and how they may play an active role in generating or justifying episodes 
of violence against women in the dynamic interplay of shari'a, the orthodox 
jurisprudence, law, and social reality. 
The critical interpretation ensures that the modernist spirit of feminist 
methodology is kept alive by connecting interpretation to experience and to the 
reality of violence against women. Following a purely constructionist approach 
seems to disconnect the relation between interpretation and reality, which betrays 
the core of feminist methodology (a connection with the reality of women's 
experience). It is worth noting that while the poststructuralist approach seeks to 
deconstruct the discourse of truth and how it works to marginalize, exclude, and 
oppress the other, it cannot get away from the idea of truth (Franks, 2001). It has to 
show the connection between its deconstruction of truth and the discourse of truth 
(otherwise the deconstruction becomes the deconstruction of everything and nothing 
and falls into oblivion), which is smuggling the truth claim from the back door. 
Gergen and Gergen note that those who have a miffor theory of truth and see their 
work as transparent reflections of their subject matter "are vulnerable to host of 
deconstructive logics. Yet those who find fault with this tradition are, in the end, 
without means of justifying their critique. In the very process of depriviliging they 
are relying on the selfsame assumptions of language as correspondent with its 
object" (2003: 585). 
One of the ways sought to reconcile realistic and constructionist approaches 
is through the idea of the situatedness of truth; the truth claims are formulated as 
local truths rather than universal truth. Situated knowledge is a concept aimed at 
"reconciling constructionist and realist positions". 'Truth' is located within 
particular communities at particular times and used indexically to represent their 
conditions. Situated truth is a space between interpretations as mirror images of 
reality and nothing outside of text (Gergen & Gergen, 2003: 587). Any 
reconciliation of truth claims with a constructionist approach inevitably needs a new 
theory of language. 
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The positivist approach viewed language as a mirror of reality, while the 
poststructuralist perceives it as a self-contained meaning system with total 
disconnection between words and objects. Reflexive methodology, with its levels of 
discursive interpretation (addressing the "how" question) and critical interpretation 
(addressing the "what" question), cannot afford to ally itself with either polar cases 
of positivism or poststructuralism. It has to have a both/and theory of language 
rather than an either/or conception of it (Gergen & Gergen, 2003). Reflexive 
methodology tries to avoid categorical thinking in all its manifestations and in this 
case attempts to see language as both a mirror and a tool. Frow refers to this 
reconceptualization of language (or discourse as he calls it) in the following terms: 
"The concept of "text" or "discourse" refers to a matter which is ontologically 
heterogeneous: that is, which is not reducible to "language" or to a reality which is 
external to the symbolic, but is rather a heterogeneous mix of language and other 
(e. g. iconic) symbolization, of social relations, of built environment, of consolidated 
institutional structure, of roles and hierarchies of authority, of bodies, etc. (2003: 
586)". It's only on this basis, I believe, that the metaphor of textuality or discursivity 
can work without being reductive either to language or to social relations. 
Level 4: Reflexive interpretation (self-reflection) 
After breaking away from the positivist view of research as a standardized 
activity which can produce a set of standardized and homogenized outcomes, the 
role of the researcher in the process of knowledge production became paramount. 
The research was found to be the product of the researcher who was situated in a 
historical, cultural, and epistemological context. The researcher is expected to be 
aware of the role of her own background and her feelings in the selection of topic for 
research, in her formulation of research questions, how the research is conducted 
throughout and how the empirical materials are analysed. Self-reflexivity became an 
integral part of qualitative inquiry and reflexive methodology. 
As Gergen and Gergen (2003: 579) point out, "Here investigators seek ways 
of demonstrating to their audiences their historical and geographical situatedness, 
their personal investments in the research, various biases they bring to the work, 
their surprises and "undoings" in the process of the research endeavour, the ways in 
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which their choices of literary tropes lend rhetorical force to the research report, 
and/or the ways in which they have avoided or suppressed certain points of view". I 
kept a high-level of self-reflexivity and reflect/report actively on how my 
background and my feelings shaped my research and honestly report my questions, 
doubts, surprises, and expectations. Before the start of research, during the research, 
and during the process of writing-up, I tried to show the process and procedures 
behind the scene of research, as far as humanly possible. I intend to demonstrate 
how my own background, feelings, and interpretations jointly, with the background, 
feelings, and interpretations of the research participants, shaped the outcomes of this 
research. 
To practice what I preach, I have to report that, throughout my life; I 
witnessed or heard about cases of different types of violence against women in my 
family and my friends' families and in the larger communal and societal 
environment. I am pretty certain that all of these experiences motivated me 
consciously or sub-consciously to investigate the issue of violence against women 
and to seek its connection with the official and formal interpretation of religion. 
Summary 
In summary, the highly sensitive nature of my research topic induced me to 
chiefly adopt qualitative methods. The specific method I adopted is mainly the 
interview. I intended to conduct my research in the framework of reflexive 
methodology which, in my opinion, closely reflects the concerns of feminist 
methodology. Reflexive methodology manifests itself fully in the incessant interplay 
between four levels of analyses in all stages of research from the start (design of the 
research), through field work, and writing-up. I do not see these levels mechanically 
and linearly as separate blocks of a process of knowledge production, but as a 
dynamic and interwoven process of movement between levels at each and every 
moment of the research adventure. Throughout this chapter I attempted to clarify, as 
far as possible, my position regarding the questions of subject matter, theory, 
method, methodology, epistemology, and ontology in the framework of reflexive 
methodology. However, the whole idea of reflexivity, as Alvesson and Skoldberg 
point out, "is the very ability to break away from a frame of reference and to look at 
what it is not capable of saying. ... In reflexive contexts there cannot be definite 
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demands - at least not heavy ones - as regards theoretical consistency, in the sense 
that a particular ontological and epistemological position is strictly maintained 
throughout. The point of reflection is rather to break away from consistency and a 
narrow focus on a particular aspect, to question weaknesses inherent in the mode of 
thought one embraces (and is easily imprisoned with), to break up and change a 
particular language game rather than expanding it" (2000; 246). In the same line of 
thought on the nature of feminist research, Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002: 147) 
offer the following: "In our view, the point of doing feminist social research is not to 
score points for political correctness, or to attain methodological purity, but to give 
insights into gendered social existence that would otherwise not exist. " 
For me, the core and salient property of reflexive methodology is its constant 
and self-aware avoidance of categorical (either/or) thinking, which is fully 
manifested in centrality and significance bestowed to polyvocality and pluralism, 
and self-reflexivity. Regarding the avoidance of categorical thinking and its 
connection to pluralism, the following example is very interesting (this is in the 
context of using hermeneutics and postmodernism in the discursive interpretation of 
empirical materials): "If hermeneutics is well suited to the interpretation of texts 
possessing a basic harmony, then postmodem is well suited to dealing with 
contradictory wholes. Both, however, are guilty of totalizing their perspective, one 
in the form of universal harmonizing, the other of universal fragmentation. More 
reasonable is instead to examine the situation at hand - harmonious or fragmented - 
and then choose the methodology suited to the conditions. Thus, one should be oPen 
to both interpretive possibilities, as well as to others of a more complex kind ... 
Within hermeneutics ... and 
in postmodernism there is a rich flora of ideas and 
inspiration for the plucking- once we have managed to break the deadlock of either 
harmony or difference. " (Alvesson and Skoldberg; 2000: 104, emphasis is original). 
This departs drastically from the positivist research program which carries a strong 
impulse for standardization and homogenization. In the framework of reflexive 
methodology, "different voices are allowed to speak as against the traditional 
research ideal of limiting the number of voices (categorizing and synthesizing), 
meaning that researchers seek variation in the empirical work as well as in a more 
ambitious interpretation of the empirical material" (Alvesson and Skoldberg; 2000: 
187). 
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In applying polyvocality throughout research stages and how it connects with 
self-reflexivity, Gergen and Gergen (2003: 595) have good points to offer: "we are 
encouraged ... to recognize both within ourselves as scholars and within those who 
join our research as participants the multiplicity of competing and often 
contradictory values, political impulses, conceptions of the good, notions of desire, 
and senses of our "selves" as persons. " Polyvocality plays a crucial role in the 
emergence of new research methodologies: "the presumption of polyvocality opens 
the door to new forms of research methodology. .. methods in which multiple voices 
are given entry into the interpretive arena - voices of the research participants, the 
scientific literature, the private views of the investigators, the media, and so on. " 
(Gergen & Gergen, 2003: 596; Ribbens & Edwards, 1998) 
Ultimately, what I intend to do is the active practice of polyvocality and self- 
reflexivity in my own research on violence against women in Iran. If we 
hypothetically classify, as Shian (2000) did, the strategies of Iranian women against 
violence in terms of survival (submission), resistance through traditional 
jurisprudence, resistance against traditional jurisprudence using the reinterpretation 
of Islam, and resistance outside all versions of Islam, we need to understand the way 
in which people's explicit or implicit understanding of Islam leads to an increase or 
decrease in the use of violence against women. This can be done by capturing their 
own interpretations of their experiences, my discursive interpretation of their 
interpretations, my critical interpretation of the root causes of violence through 
theories of ideology, power and the subconscious, and my reflection on my own 
perceptions and preconceptions. By this means I intend to trace the role of 
traditional jurisprudence and its formulation of marriage in shaping violence against 
women. 
Reflexive feminist methodology also gives me ethical/political positions 
through the conceptualization of 'understanding' as an inherently ethico-political 
act. This can be conducted either responsibly, and with care and compassion and 
with the aim of reducing pain and oppression, or it can be conducted ruthlessly, 
selfishly, resulting in reproducing oppression and aggression in new disguises. I am 
fully aware of intense political interest in my subject matter and the outcomes of my 
research inside and outside Iran, and intend to use my research responsibly for the 
betterment of women's lives (alongside promoting my professional status as a 
feminist researcher), inflicting no or minimum harm to my participants and myself. 
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Reflexive methodology has a theory of understanding in which, as noted bý- 
Schwandt (2003: 302), "understanding is participative, conversational, and dialogic. 
It is always bound up with language and is achieved only through a logic of question 
and answer; ... meaning is negotiated mutually in the act of interpretation; it is not 
simply discovered; which leads to rejection of naive realism or objectivism". In this 
framework, understanding is an adventure and, like any other adventure, is full of 
risk, novelty, surprise and danger and in need of being morally and politically 
attentive and aware, and not like a rule-based activity. "Gadamer tells us that to 
understand is always to understand differently. But this does not mean that our 
interpretations are arbitrary and distortive. We should always aim at a correct 
understanding of what the "things themselves" [the object of our understanding] say. 
But what the "things themselves" say will be different in light of our changing 
horizons and the different questions we learn to ask. ... understanding 
is "lived" or 
existential; ... understanding as a 
kind of moral-political knowledge that is at once 
embodied, engaged (and hence "interested"), and concerned with practical 
choice"(Schwandt, 2003: 303). The whole reflexive understanding of understanding 
was nicely summarized by Smith (1997: 16) in the following passage: "All 
knowledge is interpretive; interpretation is always value-laden; values are ultimately 
expressions of some heterogeneous non-cognitive faculty, process or event (such as 
mechanics of desire, history, or the will to power); therefore truth claims are 
ultimately expressions of that non-cognitive faculty, process or event". I intend that 
"non-cognitive faculty" underpining my research to be moral values of care and 
compassion and political values of justice, fairness, and emancipation or betterment, 
for my participants, my people, myself and the world at large. 
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Chapter 4 
Sanction and Sanctuary: The Judicial System in Iran and its Role in 
Relation to Domestic Violence Against Women 
"Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only 
by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it 
induces regulatory effects of power. Each society 
has its own regime of truth, its general politics of 
truth: that is the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisitions of 
truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true" (Foucault, 1980: 13 1). 
"A woman should obey her husband, as this 
makes him really happy and fulfiled. A man 
should respect his wife and provide for her" (one 
of the judges interviewed as part of the study). 
Introduction 
The judiciary, a formal mechanism of conflict resolution, plays a major role 
in defining violence against women and designing various devices to tackle it. 
Certain questions arise: How does the system view the problem? What are the 
assumptions of the judiciary? On the basis of these assumptions, how do women and 
men formulate, conceptualise and resolve their disputes? Whose voices are 
represented, and using what discursive strategies? And to what extent can they 
influence the legal outcomes? How does the legal system use the resources and 
discourses of the community to make sense of and resolve disputes and violent 
confrontation along the gender divide? These questions will be addressed by 
analyzing the accounts of eight men and women involved in the judiciary. 
On the basis of their social and political backgrounds and current positions, 
the participants are divided into two groups: judges (who are directly involved in 
decision-making in the Iranian judiciary) and non-judges (those who are indirectly 
engaged with the judiciary: lawyers, consultants and university lecturers). They are 
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also classified according to gender. Although the participants had different 
perspectives on domestic violence and the role of the judiciary, a kind of consensus 
emerged, in which the burden of peace and serenity in the family rests on women 
through the wholehearted embrace of men's right of control over women's affairs, 
and women's submission to this power. The question arises as to whether this 
control can be exercised through violence. On this point there were some differences 
within the participants' accounts, which will be discussed at length in the following 
sections. 
In this chapter, first, I will discuss the structure of the judiciary, including the 
definitions related to the laws of the land and their sources, the process of law- 
making and the procedures designed to resolve conflicts within marital relationships. 
This will be followed by analyses of the interviews with the judges and the accounts 
of other participants (lawyers, consultants and lecturers). 
A brief introduction to the judicial system in Iran 
In Iran the law is categorised into public law and private law (Ebadi, 2002). 
Public law governs the relations between the apparatus of state and people, while 
private law addresses the relationships between private entities. The most important 
branches of private law are civil laws, which regulate the interaction between people 
based on their membership of society. One of the most important branches of public 
law is criminal law (in Iran it is called the Islamic panel law). The cases referred to 
the judicial system are resolved on the basis of these sets of laws. 
The question is, "How widespread is the use the judiciary in resolving 
criminal or civil conflicts? " How many cases of domestic violence against women or 
civil conflict are referred to the courts? This depends on two main factors. The first 
is related to people's perceptions of the judicial system in terms of matters of shame 
and honour; referral to the courts is perceived as a matter of disgrace for the person 
or her (or his) family's reputation (Kusha, 2002). The other is the extent to which 
the system is perceived to serve justice, and the efficiency of crime detection in the 
police system. Asadi (2004) reported that domestic violence cases rarely reach the 
court, and women keep their husbands' abusive behaviour secret. 
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In my interview with Mr R. 87 , 
he explained that when two people have a 
quarrel, they initially go to a wise person to resolve it. By using arbitration 
mechanisms, people try to avoid involving the courts in their disputes. They only do 
that as a last resort. The judge has absolute power in the court. He acts as jury, 
prosecutor, lawyer and issuer of the final verdict (although there are some changes 
underway to restore the office of independent prosecutor). About 15 years ago, the 
roles of prosecutor and judge were combined, and judges were given the position of 
prosecutor (as the defender of the rights of society) in addition to being neutral 
referees between the defence and the prosecution. This was believed to be the 
system of judgement at the beginning of Islam (Imam Ali was believed to be judge 
and chief prosecutor at the same time). According to Mr R., this gave immense 
power to judges and blurred their impartiality, and caused many problems. 
Therefore, the judicial system is now in the process of restoring the separation 
between the roles of judge and prosecutor. This issue came up in one of my 
interviews. Mr R. said: 
"Before the revolution, there was a prosecutor whose job was to prove that 
the accused is guilty, and there were also defence lawyers who could defend 
him or her. It was more logical, because a judge should be impartial and 
reside over a fair trial, but nowadays we don't have this system, although 
recently it was decided that we should go back to the old system. They 
started the change in Tehran. Here in Gilan, we still have a judge as both the 
prosecutor and the judge. Lawyers don't have too much influence on the 
judge's decisions. That creates a number of problems. The principle should 
be based on the judge's impartiality. For example, if a criminal is referred to 
him he must not assume that he is guilty. Principally, the person should be 
considered innocent and the prosecutor should prove his or her guilt. " 
In Iran, the sources of laws employed in the courts to issue verdicts in cases 
of conflict resolution are: 1) the constitution (Schirazi, 1998: 2) laws approved by 
referendum or laws passed by the parliament after going through the filter of the 
Guardian Council, and the regulations designed by different state bodies including 
the cabinet and other bodies, provided they are not against the constitution or 
Islamic jurisprudence's rulings; 3) the Council of Maslahat-e nezam 88 ; 4) custom 
87 A university lecturer who studied law at the University of Tehran. 
" See Appendix E. 
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and practices; 5) legal precedence set; and 6) the opinion of the jurists (foqaha) and 
legal scholars (Schirazi, 1998; Ebadi, 2002; Kusha, 2002)89. 
The potential conflicts (Arkoun, 2002) between religion, feqh, law, 
modernity and tradition (popular culture) generate major complications in the 
system, which evade straight analysis. For instance, the dependence on customs and 
their potential and real conflict with the written laws and Islamic jurisprudence has 
major implications for women's rights and cases of violence against women. 
Modernity also influences the law through the deputies in parliament, who are 
frequently affected by the debates taking place in the media, society at large and the 
international environment. The same influence is exerted through the opinion of 
legal scholars and even Islamic jurists whose views are partially influenced by 
modernity. However, the main element connecting all these sources is traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence, the ultimate decider in parliament and other bodies. 
These five sets of tensions between religion and Islamic jurisprudence (feqh), 
Islamic jurisprudence and law, law and tradition (as in the cases of polygamy and 
temporary marriage), law and modernity 90 and law and social reality (as in the cases 
of bad-hejabi [poor veiling] and grug use) require ftirther investigation. 
In summary, an overall review of the judicial system in Iran reveals that the 
ultimate formal force is the orthodox jurisprudence. There exist, however, perpetual 
tensions between different sources of the law, which destabilise the judiciary system 
and introduce a huge amount of uncertainty into the system. 
The structure of the judicial system 
In this section there is an attempt to answer the following questions very 
briefly: What are the different types of courts, and what is the hierarchy of courts in 
Iran? What are the characteristics of the judges working in the system and the chief 
of the system? What limits judges' power? What level of discretion is available to 
the judges? What are their duties? 
There are three types of courts in the Iranian judicial system; revolutionary 
courts (addressing cases (mainly political in nature) against the foundations of the 
89 For more information on the forinal structure of power in Iran, see Appendix E. 
9' in practice, this is usually caused by the demands placed on the judiciary by international bodies, or 
by activists who resort to international laws, treaties and conventions, the results of which affect the 
international reputation of Iran. 
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political system), civil courts and criminal courts9l. Family courts are branches of 
92 
civil courts addressing family disputes in matters of marriage, divorce, and so on 
Cases of domestic violence are dealt with by the criminal courts. 
According to the bill passed by parliament, judges are selected from men 
who are qualified Islamic jurists (mojtahedin) or have at least a BA in law or 
theology, i. e. university graduates or religious students who passed a certain level of 
Islamic jurisprudence (Schirazi, 1998; Ebadi, 2002). Ebadi (2002) reports that after a 
long discussion within the judicial system, the chief of the system was persuaded to 
allow women to become judges. In 1998, two women who were employed as judges 
in the Shah's regime and still remained in the judicial system were appointed 
consultants of the Tehran appeal court, with the status of judges. Ebadi maintains 
that, ironically, these appointments were illegal, as they contravened the law passed 
by parliament (according to which judgement was the sole territory of men) 93 . Later 
modifications in the law always retained the tone that women judges should be 
appointed to the post of consultant or assistant prosecutor (dadyar): for instance, one 
law was passed to ensure that family courts issued the verdict after consultation with 
a woman judge. Judges in the Iranian judicial system are almost entirely men who 
are graduates of religious schools or universities. Here one of the potential tensions 
in the system reveals itself. Those who are graduates of universities have 
experienced an atmosphere and course which differ considerably from those of the 
religious schools. 
Regarding the limits of power of judges, according to Article 165 of the 
constitution (Schirazi, 1998), judges must give reasons for verdicts issued, and 
document their reasons by providing reference to the laws and principles on which 
their verdicts are based. Furthermore, they are advised to find the verdict for each 
91 In the Iranian legal system, there are two kinds of laws: penal codes (keifari) and civil codes 
(hoghoghi). Laws regarding the family are classified as hoghoghi. The courts are more concerned 
with the penal codes, and to give verdicts they considerfeqh rulings. Most family courts are 
administered by religious scholars, and tend to make their decisions on the basis of sharia. Some of 
the verdicts issued by family courts (regarding divorce and marriage, for example) are final, and may 
not be referred to the appeal courts. 
92 There are courts of appeal in each jurisdiction. The highest court of appeal is the High Court 
(Divan-e A ali- ' ye 
Keshvar), whose chief judge is appointed by the head of the judicial system for five 
years. The court of bureaucratic justice is another body whose task is to address complaints against 
state officials and bodies. The General Audit Organisation (sazman- bazrasi-e koll-e keshvar) is 
another body in the judicial system whose task is to monitor the correct application of the law in 
governmental bodies. 
93 This is one of the examples of the way that different sets of tensions make the outcomes of the 
system unpredictable. 
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and every case in the Islamic sources and fatwas, even if they are unable to find 
them directly in the written laws. From here, each judge's legal doctrine and 
tendency can manifest itself in his verdicts. For instance, the question whether the 
man has the right to beat his wife is left unaddressed in law; the same applies to 
cases of sexual violence in marriage, except where there are obvious signs of 
violence on the victim's body. Furthermore, as we have already seen, the law-maker 
allows the judges to refer to tradition to resolve the cases, and this paves the way for 
94 judges to issue verdicts based on their perception of the tradition 
Thus, a judge in the current judicial system makes the final decision in a 
family court (and to a large extent any other court) with absolute authority, and his 
formal and personal opinions and perspectives play a vital role in individuals' lives. 
As one of the judges stated, however, being a judge is neither easy nor 
straightforward: 
"A judge's knowledge is very weak, and he doesn't dare to decide in 
accordance with his knowledge. That's either because he's not courageous, 
or his personality isn't strong enough. Not everybody can be a judge - it's a 
very difficult job, and only the prophets are able to do it, or the last Imam, 
who can convince everybody with his knowledge. I have to rely on my 
experience and my own mind. " 
As a result, the structural power bestowed upon women in these courts is 
highly limited, and male dominance is by definition the main property of the system. 
Women are left to rely on their own resources. They need to be wealthy enough, for 
instance, to pay money to their husbands (khula) to encourage them to agree on 
divorces, or to employ experienced lawyers to present their cases strongly in courts, 
in order to change the judges' opinions. In the same context of marriage and divorce, 
one of the female lawyers stressed that one of the conditions in the marriage contract 
is that the man can designate his wife as his delegate, so that she may "divorce 
94 Courts are also permitted to reduce the punishment of certain types of crimes according to articles 
22 and 25 of the Islamic criminal law. Article 170 of the constitution obliges judges not to apply 
regulations set by governmental bodies if they find them contradictory to Islamic rulings, or outside 
the power of the executive branch. The chief of the judicial system can veto any definite verdict 
issued by the courts, and refer them to another court if he considers that a particular verdict clearly 
contravenes sharia (article 18 of the modifications to the regulations of revolutionary and general 
courts). The power of judges is one of the issues investigated in my empirical work, and will be 
further addressed in further parts of this thesis. After a verdict is issued and has gone through the 
process of appeal, its enforcement is the job of the office of prosecution. This results in a new series 
of complications, which involve the police. Many verdicts may, consequently, not have the chance to 
be fully enforced in practice. 
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herself' on his behalf, at the same time, however, he has the right to dismiss her as 
his delegate. Therefore, as she commented: 
There has to be a law to stop men acting arbitrarily, which we call 
khareg va lazem or vekalat-e bela avaz". 
Lý1- 
Khareg va lazem means "outside the sphere of power, and indispensable" 
and the latter term means "irreversible delegation", or removing the man's right to 
dismiss his wife's authority over divorcing herself. Nonetheless, in the lawyer's 
opinion, the nature of each condition should be explained to both parties at the time 
of arranging the contract. 
In my conversation with one of the judges, he, however, reported that in 
practice a judge is always under the pressure of his superiors, outsiders and people 
of power and wealth. He explained that people of wealth gain access to judges' 
relatives, especially their sons, and can incite them with expensive meals in 
expensive restaurants, money, property and so on. 
This judge reported on having heard (from one of his friends and colleagues 
in the judicial system in Tehran) that files are classified into different categories. 
The first category is made up of files belonging to people who are well connected. 
These are addressed urgently, within a period of three months. The files which 
belong to people who are not quite so well connected are dealt with within a year. 
The third group includes those who do not have any connection in the system: "Only 
God knows when those will be addressed". 
Moreover, he referred to the spirit of reciprocity operating between judges 
and other powerful government officials, an unwritten code of mutual understanding 
of the "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" variety. The example given was 
that of bank officials providing well-craft loans for judges in response to favours in 
cases relevant to them; these all seem to be handled in the spirit of gift-giving rather 
than financial corruption. As a result, judges can have access to resources in the 
95 form of land, beach-houses, bank facilities and even shares 
95 Official acknowledgements of the dire situation in the judiciary system can be found in the BBC 
Persian site: hitp: //www. bbc. co. uk/persian/iran/stoDL/2005/07/050723 mf judicial-report. shtmi 
(2005) 
htlp: //www. bbc. co. uk/persian/iran/sto! y/2005/05/050504 mf judiciqu. shtml (2005) and 
httD: //www. bbc. co. uk/persian/iran/story/2005/07/050724 ra-judiciM-citizenrights. shtml (2005) 
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Moreover, this may suggest that a form of patrimonialism, "a system of 
favourites which [depends] upon personal consideration such as pure personal 
connections, promises and privileges" (Weber, 1978: 1041), operates in and around 
the system. Patrimonialism is a form of clientelism, a system of corruption in a 
society where economic and social conditions are in turmoil and there is a lack of 
government transparency, ineffective institutions, and mishandling of public office 
resources for private gains (Indriason, 2005). The weakness of the state and people's 
lack of trust in the system give rise to clientelism (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980), in 
which individuals seek alternative ways to utilise resources. Approaching civil 
servants directly and offering them favours in return for services is more efficient, 
and quicker, than relying on the government's inefficient response, which may never 
come (Komito, 1999). Clientelism and its implications for women's lives need to be 
further investigated in Iran. 
In these circumstances, the voices of a vast number of women who normally 
lack any access to the system go unheard, and women are left to their own individual 
resources, including their male connections, to be able to redirect the system to 
achieve justice or to serve their interests. These actual processes of wheeling and 
dealing involving powerful men ftirther enhance the "male dominance" aspect of the 
judiciary system. 
Judges' and non-judges' views on the permissibility and legality of domestic 
violence 
Physical violence 
Physical violence in Iran is addressed under criminal law (Hojatiy-e Ashrafi, 
2003). If an incident leads to payment of diyeh 96 (Criminal Codes 294-5), it is 
considered a criminal act, and the person who has committed the crime is charged 
and tried in the criminal court. If a husband,, for instance, beats his wife and as a 
result leaves some injuries or bruises on her body, he is tried and made to pay diyeh. 
The four male judges I interviewed agreed that beating a wife is a criminal act if it 
96 Diyeh or "blood money" 
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leads to payment of diyeh, and is therefore illegal. They believed that the law does 
not grant the husband such a right. One of the judges (Judge G) stated: 
"There is nothing in the law allowing men to beat their wives, and when we 
do not have laws we refer to the opinions offoqahas and scholars. " 
Judge A. 97 , however, admitted that there are sometimes 
differences between 
the law and the orthodox jurisprudence's textbook rulings, and further 
acknowledged that the legal system is dominated by the orthodox jurisprudence, 
according to which the husband's right to beat his wife in the case of nushuz (see 
Chapter 2) is recognised. Judge G. did not see any problem in a husband 
occasionally beating his wife. If the wife has been proven to be nashezeh, the court 
will discipline her by following a number of steps. The first of these involves 
"preaching her to righteousness". Next, the husband may deprive her economically, 
and isolate her. If none of these measures leads the woman to the right path (to 
submission), the court, and not the husband, has the right to punish her (Afshar, 
1998). Judge A. admitted that in practice he makes his decisions on a case-by-case 
basis. This means that he sometimes disregards the instructions given by the 
orthodox jurisprudence, and tries to issue verdicts in favour of women. He explained 
that although the orthodox jurisprudence gives a man permission to beat his wife in 
cases of disobedience (nushuz), according to the law physical punishment is illegal, 
and the court should decide how to punish the woman: 
"He cannot punish his wife because of her bad cooking. We confront such 
men in a seriouse manner in any court, even with a religious judge. " 
However, he believed that there are some occasions when a man may punish his 
wife: 
but if he thinks his wife is getting corrupted morally and betraying her 
husband by thinking about other men, then he has the right to take action. " 
Nevertheless, Judge A. had his own criteria about how this should be done. 
For instance, if a woman wishes to leave the house for legitimate reasons, such as 
going to work, shopping or visiting family members, she does not need her 
husband's permission. This is not disobedience, "unless her going out or her action 
97 A man in his early 50s, a university graduate with liberal views, from a high social class 
background. 
131 
results in breaking the family union or causing moral corruption [fesad]". Overall, 
Judge A. rejected the idea of a man's right to beat his wife, even when she is 
nashezeh, but deemed divorce by the husband a fair course of action. 
According to Judge Y., on the basis of the law of osr va hara (hardship), if it 
becomes evident that it is impossible for the woman to live with her husband 
according to Article 1130 of the Civil Code, she may obtain a divorce. According to 
Article 115, if a woman claims that her life is in danger, or experiences financial 
hardship, she may obtain a separation. However, Judge Y. stated that, in practice, a 
woman's evidence does not provide sufficient grounds for enforcement of the 
rulings 98 . If the court is not convinced that the woman truly is trapped in a dangerous 
situation, it will take no action. However, he was very concerned that the system is 
not doing enough to protect women who really are in peril. He was shocked to hear 
on the radio that a woman had lost her life as a result of returning to live with her 
violent husband by the court's order. He said: 
"I think we really should take these issues into consideration. Sometimes we 
hear that women who have to carry on living with their violent husbands 
because the court gave a verdict ordering them to go back home end up dead, 
or are at great risk. The court can give an order that a woman who claims her 
life is in great danger must live elsewhere". 
Judge Y. drew attention to the major crisis currently faced by the legal 
system in Iran in relation to recognising women whose lives are indeed in grave 
danger. He suggested that the court's decision in individual cases should be based on 
the woman's claims (not the court's verdict), and she should not be sent back to her 
abusive husband. There seem to be no consensual guidelines for the judges that 
would enable them to identify women at risk. His suggestion also indicates the great 
need for the provision of safe places, or refuges, for such women. 
On the other hand, when I discussed the legality of violence with Judge H., 
he first read the verse 3: 34 (Nessa sura)99 from Qur'an and interpreted it to me. He 
asserted that Qur'anic verses should not be interpreted according to people's desires 
and whims because, in his opinion, they become flawed and fallible. He believed 
that: 
98 In Persian is 'maye-e hokmi. 
99 The verse discuss about women and their rights. 
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"Although this verse refers to the chastisement of the women when they 
disobey their husbands, we have to regard this type of beating as different 
from a severe beating. According to some ahadith and ravayat (Infallibles' 
sayings), if a man beats his wife it should not cause any harm to her body. If 
her skin turns red or black [as a result of beating], he must pay her diyeh 
[blood money]. Here the emphasis is more on psychological punishment than 
physical punishment. " 
While in Judge H's court room, I interviewed a young woman whose 
husband regularly beat her on the head with the intention of leaving no injuries 
behind. She was feeling shame to speak to the judge in person. She wrote him a 
letter describing her husband's abusive behaviourloo. Her husband sexually abused 
her (orally, anally and vaginally with tied hands) without leaving any evident 
injuries behind. More importantly, psychological violence can not be diagnosed and 
detected by the court and a woman cannot support her claims if she does not provide 
the court with sufficient evidence. Judge H. acknowledged that physical violence 
was more important than psychological violence in the eyes of the law. In his view, 
it is frequently difficult for a woman to prove her claims to the court, and 
occasionally she will be sent to see a doctor, or, in the case of psychological 
violence, to a psychiatrist or psychologist. My impression was that there was no 
campaign or even awareness of the issues associated with psychological violence, 
and such an approach appeared to be a luxury; either the system could not afford to 
concentrate on these cases due to the prevalence of physical violence, or there was 
widespread ignorance of the significance of psychological violence. This is 
discussed in the following sections. 
The other four judicial professionals I interviewed maintained that physical 
violence is not approved by Iranian law. They maintained that in sharia, such a right 
is reserved for a man in the case of his wife's disobedience. Mr P. (the cleric), by 
reading Nessa sura (4: 34) from the Qur'an, explained to me that: 
11 ". 
It may sound as if the verse is saying "If a woman disobeys, beat her", 
but it is suggested to avoid injuring or bruising the woman's body. The 
'00 As I was the only woman in the room, she approached me and asked me to read the letter and 
explain her situation to the judge. I was permitted in her court hearing by the judge, and he allowed 
me to do that. This is very important in terms of the importance of a female judge, lawyer and 
consultant in courts. 
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beating is symbolic, just to show the man's dissatisfaction - it must not lead 
to paying diyeh. " 
Mrs K., a female consultant, stated that if there were any clear signs of 
bruises or injuries or any evidence from the woman's doctor, then: 
"We can either order the husband to pay blood money, or we can put him in 
jail for six months to a year. " 
She explained the difficulties and complexities involved in the cases of 
domestic violence in law and sharia. She believed that these issues did not exist 
before the Islarnisation of the judicial system. She told me: 
"In 1974, our family law took many issues into consideration. The situation 
for women was better. For instance, they could talk to the court and the court 
could detect that they were unable to tolerate their situation. Nowadays, 
when women don't have any explicit evidence, the court makes decisions on 
their behalf Normally, they are sent home to submit to their husbands 
because they can't prove their cases. If we have strong evidence that the 
husband is addicted to drugs, we can do something about it - otherwise, 
getting beaten to a certain level is considered a cultural norm, and the woman 
is expected to tolerate it. " 
She was referring to the laws introduced after the revolution, laws such as 
tamkin (submission) which will be discussed in the next sections. In her opinion, 
women are the "real losers" in the current system. In addition, the above passage 
shows that Mrs K. made a distinction between beating (as a social norm) and 
battering (which is deemed excessive and legally punishable). This is a common 
theme emerging throughout the thesis. 
Psychological violence 
I was particularly concerned about the way in which the legal system deals 
with psychological violence. It seems that there is no systematic way of dealing with 
cruelty of this type. The law does not address injuries caused by the husband's 
abusive behaviour where this leaves no clear visible scars. There is silence in law on 
such matters. According to article 167 of the constitution, when the law does not 
I-., 
specify a response, the judge should refer to legitimate fatwas. This leads to 
different interpretations of the rulings. 
According to Islamic penal law introduced in 1996, any behaviour which 
damages the individual's reputation, such as insult, slander, accusation of adultery 
and the spreading of rumours, is forbidden. However, gender has not been a matter 
of importance, and is not specially mentioned in the law (Sadat Asadi, 2004), and 
psychological cruelty has not been recognised either in law or in sharia. While 
insults and harassment in the streets are addressed in law, the use of abusive 
language in the marital relationship has not been specifically mentioned. In Asadi's 
study of the files in a court, psychological violence has been reported to be more 
prevalent than physical violence (Sadat Asadi, 200#01. In addition, Sadat Asadi 
(2004) refers to many unreported examples of women having to withdraw their 
cases due to the fear of their husbands' or families' threatening behaviour, or of 
losing their reputation, not having enough witnesses or not having any support. 
Sometimes the husband does not use any physical violence; rather, he humiliates his 
wife or verbally abuses her or ignores her (by not talking, sleeping or socialising 
with her). He may also threaten to divorce her, or even to marry another woman 
without divorcing her. Sometimes he will agree to divorce his wife with the sole aim 
of forcing her to abandon the court case. Mr R., a lawyer and university lecturer, 
gave some examples of the strategic use of psychological violence by men: 
"The man says, 'I'll keep you here, and I won't divorce you until your hair 
grows white like your teeth, and I'll go and marry again'. This leads the 
woman to say, 'Free me [divorce me], I relinquish the mahrieh [Janam azad 
mahram halafl'. Her husband may put lots of pressure on her, and then she 
may even give him some money [khula] to set herself free. That's more 
likely when she's rich. " 
This shows that the balance of formal power in the family is overwhelmingly 
in favour of men, since the law-maker bestows enormous bargaining power upon 
them through reserving their right to chastisement, divorce, polygamy and custody. 
What is the most effective tool in the hands of men and the source of most prevalent 
form of dysfunctional relation is the strategic use of these powers by men, not to act 
10' In Asadi's study, the most prevalent forms of psychological violence were: not on speaking terms 
6-3.1 %; humiliating and blaming 37.5%; verbal abuse 30%; economic deprivation 18.8%; the 
husband's suspicion 17.5%, not being permitted to go out of the house 5.6%; sexual deprivation 19%; 1-11) 
not having permission to work outside the home 11.3%; being thrown out of the house 6.9%. 
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upon them but to silence women by reminding them who is "in charge" in the 
family. What is routinely neglected in discussions on the rights of men to chastise or 
divorce their wives is the image-making function of this set of rights, rather than the 
detailed mechanics of whether the rights are actually activated in reality. These 
rights establish the divine legitimacy of men to control and manage women's affairs. 
Mr R. drew attention to the fact that divorced women cannot live 
independently in Iranian society. It is not easy for a woman to obtain a divorce, and 
if she does, people immediately become suspicious: 
"Everybody looks at her differently if she's divorced. If a married woman 
goes out shopping a few times, only one man out of a hundred is likely to ask 
why she's gone out twice. But if a divorced or widowed woman does the 
same, it raises many suspicions and questions. " 
This shows the nature of Iranian society as a deeply panoptical society at 
ground level, on the streets and in communities, families and all other forms of 
formal or informal associations and organisations. The panoptic gaze especially is 
cast on divorced women to make divorce a highly (socially) costly affair, in order to 
ensure that women stay married and the social stability and order are reproduced. A 
woman who becomes divorced is very unlikely to have an "easy ride", since her 
status as a respected woman has been damaged, her social network has shrunk due 
to her arousing suspicion in other women as a potential target for their men, and her 
every movement is under communal and societal scrutiny and surveillance. From the 
point of view of Mrs K., the practice of polygamy in society has many prolonged 
psychological and physical effects on women: 
"Women suffer a lot because they are jealous. We women are jealous - we 
want our husbands and our family life for ourselves. Polygamy is a kind of 
animal act, and we are not animals and don't live in the jungle. " 
She believed that women find it very difficult to share their husbands with 
others, and cannot cope when their husbands leave them and their children behind to 
sleep with other women. She maintained that: 
"In the time of the Shah, at least, we could confront polygamy, but we can't 
do anything about it now. It would be better if the sharia didn't intervene in 
the law. To resolve men and women's disputes, for example, the judge draws 
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on Nessa sura. Men don't like it if we tell them they're wrong - they say 
sharia law is perfect, and we're the ones who are imperfect. " 
The last sentence of the above quote shows that the orthodox jurisprudence 
rulings bestow enormous bargaining power upon men, and that its role as the 
ultimate regime of truth and its perfection is unquestionable. We also note that there 
is a presumed identity between sharia and the orthodox jurisprudence 102 . Although 
logically unfounded and false, this identity and unity depicts the fact on the ground 
and the social reality since there is no serious and viable alternative to the orthodox 
jurisprudence; an alternative as a socially recognizable and legitimate way of seeing 
and being is lacking and as such the orthodox jurisprudence enjoys a monopolistic 
position in the production of ultimate and perfect truth. It also reveals that there is a 
tension between the law and sharia which makes it uncertain whether similar cases 
can be expected to be resolved similarly (vahdat-e ravvee-ye ghazaei) due to judges' 
different levels of allegiance to the law and the orthodox jurisprudence; one 
particular judge may even issue different verdicts for similar cases at different times. 
In response to my question on the way the courts deal with psychological 
problems, one of the judges (Judge A. ) explained that: 
"We investigate the husband's behaviour in the family and community. We 
ask the neighbours and his close friends about his behaviour. We refer the 
woman to forensic experts or to family or psychological counselling, and the 
psychologists interview them. I've seen some of the files myself" 
Two of the judges claimed that they referred the women to either 
psychologists or psychiatrists' 03 . Another 
judge, however, told me that he does not 
refer anyone to psychologists, and the judge in charge of the case usually decides 
these issues. The only thing the judge could do was to send the court police to gather 
evidence from the couple's neighbourhood about the man's behaviour. But he told 
me that in reality they would not do anything about certain types of psychological 
violence such as constant humiliation, ignoring the wife and so on. It became 
102 In Chapter 21 explained that we can logically and historically differentiate between religion, 
sharia, the orthodox jurisprudence, the law, popular culture and the wider social reality. 
103 These are mainly located in the Institution of Behzisti (a welfare organisation charged with 
tackling health issues and poverty). 
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evident to me that there was no systemic or institutional protocol on psychological 
violence in the Iranian law. The most the system can do is to refer the man to a 
psychiatric facility, to test his sanity; if he is proved to be insane, the court will 
allow the woman to be divorced. 
Sexual violence 
In relation to sexual violence, in some areas the law does not make any 
statement on certain violent acts such as rape or unwanted sexual relations. Rape in 
the marital context has not been recognised, as tamkin, or submission in matters of a 
sexual nature, is part of the transaction in the marriage contract. These are now 
discussed. 
Tamkin and its role in relation to domestic violence 
One of the most important components of Islamic marriage is tamkin. The 
most important duty of a woman, in Islamic marriage, is tamkin or submission (1105 
Civil Code), and the most important duty of a husband towards his wife is to support 
her financially (1106 Civil Code). The legal term for the wife's refusal of tamkin is 
called nushuz (rebellion or disobedience), in response to which physical, 
psychological and economic chastisement by the husband can be justified. The 
husband's refusal to pay maintenance, which is called tark-e enfagh, is punishable 
by law. As the four judges in my interview asserted, a man's job is to manage his 
family's financial affairs, and if he refuses to do so without adequate justification, he 
may be fined or imprisoned. Given the importance of these terms, both in the legal 
system and in women's everyday lives, my next section attempts to unravel the 
relationship between the marital institution and domestic violence. 
Judges' views in relation to tamkin 
While I was in court, a woman was seeking divorce as a result of her 
husband's refusal to pay nqfegheh (maintenance). The husband complained that his 
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wife did not obey him, the legal term for which is adam-e tamkin (non-submission). 
Generally, when a man complains in this manner, he intends to convince the judge 
that his wife's going out could lead her to be corrupted or seduced by other men, or 
is claiming that he doubts her or distrusts her. Interestingly, men and women who 
come to court usually bring their cases against each other using the terms tamkin 
(obedience) and tark-e enfagh (non-payment of maintenance); whatever the root 
causes of their dispute, they try to formulate their complaints by way of these 
concepts. 
As all the participants in this study stated, when a woman admits that she 
does not obey her husband she will lose the case immediately. Most women do not 
know how to formulate their cases, and are unaware of the legal details regarding 
their rights. Moreover, they cannot afford to hire lawyers. Conversely, when a 
woman claims that she obeys her husband and he refuses to pay her nafagheh, the 
onus is on him, and the judge's approach to the case becomes really crucial. I asked 
one of the judges how he verifies the woman's obedience, or tamkin. Judge H. made 
a distinction between two kinds of tamkin: general (tamkin-e aam) and specific 
(tamkin-e khas) (this categorisation was also emphasised by my other interviewees). 
He believed that women's obedience (tamkin) has some useful consequences for 
both parties; it makes men more fulfiled and, at the same time, paves the way for 
women to gain power through their submission to the master, and to become masters 
themselves. He elaborated his view further in the following analysis: 
"It's quite different from slavery... The Islamic order brings some stability 
to society. A woman can be commander-in-chief of the family with her 
obedience [etaat]. When my wife says "No" to me, I get a bad feeling. A 
woman's obedience satisfies her husband. Through it she can dominate her 
husband. Unfortunately, in western countries they don't understand that. 
Here the woman can say, 'If you don't give my money [mahrieh], I won't 
obey you, ' and she can live in her father's house, and a man is obliged to 
provide her clothing and so on. " 
The above passage refers to tamkin-e aam, a woman's recognition of her 
husband's authority over her and her appreciation of his being the head of the 
household. Judge A. and the other judges (together with Mr P. the cleric) held the 
view that the power designated by the orthodox jurisprudence to the husband is not 
absolute, but is limited through the imposition of a set of conditions. For instance, he 
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does not have the right to intervene in her financial affairs or make her do the 
housework; the only punishment that he can apply is to cut off her maintenance. He 
does not have the right to beat her, or if he does he should do it symbolically, purely 
to show his dissatisfaction. Judge H. explained to me that as soon as a couple 
contracts a marriage, both husband and wife become obliged to perform a set of 
duties: 
"... The only obligation a wife has, in sharia, is to obey her husband and not 
to go out without his permission. Doing the housework and feeding the baby 
and so on are not a woman's duty - she can get money for those sorts of 
jobs. However, it's only in sharia, and in courts they may not act 
accordingly. " 
Under the current modified laws, women cannot at the time of divorce claim 
payment (ojratol meso for housework and other tasks carried out in the past, unless 
they can prove that at the time the work was done their intention was "not to work 
for free". 
Tamkin-e khas, or sexual submission, and its relation to violence 
In Sharaye-ol Islam, Hilli defines tamkin-e khas as "removing the obstacles 
in relationships between men and women without any limitations in time and place". 
A contemporary jurist (Araki, 1998: 742) defined tamkin as "the woman's readiness 
for her husband's demands for satisfaction". The question is, to what extent can a 
husband advance his will and power over his wife, in order to make her obey him 
sexually? Or, to put it bluntly, can he use force or intimidation to achieve what he 
wants? How do the courts conceptualise and resolve such cases? There are many 
arguments on these issues. Those who claim that Islam gave men permission to beat 
their wives for disobedience refer to the Nisa verse in the Qur'an. But others argue 
that the Qur'an does not suggest using violence by any means; rather it teaches men 
how to express their dissatisfaction to their wives symbolically, by beating them 
softly without inflicting any harm. The question on the extent to which a woman 
should obey her husband is a matter of dispute between jurists and judges. Some, 
among them Ayatollah Khomeini (now deceased), believed that a wife's most 
important duty is her sexual obedience (Mokhtari, 1996, in Afshar 1998). However, 
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according to the ijma-e foghaha Ourists' consensus), there are some exceptions in 
relation to time and place. Three judges in this study stated that they take moral 
codes, social norms and acceptable excuses (ozr-e sharie) into consideration. 
Nevertheless, there is an overall agreement that in tamkin-e khas a woman should 
submit herself to her husband in order to satisfy his sexual demands. For that, as 
Judge H. stated, she is obliged to stay in her husband's home, and should not go out 
without his permission. Many men in court use this discourse to justify their 
misbehaviour towards their wives: "She's a vulgar woman - she goes out without 
my permission. " Muslim women are permitted to work outside the home, but need 
to obtain their husbands' permission. Some, however, like Judge H., argue that if she 
has her husband's permission to work outside the home, or if the couple agreed in 
their marriage contract on her right to work, she cannot be prevented from going to 
work for her husband's own sexual gratification. He rejected the idea that a wife 
must always be available sexually, but added: 
"In the case of a housewife, it's different. Because she doesn't have the time 
restraint and she's often at home, she doesn't have any excuses for not being 
ready for her husband. " 
In relation to sexual violence and whether or not a man can have a variety of 
sexual demands from his wife, Judge H. clarified the issues as follows: 
"A woman should always surrender herself to her husband, and cannot 
simply say, 'I'm tired - leave me alone'. But that's not to say that she can't 
go to work, and must always be available at home. That's because tamkin is 
an amr-e movasa [a 'broad task' which it is not necessary to perform on the 
spot]. The woman may fulfil her duty at an appropriate time. It's not like 
praying, which requires a specific time. Her husband cannot stop her going 
to work. Furthermore, he cannot have intercourse with his wife in other 
ways, because according to a Qur'anic verse, women are men's fields. Men 
may plant their seeds in them, but only in the right place. Therefore, doing it 
the wrong way is haram. " 
When I asked him about the term "field" and the ambiguity embedded in the 
verse, different interpretations of it and other judges' positions in this case, he 
explained: 
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"We cannot constrain the argument. What if I say it is haram and a million 
years later men and women request a change? We don't normally ask for 
details of the couple's sexual relations. If the woman isn't happy, we send 
her to a doctor. An expert has to explain it to me. I don't know whether that's 
tamkin or not. In such cases, we ask someone like the marja-e taghlid (the 
highest authority in the orthodox jurisprudence), and I accept whatever he 
says. All judges should have a consensus [ijma] on this, but they don't. A 
man cannot have sexual relations with his wife whenever and however he 
wants, and stop her from going to work. The judge shouldn't address the 
issue at stake here under the title of tamkin, and if he does, it's an 
infringement of his specified duties, and his superiors will impeach him (he 
however acknowledged at the same time that judges' hands are open; for 
instance he can avoid reporting the woman's complaint to his superior in his 
court note). " 
In most legal texts, the term tamkin-e khas is extensively applied to women's 
sexual submission to men's sexual demands, and satisfying women's sexual needs 
does not seem to be at the forefront of legislators' attention. In theory, a woman is 
entitled to have sexual relations with her legitimate husband every four months and 
ten days (compared to men, who can demand to have intercourse any time). 
However, in practice, culturally and legally, it is very rare for women to complain 
about their husbands' disobedience in relation to sexual matters, including sexual 
violence; rather, if there is any problem, they prefer to wrap their complaints in 
economic terms. The most usual and acceptable way is to say, "He doesn't provide 
for me. " Even if a woman could complain about her husband's forceful and 
aggressive conduct, the court does not seem to have the capacity to interfere in this 
highly private matter, as the judge above pointed out. The most a judge can do, 
when a woman complains about sexual violence, is to refer her to forensic doctors to 
find any injuries or marks that could be used to make a case for divorce. Meanwhile, 
as the judge above stated, the judge's "hands are open": he is endowed with great 
arbitrary power. In practice, it is highly unlikely that a judge will undergo an 
impeachment process over a wrong ruling. 
Moreover, if a woman stays with her violent husband (as a result of a court 
order to tamkin), how can she secure herself from his misconduct? In court I met a 
woman who had brought a case against her husband for his bad behaviour, and for 
not providing for the family adequately. She was illiterate, was not well informed 
about her rights, and had no lawyer. In court, she stated that she had left her 
husband's house, and her acknowledgement of this resulted in her losing the case 
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immediately. In the eyes of the court she was a nashezeh. The judge urged her to go 
back to her husband's home and obey (tamkin) him so that she could be entitled to 
maintenance (nafagheh). With four children (who wanted to be with her), no job and 
no family support, she had no other choice. Judge G. described the situation: 
"It's in our law. A woman should obey [tamkin], and in return she can get 
her maintenance, but if she isn't living in her husband's house, she isn't 
entitled to any money. " 
In his opinion this was fair, because the man works hard and the woman and 
the rest of the family should appreciate that and listen to him. However, he admitted 
that if the woman claims that she obeys her husband and lives with him under one 
roof, and complains about his bad behaviour, then the court, after investigating 
matters further and after compliling evidence against the man,, may fine him, or 
imprison him for a few weeks. Since the imprisonment of the man is likely to 
become a source of even further social and economic problems for the family, the 
woman often has to withdraw her request. Recently, the courts have been more 
flexible, and have accepted women's requests for divorce; however, this usually 
depends on the flexibility of the judges and the courts. That is why people "shop 
around" for the most suitable court. For instance, among my interviewees there were 
a few women from another part of the region. They told me that their city or town's 
court did not accept the divorce request, and they had to go to other towns to be able 
to file for divorce. There are also some regional differences within the country. For 
example, the southern part of Iran is mainly influenced by Arab culture. Societal 
norms and practices are much more male-orientated. One female interviewee from 
the north applied to the family court in Rasht (in northern Iran), and won her case. 
However, her husband -a southerner - appealed. He took the case to Ahvaz (in the 
south), and won. In my inquiry, one of the judges explained that this is the case in 
reality because the judges have different backgrounds and personalities. 
All in all, the divorce process can be prolonged and expensive. In addition, 
when the request is from the woman, the court is unlikely to take it seriously, as 
women's decisions are deemed emotional, transient and irrational. One of the judges 
acknowledged that he extends the divorce process until he is sure the woman's 
decision is logical and not emotional. 
143 
Others' views of tamkin 
Mr R. 104 believed that bestowing power upon the husband as the head of the 
household, and giving him other advantages such as the right of polygamy and 
divorce, have a serious impact on women's lives. He said: 
Giving power to the man, as head of the family, may result in 
authoritarian behaviour and end up with him beating his wife. Giving 
polygamy and divorce rights to men, according to our law, has a serious 
effect on husbands' and other people's opinions about women. " 
The opinions of the female consultant (Mrs K. ) and the female lawyer were 
in line with his. Mrs K. also believed that introducing tamkin to the law after the 
1979 revolution made their work very difficult, specifically in relation to domestic 
violence. In her own words: 
"What the court does, these days, is to order the woman to go back and obey 
her husband. At best, if she can prove her case, she will get the divorce. 
There is nothing much we can do. All in all, I have to say that women are the 
real losers. " 
Thus, according to Mr R., tamkin could provide a breeding ground for 
domestic violence by bestowing excessive power on men. Women consequently 
become powerless. One of the factors found to be important in domestic violence is 
women's dependence on men, and their sense of powerlessness. Karr (2001) argued 
that because the law-maker offers men the absolute authority of being the head of 
the household, this can expand into other domains of marital life such as sexual 
relations and thus sexual violence. Others who argue against this idea believe that 
the headship of the household is a managerial task, and it is expected that the man 
will act wisely and fairly (Mohamadi, 2004). However, they do not believe in 
government interference in family affairs, as it might damage the family's interests. 
They simply hope that the husband eventually acts reasonably. They argue that there 
should be no forceful interference in marital relationships, and no-one can compel a 
woman to obey her husband; rather. she is encouraged to do so in the expectation of 
'04A lawyer, and a university lecturer in law. 
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a heavenly reward in the Hereafter. Taking good care of a husband for a woman is 
equivalent tojihad (the struggle for God) (Koleini, 1967: 329). 
Hence, the courts in Iran order the woman to return to her husband's home 
and obey him. Or they recommend that the husband does not beat his wife. Instead 
he can neglect her by starving her, or not providing her with clothes. 
The reasons behind domestic violence, according to judges and others 
An analysis of the accounts of the participants in this section of the study 
brought different themes to light: economic hardship, psychologism, sociologism 
(failure by family members to accept the gender roles assigned to them), upbringing, 
fear of scandal, moral bankruptcy and un-Islamic behaviour. These are discussed in 
the following section. First, I shall discuss the judges' views. I shall subsequently 
deal with others' Points of view. 
The judges' perspectives 
When I approached one of the judges, I was given the opportunity to attend 
his court. In my attendance at one of his court hearings, he ordered the woman to go 
back and obey her husband, in order to receive her maintenance. He told an 18 -year- 
old girl (who was accompanying her mother, and complaining about her father's 
violent behaviour) that according to law she was not entitled to her father's financial 
support (nafagheh), and should either seek a job or "stop being so demanding". 
Judge G. believed that the reason behind the husband's abusive behaviour was 
economic hardship, and that women were excessively demanding: 
4ý ** . In this difficult economic period, when men 
don't have jobs and have 
little money, it's hard to manage a family - and women are too demanding 
these days [chesh va ham chesmi mikonand] 105 . They make their husbands 
angry, and then the husbands start beating them. " 
Economic dependency on men, in Judge G's views, automatically leads to 
men becoming more powerful in relation to their wives. He believed that because 
women are physically, psychologically and intellectually weaker than men, they 
105 'Keeping up with the Joneses'. 
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become vulnerable and need to be protected by men. He believed that in seeking 
amnesty and security, women search for men's protection, and thus become 
dependent on them. He, however, refused to see the problem from a different angle: 
that if women are weak (as he thought), it is because they are not given the same 
opportunities as men (in work, education and so on). He gave more weight to 
biological gender differences than any other factor. In response to my question that 
perhaps working and earning money could empower women and free them from 
dependency on men, he maintained that: "Women are easily seduced (farib-khor), 
and gullible. " 
In his belief, women need to have custodians because they are gullible, and 
men can deceive them easily. That is why he would not allow his wife to work 
outside the home. Overall, Judge G. had a negative and pessimistic view of women. 
He admitted, "I had to beat my wife sometimes, to bring her to her senses". His wife 
was many years younger than he, and was "very inexperienced". The picture he 
painted of her was of someone who was unruly, unkind, sexually cold and 
rebellious. He could not comprehend his wife's behaviour and the roots of her 
problems: "I even had her learn to drive". To him, providing and satisfying her 
economic needs were enough to make her grateful: "Women must be appreciative. " 
His personal experiences with his wife, and women in general, together with his 
belief system (he had been raised in a conservative, traditional family), had had a 
major impact on his professional views and practices. 
Initially, Judge G. placed the emphasis on poverty and economic factors; 
however, in our later conversations it became clear that, in his view, womeWs 
behaviour (disobedience, rebelliousness and sexual frigidity) and character (being 
emotional, less rational, simple-minded and gullible) irritate men, and ultimately 
culminate in the men resorting to violence. Therefore, the primary reason behind the 
cases of violence against women was perceived to be the women's behaviour, and 
attitudes and economic reasons were deemed to have secondary significance. 
In another judge's view, however, economic causes per se are not the root of 
violence against women. The woman's personality is more important. Judge H. 
believed that the real reason behind domestic violence is the lack of men and 
women's mental and psychological development. He rejected poverty, economics 
and other causes because. in his opinion: 
146 
"Some couples, in spite of their financial problems, live together happily 
because they have mutual understanding. " 
He defined mutual understanding as: 
"A woman should obey her husband, as it makes him really happy 
and fulfiled, and a man should respect his wife and provide for her. " 
Therefore, women's obedience is regarded as the key to happiness in the 
orthodox order. Judge H. said that when he went to ask his wife's hand in marriage, 
he told her that he wanted nothing from her but "absolute obedience", and she 
accepted that. "By acknowledging it in speech and action, she became a 
commander-in-chief [amir] herself' (the maid becomes the master of the master). In 
his opinion, a woman should have a great deal of tolerance, and should not get angry 
easily: 
"She has the power to turn poison into sweetness [to change the husband's 
bad behaviour to good]. And that's how she can keep her husband for 
herself. " 
Yet again, it is all in a woman's hands. The male judges approached the 
factors involved in domestic violence from a specific angle; they all agreed that a 
woman's role (as the main source of peace or tension in the family) is the most 
critical and profound in provoking, sustaining and practising violence. 
According to another judge (Judge A. ), "morality" can be a ground for 
violence. He sympathised with the man who beats his wife if she commits infidelity 
or even thinks about other men. Generally, in his opinion, a woman should obey her 
husband. This was found to be a general pattern in male judges' views, and their 
differences, in this regard, were a matter of degree and not type. Judge A., however, 
tried to justify his position by saying that every office or institution needs to have a 
manager, and that families are no exception. If the family members do not listen to 
their "boss" (their father or husband), there will be turmoil and chaos, and 
everything will fall apart. Judge A., however, did not seem to comprehend the full 
implications of his sympathy with men who beat or even kill their wives in this 
relation. This is reflected in every girl's and every wife's life through heavy 
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restrictions imposed on her dressing and freedom of movement, for fear of sexual 
scandal and to safeguard her modesty and chastity and the family's honour. 
If a married woman is caught in an illegitimate relationship, the punishment 
is very severe. According to sharia and Iranian penal law (article 83 )106 ,a married 
woman found in such a relationship is defined as an adulterer (zenakar), and should 
be stoned to death' 07 . If the 
husband happens to witness his wife in this condition, he 
has the right to kill her and her lover (articles 629 and 630). There are many 
arguments and different interpretations regarding this law 108 . However, Judge A 
indicated the rarity of such situations: 
"It's right that sharia secured the right for a man to kill his wife in those 
circumstances, but in 25 years I've never seen such a case". 
Here, Judge A. clearly overlooked the image-making function of the rulings 
and laws on honour killing 109. What fiercely restricts women's freedom of 
movement and participation in the social life of the nation is the threat and fear of 
being exposed to scandalous situations. Families may find themselves and their 
reputation damaged irreparably, and their mere survival in the community in peril. 
Furthermore, the wrath of the rulings and the laws is a continuum; it is felt by 
women at different levels, from an angry argument in the family on how to dress in 
public, to fierce fighting or beating over issues such as attending specific occasions 
such as a wedding, exercing in the park or visiting a football stadium. I 10 The image- 
making function of the rulings and laws regarding the safeguard of honour is 
reflected in the life of the nation and its social interactions, mainly through 
subliminal messages imprinted in people's selfhood to view women as a source of 
1061slamic Punishment Law. 
107 Stoning to death has been practised in Iran since the Islamisation of the judiciary system. 
108 This is a very important point, which has been highlighted by a number of researchers in Iran. 
According to Article 179, a husband who kills or injures his wife or her lover (or both) in an 
adulterous condition does not face punishment. A brother or father who witnesses his sister or 
daughter in this condition and kills her faces imprisonment for between six months and one year; if 
he injures her, he will receive a prison sentence of between eight days and two months. 
109 Honour killing is common practice, particularly in traditional Iranian communities (some parts of 
Iran, especially in the south, still practise honour killing, despite government efforts to restrict these 
practices). This is a punishment strategy to control women's sexuality (ref. Chapter 2). 
110 Women and girls are not allowed into a football stadium. There have been many debates and 
arguments about this in Iran recently; see Zanan magazine, vol. 129, March 2006. 
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danger and chaos with all its ensuing ramifications. The effect of codes of honour 
and chastity is not reflected in the statistics of honour killing, but in everyday 
restrictions imposed on women's lives, labour and language. It heavily sexualises 
women's beings and society's gender relations. 
Others' views regarding the roots of domestic violence 
In contrast with male judges, Mrs K., the female consultant, believed that the 
inherently unequal treatment of men and women in legal and cultural terms is at the 
root of violence. She started by criticising Iranian society's belief system regarding 
childcare, and the differences in raising girls and boys. She believed: 
"Our women don't have enough confidence. For instance, when they come 
here they don't know how to explain their problems to us. It's so difficult to 
judge between a wife's and a husband's account. When the woman cannot 
explain her problems, she can't prove her claims and that can lead to 
injustices against her. " 
According to Mrs K., lack of confidence on the part of women plays a 
crucial role in the failure of their cases in court. Her experiences have led her to the 
conclusion that society does not value women enough, and regards them as the 
second sex. Women cannot obtain important jobs. Even those who have received 
higher education, such as doctors or teachers, are not safe from beatings by their 
husbands. She informed me of incidents where such women had been beaten or 
humiliated in front of their clients or patients. She observed that professional women 
generally tolerate the situation better than women of a lower social class, through a 
fear of scandal and loss of reputation, or abero-reezi. Abero-reezi is a powerful 
discourse in common circulation in social interactions, with its associated 
normalisation and inclusion/exclusion codes coupled with fears, and ways of being 
and seeing, inscribed in the sense of selfhood. Mrs K's argument is in line with the 
literature. It is a well-known and well-documented fact that domestic violence does 
not belong to any specific social or economic ranking: it is experienced by women in 
a wide range of occupations all over the world (ref. Chapter 1). Furthermore, 
according to some studies, women of a higher social ranking tend to report domestic 
violence to a lesser extent than other women in similar situations (ref. Chapter 1). 
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Mrs K. tried to explain the process through which girls acquire low 
self-esteem and low self-confidence in society: 
"Our society doesn't only discriminate between girls and boys - it also tries to 
generate fear in girls, while giving more freedom to boys. Society offers specific 
gender roles, which lead men to be violent against women. Human beings learn to 
be afraid. Girls learn to be afraid of everything - they are told 'You should be 
protected. You are like flowers, and you are weak, vulnerable and helpless'. That 
means simple activities, like travelling on your own or going out at night, become 
very frightening. Even at my age' 11,1 am afraid of going to another city alone. " 
Differences in raising girls and boys are common practice worldwide. In 
most cultures, boys are considered the superior gender, and the use of violence by 
men in heterosexual relationships is considered natural and immutable. Men are 
categorised as being assertive, sensation-seeking, risk-taking and aggressive; 
females, in contrast, are described as passive, nurturing, caring and victims (Hird, 
2002). 
Mrs K. 's personal experiences of her own culture led her to believe that: 
"Women aren't taught how to think rationally. Instead, they are restricted as 
much as possible. Boys and girls are separated, and this provokes children's 
curiosity. Parents bring their 13-year-old daughter to be married because 
they are afraid of scandal. The policy-makers put too much emphasis on sex- 
segregation policies, and this affects men's and women's minds. It is 
frequently said that women cannot be good bosses or judges or managers 
because they are emotional, and that is why society doesn't take them 
seriously, and has a negative image of women in general. For example, I'm a 
consultant here - the judge asks my opinion, but he's the one who gives the 
verdict. That makes me feel inadequate. " 
She was pointing out the role of discourses of gender difference, fear of 
scandal and gender segregation, which are widely practised throughout Iran to 
justify unequal gender relationships. Overall, she concluded that: 
"Everything in our society is problematic. We have lots of problems 
everywhere. When asked, 'Which part of your body is not crooked?, the 
camel answered, 'Nowhere. "' 
111 She was55 years old. 
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The female lawyer's account was very similar to Mrs K. 's argument. She 
also believed that women are not self confident. A number of her clients who were 
trying to obtain a divorce were women of a higher social rank than their husbands, 
who still suffered from their husbands' bad behaviour. She told me that the husband 
would sometimes go to his wife's workplace, and beat her and verbally abuse her in 
the presence of her colleagues, clients or students. But in her opinion and 
experience, one of the most problematic issues in her cases was mahrieh. She fin-nly 
believed that if the system eliminated mahrieh from the marriage contract, and 
replaced it with another law such as the equal division of wealth after divorce, most 
of the problems regarding domestic violence would be solved. The issue of mahrieh 
will be discussed in the next section. 
Gender roles and gender differences embedded in the rulings of the orthodox 
jurisprudence and reflected in the current laws implicitly impact on people's 
thinking. Like Mrs K., Mr R., a liberal university lecturer in his early forties who 
teaches law at his university, believed that the inherent inequality in the law sends 
messages to both men and women, and that this has serious consequences for 
women. His argument is in line with feminist theories of interpersonal violence of 
the 1960s and 1970s. These stated that patriarchy manifested a system of power 
relations which maintained the power of men over women. MacKinnon held the idea 
that, "[Gender] is ... a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female 
subordination"(1987: 40). What Mr R. was most concerned about was the influence 
of these laws on people's mindsets. For him, that is far more important, and could 
eventually work against women in the long term. In earlier chapters I argued that the 
orthodox jurisprudence has two functions of law-making and image-making 
specifically in relation to women's lives (ref. Chapter 2). 
The representative of velayat-e faqih, Mr P. explained the reasons behind 
domestic violence as follows: 
There are two issues here which need to be taken into consideration: 
faeliyat (agency) and ghabelyat (capabilities). " 
He explained that the man is the one who commits the act (beating), and the 
woman is the one who paves the ground for that act. Thus, in his view, her 
behaviour and attitude provoke the man to behave violently. The man's actions 
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depend on the woman's behaviour. She can cleverly, he believes, guide her husband 
to the right path by obeying him, being kind to him and comforting him. Essentially 
it is a matter of behaving politically. She is the one who is responsible for anything 
that happens. He asserted that: 
"Women who behave badly should be punished. " 
Meanwhile, he added that the reasons behind domestic violence rest in the premise 
that: 
"Society isn't Islamic enough. People don't follow the holy rulings ... That's 
why men beat and women get beaten. " 
Mr P. employed a very important discourse, the discourse of un-Islamism. 
Loyalty to' authentic religious teachings, alongside adherence to customs and 
traditions, could, in his opinion, put a stop to violence against women. He gave the 
example of sacrifice. Women will not sacrifice their desires and whims for the 
greater good of the family, and do not forgive their husbands for their shortcomings 
or bad behaviour. That, for him, is the cause of the problem: 
"Women should sacrifice. Injustice in society is a result of not being Islamic 
enough. That's why divorce rates in the villages are very low. Women stay 
in a relationship, because if they get divorced they will be in more trouble - 
society will punish them. They will become victims of more assaults. 
Toleration as an Islamic value is good. " 
Thus, in Mr P. 's opinion it is better to stay in a difficult relationship and try 
to resolve it by being tolerant (sabour) than coming out of it and confronting other 
problems in the society at large. Another Islamic value and a good tradition which is 
forgotten these days, according to him, is the division of labour and the differences 
between men and women. He asserted that inequality between men and women is 
the result of flawed ideas imposed by westemers. Such ideas lead people to forget 
their own cultures and values. Women must play their part and men theirs, 
according to God's orders. He put his understanding of equality in the following 
terms: 
"There has to be a balance in life, and that's the division of labour. We 
destroyed this balance by saying that a woman can do whatever a man does. 
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She will suffer as a result... There should be common sense. I go and earn 
money, as a man, and you work at home. That's equality. Men and women 
should be considered as equal, but in practice there has to be a division of 
labour. We should allocate work according to each person's capabilities. The 
mistake is when we give a job to the wrong person. We cannot put 
something weighing 20 kilos in a bag which is designed to carry only 5 
kilos... In practical terms, Islam offers the quality model. We created you 
from one soul. God gave different roles to men and women. Women aren't 
designed for difficult jobs, either psychologically or physically. " 
Mr P. was not the first (in my group of interviewees) to point to gender 
differences. The orthodox fon-nulation of marriage offers women a specific place in 
the social order. This positioning is further justified and supported by a set of 
discourses, including the discourse of gender difference, naturalising and 
essentialising gender relations and the division of labour enshrined in the orthodox 
formulation of marriage. He believed that women are highly emotional, and even 
think emotionally rather than rationally: 
"Women's intelligence is emotional, and its function is greater than men's 
rational and economic wisdom. " 
Mr P. meant that women's emotionality serves a significant purpose in the 
great scheme of things. He intended to valorise women's emotionality in his 
discursive conception of femininity. But in his opinion a woman's body is not as 
strong as a man's, and she is designed to bear and raise children. He admired women 
for their kindness and sweetness: 
"One cannot live without them. They are sweet and delicate, and are fragrant 
like flowers [reihan]l 12 , and men should treat them nicely. 
" 
Mr P. constructed his argument along these lines. He had come to the 
conclusion that women's roles are inherently different from men's. In theory, we are 
equal; in practice, we are different, with different roles. A woman's main task is to 
create peace and tranquillity for her husband and children. The essence of his 
argument regarding the root causes of violence may be surnmarised in the following 
propositions: 
1. Women's delicate constitution dictates a certain delicate way of being, and 
offers a set of delicate roles and positions. In this essentialist discourse, in which 
femininity and masculinity are constructed as two opposite poles embodying 
'12Reihan means "basil". 
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fixed characteristics, women are designed to occupy a certain set of positions 
and perforrn a set of specific functions. 
2. Philosophies and lifestyles imported from the West tempt women to stray from 
submitting to this divine design. 
3. The West (and its cultural onslaught) breeds un-Islamic lifestyles and mindsets. 
This in turn brings about a variety of social calamities for Muslims, including 
violence against women. In this formulation, Mr P. is heavily under the 
3 influence of Motahari's philosophy of gender difference" . 
Being a cleric, Mr P. strongly supported the orthodox discourse, and 
vehemently opposed feminism and westernisation. Overall, he blamed feminist 
movements and the westernisation of society, and expressed his regret that people 
are under the influence of these ideas, and have forgotten their roots: 
"The unpleasant odour of the feminist movement spread here as well. People lost 
their way. That isn't good for our society. Religion should clarify everything and 
put a stop to any wrong influences. Islamic feminism is a paradox. Feminists are 
basically protesting against the creation of women and men by God, in general. 
They protest against the structural constitution of female creation. Now they are 
asking why God had to create women like this ... On the 
basis of the physical, 
psychological and social structure of men and women, God designed a division 
of labour, and based on these differences He assigned them different tasks ... " 
Mr P. was referring to the conventional discourse of gender difference, 
which attempts to safeguard the concept of inequality by placing it in the immutable 
ground of God's will. According to this perspective, God's commands are the 
manifestation of His will, and believers are obliged to submit to them whether they 
understand the reasons behind them or not. The place of women as enshrined in the 
set of rights and obligations is determined by God. Furthermore, we may not know 
their multi-layered mysterious reasons, as God the omniscient, the compassionate 
and the merciful, set his immutable will according to his divine logic not entirely 
comprehensible to us. If one is a believer and looks for eternal rewards, one must 
113 Motahari (2001), a very influential cleric, now deceased, argued that the physical, psychological 
and sexual differences between men and women inevitably translate into different obligations and 
rights, including different systems of sanctions and punishment. Motahari maintains that men's 
nature is totally different from women's (ref. Chapter 2). 
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accept them, even if one's earthly mind sees no sense in them, or sees them as unjust 
and discriminatory. This theory is the ultimate refuge for many adherents of the 
orthodox jurisprudence, who see providing the modem pleasant justifications for 
Islamic jurisprudence rulings as a futile exercise, since the plausible discourse 
changes constantly. Therefore, they must master modem and postmodern discourses 
in order to be able to reformulate their arguments in defence of the orthodox 
jurisprudence. This approach is seen as ultimately inconsistent with the logic of 
traditionalists, who pay little attention to time and place, and whose mode of 
argumentation is authoritative and rhetorical (Mir-Hosseini, 2003). 
In this view, God is the ultimate benevolent patriarch who knows what is 
best for his creatures. Before the almighty patriarchal God, what is deemed 
appropriate is submission and obedience, and not questioning, objection and 
demands for explanation. The position of women in the divine order is the 
convention set by God, and to follow His will and commandments we do not need to 
know the reasons behind them. What we do know is that He is compassionate and 
merciful; thus it is good for women, for the family, and for the Islamic community 
(ummah), and it is expedient to follow His will and free oneself from one's own 
nagging short-sighted, myopic reason-thirsty mind. Take the leap of faith and 
transcend the boundaries of your limited, earthly-bound rationality, and your future 
eternal life in prosperity and happiness is guaranteed. This logic has a long 
precedent in the history of Muslim thought. 
In Mr P. 's opinion, women are powerful, and should use their own feminine 
power instead of trying to be like men, since, all in all, they cannot achieve men's 
status, and if they strive to do so, they will ultimately lose their own power and 
functions too. Women should take the initiative into their own hands. They have the 
power to change men by tolerating their bad behaviour, accepting their own God- 
given gender roles, trying not to compete with men (this view was shared by two 
judges), not arguing with their husbands, being very careful in bringing up their 
children, especially their daughters, and always acting politically and diplomatically. 
In the model he was proposing, there is equality and tranquillity between men and 
women; no-one is in charge, and women are not followers. However') there are 
ambiguities and contradictions in his statements. It seems that women's partnership 
with their husbands within this model requires them to invest drastically more than 
their husbands. They must sacrifice, tolerate and submit. They should also be wise, 
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diplomatic, tough "like a rock" and "resilient". Only through these skills can they 
attain what they want: "power". 
As a married woman myself, I have found it really difficult to acquire all 
these skills. I asked Mr P., "How about those women, like me,, who do not have 
these qualities and skills? " His response was that we should follow some courses 
with him; he would teach us some of the skills, starting with how to make your 
husband work for you like a horse in the farm. He used a specific local term for this: 
deraz-e lafand, a long rope farmers often use when grazing a horse. The length of 
the rope provides the horse with a false sense of freedom, as the rope is in fact 
firmly tied. Mr P. used this metaphor to show how women can cleverly control their 
husbands: a man in the marital context (the field) can only remain faithful and 
behave nicely if the woman fulfils her husband's needs with love, tenderness, and 
obedience (as a result keeping him in her sphere of control). He also offered an 
Islamic model for women, different from the model offered by "polluted feminists 
and westerners": 
"Our model should be Fatemeh, the prophet's daughter, not a western 
woman. Not only did she raise two children who became charismatic leaders 
later on in their lives, but she also defended her husband and Islam. If you 
want more, look at Khadijeh and Zeinab. " 
Mr P. was trying to anchor the feminist concepts in the historical narrative of 
the nation; the narrative of three generations of women Khadijeh-Fatemeh-Zeinab. 
Khadijeh was the first wife of the prophet, Fatemeh was the prophet's daughter, and 
Zeinab was Fatemeh's daughter. These three charismatic historical personalities are 
frequently presented as role models for Iranian women (Shari'ati, 1990,1980). Each 
character opens up new narrative space, and exemplify a new avenue for women to 
develop themselves and invest in the spiritual and religious experience of the golden 
age of Islam, so that they may establish their worth and attain their capital gain in 
this world and the next. As Marx maintained, human beings "continue to live in the 
narratives of the past" (Murray, 2004, p. 18 1), which shows that without the 
innovative, powerful, imaginative and heart-and-mind-capturing narrative of the 
past, women cannot be freed from the subject positions assigned to them by the 
orthodox narrative of the past. The gendered subject positions designated to women 
by the narrative of Khadijeh-Fatemeh-Zeinab are strongly grounded in wider, 
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cosmic narratives related to the corresponding three holy men Mohammed-Ali- 
Hossein, narratives all firmly positioned in the "history of salvation" as coined by 
Arkoun (2002), and manifested in endless series of sayings, praying, rituals, 
ceremonies, processions and festivities engaging and engulfing the whole beings of 
women (and men). Regarding the far-reaching and deep influence of these 
discursive and non-discursive practices in shaping women's beings, and inscribing 
in their hearts and minds the subliminal messages of the orthodox philosophy of 
creation, Afary and Anderson (2005,47) report that "Peter Chelkowski, the foremost 
scholar of Taziyeh [a theatrical representation of the events of martyrdom of Imam 
Hossein, similar to Christian passion play], writes that neither time nor place is real 
and definite [in Ta'Ziyeh]. What happened in the year 61 of the Muslim era (680 
AD) on the battlefield of Karbala becomes a reality today: "Ta'Ziyeh breaks the 
boundaries of time and space. " The past and the present meet, and "[The] audience 
is both here and in the desert of Karbala" (Chelkowski (1991: 220) cited in Afary 
and Anderson (2005: 47)). The past becomes the kernel of the present and formative 
of the present. 
Another point emphasised by Mr P. was that Partial liberalisation, without 
the widespread circulation of 
as men sexually use girls 
well-respected and sexually 
pointing out that the price 
availability. He deemed this 
using the following example: 
liberalised views and beliefs, may act against women, 
who are available, but go searching for socially 
virgin girls when they wish to marry. Mr P. was 
of girls diminishes in proportion to their ease of 
against women's interests, and elaborated his point 
"If one wants milk one has to buy a cow, but if it's easily and cheaply 
available in the market, one doesn't go and buy the cow. " 
According to Mr P., the false liberalisation of the market for sex and 
marriage, without associated changes in discourses of honour, chastity, and morality, 
generally has an adverse effect on women's lives. Another important factor which 
could in his view create conflict in a girl's future life is the mother's bad influence: 
. 1f a mother brings up her daughter in ways that teach her not to trust a man, 
whatever her future husband does for her, she cannot believe his good 
intentions. " 
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His point was that girls' pessimism, suspicion and mistrust in relation to their 
husbands is generally the result of their mothers' teachings. But the question is: why 
do women feel that they cannot trust their husbands? The role of the father in raising 
children is very trivial in his perspective. A mother has a central role in the family-, 
she has the power to make her aggressive husband calm. When I asked him about 
the violence women use against their children, he distinguished between two types 
of violence based on gender: feminine violence versus masculine violence. Men are 
not, in his view, able to control their anger due to their rough nature, and their 
aggression is more severe than women's. Women's violence is less severe, and they 
can control it: 
"Due to their sensitive nature, they regret it later, and in order to control 
themselves they fast, for instance, and make a promise not to repeat it again. " 
The cleric was trying to valorise the role of woman as a hidden power centre 
in the family, and as a nurturer. The discourse of motherhood is a protective strategy 
of traditionalists to keep the core of the orthodox jurisprudence-based formulation of 
marriage intact, and to attract women and give them something to be proud of, so 
that they feel validated and valued. One of the Islamist feminists (Azam-e 
Taleghani) has questioned the role of motherhood and the significance attached to 
the family in traditionalist views. She believes that there is no real importance of 
family or motherhood in this model, as the law of immediate divorce or polygamy 
destroys the basic foundation of family. Mothering and the role of the family are 
reflected in the constitution (article 10), while at the same time laws such as the 
unilateral right of men to divorce, or the right to multiple wives or temporary wives, 
reveals that the orthodox jurisprudence does not truly appreciate motherhood or 
family. Motherhood is secondary to the main role of women in the marital 
transaction of sex for financial protection. We know that in the traditional context, 
the tribe was responsible for taking care of children, and this was replaced by the 
extended family rather than the mother (who was deemed important after the 
emergence of the nuclear family). The imporatance of the family is also secondary 
as, the father is the centre around which the whole set of laws revolves, including 
the law which gives the father the right to kill his child. 
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As a cleric, Mr P. was the representative of the leader (ve1qyat-efaqhih), and 
by using a number of discourses (such as gender differences, motherhood, sexuality) 
he made an effort to demonstrate the rationale behind the orthodox jurisprudence 
model of gender relations. He believed that the road to power for women lay in the 
careful management of men using emotions, obedience and sexuality. He wanted to 
encourage women to take this road, and not to pay any attention to "feminist junk" 
(he became very angry here, and his soft tone changed to a very hostile one). He was 
on the road taken by some feminists in stressing the differences in male/female 
constitutions and psychology. He was valorising the feminine and ridiculing the 
masculine. Men, in his belief, were set to be the social labourers handling the 
tedious tasks in social life with its apparent glory and status versus the women who 
were assigned to do apparently thankless and unappreciated tasks while being truly 
mysterious and wondrous (this was his interpretation of the famous Nisa verse). 
Women, in his view, are the fountain of power and humanity, the symbol or 
prototype of humanity; he invites them to "invest" in the subject position of ideal 
woman as constructed in the image of the traditional jurisprudence and protected by 
revolutionary discourses of motherhood and family. 
The next section will deal with another important component of the orthodox 
formulation of marriage, mahrieh, which emerge in the participants' accounts. 
Mahrieh and its relation to domestic violence: the views of judges and others 
What is the underlying assumption for the stipulation of mahrieh in orthodox 
marriage? How can it cause or prevent domestic violence against women? Judge H 
explained the nature of mahrieh: 
"In marriage we have the issue of mahrieh. The woman can say to her 
husband, "If you want me to submit to you, I must first have my mahrieh. " 
But once she submits (even without her mahrieh being paid to her), she can't 
bring any excuse for not submitting thereafter. " 
There are many arguments surrounding mahrieh. Those in favour of the 
practice argue that it was a progressive idea in the past (1,400 years ago) and is still 
so today; it is a kind of insurance policy for women. Others argue that its existence 
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has a profound impact on women's lives, and could trigger violence against them. 
One of the judges, Judge A, admitted: 
"Sometimes the man puts the woman in a dire position. There's a risk that he 
will beat or even kill her. So she prefers to give up her mahrieh, saying, I 
abandon my mahrieh and set myself free Uanam azad mahram halafl. "' 
Many women are severely beaten or psychologically abused by their 
husbands, or by male relatives, in an attempt to coerce them to disregard their rights 
in this regard. In most cases, they find it difficult to get hold of their mahrieh. There 
is a famous saying: "Nobody has ever given it, and nobody has ever received it". 
One of the female lawyers I interviewed, Ms M., believed that mahrieh causes a 
great deal of trouble between men and women at the very beginning, when the 
families wish to agree the amount to be paid. The woman's family has high 
demands, and the future husband's family are reluctant to sign up. If it goes wrong, 
as generally happens, this will always affect the fragile relationship between the 
bride and her husband's family, and possibly her relationship with her husband too. 
He will always remind her that he has paid a high price, so she must do as he wishes. 
She can always threaten him by asking for her mahrieh at once (while she is still 
married), or by filing for divorce; however she is then unlikely ever to receive it. Ms 
M. acknowledged that her experience led her to the conclusion that mahrieh is a 
major source of problems in marriage, and causes much suffering in both men and 
women, especially in women. Her solution was to eliminate it, because as she said: 
"After all, what's the use? Most of the women can't have it because either 
their husbands can't afford it, or even if they can they won't pay it. Plus they 
are always asked to obey, or they have to reduce it to an affordable figure 
based on the man's financial situation. " 
Instead of mahrieh, she believed that it would be more practical "to divide 
the wealth at the time of divorce for all women". It is worth mentioning that most 
Iranian families expect the future groom to offer a higher price as a sign of his love 
and affection; the higher the price, the greater the love shown. The symbolic value 
of mahrieh as a gesture and token of validation is very important for the families 
involved. 
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In line with this argument, one of the university lecturers in law (Mr R. ) 
admitted that mahrieh damages both men and women, although his approach, as a 
married man himself, differed slightly from that of my female participant. Ms M. 
and another female consultant tended to view women as victims who are "the real 
losers" in this system. Ms A did admit that she knew of some cases in which 
women who had the power to ask for mahrieh used it to ruin a man's life financially. 
They did this by employing highly qualified lawyers who could defend them 
skilfully. Nevertheless, she admitted that these cases were rare, and most women are 
not fully aware of their rights, or their husbands' predisposition to violence prevents 
further action. She referred to one of her female clients, a doctor, whose husband 
severely beat her in the presence of her patients and colleagues. 
Mr R., who also opposed mahrieh, regarded himself as someone who 
sympathises with women's ordeals in society, but women should in his opinion be 
reasonable and clear about what they want; otherwise they lose the support of 
people, like Mr R., who sympathise with them. He thinks the system needs to 
change, since the current system "could lead to more violence against women, as it 
gives men more power", but the change should not be only in one component. He 
stressed that: 
"In Islam we have nafagheh and mahrieh for women, but on the other hand 
the right of divorce and the permission right are preserved for men. In 
addition, men's inheritance and blood money are twice as much of women. 
It's like a solar system. The elements of the system match each other - if one 
of them has to change, everything else should change with it. We cannot say 
inheritance should be equal, but nafagheh should remain intact. " 
His approach was very similar to the female lawyers', but he presented it in a 
different way. In his view, a couple's wealth should be divided after the divorce, but 
women should not receive mahrieh. He found it ludicrous that a man who pays 500 
gold coins may not claim the authority and headship of the family (he said it with 
laughter). Another judge who was present in our meeting agreed. Mr R. continued: 
"We have some female students in law who come and criticise: "Why do 
men have to be our bosses? Why is our inheritance half that of men? Why is 
our blood money half ... T" From a hundred girls, not even one asks why there 
is mahrieh. Boys ask me, "Why do these girls never ask themselves why we 
should pay mahrieh, and why they are not after abolishing it? " I invited them 
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to think rationally. We can approach the problem from other dimensions: 
when a man offers a woman 200 or 300 gold coins and she insists on having 
500 or 1,000 coins and may demand it at any time, then the man should have 
the right of divorce. Otherwise, she can have the money (1,000 coins) and 
get the divorce and say goodbye. That's very unfair. " 
Here Judge A., who was present at the meeting, pointed out that this is "women's 
violence against men". 
Mr R. continued: 
"We should think of 1,400 years ago when this kind of contract was set up. 
In my opinion, it was logical in that time. There are some young girls who go 
after rich boys and they get the divorce right, but after a short while they 
divorce their husbands. Especially, these days it has become fashionable that 
the girl's family don't agree to the marriage until they have the right to 
divorce. The price of mahrieh has gone sky high. For instance, nowadays 
girls demand golden coins according to their year of birth: if it is 1363 [solar 
calendar] they receive the equivalent of 100 million tomans and tomorrow 
they can get a divorce and leave. That isn't rational. The only way is to have 
a mutual contract like western countries where there is no mahrieh at all. 
Approaching the subject from only one side isn't right. Girls can say on the 
wedding day, for instance, I don't want mahrieh -I want the divorce right 
instead. " 
The model Mr R. and the other lawyers were suggesting, a mutual and equal 
relationship, is reflected in Saidzadeh's, a reformist clergyman viewpoints, and 
supported by Mojtahed-Shabestari, an influential reformist cleric. Gender equality is 
established as a principle of inference of God's Rulings (see Chapter 2). 
The theory of mutual protection, as my participants stated, will change the 
basic definition of marriage as an exchange of sexual obedience for financial 
protection. The implication of the theory of mutual protection is that unilateralism 
will be dropped from the heart of marriage in all its forms. Unilateral provision of 
sexual services by the wife as a duty will logically change to mutual provision of 
sexual services (see Chapter 2); and unilateral provision of financial protection will 
be replaced by mutual attempts to satisfy the couple's financial needs. The full 
extension of this logic will yield a mutual ownership regime of the wealth created by 
the couple during the marriage period. It will generate mutual custody right or at 
least no priority is given to one to the disadvantage of the other. 
Furthermore, this approach will produce mutual permission rights and 
mutual headship, and will affect the rulings on blood money and honour killing in 
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cases of adultery. This could in turn debase the violence against women in a drastic 
way. In short, introducing mutual protection into marriage contracts will change the 
whole traditional model of marriage dramatically, and will generate a marriage 
model based on partnership. 
Conclusion 
From the accounts of the eight participants in this study, it can be concluded 
that the focus of law in relation to domestic violence is on observable, physical 
injuries and bodily harm, while marginalising or disregarding emotional, 
psychological and sexual abuse. It is clear that beating and using physical violence 
against women in marital contexts is against the law, and will be punished if any 
bruises or marks can be detected. However, according to the jurisprudence texts, a 
man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys him. In addition, the law stays 
silent on some violent acts, such as rape or unwanted sexual relations in marriage. 
By definition, rape in the marital context is not recognised, as the concept of tamkin 
or obedience in sexual matters is inherent in the orthodox formulation of marriage. 
Furthermore, unwanted forms of sexual intercourse (such as sodomy) are not 
unambiguously addressed in law. As one of the judges said, complaints are generally 
overlooked, since these matters are highly private and women rarely complain about 
them. This hints at the possibility of sexual violence being largely unreported to the 
courts. 
The tension between the orthodox jurisprudence, law and social reality 
"However, this is only in sharia, and in courts they may not act accordingly", 
or "It might be better if sharia did not intervene in the law", or "In practice, the 
system is more open to women's rights". These statements were frequently made by 
some of the judges and lawyers; this reflects the tensions between sharia, the 
orthodox jurisprudence, law and social reality, which in turn may result in 
selectively highlighting some of the laws regarding women, while ignoring others. 
For instance, as Judge H. stated, in this study, having the rulings in sharia (theory) is 
different from applying them in reality (practice). One of the main problems in the 
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judiciary in general, and specifically regarding family relations, is the ambiguity 
between orthodox jurisprudence's rulings, the law and social norms and reality. For 
example, in relation to a woman9s sexual obedience to her husband, orthodox 
jurisprudence does not specify the details. According to the rulings, a woman must 
obey her husband everywhere and at any time (there are famous sayings from the 
Infallibles declaring the divine entitlement of men to their wives' sexual faculties 
even while riding a camel, or encouraging women to prioritise performing their 
sexual duties even over prayer), but when the matter reaches court, other social 
considerations may come to play important roles, culminating in similar cases in the 
courts being dealt with differently, depending on the intensity of the allegiance of 
the judges to the rulings in the jurisprudential texts and the law, or their degree of 
consideration for the social reality. 
Overall, the marital model presented by orthodox jurisprudence offers 
unlimited power to men by bestowing on them the headship of the family and 
formulating a sexual relationship based not on reciprocity but on submission of one 
to the other. The formulation of marital relationships proposed by traditionalists 
seems to establish and maintain the power and control of men over their wives 
through the term of tamkin and through women's subordination. This conclusion 
was drawn from the accounts of the participants. Gender difference discourse was 
largely employed to justify this relationship. On the basis of this discourse, men 
were defined as more rational and experienced, and as having better access to 
resources, and women were defined as emotional, inexperienced, and suited to 
housework and caring for the family. Moreover, male and female needs are believed 
to be different from each other, as defined by their God-given nature: men are seen 
as aggressive, tough and in control of their emotions (but not their anger), while 
women are regarded as caring, soft and hasty. 
The judges in the Iranian judicial system are overwhelmingly male, and their 
gender often affected their decision-making in relation to women's lives. This is 
central to the problem of domestic violence in Iran. While the male participants 
(except Mr R. ) attempted to justify the differences between men and women on the 
basis of their nature using essentialist discourses, the two female participants viewed 
the problem from a different angle. They placed the emphasis on the 
social ly-constructed nature of gender, and familial structures and communal 
relations. They firmly believed that if girls have lower self-esteem and are less 
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experienced and more emotional, it is because of their upbringing rather than their 
nature. They stressed the role of family, and the ideology of gender segregation and 
gender differences, fuelled by the religious establishments in defining and fixing the 
subject positions assigned to girls and boys. The female consultant viewed herself as 
a victim of such policies of gender discrimination. 
The major problems are the demand for women to obey their husbands, 
giving the headship of the family to the husband, the specific formulation of 
marriage, the exchange of money (mahrieh) for selling or renting the woman's body, 
and the notion of gender differences. All of this may lead to violence against 
women. More importantly, the kind of image this formulation introduces could put 
women in a more vulnerable and inferior position. Regarding women and their role 
in the orthodox order, the image-making function of orthodox jurisprudence is 
critical. This function refers to the image of the woman projected by the rulings 
pertaining to women and gender relations. The image projected by the orthodox 
jurisprudence rulings is the logical implications of its rulings on women's rights and 
obligations in the orthodox (Mir-Hosseini, 1999). This is what is taught to people 
and shapes and organises gender relations, the vast majority of these teachings does 
not reach the legal system and functions through social relations. This influence of 
the orthodox jurisprudence is beyond law and beyond the legal system, as a 
philosophy organising gender relations and life in general. 
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Chapter 5 
Women's Experiences, Perceptions and Understanding of Domestic 
Violence 
Introduction 
This chapter is based on field interviews conducted with 40 women (ref. Chapter 3). 
The concern of this chapter is to explore local conditions and factors leading to 
domestic violence against women in Iranian society, with Islam in its Shia version as 
the mainstream discourse. This is done by analyzing the narratives of women and 
their understandings and perceptions of the roots and causes of violence. It was a 
quest both for me and my interviewees to delve into their lives and try to understand 
the reasons behind their difficult relationships with their husbands and partners. The 
following sections consist of the themes and sub-themes that emerged as a result of 
the analysis of their accounts. Inferring from the women's own interpretation and 
understanding of the reasons for being abused by their husbands, as becomes 
apparent, the most important cause of conflict between couples was the men's 
tendency and desire to exert "power" and "control" over their partners. 
However, this need for control was found to be applied in different forms by 
different men. In the first section,, I discuss the different types of domestic violence 
reported by women. Subsequent sections deal with the factors involved in domestic 
violence, based on the women's accounts. 
Types of domestic violence 
I asked each of the women interviewed a few questions related to the type of 
violence their husbands used. On the basis of their accounts, I divided their 
experiences of domestic violence into four categories - physical, psychological, 
economic and sexual violence - as demonstrated in Table 5.1: 
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Table 5.1: Types of violence used by men against their partners 
Type Violent behaviour 
Physical Hard punches or slaps, kicks 
. Beating with a stick, club, 
belt or other instrument 
. Cutting or stabbing with a 
knife, dagger or scythe 
Psychological Imprisonment at home 
. Isolation (not being able to talk to (or see) anyone) 
. Threatening to kill or hurt the woman, or ruin her reputation 
(blackmail) 
. Threatening to set fire to the house 
. Husband's self-beating 
. Burning clothes 
. Humiliating the woman in the presence of others 
. Threatening divorce 
. Damaging her self-worth 
. Playing with her emotions (manipulation) 
. Verbal abuse by swearing, insults, insulting late relatives 
. Negligence 
. Deliberately delaying carrying out repairs at home 
. Throwing her out of the house 
. Boasting about paying nafagheh or having money 
. Ignoring her 
Economic Cutting off maintenance and abandoning the woman 
. Starvation Jaking her money by force 
. Banning her from going to work 
. Making her work long hours on the 
farm 
. Ignoring her decisions over 
her personal property or joint property 
Sexual Forced intercourse, either by physical coercion or psychological 
intimidation 
. Marital rape 
. Sodomy or oral sex without consent 
. Unwanted pregnancy 
. 
forced abortion 
. Sexual harassment 
. Exposure to pornographic 
films 
. 
Accusing her of having an illegitimate relationship with men 
Physical Violence 
In this study, physical violence was always accompanied by other types of 
violence (sexual, economic and/or psychological). The findings are in line with 
those reported in WHO (2005) publications. Kelly also pointed out the close 
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association between sexual and physical violence (in Hanmer and Maynard, 1987). 
MacKinnon (1982) explains how men establish their power over women through 
sexual coercion. I decided to divide violent acts into four categories for the purpose 
of analysing women's different experiences. Women who had experienced physical 
violence stated that they had often been punched, slapped, kicked, or hit with a club. 
Here are some examples: 
"My husband beats me with a stick, punches or slaps me, kicks me. " 
"He beat me so hard with his fists that he hurt himself and wore himself out. " 
"He used to beat me with a stick, and I wouldn't dare look at him or move. " 
Some of the women affirmed that they had had miscarriages as a result of 
being severely beaten: 
"When I was five months pregnant he kicked me, and I lost the baby because 
he wanted me to make his food ready and I was praying. I buried the baby 
with my own hands and he never asked where the baby was. Can you call 
such a man a husband? " 
"Every day we had fights and he used to beat me severely; once, when I was 
four or five months pregnant he beat me and I lost the baby as a result of 
being kicked and punched and beaten with a stick. " 
"He did a lot of bad things. He had an affair. I saw them together, he wanted 
to kill me, he made me have an abortion, and my womb is now damaged 
forever. " 
The use of a dangerous instrument such as a dagger, hammer or scythe was reported 
rarely, in only a few cases related mainly to women farmers, who generally work 
with such tools either at home or on their farms. 
"He beat me with a scythe [das] and a stick. Once he beat me with a hammer 
and broke my cheek bones and I pretended that my toddler did it to me. He 
threatened that if I applied for a divorce, he would cut my head with a knife 
or would stab me. I was petrified. " 
-My husband beat me... and threatened me with a knife and closed my 
mouth to stop me shouting, and I was nearly suffocated. " 
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Psychological violence 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, psychological violence is more diverse. 
Although women suffered a great deal from physical injuries, they reported that 
psychological violence caused them more pain. The most prevalent was the man 
accusing of his wife of infidelity (by shouting loudly). Women explained that this 
could damage their image as a pious woman among the neighbours and within the 
community: 
"He shouted loudly in the yard that I'm a bad woman who sleeps around, and 
all the neighbours could hear him and he knew thaf'. 
Men, consciously and intentionally, use this effective strategy to keep their 
wives quiet. There is a strong tendency among people to avoid public scandals at 
any price, and the pressure to accumulate and safeguard a good reputation as social 
capital is very intense. Men know how important it is for a woman to keep her 
reputation in the community. The discourse of effat1haya (chastity/modesty) has a 
powerful grip on women's subjectivity, and is actively strategised by men in order to 
advance their own agenda. Women's selthoods are constructed by these orthodox 
discourses in such a subliminal way that they "own" the discourses, and actively 
seek to be known as respected members of the community in order to protect their 
social relations. Those who had young daughters were particularly concerned: 
"Nobody would marry them thinking that their mother is a bad woman. " 
I don't argue with him any more, and whatever he says I don't pay attention 
any more - my daughters are quite big now. I don't want my children and 
my neighbours to hear such nonsense. " 
"He even accuses me of having relationships with men who are younger than 
I am, even though I now have two grandchildren and it hurts me a lot... 
Because I'm scared of the neighbours I keep quiet, because they might think 
I'm the kind of person my husband says I am. " 
Insulting late relatives was found to be a very effective way of hurting 
women's feelings. One woman said: 
"When he swears at my father, who's dead, I get really upset and it makes 
me cry. He knows it too, and uses it a lot to hurt me. I tell him 'You can beat 
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me a hundred times a day, but please don't say any bad words about my 
father. "' 
Psychological violence towards women also included imprisonment at home, 
forced isolation and deprivation, and a ban on talking to (or seeing) friends and 
relatives. These cases were reported by many of the women in my study. One, 
whose name was Parvaneh, said: 
"Nobody was allowed to come to our house, and I wasn't allowed to go 
anywhere. He imprisoned me, and to convince me of his goodwill he told me, 
'It's out of too much love for you. You're so beautiful, if other men see you 
they'll fancy you. "' 
She, however, thought that he did not want her to go out because her social 
relations could lead her to wise up by obtaining infonnation and advice from her 
family and friends, which could endanger his position: he was a drug addict, and it 
was not in his interest for that to be known publicly. By imprisoning his wife and 
formulating his interests in the framework of the widely legitimate concerns arising 
from the discourse of sexuality (beingsexually attractive to other men), he was 
protecting himself. This demonstrates the powerful role the force of fantasy and the 
gaze of imagination play in gender relations in Iran. The force of fantasy is deployed 
by men to remove the veils of the hejab from the female body. As we see, the use of 
the hejab is not enough to protect women's modesty and chastity; their mere 
presence in the social realm unleashes the powerful forces of male imagination 114 . 
The logical implication of this dynamic process of strategy and counter-strategy 
(faced with restrictions imposed by orthodox jurisprudence on gender relations by 
imposition of the hejab and the will to sex segregation in all spheres of social space, 
the discourse of Mahrameat 115 ; men's strategy to have unfettered access to the 
forbidden female body is through gaze; the counter-strategy is more hejab, covering 
the whole body from top to toe; the next-round male strategy is fantasy) is, in order 
to ensure the safeguarding of women's dignity and chastity, the fact that total 
seclusion and segregation are the "best" option. 
The fact that some men actively and dishonestly abuse this set of discourses 
further reveals their grip on people's sense of selfhood, and their widespread 
114 In Chapter 21 provided a coherent argument supporting the powerful relation between fantasy, 
eroticism and sexuality on the basis of social psychology research. 
115 See Chapter 2 of this thesis for elaboration on the interconnectedness of these notions. 
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currency. Of course, these discourses do not per se inflict violence on women. 
Violence emerges at the interplay of modernity and orthodox jurisprudence, as there 
are two sets of opposing forces at work here. While orthodox jurisprudence places 
women at home, modernity invites their active participation in the sphere of social 
life; each has its coherent structures of power/knowledge/subjectivity, and each 
promises rewards and warns of severe adverse effects. Most women (and men) want 
both, and as a result become victims of the tension between them. If all submitted to 
one or the other, these types of violence against women would not emerge in the 
Iranian context. All in all, this part of the interview demonstrates the strong 
interconnection between the realms of knowledge (set of specific discourses on 
modesty, reputation etc. ), power (normalisation associated with social sanctions due 
to the loss of reputation, or rewards due to the gain of piety) and subjectivity (fear of 
loss of reputation and sense of pride associated with piety, and shame associated 
with lack of it, in women and men's sexual jealousy or suspicion depicting the 
powerful formative forces of structures of power and knowledge in the architecture 
of the self)' 16 . As Arkoun (2002) puts it, mind is a social institution. One of the 
logical implications of this whole dynamic is male sexual jealousy, constant 
suspicion and a strong sense of mistrust. Parvaneh stated that her husband was 
undeniably a suspicious person: 
"When his friends were in our house in order to smoke [drugs], he would ask 
me to stay in another room because he didn't want anybody to see me. He 
was a very suspicious man. " 
In addition to these forms of psychological violence, women also reported 
having been threatened with divorce, removal of the children, murder or burning. 
Other abuse included burning a woman's clothes, damaging her self-worth and self 
esteem, playing with her emotions, delaying household repairs, throwing the woman 
out of the house, and boasting about paying nafagheh or having money and 
neglecting her. Some husbands used self-beating as a way to scare their wives. As 
Faranak, another of the women, stated: 
116 See the exposition of the Foucauldian framework in Chapter I of this thesis. 
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"He used to break the dishes, or bang his head against the wall. That made 
me think he was mad. But he wasn't. Because I was much younger than him, 
and was scared of him, he was doing it to scare me off. " 
Two women reported that their husbands hit their own heads against the wall 
very hard. This behaviour made the women extremely worried even petrified. 
Another woman reported: 
"When he beats himself I get really scared, and I scream and beg him to 
stop. " 
Eventually one of the husbands confessed to his wife: 
"You're so naYve. Next time when I tell you I am going to bum the house or 
bash my head, don't be so frightened. I only want to scare you. " 
The above example shows that the husband is using self-beating as a 
conscious act to control his wife's behaviour. Threatening to bum the house down or 
killing them in a car accident were other strategies adopted which proved very 
effective. Faranak was frightened to protest, and her husband eventually took control 
of the matter himself, Faranak's nervous breakdown and panic attacks as a result of 
being constantly anxious made him stop employing such tactics. 
Economic violence: 
According to the orthodox formulation of marriage, if the woman does not 
obey her husband he can beat her, stop giving her nafagheh or starve her. Many 
women reported that not only did their husbands stop giving them money, food and 
clothing, but also removed their own money with force. Kobra, a woman farmer, 
reported that: 
"Many nights I had to sleep with my shattered body as a result of being 
beaten and working hard. I was left hungry in the stable below the building 
with animals, and I wouldn't dare come out in case he saw me and beat me 
again. " 
Some men made their wives work for long hours, either on their farm or on their 
parents' or other people"s farms: 
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I worked very hard. While my husband was sitting in the village coffee 
shop I was looking after the animals in the farm and planting rice in the 
fields, taking care of the children and the housework - cooking, cleaning 
etc. " 
This woman was 68 years old, with 12 children, and was still working to 
provide her daughter's jahizieh 1 17 because, she said: 
"My husband doesn't care about it. He doesn't want her to marry - he wants her to stay here and work for him. " 
She was shaking, and was in a very bad shape. She showed me her arms, 
which were bruised. She said that her husband had beaten her with a stick only three 
days earlier. All the woman farmers I interviewed reported similar stories: 
"Some days he wouldn't give us anything to eat. Once, my children starved 
for four days until I could work and provide some food for them... We didn't 
have enough to eat, and to feed the kids I had to give them my husband's and 
his friends' leftovers. Once I hid some rice for my children, but he gave it to 
his friends and when I complained he slapped me very hard. Did I say 
something wrong? We were eight hungry people, and I worked very hard to 
get that bit of rice. " 
Those interviewees who were not farmers and did not have any income were 
more dependent on their husbands' generosity. By not paying, or delaying, the 
payment of maintenance costs, the husbands had a strategic tool at their disposal to 
teach the women a lesson. Loss of maintenance devastated the women completely. 
Many complained that their husbands' arrogance hurt them and brought them 
humiliation, especially those whose husbands overtly and constantly reminded them 
that they, with their money, were in charge at home. Most of these men demanded 
that their wives obeyed them. Middle-class women I interviewed told similar stories. 
Irin explained: 
"It was humiliating for me to be ignored by him - he played with my 
emotions. That was more difficult for me than the financial problems I have 
with him. He wouldn't buy me anything, despite the fact that he's well off. 
He asked me to be a totally obedient wife, and then he would provide for me. 
I told him to go and get a rope and put it around my neck. He says a 
woman's afsar [rein] should be in the man's hands [a man must control his 
... A newly married girl should be provided with the furniture of her future's house, orjahizieh, by 
her parents. 
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wife's affairs]. If he says 'Die', she should die. She must do whatever he 
demands. He says 'This is my culture [he is from the south], and I'm very 
proud of it. ' He thinks a man should be the breadwinner -a woman! s place is in the home, and her job is looking after the children. I told him, 'We're 
not chicken and chicks. "' 
Most of these women were educated, and a number of them had worked 
before marriage, but they were not allowed to have any job outside the home after 
their marriage, because, as they said: 
"He believed that a woman's place is at home and she shouldn't go out. " 
"He didn't let me work in the office because he thought other men might 
fancy me. " 
"He didn't let me go to work. He thinks I should stay at home. " 
"He threatened that if I went to work,, he would come to the office and ruin 
my reputation. " 
Why these women decided to listen to their husbands and not seek a job is 
another issue for investigation. Did they themselves believe that a woman's place is 
indeed in the home, or were external circumstances not ready for them? Some 
explained to me that the outside world is not welcoming for women, or for their 
participation in the workplace, and that they would not earn enough and did not 
want to ruin their families' happiness and peace for a little money. Those who 
decided to challenge the obstacles (the women shopkeepers) resisted the pressure, 
persevered and worked really hard (with their husbands' permission), and they were 
successful. However, they claimed sexual harassment, but could not report it to any 
official authority because nobody would believe them, and they could lose their 
reputation and profits. One said that if she had decided to complain, she would have 
needed to provide four witnesses, which was not possible. Even if she could find 
witnesses, nobody would be willing to go to court to give evidence. The women 
would then have lost out,, because nobody would have gone to their shop any more, 
fearing possible accusations. Additionally, the women could not tell their husbands 
about the abuse because they would accuse them of not being cautious enough, and 
eventually they could stop them working. One of the women, who had recently 
opened her shop, had to wear the chador in order to go to work, as her husband 
suggested that if she wanted to sell underwear she should behave piously and should 
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not look like a vulgar woman wearing make-up and improper clothes. These sets of 
interwoven strategies and counter-strategies adopted in homes, streets and 
workplaces neatly and vividly demonstrate that the whole social order is geared up 
to keeping women at home, and to sending them constant messages that home is the 
right place; the ideal situation of total sex segregation through seclusion is sought. 
The dynamics of gendered social interactions in all realms of life point in one 
direction only: home. 
Sexual violence 
Discussing female sexuality was not always easy. I preferred to wait for an 
appropriate time to broach the subject. However, sometimes I asked the question in 
a very delicate way, and if they did not want to talk about it I did not pursue the 
subject further. In Iran, sexual matters remain an extremely sensitive issue, except as 
the subject of jokes and humour, or in private conversations based on mutual trust. 
Marital rape within the orthodox marriage is not defined. Sexual obedience and 
satisfying the husband's desire is a woman's duty according to the jurisprudential 
rulings and the law. 
Generally speaking, I found it easier and more fruitful to talk about sex and 
sexuality with those of the younger generation. There were some differences 
between the young upper-middle-class interviewees and the rest of the women (most 
of them working- or middle-class) in this study. The former reported that their 
husbands did not use force or put further pressure on them when they did not want to 
have sex with them. This was partly due to the women's willingness to have a sexual 
intercourse as frequently as possible. Moreover these young women believed 
satisfying their husbands' sexual needs was part of their deal in the marriage 
contract. However, the latter group were in a different situation altogether. For them 
the sexual relationship was defined in an old-fashioned way: the husband wants it, 
and whether the wife wants it or not, she must "give it to him". A number of the 
women reported that their husbands forced them to sleep with them, and they 
suffered a lot both psychologically and physically. Unwanted pregnancy and 
abortion were often reported by these women. The most severe case was the sodomy 
reported by a 68-year-old woman: 
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"He sodomised me for a few years, and now he's too old for that, and I'm 
not afraid of him any more. " 
I met a young woman in court who reported (in her letter to the judge) that 
she had been severely abused by her husband vaginally, orally and anally. Alongside 
beating her, the husband was doing this to place more pressure on her to give up her 
mahrieh. Eventually she agreed to abandon her claim to mahrieh, and the judge 
agreed to grant her a divorce. 
Some women did not report any forced sexual contact. They never 
questioned their husbands' demands for sex. They had to sleep with their husbands 
because they themselves were thinking that it was their duty, and not submitting was 
a sin: 
"I've heard that if one doesn't satisfy her husband, the angels curse 
her hundreds of times till morning. " 
Overall, most women reported unwanted sexual relationships; in addition they said 
they were sexually cold (frigid). Zari said: 
"I am cold, and during my married life I was cold most of the time. I hated 
having a sexual relationship. I didn't like men at all. Any time he wanted me 
it made me upset. I would do it reluctantly. " 
A number of women asserted that if they did not submit, their husbands 
would not talk to them, or would find an excuse to start a fight. Using sexual 
intercourse as a means to achieve something was found to be women's instrumental 
approach to sex. Having sexual desire was not an option for these women. One of 
the women in a focus group was very surprised to hear that women could have 
desires: 
Parisa: Are there any women who like sex? Do they exist? 
Narges: Yes. 
Parisa: Ah! 
Either the women submitted to their husbands purposefully because they wanted to 
keep their husbands quiet, or they did it in order to gain access to resources or 
favours. One of them said: 
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"If he wants to sleep with me, I ask him to do something or buy something 
for me. It's the only weapon we women have. We don't have any other 
resources or income. That's also good for them (benefits men). " 
These remarks points to the strategic use of sex by women as a means to gain 
access to power. On the other hand, there were a few women who did not believe in 
obeying their husbands in every way. One woman found it difficult to identify with 
the fact that a woman must obey her husband in sexual matters: 
"I can't believe it's Islam or God who orders us to obey our husbands in 
every way, or the claim that men are superior to women. I believe in God 
firmly, but I think it's unfair. He doesn't give me any money, so I have to 
look after my own body and health to prevent getting ill... I ask him, 'If you 
want me to satisfy your sexual needs, will you agree to treat me when I am 
MTýl 
Her husband did not support her financially for her medical treatment. I 
asked some women what they thought about their desires. One of them said: 
"I always constrain my desires. I'm not sure whether I'm doing the right 
thing or not. I've heard from my husband that it's better if a woman waits for 
her husband to ask for it. That makes men love women more... Whenever I 
show my desire he's cold with me. I think if I showed some resistance and 
pretended I wasn't interested, he would want me more. " 
For this woman's husband, controlling and constraining one's desire was 
sexy. However I cannot help thinking that he intended to construct a discourse of 
"constraining and controlling" to teach his wife to restrain her desire to protect her 
chastity, in order to avoid any possible disloyalty in future. 
The younger generation claimed to be more open-minded regarding their 
desire and their husbands' sexual needs. However, they also admitted that while sex 
was very important for men, they preferred love. They had their own concerns: 
Parisa: Really, why do men constrain us? 
Homa: Because God put the instinct in them, and that's why sex is important 
for them. 
ZT: Isn't it important for women? 
Homa: Not as much as for men. I prefer love to sex. 
Others together: Yes, we do too. 
One of the issues that concerned the women was the role of pornography in 
their husbands' sexual preferences. The men became too demanding, expecting their 
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wives to perform, act and dress just like the women in the films. Some of the women 
said: 
"I feel jealous whenever he watches those movies, but I'll do everything and 
I don't try to stop him watching them. But truly I don't like it. " 
"He married me because I was a very hardworking, pious girl and I was 
always dressed up like this (very conservative), and now he wants me to be 
more fashionable and wear sexy clothes. Even my mother-in-law told me 
about it. But I found it hard to wear short skirts and sexy clothes. I don't feel 
comfortable. " 
"At night he always watches the movies - he has access to 700 channels - 
and I don't like it at all. " 
Tolerating sexual harassment 
As mentioned in previous sections, women revealed that they had to tolerate 
a wide range of abusive behaviour in public due to the harassment they receive from 
men. In reaction to these cases of harassment women reported to keep quite most of 
the time because, they believed, society would blame them if they make a fuss about 
it. There is a cultural belief that a good, pious, and covered woman will not get 
harassed, and men will only do it to those who are provocatively dressed, or wear 
inviting make-up. If a woman complains to her family or her husband that somebody 
is harassing her, before exploring all possibilities he is likely to start by blaming her 
for not being careful enough. Here are some examples: 
"If we walk across the street and someone looks at me, he blames me. " 
"Once we were walking across the street and someone stared at my sister's 
chest and said something very rude to her. Her husband blamed her for not 
covering herself properly. " 
"Once somebody said something bad to me, and my husband was with me. 
He attacked him and tore his shirt apart, and later blamed me for not 
covering myself properly, though I was wearing my chador. " 
There are no official statistics in relation to sexual harassment in Iran. 
However in one report (Ghadimi, 2005), it was stated that a number of women had 
reported that they had either suffered from sexual harassment themselves, or 
witnessed others suffering from it. However, the majority of women in that study 
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were unwilling to talk about it. Sexual harassment in Iran is not defined accurately. 
Iranian men and women's perception of sexual harassment is not clearly defined; 
they only take it seriously when there is physical contact. However, there is a 
tendency to blame women rather than men, and consequently more burdens are 
placed on women. There are different approaches to this subject. There are men and 
even some women who blame women for provoking men into harassing them 
(Ghadimi, 2005). This group believes that if women behave appropriately in the 
workplace or in the street, they will not attract men's attention. This approach is 
defended by a number of academic and religious scholars, who maintain that some 
women create a suitable circumstance for sexual harassment. They think these 
women are emotionally deprived, and are attention seekers (Ghadimi, 2005). This 
approach could be based on traditional attitudes, which demand women to be chaste 
and virtuous, and to behave responsibly in order to safeguard their piety. Women 
should not behave sexually (by behaving or dressing up loosely, or by wearing 
make-up), and if they do they invite trouble, and are therefore "asking" to be 
harassed. This argument is used frequently by rapists (Kelly, 1997-2000). Others, 
however, are against this idea, and regard women as the victims of the system 
(Ghadimi, 2005). A number of women blame the unjust economic situation,, where 
the distribution of jobs and wealth is not in favour of women, and they are forced to 
accept such harassment in order to keep or find a position (Ghadimi, 2005). 
Reluctance on the part of women to report sexual assault and sexual 
harassment is reported by Kelly (in VIP Guide); however, this is even more extreme 
in countries with a traditional background. Saidi, a sociologist at Tehran University, 
believes that this is rooted in Iranian culture, where any events with sexual 
connotations are seen as taboo (Ghadimi, 2005). He believes that there are very few 
words and phrases in Persian indicating different kinds of sexual harassment. Even 
if there are a few, he, as a lecturer, has found it difficult to teach them in his classes, 
as students regard them as shameful and ridiculous; they think it is rude and 
degrading to discuss such things publicly (Ghadimi, 2005). The most vulnerable 
group of women in terms of sexual harassment are widows and divorcees, followed 
by unmarried girls, and lastly married women. The reason for this problem, one 
academic, Eghlima (Ghadimi, 2005) believes, is cultural deprivation and gender 
segregation, he suggests that there is a need to create more posts, and improve job 
security (Ghadimi, 2005). Saidi views the problem in another perspective; he is in 
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favour of bringing the issues regarding sexuality into the public arena, and 
reconstructing the relationship between the sexes in organisations and in marriage 
(Ghadimi, 2005). 
A woman lawyer I interviewed counted four reasons why women do not 
complain about sexual harassment: "Women don't complain because they are afraid 
to lose their reputation. Society views women as the guilty party. They stay silent 
because they don't want to lose their jobs, due to economic difficulties. The victim 
must have a witness or strong evidence. The fourth reason is the system, which is 
male-dominated from police to the court rooms, and the legal procedure is 
prolonged (Ghadimi, 2005). 
According to article 637 of the Islamic penal codes, the punishment for those 
who commit sexual harassment, in the absence of adultery (zena), is 99 lashes, and 
because it is not defined as predetermined Qu'ranic ruling (hadd) it can be converted 
into a cash payment. If it results in rape, proof is very difficult, as there is rarely a 
witness and medical procedure cannot prove it very effectively. If the woman's case 
is proven, the man will get 99 lashes, and she will be fired as soon as she goes back 
to work. And if she denies having a consensual relationship, she is the one who will 
be punished. According to Arzani (a woman lawyer) (Zanan, 2005), when a woman 
is raped in her workplace, she herself will be asked why she placed herself in 
118 difficult and dangerous conditions 
Women's understanding of the reasons behind domestic violence 
To deconstruct the women's accounts of the reasons behind violence and 
analyse them, a thorough and focused coding of the narratives and a categorising of 
them into themes and sub-themes has been conducted. The first category consists of 
the women's perceptions and interpretations of their own feelings, thoughts and 
behaviour; the second their perceptions of their husbands' feelings, thoughts and 
118 If both parties agree to have a relationship and this leads to sexual intercourse, they have 
committed zena, and the punishment if both are single is 100 lashes. If one of them is married, 
they have committed zenay-e mohseneh and will be punished by stoning, or, if there is no 
intercourse, by 100 lashes each. If the relationship is not consented by the woman, the intensity 
of the punishment will vary: rape is punished by execution, and if intercourse did not take place 
the man will receive 100 lashes. 
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behaviour; the third their perceptions of society; and the fourth their perceptions of 
the communities they are living in. These are presented in the following table (Table 
5.2). There are some sub-themes, which emerged in the process of the interviews. 
Table 5.2: Women's perceptions of themselves, their partners, society, and their 
communities in relation to factors causing violence 
Personal Mismatch in their opinions/ expectations/ local cultures/ education 
relations: 
Women's Lack of family support / experience/ money/ power/ job/ their 
perceptions of husbands' love and care/ self-esteem and self-worth/ courage 
themselves and of 
their partners Acting passively/ too much tolerance/ too much silence and being 
naYve/ forgiving and sacrificing/ not being political enough 
Having difficulties with mother-in-law/ husband's infidelity 
In relation to their husbands: 
Women's frustration at being ignored and not being taken seriously/ 
men"s authoritarian behaviour/ men's self-righteousness/ husband's 
short temper/ husband cannot tolerate criticism/ men's nature: they 
are "born angry" and have less self-control/ consuming alcohol/ 
failure to pay the bride price (mahrieh) and/or maintenance/ 
misogynistic ideas/ men being suspicious/ bigotry (ta-asob and 
Women's Society's biased views of women/ not having legal and social 
perception of protection/ society giving more advantages to men/ discriminatory 
their society rules against women 
Women's Gossiping about a woman's behaviour/ sexual harassment/ 
perception of stereotypical views about women divorcees/ lack of social support/ 
their community legitimising the use of violence to punish women 
A broad range of data was generated in interviews, with women talking 
about their thoughts, feelings and behaviour in response to violence. I divided the 
women') s accounts into different categories. I discuss these in the following section. 
Women's perception of their own thoughts, behaviour and feelings in relation 
to violence 
Women identified the factors at the root of their difficult relationships with 
their partners. These could be divided into four groups: social (kin relationships), 
cultural (coming from different regions), economic (not having jobs, experience or 
social security) and personal (difficulties with mother-in-law, husband's infidelity, 
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lack of love or respect). These themes and sub-themes will be explored in the next 
section. Women's behavioural strategies and their feelings in relation to their 
partners' abusive behaviour will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The role of kin relationship as a social factor in moderating violence 
According to kin-selected altruism theory, women use their own strategies to 
resist the physical and economic power of their men; one of these is using social 
support from their kin group such as family, friends, and relatives (Hrdy, 198 1). 
However, to be effective, this social network must be accessible and available. 
The oppression of women and the prevalence of domestic violence were 
found to be related to the family structure, and might be moderated by the proximity 
of male relatives (brothers, father, and uncles). Having a close relationship with 
oneýs natal family is a protective factor against spousal abuse. Community and 
family relations also play a significant role in permitting, sustaining, and preventing 
domestic violence through their attitudes towards women and family life and 
conflict management. The socio-cultural beliefs and values within a local 
community or extended family underlie theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic 
approaches to conceptualising and interpreting conflicts, interests, and power in a 
social network. In the case of Iranian women, as Friedl (1992,1994, and 1989) has 
pointed out in her studies of sources of Iranian women's power, having close family 
relationships can be considered a buffer against the abusive behaviour of husbands 
and their families. Without the implicit or explicit support of the close family 
network, women"s "disobedience" (or flouting of male rules), either directly or 
subversively, was found to be provocative and to lead to increased conflict and 
violence. 
On the basis of evidence from studies of primates and human ethnographic 
literature, Smuts (1992) generated five major hypotheses regarding the possible 
factors responsible for the variation in women's vulnerability to wife beating and 
sexual coercion. Accordingly, male aggression towards women will increase when 
female alliances are weak and they do not enjoy the support of their families (the 
proximity of the family network), and when male alliances are strong, male 
relationships are less egalitarian and male control of resources increases (leading to 
a female's absolute dependency on her husband). 
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The data generated by this study is in line with the literature. The majority of 
women interviewed stated that if they had family support, it could help them to stop 
violence, or at least at the time of the conflict they could have somewhere to go and 
someone to talk to. Most complained that they did not have any family support. One 
said: 
"My father told me, 'You're going to your husband's house in white 
[wedding clothes], and you'll come back here in white [kafan]. "' 
This statement was replicated by other women interviewees. The term kafan 
means "shroud" - the white cloth used to wrap a dead body for burial. This means 
that whatever happens to them in their marital homes, they should stay and tolerate 
it until they die. This statement had a profound effect on some women's lives. Those 
who were married when they were very young (under their families' pressure) said 
they had found it very frightening. One said she could not even think about filing for 
divorce or returning and seeking help, because she always remembered her father's 
advice: 
"I've always been so scared of divorce. My father told me it's the worst 
thing that can happen to a woman. " 
The women's families, in general, were against divorce. Although they knew 
that their daughters were suffering, they still encouraged them to be tolerant, and 
stay with their abusive husbands. A number of my participants told similar stories: 
"I only ran away once, to my father's house, and they sent me back and told 
me to tolerate his bad temper. " 
"My father sold me to him when I was only 9 years old .... I was really scared 
of him [her husband]. I didn't know anything but I knew my father didn't 
want me back, so I had to tolerate it. " 
"My father didn't help me at all. He forced me back to my husband 
whenever I ran away. He said it's evil to keep a young woman without her 
custodian at home. " 
The above quotes refer to a very important concept, which is closely linked 
to the perception of people in relation to marriage. A married woman is considered 
someone who is managed by her husband. An unmarried woman, or a woman who 
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is separated from her husband, is regarded as custodianless (zan-e bi-sarparast). She 
is an easy target for the male gaze and men's unwanted sexual advances. In a 
traditional society like Iran, the idea of an independent woman living on her own is 
viewed as a threat to the family and society at large; she must either remarry or 
return to her father's house. The father of the woman above was fearful of keeping 
his daughter in his house due to the fear of scandal, and for the sake of respectability. 
She is now a potential danger, who might put the family's reputation at risk by 
becoming sexually corrupt. Mahbubeh, a highly-educated woman who had the 
experience of being a divorcee, told me how her life changed for the worse as soon 
as she became a divorcee. The intense pressure from her family made her jump into 
another marriage: 
"My family was totally against my divorce. My mother threatened that I 
wouldn't be welcome in their house any more. She was more concerned 
about the family's reputation than my situation. She was worried about what 
they could tell people, and that I brought scandal and shame to the family. 
My cousins, who had been very close to me since childhood, wouldn't 
receive me in their homes. They were afraid I might seduce their husbands. 
Everybody rejected me. I couldn't undo my action. The only way that 
remained for me was to remarry... " 
Remarrying did indeed improve Mahbubeh's relationship with her family. 
She was accepted once again, and reconciled with her cousins. For all of the women 
who found themselves in a similar situation, the parental home and family were the 
only sanctuary. Yet most of them were deprived of it, because their own family 
could not afford to have them, or could not tolerate the social pressure. Even when 
they were well-to-do, the families did not believe they should support them. They 
thought it was quite normal to be beaten by one's husband, and one should tolerate it: 
"My father didn't care. My brothers did, but there was nothing they could do. 
They couldn't have me in their houses because their wives wouldn't feel 
comfortable, so I had to go back to my husband again, and tolerate his bad 
behaviour. What else could I do? " 
-My mother told me that she was beaten so many times, but she stayed and 
tolerated the situation, and she says I should do the same. " 
was beaten all my life from the age of 13 or 14, and when my daughter 
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comes to me and complains about her husband's behaviour I tell her my 
stories, and ask her to tolerate it. " 
The situation is even more difficult for women who marry men from other 
cities and towns. A man in court, while ridiculing his wife, said to her: 
"You poor woman! Where do you want to go in this strange city? You don't 
have anybody here. " 
There was only one woman in my study group who said she felt more secure 
from physical violence because she had a very close relationship with her family, 
and lived near them: 
"Once he slapped me, and I told him if he ever did it again I would tell my 
father and brothers, and he never did it again. " 
There were some individuals who had their families' support at the last 
stages of their married life, when they were about to get a divorce as a result of their 
husbands' addiction to drugs, or their absence. However, one of these women had to 
leave her child behind because her own father did not want the child in his family. 
He strongly believed that the child belonged to his father, and that his family must 
take responsibility for him. 
Cultural differences 
Cultural variations between different regions were believed to be very 
important in causing conflicts, according to a number of women. Some of my 
interviewees were married to men from other regions of Iran such as Khuzestan, 
located in the south-west, which is mainly under the influence of Arab culture and 
customs, or AzarbayJan, situated in the north-west (a Turkish area), with its specific 
norms and customs. Iran is very diverse in geographical and cultural terms; although 
the majority of people share more or less the same belief system, there are some 
important differences in local customs and cultures which affect women's lives. For 
instance, in the southern area, the dress code and general codes of behaviour for 
women are more conservative than in the north, where women are more relaxed in 
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terms of their clothing and socialising with the opposite sex. Those from other parts 
of Iran perceive northerners differently, especially in relation to gender relationships. 
There are a vast number of jokes and comic stories about a northern husband's 
relaxed attitudes and feelings towards his wife's behaviour. These jokes contain 
sexual terms referring to a northern (Rashti) man not caring about his wife's 
vulgarity and infidelity. A northern woman is often portrayed as an omnisexual 
woman who is having multiple sexual relationships with almost everybody. In 
reality, however, northerners are not very different from their brothers and sisters in 
other regions of Iran regarding issues surrounding women's sexuality. A man from 
the north can be as gheiraty or jealous as men from any other part of Iran. But the 
difference rests in the scope of the freedom given to women: in the north, women 
have more space in terms of their social relations. Irin, a 40-year-old Rashti woman 
said: 
"Once, we were invited to a wedding where men and women were 
mixing and dancing and having fun. My husband's friend from the 
south, who has a bad reputation (he sleeps with prostitutes) was 
there. He said to my husband, 'These women who are dancing with 
men are all fased [corrupt]. If I asked them to lie down [to have sex] 
right here, they'd do it right away'. My husband, who knows our 
culture, warned him: 'Don't you dare say anything to them! They'll 
kill you right here! This is their culture, and those men they are 
dancing with are their brothers, sons, husbands and relatives. "' 
Nevertheless, Irin's husband (a southerner himself) was in the same dilemma 
over his wife's lifestyle. Irin added: 
"He thinks that if a woman talks to a man, it means they have a 
sexual relationship, while here in Rasht it's normal. Once, after our 
reconciliation, he came home and told me angrily, 'You are like 
your vulgar cousins. You are like a whore who can have ten men on 
top of you at the same time. "' 
Irin's husband was an engineer from the south. Irin pointed out that these 
differences caused a colossal crisis in her life, as she had to "change herself from top 
to toe". She reported that her father, who had worked in the south and knew about 
people's lifestyles, warned her about the cultural differences. He told her she could 
not possibly live in that condition, but she overlooked his advice due to her 
husband's convincing behaviour and manner: 
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"He has two sides: zaher [overt] and baten [hidden]. At the beginning he 
seemed very modem and open minded. He had travelled to many western 
countries, but after marriage he changed. " 
There was a sharp contrast in her life before and after marriage. While before 
marriage she was a free girl working independently, after marriage her husband 
rejected her lifestyle, demanding a total change: 
"From the beginning he gradually started to restrict me. He told me 
that I must wear my chador in every city in Iran, and only in Tehran 
and Gilan region can I take it off. I wasn't allowed to use make-up, 
my hair wasn't to be seen, and I wasn't allowed to go to mixed 
parties. I shouldn't receive any male guest. He said, 'This is our 
custom and culture in the south, and it isn't appropriate for a man to 
carry a baby around, or do the housework'. In their region some of 
the women wear borgha. Their parties and weddings are segregated. 
The women cook and do everything in their own segregated section 
of the party, but in our region [north] we don't have the facilities. I 
have to cook and serve my guests while I'm wearing my chador, 
which is very difficult... If we go to a wedding, I have to sit 
isolated and must wear the hejab - no laughing, no dancing. He 
controls me with his eyes. If he looks me in the eye then I have to 
remove the eye make-up, and if he looks at my lips I should wipe 
the lipstick off. He controls everything, whether I am looking at 
another man or someone else is looking at me. I have to cast my 
eyes down all the time. " 
Although the above passage shows how cultural differences within different 
regions in Iran can be a determining factor in women's lives, a close examination of 
the narratives reveals that these function within a wider background (a symbolic 
order, a regime of power and a regime of subjectivity), encompassing a set of 
legitimate discourses on what being a good woman constitutes. Irin's husband is 
merely applying the legitimate policies and discourses such as those governing the 
hejab, sex segregation and the gheirat effect, which are inscribed in him by the 
orthodox discourses enshrined in everyday conversation and in the formulation of 
marriage and other social institutions. If Irin were a man, he would, almost certainly. 
perform the same set of discursive and non-discursive practices. Of course, there 
would always be a shade of difference related to biography and specific local 
situations, but the difference would be in degree and not in type. Irin's husband 
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justified his authoritarian behaviour by telling her that he was "sensitive about her-, 
while as Irin said: 
"When I ask him why he doesn't show the same sensitivity towards his own 
sisters when they don't take good care of their hejab, he says that they are 
other men's responsibilities, and their affairs are in their husbands' hands. " 
Irin's husband believed that his sisters were not in his realm of responsibility 
and jurisprudence once they were married' 19. The issue of gheirat is not applicable 
here; a man only shows gheirat in relation to his wife, who is under his 
custodianship (of course he has gheirat towards his sisters as well, but it is dormant 
and can only be activated when her sisters' husbands' mechanisms are off for 
whatever reason). The fact that Irin's husband does not think the same way for his 
sisters shows the custodian nature of marital relations, where men feel that the 
women they marry are under their surveillance and in their custody. Therefore, it is 
their duty to control, protect and guard them. In particular, women's sexuality is 
considered highly important, and needs to be taken care of by any means. This set of 
beliefs is strongly supported by the mainstream discourses in the culture and society 
at large, and cannot be changed or replaced easily - as Irin's husband indicated: 
"He says, 'I can't change myself. It's in my blood - these are my family's 
values. They're shared by my brothers, my father and my tribe - all of them 
think like me. "' 
He was referring to the ossified constituent components of subjectivity; how 
the orthodox discourses acted as formative and integral parts of his self. However, 
after ten years of marriage, with two young children, she was seeking divorce 
because she said I can't do this any more". Her bad experience led her to the belief 
that: 
"I don't think a girl should marry - she should stay single. Marriage 
means two people loving each other and living with each other 
equally [hamsar], not this kind of Islamic marriage, which is a kind 
119 The situation for an unmarried girl is different. She carries the honour of the whole family, and 
her male relatives have a huge responsibility in guarding their honour. In southern Iran, honour 
killing is still practised. 
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of slavery. A wife must become a man's slave... not marrying is 
like having one sorrow [gham], and being married is like having 
thousands. " 
Irin's perception of marriage did not match the nature of most marital 
arrangements in Iran. In theory, the orthodox-based formulation of marriage does 
not rest on love. It is a commercial act, which is based on a contract. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, both husband and wife have a set of rights and obligations as soon as the 
contract is conceived. Orthodox marriage is not even for the creation of family (as 
supported by the relevant references in Chapter 2 of this thesis). There is no 
theoretical place for love or family in the orthodox formulation of marriage; these 
are secondary to the sexual satisfaction of the believer, freeing him from sexual 
tension to worship God. However, in practice, people tend to believe that marriage is 
the cradle of love and is there mainly for the purpose of creation of the family. 
Conflict between these two different conceptions of marriage (the tension between 
the orthodox jurisprudence and popular culture), people's expectations of marriage 
as love and creation of family and the actual formulation of marriage, sex (nekah) 
for money (mahrieh, nafaghe and qjratol-meso, causes tension, dissatisfaction and 
violence. 
Other women interviewees stated that their cultural differences created some 
difficulties for them. Three were married to Turkish men. They reported that their 
husbands were highly stubborn and authoritarian in comparison to their fathers and 
brothers, who were northerners. They thought this was due to their being Turkish 120: 
"He's pigheaded - he's a Turk. Although he's lived in Rasht for 30 years, 
he's still a Turk, very stubborn, gheirary, patriarchal and arrogant. " 
These women's problem was that their husbands were so inflexible that they 
made their lives unbearable: 
"Nothing can change their minds when they put their minds to something. " 
According to these women, their husbands believed in a gender division of 
120 Iran has different regions with Turkish populations, mainly in the north-west of the country. 
Turkish people are also called A: ari. 
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labour in the home; they did not want their wives to go out to work or to take part in 
making important decisions. In their husbands' opinion: 
"Women are only made to be in the house and do the housework and take 
care of the children. " 
One of the women told me her husband wanted her to be more like his sisters 
and his mother: submissive and obedient. Fariba, 42, complained that: 
"Whatever I do he isn't happy, but when he's with his family his laughter 
shakes the house. I thought it was just because I don't know his language, 
but he denies it. " 
Mona stated that, unlike her in-laws, she could not behave submissively. In 
contrast, there was a Turkish woman who had married a Rashti man for love. But 
she was seeking divorce because her husband, in her opinion, was an irresponsible 
man who did not think about family, and who only cared about having fun and using 
drugs. She also thought his behaviour had something to do with being a Rashti man. 
She described Turkish men as family men who: 
[feel] responsible and care about their families. They work hard to 
provide for them. My father told me he's just a sloppy good-looking boy. " 
She was envying her sisters, "who have Turkish husbands, and they've 
provided them with a fantastic life - they have lots of jewellery". Although she 
admitted that they are stubborn and authoritarian, nevertheless, she wished to be 
married to one of them. She said: 
"My sisters found their ways to deal with them in a diplomatic manner. 
They listen to them and make them happy and in return get what they want. " 
However, later in her interview she said her father did not support her when 
she was severely beaten by her husband, since he believed that once married she 
must stay and tolerate the abuse. He did not approve of her divorce. He felt strongly 
about family values, manhood and womanhood. He even rejected his grandson: 
"He doesn't want my two-year-old son in his house. He says he already has 
10 mouths to feed in his household, and he doesn"t want someone else's 
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child. " 
In his opinion, the child belonged to the husband's family. It is clear that, 
generally, her father as a Turkish man was feeling, thinking and behaving like other 
Iranian men. She sadly had to leave her two-year-old son in the care of her 
husband's family, and has never seen him again. She was deeply hurt, and tearful. 
Although these women believed their husbands' regional customs and 
practices or their difference in language caused them pain and misery, they 
overlooked the fact that their Gilani sisters who are married to Gilani men have 
more or less the same problems. Marrying a Turk or an Arab could make their lives 
more complicated, but that is not the only factor involved. This triggering factor 
functions through and is embedded in a bigger set of existing discourses in relation 
to the nature of the relationship between a husband and wife, designed and portrayed 
by the historical force of orthodox jurisprudence which is widely established 
everywhere in Iran. 
Economic factors 
Women often complained that they do not have enough resources. They 
repeatedly mentioned that they do not have money or jobs to be able to support 
themselves financially. They could not leave the house and sleep rough in the street 
at the time of conflict. They did not know what to do if their husbands stopped 
giving them maintenance. Those who could work, however, often admitted they 
were powerless to keep their money, since their husbands often forced them to 
relinquish the control of their income to them. One of the women told me that she 
and her four children had to starve for four days when her husband refused to give 
them food; all the resources at home were under his control. She had to work 
secretly so that she could earn something and feed her starving children. Economic 
deprivation has resulted in women's powerlessness in relation to their husbands, and 
that their financial dependency on their husbands damaged their self esteem and 
their self-worth, causing more frustration and anger for themselves and their 
husbands. 
There was only one exceptional woman amongst all my interviewees who 
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did have a separate bank account, albeit in secret. She was highly educated, and had 
the support of her employer, who offered her a loan to buy a house; this empowered 
her enormously: 
"I wish I'd been knowledgeable before. Then I wouldn't have let him affect me 
and ruin my happiness. I am happy now, I am educated and I have a job and 
income and the house is in my name, so he can't hurt me. If he wants to go away 
or have an affair I don't care any more... If a woman has financial security, it 
helps her to have more confidence and power. When I was weak and afraid he 
took advantage of me, but as soon as I started believing in myself and became 
fearless, he stopped beating me... He threatened me with divorce. I went to court 
and complained that I didn't have any job or financial security. Now he can see 
that I'm able to do anything. If a woman start working before marriage the 
husband cannot stop her from going to work but if she finds work after getting 
married he can. " 
She was a civil servant in Tehran, and in her workplace she had had the 
opportunity to meet a number of writers, academics, feminists and women activists, 
who had informed her of her rights and encouraged her to be independent. This had 
had a profound effect on her personality. She had studied Sociology as a mature 
student with two children, and gained her BA. She told me: "As Shahla Lahigi 12 1 has 
said, "Justice has to be earned, it is not given". Although her husband's violent 
behaviour had, to some extent, diminished her success added new complications to 
her situation. He could not cope with the fact that his wife was better educated than 
he was, and earned more, and he felt inadequate and threatened: 
"My husband was against my education, and he wanted to make me pregnant 
just to stop me from going to university, but 'If you set a trap for someone, 122 
you could be caught in it yourself . Perhaps 
he thought it's very bad if his 
wife studies - when I express my opinions he thinks I'm showing off, 
because I have a BA... Basically, he has a problem with my job. At the 
beginning, he threatened he would come to my office and ruin my reputation. 
But I carried on. " 
This interviewee had found some ways to reduce his resistance by being diplomatic: 
"I respect my husband, and I make him believe that he's the boss. Whatever 
he is, he's my man, and I let him be the boss at least in name [esman]. " 
12 1A 
woman activist in Iran. 
122 Proverb: chah kan hamisheh jayash tah-e cha ast. 
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The above statements demonstrate that although financial security, a job and 
education can have a very strong impact on women's lives in terms of empowering 
them, it can also create further tensions in the family. In the current system, a man is 
expected to be the main breadwinner, and this legitimises and maintains his 
authority in the household. When his ability is challenged and threatened by his 
wife's financial autonomy, the conflict resurfaces in other forms and shapes. A 21 - 
year-old woman who was seeking divorce at court said: 
"You [she was referring to all women activists and journalists] think, if a 
woman works her condition gets better? You are wrong. On the contrary, her 
life becomes even more difficult. My husband didn't let me work outside. I 
decided to get some training in embroidery and work at home. I earned lots 
of money, but that made me suffer a lot - every night we had a fight because 
he wanted my money. " 
Later on, she told me that her husband was a highly suspicious man, and one 
night, when she was late home, he burnt all her clothes in the bathroom in order to 
stop her going out again. However, she had money to buy new clothes for herself 
and to go to university, and that led her husband to force her (by beating) to hand 
over her money. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, women farmers reported the same 
problem when their husbands made them "work like slaves". Empowering women 
economically, in and of itself, cannot guarantee a reduction in violence if it does not 
change the whole structure of marriage contract and the associated supporting 
discourses. Research has been carried out on the impact of credit programmes on 
violence against women in the home. These studies (Kabeer 1998, Goetz and Gupta 
1996) suggest that violence increases when women have access to credit. In their 
study on micro-finance and women's empowerment, Hunt and Kasymatharn (2001) 
reported that women who were given credit were beaten by their husbands. One 
husband threatened to demand more dowry payments unless his wife could secure 
more credit (Hunt and Kasymatham; 200 1). 
Women in Islam are endowed with financial independence; they are allowed 
to keep their property or sell it. However, in reality, women's rights are 
overshadowed by the overwhelming power of men, bestowed upon them by the 
orthodox structure of marriage. In most cases, husbands have control over their 
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families' resources, including their wives' finances. Women often easily accept their 
husbands' authority in family affairs; traditionally they are brought up in this way. 
They believe that by assisting their husbands in their financial difficulties, they are 
helping the whole family: "After all, we are a family and he's a hard-working man, " 
Raana (57) said. Raana's husband, however, had control over every aspect of her life. 
Later in her interview she mentioned how this created much tension in the family. 
She mentioned that there were times when she wanted to give some money to her 
children, but had nothing, or to make a simple telephone call to her children, and 
could not. She said she had to save gradually, and hide her money under the carpet, 
and when she had enough she would give it to her children or her sister, who was a 
widow with three young children. 
Some husbands did not approve of their wives spending their money-on their 
own family (sisters, brothers or parents); this was found to be a cause of tension. 
Other women reported the same problem with their husbands' unwillingness to help 
family members; however, they all mentioned that they saved whatever money they 
have, in secret, so that they could give it to brothers and sisters in need. Another 
interviewee told me that her father gives her money secretly, to buy clothes, because 
her husband will not buy her anything. These stories show that these women adopt 
secretive ways to avoid tension and conflicts, rather than falling into quarrels about 
their rights in Islam. 
The role of powerful women: mothers-in-law 
The role of the mother-in-law in generating, increasing and encouraging 
violence was critical, according to many women in this study. Women farmers who, 
due to their family structure, have direct contact with their in-laws appear to suffer 
more. One of the women, Khadijeh, complained that she was severely beaten not 
only by her husband, but also by her husband's brothers, as a result of her mother- 
in-law's interference: only because she did not want to work on her mother-in-law's 
farm. She wanted to be independent and earn some money by working on other 
people's farms 123, and this made her mother-in-law furious. Khadijeh, 42 and a 
mother of five children, described her situation: 
123 Working in the rice fields is a way of earning money for girls and women in Gilan. 
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"Because we were very poor we didn't have food or money, and I 
started working for people on their farms or gardens and earned 
money, but my mother-in-law wanted me to work for them. I asked 
them, "What about my life? " I want to manage my own life, and 
when I didn't listen to her she complained to my husband a lot, and 
made him beat me very badly... Once, when I was going back 
home after a long day's work, my mother-in-law saw me and she 
caused a huge fight - my brother-in-law beat me very severely in 
front of her and everybody else. She accused me of having an 
illegitimate relationship on the farm. I was five months pregnant, 
and I lost the baby afterwards because of being kicked, it was just 
because I refused to work on their farms and worked 
independently. " 
Those who did not have close day-to-day contact with their husbands' 
families reported less intensive intervention from their mothers-in-law. However, 
they believed their mothers-in-law influenced their sons' behaviour and attitude 
towards their wives indirectly from a distance, normally by telephone calls or short 
visits. One of the women told me that her husband had encouraged her to terminate 
her pregnancy because her parents-in-law did not want her or her child. She had to 
go through a very unsuccessful illegal operation' 24 which resulted in the removal of 
her womb. Gilan 125 told me how the event ruined her life and her relationship with 
her husband: 
"They ruined my happiness - they turned my husband against me, and 
they're still doing it. My husband beat me severely, and threatened to kill me 
when I saw him with another woman in the bathroom. All because I cannot 
give him a child, and he thinks he can have a relationship with whatever 
woman he wants, because his mother wants him to have a child and to bring 
her a grandson... " 
I also had the opportunity to interview a number of mothers-in-law. 
Roghayeh, a 75-year-old woman fanner, was one. She told me that her own father 
had "sold" her to her husband when she was only nine, and she had been taken to 
her husband's family. She had given birth to 14 children, three of whom had died. 
She told me how she had worked on her in-laws' farm: "[they] put the children on 
our back, and we worked like slaves from dawn to dusk". It became apparent to me 
124 Abortion for non medical reasons is illegal in Iran, according to Islamic law. 
125As 
well as the county name, Gilan is also a girl's name. 
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that she expected her daughters-in-law to work for her in-laws for free of charge and 
as a duty, just as she had always done. She could not tolerate the fact that her 
daughter-in-law (Khadijeh, the woman mentioned above) was not willing to do the 
same. In Roghayeh's eyes, Khadijeh belonged to her husband and consequently to 
them; she was a rebel, and it was her fault if she was being treated violently by her 
brothers-in-law. The other mothers-in-law also admitted that they worked with their 
mothers-in-law without any protest: 
I was 12 when I got married. My mother showed me the work, and made 
me work a lot, to be prepared for life. I used to work with my mother-in-law 
in the farm from early morning to late in the afternoon. We used to eat our 
lunch at 3 or 4 p. m. I was starving, but I wouldn't dare say anything, I 
couldn't stand up properly due to my backache, and then when it was time to 
eat I couldn't eat my dry bread... My mother-in-law verbally abused me a 
lot, and said many awful things about me, and made my husband beat me. " 
These women farmers were married very young, and had to stay in their 
relationships. They said there were times when they could not bear all the pain and 
pressure, and ran off to their parental home, but their fathers took them back. The 
perceptions held by the mothers-in-law of the marital relationship, and of their 
daughters-in-law as property or labourers, led them to justify their abusive behaviour. 
Similarly, in her study Yoshihama (2005) reported how in-laws' reaction to their 
sons' abuse (against their wives) "constitute a key component in the patriarchal clan 
system" in Japan, which supports violence and furthermore, reinforces "a pervasive 
ideology of male superiority" (Yoshihama; 2005: 1254). Yesterday's daughters-in- 
law (powerless) are today's mothers-in-law (powerful) 126 . They themselves were in 
the same situation when they were young, and are now co-perpetrators in their sons' 
abuse of their daughters-in-law. In their interviews, they reported exactly the same 
difficulties they had with their mothers-in-law. However, their painful past did not 
prevent them from maltreating their daughters-in-law, who, they were convinced, 
were in a better situation than they were, and were "living in heaven" by comparison. 
They simply believed, "One should tolerate and be patient. We did the same thing, 
after all. " They were mainly referring to the economic situation (having cars, carpets, 
126 Judith Baxter (2003: 39) argues that "Feminist inquiry should take an interest in 'discourses in the 
making"', and continues: "... how important it is to promote an understanding of the complex and 
often ambiguous ways in which women and girls are simultaneously positioned as relatively 
powerless within a range of dominant discourses on gender, but as relatively powerful within 
alternative and competing social discourses... In other words, oppressed groups are not permanently 
trapped into silence, victimhood or knee-jerk refusal by dominant discursive practices... ". 
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gas, electricity and other things), while underestimating the physical and 
psychological injuries to their daughters-in-law. By minimising the pain and misery 
of their daughters-in-law, and maximising their own suffering, they had found a way 
to justify themselves. 
The question is, why is yesterday's battered woman today's batterer? Why 
do these powerful women commit acts of violence against others who are powerless? 
Perhaps the case of black-against-black violence can shed more light on these 
questions? In his autobiography, McCall sought to explain why the rate of "black 
against black" violence exceeded that of "black against white": 
"The irony was that white folks constantly disrespected us in ways seen and 
unseen, and we tolerated it. Most blacks understood that the repercussions 
were more severe for retaliating against whites than for doing each other in. 
It was as if black folks were saying, 'I can't do much to keep whites from 
dissin' [slang for 'disrespecting'] me, but I damn sure can keep black folks 
from doing it. "' (McCall's autobiography, 1994: 52, reported in Wilkinson, 
2005: 150). 
If we replace whites with men and blacks with women, a similar dynamic 
appears to be at work. The mothers-in-law cannot confront or question the 
established power of men in the system; thus they adopt the policy of "If you can't 
fight them, join them. " Moreover, they cannot tolerate their brides' (perceived) 
disrespectful behaviour, and make "damn sure" that they can keep their daughters- 
in-law from disrespecting them. McCall describes it as follows: 
"The struggle for respect is a struggle for human recognition, for social 
existence itself, and violence is the mother tongue of dominance" (McCall's 
autobiography, 1994: 52, reported in Wilkinson, 2005: 15 1). 
Other factors are also involved in empowering the mothers-in-law. One of 
these is ageing, which is highlighted by some researchers (in Counts, et. al, 1992: 
235; Brown, 1982); for these women, growing old has some advantages. First, as 
mothers they gain their children's support, especially if they have sons, as sons will 
protect them against their powerful husbands. However, once they join the 
establishment and become powerful, they become abusive to their daughters-in-law. 
The abused becomes the abuser. 
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In addition, religion and culture together help women to earn their 
offspring's caring attention and respect. Respecting mothers and taking care of them 
is a very powerful message enshrined in stories, poems and religious texts. It is also 
recommended to believers in the Qur'an. 
As mothers-in-law, they have control over the young brides. As middle-aged 
women, a new stage in their life starts to emerge; they lose their youth, beauty and 
sexual attraction, and become free of their husbands' suspicion. Raana, 57, told me 
that she is now free to go wherever she wants, because she is old and her husband is 
not suspicious any more: 
"... For 16 years I lived in that village, and I never went to any weddings or 
parties. He was very suspicious... he imprisoned me. I had to stay in the 
house and work all the time with my mother-in-law... Now that I'm old he 
lets me go out, but I don't know anywhere -I can't go anywhere alone. " 
The strategies the mothers-in-law were using to influence their sons' 
attitudes towards their wives were varied, but shared some features. They frequently 
used the discourse of motherhood provided for them by the available discourses. 
Soraya was a young woman in her late twenties and she had a BA. She was so 
desperate to save her marriage, against the will of her mother-in-law, who wanted 
her son to divorce her. Soraya was introduced to me by some friends, who were very 
concerned about her health. She was on the edge of a nervous breakdown. She told 
me her mother-in-law interfered in everything, even in her intimate relationship with 
her husband: "She's afraid that this [sexual intercourse] might make my husband 
love me. " When she fell pregnant, her mother-in-law forced her to have a 
termination. Her mother-in-law was a clever woman, who used legitimate religious 
language to brainwash her son. In this battle Soraya felt defeated: 
"She interferes in my life a lot. She feels very jealous because she loves my 
husband so much, and she's also economically dependent on him. To 
influence him she tells him some stories or ahadith 127 from the Prophet, that 
he must make his mother happy, and she emphasises some particular verses 
from the Qur'an that require believers to be kind and caring towards their 
parents. She threatens her son that she will curse him [shiram ra halalat 
nemikonam]. So psychologically she makes him feel guilty. He's confused. 
Sometimes he turns back to me and takes my side, and sometimes he takes 
his mother's side - on those occasions he starts beating me because I stand 
12' Religious sayings from the Infallibles. 
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up to him. She shows him lots of affection, and gives him lots of attention. 
Once, he beat me in front of her. That made her very pleased. When I 
became pregnant she wanted me to have an abortion, and in one incident 
when I was 7 months pregnant my husband beat me hard and I fell down the 
stairs. She's threatened to kill me if I don't get divorced. She's doing all this 
because she wants me to hand over my mahrieh and leave the baby for them. 
She wants to take my son away from me, and that's the only reason I'm not 
getting a divorce. " 
According to Soraya and her mother and a very close family friend, Soraya 
had been placed in a situation in which she did not have enough power against her 
powerful mother-in-law. One reason she alluded to was that she did not have enough 
information about the religious discourses to use them strategically to influence her 
husband. It can be said that she was clearly suffering from "discursive 
homelessness", when she needs "discourses in the making" as Baxter (2003) argues. 
Heideger and Gadernaff (in Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000) pointed out that human 
being resides in language. There are not adequate discursive resources and narrative 
repertoires available to her to legitimise her opinions of conjugal relations, and if 
there are any, they are not as widespread and powerful as the discourses of 
motherhood. As she said, her husband was so fearful of God, the Prophet and 
Judgement Day that it made him easily susceptible to the influence of his mother. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the motherhood discourse is a very powerful one in Iranian- 
Islamic culture. One of the interviewees told me that she asked her husband to 
explain the difference between her and his mother in his eyes. He told her: 
"One should take care of one's mother -I can easily find any woman I want 
in the street, but there is only one mother. " 
That was his reason for being more concerned about his mother than his 
wife. In addition, Soraya pointed out that her husband would not listen to her 
because he was afraid of becoming weak and zan-zalil (hopeless or powerless in the 
presence of women; the person who heeds his wife's advice too much, or is very 
mindful of her). 
"He doesn't like to listen to me because he thinks if he listens to me then I 
am going to have power over him and he will turn into a weak man (zan- 
zaliO. He thinks he never makes mistakes. " 
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Overall, there are three demonstrable categories at work here. There is a 
cycle of violence. The mothers-in-law, as reported in this study, were beaten by their 
husbands and their in-laws, and they, in turn, beat their daughters-in-law or incite 
their sons to do so. The daughters-in-law beat their children (as I witnessed on some 
occasions). The victims of violence are very often violent themselves. Sometimes 
men who beat their wives have been beaten as children (ref, Chapter 1). There is a 
general understanding that violence breeds violence. Straus (1990) used systems 
theory to explain wife abuse. He argues that there is an association between wife 
abuse and physical violence toward children. In his work on a national random 
survey in the USA, Straus reported that fathers who used severe forms of violence 
against their wives were more likely to beat their children. This was also true of 
women who were beaten. Straus also concluded that those who were abused 
physically as children were more prone to be engaged in child and wife abuse as 
adults. Systems theory views physical retribution as a fraction of the continuum of 
physical violence against children, "with child abuse at the far end in terms of 
frequency and severity of the violent act" (Counts et. al, 1992: p. 241). Severe 
corporal punishment of children in countries such as Iran (Hegland, 1992) and 
among the people of Bun, a village in Iran, (Campbell, 1992) was noted by some 
researchers. 
The second reason that mothers-in-law use violence is that it is the only form 
of power they have. They use force to establish their authority. If they cannot do it 
they incite their sons to do it. They need to establish authority and control, in order 
to put the daughter-in-law "in her place". In particular they need her submission for 
the very clear reason that they (as well as other members of the extended family) 
need her labour. If the daughter-in-law concentrates on her own household, she 
leaves the mother-in-law without help. Thus, the mother-in-law uses her son to 
impose restrictions on his wife. 
On the third level are the views of the daughter-in-law. First, she considers 
that she is beaten for not working for her mother-in-law. The next stage is also the 
question of power and authority. The daughter-in-law believes that her mother-in- 
law is jealous of her because she is young, desirable and able to work. She also 
spends her son's money and resources. Her mother-in-law cannot enforce her power 
and authority by communicating with her; the only way is to hold her hostage to 
violence. The mother-in-law sees violence as a legitimate means of establishing the 
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norms; the daughter-in-law sees violence as an act of desperation. The mother-in- 
law says, I was beaten", so it is normal to beat; the daughter-in-law says "She's 
beating me because otherwise I wouldn't do what she wants". The daughter-in-law 
is well aware that it is illegitimate to beat. She does not think it is fair. The mother- 
in-law claims that she thought it was fair at the time when she was beaten. What is 
interesting about the daughter-in-law's view is that she thinks that it is unfair to be 
beaten, yet she beats her own children. The use of force continues, and she beats her 
children for the very reason that the grandmother has her husband as a proxy beat 
her, so this again may well exacerbate the cycle of violence. There is a kind of 
collusion between mother and son, but also between wife and husband. The physical 
force of the son is used in order to impose authority. While the daughter-in-law 
believes her mother-in-law's utilisation of her husband is illegitimate, she thinks 
using him to beat the children is fine. 
There are two categories of mothers-in-law here. There are the rural 
mothers-in-law who want to use the labour of their daughters-in-law labour (to keep 
them in the household). An urban mother-in-law who beats her daughter-in-law so 
that she will leave her husband's house, possibly because of the way the daughter- 
in-law behaves, or because she is jealous, or resents losing her son, falls into the 
second category. There seem to be similarities between the two categories: both are 
trying to shape the daughters-in-law in their own image. The question of jealousy 
and economic needs comes down to "power". They are using their power to extract 
submission. 
Moreover, the mothers-in-law feel that they have the right to control the 
household. There is a cultural assumption that the son belongs to his mother, and the 
mothers-in-law see themselves very much as the guardians of the family, for 
securing the future of the family; this cultural discourse is sometimes employed 
strategically to incite the son into acts of violence against their wives. Why does the 
son allow himself to be used as a proxy? Not all sons are willing to conform to this 
pattern. Some men see violence as part and parcel of their negotiation in the 
marriage. The mothers-in-law may be instrumental, but some men have actually 
interrialised the notion of violence as a means of negotiation, while others have not. 
Some men commit violence because they prove their love by jealousy; for them it is 
part of the language of love. In the next section, the question of love and the 
discourse of male sexual jealousy and suspicion will be discussed. 
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Suspicion and the discourse of male sexual jealously: gheirat, ta-asob and love 
Suspicion was found to be one of the main causes of violence against women 
in this study. All types of women, old or young, literate or illiterate, housewives or 
farmers, employed or unemployed, reported it. The Persian term for suspicion is 
shak-kardan; and shakkak is the one who is suspicious. A number of terms relating 
to suspicion emerged in interviews with the women. Due to close proximity of 
meaning, women used some of these terms either separately or jointly. This family 
of terms was utilised to cover the psychological territory of the battle of sexes 
culminating in violence against women. They overlap with and are distinguishable 
from each other. These terms are gheirat (jealousy, protectiveness); ba-gheirat 
(jealous protectiveness); bee-gheirat (indifference); ta-asob (bigotry, narrow- 
mindedness); moto-asseb (bigot, narrow-minded). In the first section I will elaborate 
on womenýs accounts of the factors leading men to suspicion. In the following 
section I will reflect on a number of themes that emerged in my interview with a 
group of young and highly-educated women; one was newly married, another had a 
fiance and three were in relatively stable boyfriend-girlfriend relationships. These 
young women belonged to high middle class, moderately conservative merchant 
families. 
Suspicion 
Most of the women in the study drew attention to the profound role of 
suspicion in their lives. I asked them what they thought of their partners' suspicion. 
Their answers varied. Some believed that because men themselves were not loyal 
and were after other women, they believed that either their wives were disloyal, or 
other men had their eyes on them: 
"Because they look at other people's wives, they think everybody else is 
looking at their wives. " 
"Because he's like that, himself. He used to betray me. He goes out and talks 
to every woman he wants, but, if he sees us [the woman and her daughters] 
talking to a man, we are in huge trouble. He even accuses me of having 
relationships with men who are younger than I am, even though I now have 
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two grandchildren and it hurts me a lot... he thinks all women are kharab 
[corrupt]" 
"At work he only sees criminals [he is a policeman]. He thinks all men are 
either murderers or burglars, and all women are hookers. Because of that 
he's very suspicious of me. He told me 'You have to prove to me that you 
are a pious woman. "' 
"My fiance slept with many women. He doesn't believe girls and women are 
trustworthy - he thinks they are kharab [corrupfl. " 
There are two main points here. First, men perceive women as being fetneh 
(chaotic) or kharab (corrupt), as the embodiment of sex; their mere existence per se 
is an invitation to sex. Sex is seen as a degradation and corruption of masculine 
integrity and strength. There is a sense of uneasiness with sex, which transfers to a 
sense of uneasiness with womankind. These men, according to my women 
interviewees, had relationships with other women, and because the women with 
whom they had relationships became corrupt by submitting to them, they 
generalised this to other women including their wives, sisters and daughters. They 
were expecting their women to be loyal to them while they themselves were disloyal. 
Secondly, the powerful moral discourse of corruption supports the legitimacy of 
orthodox formulation of marriage that allows polygamy, enshrining unequal right of 
access to sexual partners. It is legitimate for men to have relationships with other 
women, while it is unlawful for women to do the same according to the orthodox 
structure of marriage. 
One of the interviewees said that her husband obliged her to prove to him 
that she was a pious woman. Only then would he give her permission to go to work. 
She explained that he was highly suspicious towards everything and everyone. On 
occasions when she had calls from her male colleagues from the office, she was in 
trouble for a couple of weeks. She had come to the conclusion that because she had a 
well-paid job and was well-educated compared to her husband, and "He doesn't like 
it", he was intentionally using "being suspicious" to prevent her from going to work. 
The fact that men can use the discourse of suspicion and gheirat as an 
effective weapon against their wives reveals the importance of this discourse in the 
social reality of gender order. If a husband feels danger in relation to his wife's 
moral corruption and chastity, he may use his power to stop her becoming corrupt; 
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as his wife's custodian, he can forbid her to go out to work or travel abroad 
Technically speaking, the law does not give a man the right to stop his wife from 
going to work if she worked before she was married. However, in practical terms, in 
the name of namuslsharaf (reputation/decency) and gheirat and the fear of his wife's 
moral corruption, the husband can win his case in any court. There is a tension here 
between the law and the orthodox jurisprudence. In this case, the latter is more 
influential in shaping the social reality of gender order. 
Some women said their husbands were suspicious because they were young 
and beautiful. Their youth and sexual attraction could put them in other men's gaze 
and finally lead them to corruption. They pointed out that their husbands were very 
sensitive and gheiraty Oealously protective), and did not want their wives to be seen 
by any non-relative man (na-mahram): 
"He was very suspicious. Because before marrying him, there were a number 
of young men who wanted to marry me but, later on, I married him and he 
didn't want me to see them at weddings and parties. That's why he 
imprisoned me in the house for years. " 
"My husband asks me to take good care of my hejab when required. With the 
male relatives we don't have a real problem, but with strangers we have... " 
"He has said he doesn't want other men to see my beautiful body, because I 
am only his... " 
"He didn't let me go out to work, because he was very suspicious. He would 
stalk me for a while to find out where I was going. I was quite a lot younger 
than him [20 years] and he felt insecure... " 
"Exclusivity" and "promptness" conditions of the orthodox formulation of 
marriage (ref. Chapter 2) oblige a woman to remain faithful to her husband. 
Moreover, men believe it is their job to make sure that their territory (their wives' 
bodies) remains intact. To do this, men use the discourse of gheirat and ta-asob and 
their associated tool kit (such as veiling and its mannerism) to ascertain their wives' 
piety. Veiling (hejab) was used extensively to guard men's exclusivity right. This 
sometimes came up during the interviews: 
128 Women in Iran need to have their husbands' approval and permission to travel abroad. 
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"He feels jealous if I wear see-through clothes or short and sleeveless dresses. 
When we go to his family or they come to our house he asks me to wear my 
chador in front of his brothers and other male relatives - they are very strict. 
When he isn't with me I feel a bit more relaxed, but he told me that if I don't 
cover myself the way he wants me to, he feels betrayed and he won't be 
happy with me, and I'll be punished in the other world... " 
"If I wanted to go out, for instance to my mother's house, he would ask me 
to wear my chador because I had to cross the shop where men used to sit. 
Then at night he would have a fight with me and beat me severely... he was 
very suspicious. " 
Sometimes, women themselves willingly and voluntarily wore the hejab and 
behaved piously. They believed that of all of the rules they were obliged to submit to, 
the wearing of the hejab was the most practical and the easiest, because as Fariba 
said: 
"We are brought up like this [to wear the hejab] in our family, in schools 
and in the outside world. We always had to dress appropriately... but we 
ourselves take good care of these things. We have some red lines for 
ourselves; we don't leave this for them (husbands) to boss us about! That's 
the way we were brought up. Sometimes we women criticise a woman who 
dances with a man at a wedding or a party. We say, 'Look! How vulgar she 
is! ý ýI 
To prevent further and constant interference in their everyday lives women 
would anticipate what their men's expectations of them are and comply to those 
standards of behaviour (before being reminded of them). Moreover, they intended to 
gain their husbands' trust by using a proper hejab. They told me their husbands 
gradually learned to trust them, and as a result, did not impose such harsh 
restrictions. Here are some examples: 
"God forbid, if he finds out anything about these things [issues related to 
infidelity] it will be really nasty, but we are very careful about these things in 
our family. He's convinced that I'm very pious. " 
"He was suspicious at the beginning, but I was/am very cautious. Later on, 
he told me he trusted me completely, and he said that if he sent me all naked 
into a town full of men I would definitely come out clean and nothing would 
happen to me. " 
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I always take good care. I never wear short things, and try to cover my body 
properly. Apart from my father's and brothers' houses, he wants me to be 
covered Oust now, before he went out he looked at me gravely, but I don't 
care anyway because I am hot) 129 . He uses 
his body language (his face and 
gestures) to show me his dissatisfaction. " 
All the above statements indicate that women take the initiative into their 
own hands. First, they said that they were "brought up like this". "This"' refers to 
issues such as the wearing of the hejab, chastity and knowing where the red lines are 
in their society and family. In the process of girls' socialisation, families ensure their 
female members behave appropriately, in parallel with their societal norms. 
Similarly, boys are socialised according to the dominant discourses available to 
them. Men are expected to have gheirat or jealousy towards their wives, and are 
expected to control, guard and constrain their wives' behaviour. A number of 
women pointed to factors such as social and family norms to explain their husband's 
gheirat and ta-asob. Male sexual jealousy, in the feminist view, is believed to be "an 
expression of societal norm that women are the property of the men" (in Campbell, 
1992, p. 234). The idea that men own women, and notions of female chastity before 
marriage (virginity or bakeregy as a critical criterion in evaluating a woman's worth) 
and obligatory sexual intercourse in marriage, constitute the core of male ownership 
of women in Iran. Campbell reported that in some societies (Iranian, Indian and 
Indo-/Fijian, for example), a relationship between severe wife-battering and male 
sexual jealousy was evident (Campbell, 1992: 23 5). 
Some women pointed out that their husbands were brought up in the way 
that they were because of their families: 
"He's very gheiraty. It's in their family... his father, mother, uncles and 
brothers are all the same. " 
"His family is very moto-asseb - his father, brothers are all like that. They 
have strong religious values... " 
"Every man has ta-asob like our brothers or fathers. It's because they are 
brought up like that and have leamt to have ta-asob. It isn't out of love. " 
Others believed that men are naturally jealous: 
129 The interview was conducted in the beach house on a very hot sunny day, and the interviewee 
clearly felt relaxed, even though her husband was annoyed and irritated by her incomplete hejab. 
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"It's in their character. " 
"They're bom like that. " 
"It's in their blood. " 
Some pointed out that ta-asoby men are psychologically disturbed: 
"He was suspicious just because of a telephone call. If any man talks to me 
he gets suspicious. He's sick. People like him are sadistic - they enjoy 
hurting others. " 
"He was extremely suspicious. It's because he was mentally ill. He always 
thought I was up to something wrong and somebody was following me. " 
It can be seen that some of these women believe suspicion is related to 
specific character traits of certain types of men (the psychologism approach). Others 
connect it to the innate nature of men (the biological approach). However, at the root 
of suspicion in the marital relation is the unequal structure of marriage, in which 
men are superior and women are subordinate. Suspicion comes about in any 
hierarchical relation of human relations in social space. The question in the mind of 
the superior ensures that the subordinate (who has a will of her/his own) acts 
according to the will of the superior. Suspicion is the character of the structure, not 
an individual trait. 
The intensity of the husbands' suspicion varies throughout women's lives. 
The worst period was reported to be the early stages of marriage; gradually the 
husbands become moderate in the middle of the marriage, and eventually stop being 
suspicious in their sixties or seventies. Some women in the later stages of their lives 
declared themselves free of their husbands' suspicions. But they said they had 
suffered a lot at the beginning and through most of their marriage: 
"He was very suspicious before, but not now. When I was younger he was very 
strict in letting me out. I wouldn't dare to give a glass of water to a stranger. " 
A 75-year-old woman told me that her husband had been suspicious from the 
beginning, and only stopped beating her for it a few years before he died: 
-My husband was terribly suspicious. He stalked me everywhere. He was 
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always scrutinising me, and he used to beat me a lot... Once, I was late 
coming back home from seeing the doctor, when I'd had a miscarriage. He 
accused me of having illegitimate relationships with other men. He beat me a 
lot. I couldn't go for treatment, and when my doctor asked me the reason I 
told her everything. She asked me to take him to her office next time. I didn't 
tell him why the doctor wanted to see him. Anyway, he came and the doctor 
told him that either he should stop beating me, or must divorce me if he had 
any doubts about me. " 
However, the doctor's advice did not work and he kept beating her and did 
not let her go to the doctor for treatment. Her husband was a lot older than she was. 
The age difference had already been reported by other women as a determining 
factor. Perhaps an age difference (men being older) intensifies men's suspicion and 
consequently their violent behaviour. But the age difference, in turn, acts as a 
catalyst to a deep-rooted problem. The notion that men must be in charge of female 
sexual activities leads to suspicion and violence. In a hierarchical and unequal 
relation, the superior falls prey to suspicion and the inferior is plagued by shame and 
low self-esteem, and the dynamics of the situation undermine the quality of the 
relationship and cause tension and violence (Wilkinson, 2005). In addition, men's 
subjectivities are constructed by a discourse of masculinity, which expects them to 
guard their sexual territory fervently (gheirat). Any sign of failure in a given task is 
an attack on their masculine identity. They are protecting their own masculine 
subjectivity from the mind and gaze of the other. The slightest doubt about their 
ability to guard their sexual territory sends them into a rage and then violence. 
Gheirat, suspicion and violence are part of the same package, and an inevitable 
consequence of a structure of superiority and inferiority endemic to the orthodox 
formulation of marriage. 
Another 70-year-old woman stated that after the revolution, due to the 
Islamisation of the nation, she had had the opportunity to join Basij-e khaharan 
(Sisters' Organisation). She used this legitimate organisation to go out and about, 
but her husband accused her of having an illegitimate relationship with some of the 
Pasdaran (revolutionary guards). Nobody paid any attention to her husband's 
accusation, partly because they were a highly religious and strict group and partly 
because her sons were Pasdaran too. By attaching herself to the mainstream 
religious discourses, she could set herself free of the "political prison" (as she put it) 
made by her husband who was using the same discourses. 
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Sometimes other people were involved in making the husbands suspicious. 
According to Soraya, her mother-in-law attempted to "sow the seeds of doubt" in 
her son's mind about his wife's behaviour, to make him divorce her; she told him all 
sorts of stories - how vulgar his wife was, how she might betray him, and how she 
might go out when he had left the house, in order to make him suspicious. As a 
result of these attempts, the husband decided to test his wife's piety: 
"Once, he hid behind the wall, pretending he'd gone to work. He stalked me 
for a while until it became clear to him that I wasn't meeting anybody. He 
couldn't believe his mother in this matter because he trusts me - it's because 
I myself was brought up that way. I don't take any telephone calls, I don't go 
alone anywhere, I don't talk to strangers, and when I walk I keep my head 
down. Overall, I am so scared of men, and my husband knows that. He, 
however, doesn't like me to see or talk to his friends when they come to our 
house - he wants me to leave the room. " 
Although the mother-in-law's attempt did not result in her divorce, it was a 
good excuse for the husband to punish and intimidate his wife. He instilled fear in 
her in order to extract the required correct behaviour and prevent any possible future 
attempts to defy him. The mother-in-law's action shows how a woman's sexual 
infidelity is highly risky, and how an Iranian man's mind is susceptible to doubts 
about his wife's fidelity. In a stratified society like Iran, women who commit 
infidelity pay a very heavy price, sometimes their lives (always subject to official or 
communal harsh punishment). The jurisprudential rulings regarding adultery, 
murder and divorce are sex-biased and generally tolerant of male sexual jealousy 
and not females' 30 . Strategies such as gender segregation, veiling and periods of 
engagement are adopted to ensure the exclusivity condition and assure certainty in 
paternity. Wilson and Daly (1992) suggest that much homicide and wife beating 
results from male sexual jealousy, and that the punishment for adultery on the part 
of women (and not on the part of men), such as beating and murder, has been 
tolerated in most societies. One 43-year-old woman stated that much of her problem 
with her husband was related to his illegitimate relationship with her own sister, 
which had existed for years (she had married at the age of 13, and they had 
continued their relationship throughout the marriage). Although this kind of 
relationship is neither legal nor religious, everybody turns a blind eye. The 
130 See the Ahkam-e Mo azat-e Islami (Islamic penal codes). j 
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neighbours did not go to court to testify against the husband, and the relatives kept 
quiet and advised the woman to go to the holy shrine and pray to God. She herself 
did not want to complain because she was afraid of the consequences: her sister and 
her husband would be stoned. This was a very heavy price that she was not willing 
to pay. Fear of scandal or abero-rizi made her tolerate the situation because "I have 
daughters of my own ready to get married. " 
Altogether, women gave different reasons for their husbands' suspicion. As 
mentioned above, that to tame their husbands, they employed a number of strategies, 
such as covering themselves conservatively and behaving piously in private and in 
public, in order to tame their husbands. It could be said that these women 
consciously or unconsciously internalised the dominant discourses, and in addition 
there was no way out for them. Some of them even said that they themselves would 
reject those women whose behaviour and appearance were not up to the norms. 
They told me they had been brought up in that way, and it was easy for them to 
comprehend their husbands' apprehension. 
In the next section, I discuss some of the issues raised by the young, 
highly-educated women regarding gheirat/chastity discourses. These discussions 
were highly illuminating in terms of the issues surrounding suspicion and its relation 
to gheirat, ta-asob and love. 
Gheirat, ta-asob or love 
In this section I report the discussion with one of my focus groups. These 
women were in their twenties, and had been in higher education. Their ideas are 
highly important in relation to themes such as suspicion, gheirat, ta-asob and love 
and their relation to violence. The discussion was very fruitful and informative in 
terms of finding out their definitions, understandings and interpretations of the terms 
mentioned above. To find out how they perceive or define these themes, I quote part 
of our conversation here, starting with the women's own definitions of the term 
gheirat: 
ZT: So you say men should have gheirat? 
All of the women together: "Of course they should! " 
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ZT: What is gheirat? How do you define it? 
Homa: Gheirat is a good moral characteristic for men. It's different from ta- 
asob. He must have pride, and shouldn't be like a nerd. It means Pride. 
personality. 
Negar: Reliability: one could rely on them and need not be afraid. Security: I 
want to feel safe when I am with him. 
Homa: It means he shouldn't be somebody who's out of character, negligent 
and imprudent. 
Parisa: It's not like telling me, "Do this and don't do that". 
Negar: He shouldn't sit at home and do nothing. He must have the guts to go 
to work. He must be decisive and be like a man. 
Neli: Restricting the access to something precious. 
Negar: That's jealousy. 
Homa: It's a good character. 
Nasrin: It's feeling responsible. 
On the basis of these accounts, gheirat means responsibility, reliability, 
personality, security and pride. These young women perceived gheirat as a positive 
trait. For me it was puzzling at the beginning, but further conversations revealed 
their active endeavour to reconstruct the territory of gheirat in their own image and 
interest; which further provides a good example for the dynamics of language as 
explicated in the Derrida's differance (the process of deferring and differentiation in 
the construction of meaning). For them, a man with gheirat is a man with good 
qualities: he is someone who can provide for them and give them security, and who 
cares about them. He is not an irresponsible, negligent and lazy man. He is a man 
who "... has a feeling for us - we want to be different from any other woman in the 
street, and when we see our husband cares about us and that we are important to 
him, it's very enjoyable. " 
However, they sometimes mix up gheirat with ta-asob, and apply the two terms 
interchangeably. In their eyes either is a sign of love. One went even further: 
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Negar: "... I think ta-asob is a sign of love. I sometimes, on purpose, wear 
some revealing clothes to make him jealous, and when he tells me off I enjoy 
it. When he tells me that he doesn't want anybody to see my beautiful white 
legs I feel his ta-asob is a sign of immense love. " 
But Nasrin, a qualified nurse, disagreed with Negar's definition of ta-asob: 
Nasrin: "I disagree. Every man has ta-asob, like our brothers and fathers. It's 
because they're brought up like that and learned to have ta-asob. It's not out of 
love. " 
Nasrin was referring to a very important concept. According to her, men learn to 
have ta-asob. It is not in their blood or their genes, but a result of the special social 
context in which they are situated. Societal and familial structures support, allow 
and facilitate such discourses as gheiraty or ta-asoby for young men whose identities 
as men are being shaped. Campbell and Humphreys (1984) pointed out that in 
societies where there are no preventative strategies in communities, and definitions 
of masculinity promote aggressive behaviour and dominance over women, the rate 
of wife-beating and battering is high. 
However, all of the women agreed that being moto-asseb is only good to some 
extent, and should not lead to suspicion and jealousy. The extreme version of 
gheirat and ta-asob, in their opinion, is suspicion. The following passage shows that 
these women expect their husbands to apply their gheirat occasionally, and not 
everywhere: 
ZT: Should he have gheirat everywhere? If you go to western countries and 
you want to wear a bikini on the beach, do you want him to have gheirat? 
[Everybody laughs. ] 
Nasrin: No, I wouldn't want him to be like that! 
Homa: I like to be the same as others in any environment. 
Parisa: I agree, he shouldn't tell me, no. 
ZT: So your husband has to change his feelings? 
Homa: Yes, he needs to know when and where to have it. [She laughs. ] 
Negar: If you don't want to be into trouble, you need to be like others [khahi 
nashavi rusva hamrang-ejamat sho]. 
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Nasrin: He must be a cultured man. [She laughs. ] 
ZT: So a husband must have "it", but not everywhere? 
Homa: He must have it here, where men harass us, but when we go 
somewhere like Europe where nobody bothers us, and everybody is the 
same, it isn't appropriate to be gheiraty. 
ZT: So, gheirat is most about security and men feeling responsible for your 
safety. 
All of the women agreed. 
For these young women, gheirat and ta-asob are different from suspicion. For 
them, a man with gheirat is someone who cares about them, loves them and 
cherishes them. He secures them from danger and keeps them safe from others' 
greed and assaults. He is a bodyguard. This demonstrates that in Iranian society 
women feel a strong need for protection in public spheres. Moreover, as the above 
passage reveals, in their opinion gheirat should only be used occasionally, and the 
husband needs to be flexible. Gheirat is not fixed and rigid; men must know when it 
is appropriate. The women were basically trying to redefine gheirat in their own 
image, to serve their own social need. Meanwhile, Negar differentiated ta-asob from 
suspicion: 
Negar: Ta-asob is different from being suspicious. When we wear something, for 
instance, men tell us, "You're wearing that because you want to show yourself to 
others", but sometimes they say, "When you wear that, I don't want others to see 
things that belong to me. " That's more pleasant to hear than the first sentence. 
In Negar's opinion, the former was alluding to the suspicion; it has a strong tone, 
which is not pleasant to hear, whereas the latter was referring to gheirat. It means 
that the man cares about her and does not want to constrain her; if he says this it is 
because he loves her,, and he thinks she belongs to him. This sense of "belonging" 
seems to be very fulfiling for these women, and is taken as a sign of love. Nasrin 
said the same thing: 
If I wear something short he doesn't say anything, but if I wear something a 
bit longer he becomes very happy and he loves me more, or he tells me, ý It suits 
you a lot. ' Or if I wear a little scarf he says it doesn't make me beautiful (while 
my friends tell me the reverse). - 
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Some of these young women were in pre-marital relationships, which are clearlý,, 
not as solid and stable as marriage. They were not obliged to listen to their 
boyfriends, and their boyfriends (or fiances) were not in a position to enforce rules 
and demand their submission. These men were using soft language to convince 
them. They were encouraging them, and seemed to be very tolerant with them. The 
women still had time to break the relationship and move on easily. It was reported 
earlier in this study that a husband's suspicion and ta-asob is a painful reality for 
those who are in a permanent marital relationship. An Iranian family consultant and 
expert in domestic violence (Ahmad-vand, 2005) 131 pointed out that in pre-marital 
relationships, girls view men's preventative behaviour as a sign of immense love. 
Later on, in the early stages of their marriage, they assume that it is a sign of 
jealousy, and feel happy. However, these preventative measures gradually become 
agonisingly painful. One of the women reported that her sister's behaviour changed 
dramatically after marriage: 
Nasrin: My own sister has been married for two years now, and her behaviour has 
changed a lot. Her husband puts lots of restrictions regarding her hejab and her 
general code of conduct. He manages to convince her that if he says this or that, 
it's for her own good... Sometimes she really wants to wear a colourful scarf or a 
handbag, and begs us to buy one for her, so she can make an excuse to wear it... 
The blurred differences between gheirat (as love) on the one hand and suspicion 
and ta-asob-e bija (senseless bigotry), which in their opinion lead to violence, on the 
other, resulted in the formation of some doubts about Negar's future. Negar (no 
matter how hard she was trying to convince herself and others that her fiance is 
right) had some anxiety that he might interfere more in her life. To reassure herself, 
she acknowledged that this is a problem for any women whose husbands are 
interfering and opinionated: 
"It's always the same for women. There's a man in my life who's from Mashad, 
and because I am from Rasht he's very ta-asobi (bigoted) about me, because 
Rashtis and Mashadis are at opposite poles. I always ask myself, 'What if he 
interferes in everything too much? ' But then I think all women have these sorts of 
problems in their lives. Men like their women to behave in the way they want. No 
man would ask his wife to dress immodestly - most men want their wives to 
cover themselves. They say, 'If you want to wear sexy clothes, then do it for me. ý 
"' hiip: //wwwO. bbc. co. uk/persian/specials/162 violence/page22. shml 10/11/2005 
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So we're no different from other women, and if a man doesn't demand it from his 
wife, it means he's with other women. " 
The above passage indicates that Negar believes in social determinism. This is 
the norm that every husband, whether one wants it or not, is authoritarian. More 
importantly, it is socially acceptable. As Campbell (1992: 242) reported in Iran, 
"The community encourages husbands to keep their wives submissive and 
disapproves of men who fail to do so". If a man does not ask his wife to behave in a 
certain way, there is something wrong with him. For Negar it means that he does not 
love her. Marriage is an inevitable fact of Negar's life, sooner or later: she must 
marry, and it is a unilateral right reserved for her future husband to impose his will 
on her. Her fiance insisted that she change her lifestyle, and as a gheiraty man he is 
expected to do so. He told her that he loved her, and that she was different from any 
other women he had dated or slept with, and that she belonged only to him, etc. etc. 
She felt that these were all signs of love. Nasrin's experiences, however, led her to 
believe that: 
"This feeling that he has about you is because you didn't have sex with anybody 
before. It fulfils him, and makes you different from other women. But you have 
to work hard and satisfy his [sexual] needs a lot, to stop him betraying you or 
being attracted to other women. " 
Here Nasrin is referring to the very important concept of "virginity" and its 
importance in marriage. She stated that being a virgin could be a determinant factor 
in a man's willingness to marry a girl. She was in a very fulfiling relationship with 
her boyfriend, but the only obstacle they had to getting married was the fact that she 
was not a virgin any more. In the past she had had another relationship, and she told 
her current partner "everything": 
"Before I had other opinions, I had the intention to marry my boyfriend. I thought 
if I shared everything and opened myself up honestly, I could hook him to myself 
and we'd be happy and trust each other. I told him the whole thing, then I realised 
that it wasn't working... " 
A romantic and loving relationship for Nasrin was based on reciprocity, trust and 
honesty. She was unaware that her honesty might cause a colossal change in her 
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boyfriend's decision to marry her. She said that he could not come to terms with the 
fact that she had already had intimate relationships with other men. Her boyfriend 
was highly educated (studying medicine), and seemed very open-minded; she 
herself was a professional nurse, an independent woman with a good job and a 
strong personality. All of these qualities had attracted her boyfriend to her in the first 
place. Despite the fact that he loved her, he decided to have her as a partner and not 
as a wife. This hurt Nasrin a lot. He had had other relationships with women in Iran 
and abroad, but he could not tolerate the thought of his girlfriend even thinking 
about somebody else: 
"He told me that men like diversity. He has had other relationships, but he 
tells me that it's different. He loves me, but has sex with others, and now he 
doesn't want to marry me - he thinks this way is better. I give him the right 
to have sex with girls, but not to love them... I am faithful to him, but if I 
wanted to think about someone else he would finish with me. He wouldn't 
forgive me. " 
Modem Iranian men still have contradictions in relation to female sexuality; 
although they believe they are westernised and open-minded, and believe in 
equality, when it comes to sexuality they feel and act traditionally. They want to 
have their cake and eat it: a paradoxical combination of sexual freedom and the holy 
cow of virginity. The term "unequal egalitarian" (Hepburn, 2003) can be used to 
categorise their positions; the unequal egalitarian characterises the position of those 
who defend the equal rights of women in theory, and resort to practical difficulties 
to justify unequal treatment of women in practice. Men can sleep with as many 
women as they like, but they demand that their women are modest, faithful and 
virgin. Moreover, the fact that men have other available options such as polygamy, 
provided by the orthodox formulation of marriage, confirms women as those who 
have to serve. This shows that the orthodox jurisprudence constitutes an integral part 
of the regime of truth for the vast majority of Iranian men. 
These women, however, tried to justify their partners' contradictory 
positions. They seemed to accept their partners' discourses. They admitted that 
while it is a necessity for men to have as many relationships as they desire before 
marriage, they do not reserve the same right for themselves. They are convinced that 
they must do their best to make their men happy and satisfy their needs, because 
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they do not want to lose them. They have strong competition (all the other women 
who slept or could potentially sleep with their boyfriends or husbands): 
"He told me, 'If you love your husband dearly and you don't want him to be 
attracted to other women, you must do your best to satisfy him. Then he 
won't be attracted to any other women. "' 
While they should serve their men wholeheartedly, they must resist 
submitting to any temptation themselves. They are well aware that this makes men 
love them, and at the same time they have managed to persuade themselves to deal 
with their boyfriends' infidelity and multiple sexual preferences: 
"A man who doesn't have relations with women before marriage might think 
he's missing out on something, and he might want to try it after marriage. I 
think he loves me because I resisted him. He couldn't get access to my body 
- all his efforts to have sex with me failed because I resisted, and now he's 
madly in love with me because of that. He told me that he wanted to seduce 
me and exploit my body, and because I didn't submit to him it made him 
love me even more... " 
Negar was also giving a message to her fiance that she was a virgin, and had 
not submitted to anybody else. This reveals that even young and apparently liberated 
and modernised women are deeply attached to the mainstream set of discourses on 
the nature of femininity, masculinity and the ideal of gender relations. They seem to 
have found no coherent alternative to the orthodox jurisprudence, and in their 
rebellion against it have returned to it. Ultimately, Negar decided to change her 
lifestyle as her fiance wished. She decided to reshape her life: initially, she dressed 
more conservatively, and used less make-up. She constructed a discourse and 
justified her actions as follows: 
"If after my marriage I dress as I used to dress before, there is no difference 
between a prostitute and me. It means that I'm after other men. I have to be 
arasteh [smart] for my husband only inside the house, and not outside for 
others. [This is one of the main ingredients of the orthodox discourse on a 
woman's duty towards her husband. ] After marriage, we cannot live the way 
we used to, we have to change. The only reason that I sometimes want to 
dress as I used to dress (before marriage) is because I'm afraid of losing him. 
What if he sees a chic girl in the street and is fascinated by her? I always ask 
him, -You saw me like this from the beginning - why do you want to change 
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me? You might go and find someone else like me again... Why don't you 
want your wife to be chic? "' 
Negar asked very important questions. Her fiance's answers were mentioned 
above. But it seemed she was not yet fully convinced. Throughout the interview she 
attempted to persuade herself and others to confirm her fiance's rationalisation. 
Meanwhile, Nasrin felt Negar should not change her lifestyle: 
"I don't agree. Because I was always the way I am now, right from the 
beginning. I can't change myself after marriage, the way I dress or the colour 
I choose... If my husband trusts me, he shouldn't think I'm unfaithful to him. 
I really don't have any agenda in dressing the way I like. That's because I've 
got used to doing it, and if he wants to interfere that much, it may result in a 
lot of disputes between us. " 
As is apparent from this discursive exchange, the women's dress code, 
make-up arrangements, beautification strategies and codes of walking, talking and 
socialising are the cause of constant arguments, challenges and violent reactions in 
the public and private spheres. They constantly see-saw between the discourses of 
modernity on these themes and the corresponding discourses and practices 
associated with the orthodox jurisprudence. 
In another part of the focus group discussion, the women stated that if they 
wore sexy dresses or make-up, or behaved seductively, it was because "We want to 
find a husband". Their ultimate aim was indeed marriage. These young women were 
all graduates, but wanted to be housewives. They all believed that it is not 
appropriate for a married middle-age woman to wear make-up and behave 
seductively, because she is married. If she does, she is corrupt (fased, kharab). It 
was appropriate for them because they were trying to find a husband. However, 
Negar contradicted herself by stating that she still wanted to look beautiful when 
married, in order to save her marriage (her future husband is an obsessive 
womaniser, and she was well aware that she would have many rivals in the ftiture). 
She dismissed the idea that middle-aged women whom she and others regarded as 
corrupt might have the same dilemma: if they dress like young women, it is because, 
in order to save their marriage, they too wish to compete with younger women who 
might attract their husbands' attention. This female competition over men may also, 
to a large extent, be restricted to the economy of attention and validation, rather than 
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the possibility of actually losing their husbands. Due to the polygamy right for men 
(designed by the orthodox jurisprudence, which opens all possible options for them), 
women are challenged to save their marriages by trying to beautify themselves all 
the time. They engage in a wide range of activities which modemisation has 
provided for them, such as cosmetic surgery, make-up, dieting, dressing up 
beautifully and so on. Modernity has also introduced pornography, which in turn has 
added more trouble for women. A number of women complained that their husbands 
compared them with beautiful women in pornographic films, placed more demands 
on them and degraded them, and how all of these things hurt them psychologically. 
There is no arrangement for premarital relationships in the orthodox 
construction of marriage. This produces tension between modernity and the 
orthodox jurisprudence in the realm of marriage. With the force of modernity, both 
sexes' lives have been transformed dramatically. For instance, women, by going to 
universities and leaving their communities, gain a degree of autonomy. Modernity 
provides a suitable context for constant contact between the sexes, while orthodox 
marriage makes it impossible for girls to develop strategies to make themselves 
attractive and find their future permanent partners; for them, the only long-term 
sanctuary in life seems to be marriage. Women who are out of wedlock suffer from 
discursive homelessness. 
It is women's coping strategy to make themselves attractive, to use make-up 
and to flirt with men. However, later on, employing these strategies leads them into 
trouble, since they are accused of acting seductively and producing chaos. This 
reinforces and provokes society's prejudice against women, which drives men to 
turn to violence against them. Although modernity challenges the traditional 
arrangements, it does not offer any legitimised alternative. Pre-marital relationships, 
losing one's virginity, becoming pregnant, being a single mother and having an 
abortion are not recognised as acceptable practices in Iran. 
The conversations above show that there is enormous pressure on these 
young women to settle down as soon as possible, and to stay in marriage as long as 
possible. Psychologically speaking, it is a matter of life and death. The possibility of 
not finding a husband, or losing the husband, strikes fear in their hearts. Not only do 
they have to come to terms with the changes in their lives; they must make sure that 
their partners would not lust for and pursue other more desirable women. They 
believe that it is appropriate for a man to have gheirat and ta-asob, and that this 
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means love, while "for women it means jealousy". Women seem to have reconciled 
themselves conveniently and safely with the available discourses and narrative 
repertoires. They have internalized the mainstream discourses regarding the nature 
of masculinity and femininity and natural gender division of labor. They have 
accepted the rules and norms imposed on them, and have neither the will, the need 
nor the discursive resources to challenge these rules. This does not mean that they 
do not have questions or their own agendas or policies. They are well aware that 
they do not have enough power to challenge their social reality: 
Homa: "Men can sigheh 132 a thousand women, but women should not move 
from their place. It's always like that. " 
Nasrin: "If I complain about it, he says, 'You know that I'm with others and 
sleep with different women. "' 
Negar: "My boyfriend has had a lot of women - every night he sleeps with 
one. But he doesn't want my ex-boyfriend to see us together, as he thinks he 
would say to him, 'What a bee-gheirat [inept], she was my girl once. "' 
Nasrin: "They say, 'Because we are boys, whatever we did or do isn't 
important, but you shouldn't. "' 
Therefore,, these women were consciously using other practical strategies to 
enhance their power and change their lives as much as they could. To keep their love 
alive, they employed these strategies to create an emotional suspension: holding 
their love, giving ardour to their men's sense of honour, and stirring men's jealousy. 
Although they did not like their husbands to be suspicious (as mentioned above), to 
keep their husbands' or partners' love they believed one should use suspicion 
strategically: 
Negar: "I don't think a man should be left to trust his wife totally. We have 
to leave some room for them to have doubts about us. If they trust us 
completely, it makes them indifferent to us. " 
Homa: "As soon as a man finds out that his wife loves him 100%, he 
becomes indifferent. She should always leave her husband in some doubt - 
then he becomes cautious and afraid of losing her love. If you tell him, 'I 
love you and I'll die for you', then he relaxes. But if he thinks you might 
love another man, then he tries harder to attain your love. " 
132 Sigheh is temporary marriage. A man may sigheh as many women as he wishes, for any period 
from I hour to 99 years. 
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Nasrin: "He trusted me too much, and I looked after him like a mother. But it 
didn't turn out to be interesting for him. He doesn't have any worries [del va 
pas] for me - he doesn't care where I am now. He shouldn't just assume that 
I'm sitting at home and only thinking about him. " 
She wanted him to propose to her, and the only way that remained for her 
was to pretend that she had another lover, in order to make him ta-asobi or 
"competitive". These young women were therefore sowing the seeds of suspicion in 
their partners' minds (they were not yet their husbands), consciously and 
intentionally: 
Negar: "Don't you get annoyed that your man doesn't have any 
consideration for you? " 
Nasrin: "Yes, it hurts me, but it has been proved to me that men are like 
that. '9 
The women were, however, unaware that these strategies could lead to more 
restrictions imposed on them later on. It might be a way of making sure that they 
were at the centre of their partners' attention, but in the very near future this could 
result in more tension, restrictions, and eventually violence. They were implicitly 
sending messages that women can be as powerful as men, that power cannot be 
hierarchal and that they can control their controllers. They believed that a woman 
should be more political, sacrifice more, be more knowledgeable, and be able to find 
a way to prevent any quarrel; and if she cannot, "It's her fault". We have "girl 
power": smooth talking, diplomacy, sexuality, desirability, and acknowledging the 
supremacy of men. Their power can be exercised through the politics of 
relationships (as the personal is political). These are the arts of resistance and the 
strategies of the weak (Scott, 1990). However, one cannot deny that this puts too 
much pressure on women, psychologically and physically (Wilkinson, 2005); they 
cannot tolerate the pressure all the time, 24 hours a day, and may suddenly snap: 
ZT: Then you have to be busy 24 hours of the day, making a lot of effort. 
Nasrin: No, it's only for a while (kill the cat at the time of heleh) [bride 
133 
chamber] . Then the 
husband will realise that you're not going to retreat. 
133 A common proverb, indicating that in a strategic interaction one must establish one's authority at 
the very beginning (establish your strategic supremacy at the beginning of the relationship). 
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Negar: In the best period of our life, we have to work hard to rebuild our 
men. Men have all these strategies to tame women, and if women don't have 
policies they'll lose the battle. 
Nasrin: I consider myself a clever girl when I defend my rights by being 
stubborn. I give him a message that I'm not backing down, and my boyfriend 
likes that - he likes to see that I'm powerful too. They realise that you value 
yourself. 
Negar: You shouldn't degrade yourself in front of a man. Once, my 
boyfriend verbally abused me and I warned him, "Watch your mouth", and 
that scared him off. A woman shouldn't let her man break her, and should 
maintain the red line. 
ZT: What if a man breaks her? 
Negar: Then the woman should pretend that she's heartbroken Why should a 
woman undermine her husband's pride in front of everybody else? She 
shows others, "I have a dominant male figure in my life, and I do as he tells 
me", but I know I'm the really powerful one who is managing everything 
and running my life. A man shouldn't be put in a position of feeling his pride 
being undermined. " 
Therefore, a woman cannot be herself She must always perform a role in 
bed (when she is tired, she must still perform her role), in the house, in dress (she 
must wear the clothes her husband tells her to wear) and in society (she must act, 
talk and walk as required). She must sacrifice her "self' and the desire to avoid 
subordination, social inferiority and dominance. Moreover, men are not the passive 
receivers of women's diplomatic behaviour. By maximising their own self-interests 
(being able to have other relationships, the possibility of marrying an adoring virgin 
girl, demanding submissiveness) and minimising the risks (the women's infidelity), 
they are actively involved in this "battle". In the battleground, one party (the man) is 
using the threat, and actual exercise of threat of going back to market for sex, and 
the other party (the woman) is using sex as a strategic weapon to gain favours. This 
ultimately creates dissatisfaction for both, who become "rational fools condemned to 
self-defeating choices and self-destructive social relations" (Hollis, 1996: 6). 
Overall, gheirat and ta-asob were used as synonymous terms most of the 
time, and were conceptualised as signs of love and care for this group of women. 
For other women, however, the terms represented a painful reality they were living 
with. For them, suspicion was found to be a very important factor in causing 
violence. Dobash and Dobash, Wilson and Daly (2005,45) maintain: 
[Marital] violence occurs around recurring themes, especially male 
sexual jealousy and proprietariness, expectations of obedience and domestic 
services, and women's attempts to leave the marital relationship. " 
Overall, women themselves came to a solution: tolerance, the will to 
sacrifice, and being "political": 
"The only way for women is to tolerate the situation, because nobody listens 
to them, and going to court is a waste of time. " 
Another factor which surfaced from women's accounts was men's gender 
attributions. These were found to be highly influential in men's behaviour towards 
women. This is discussed in the next section. 
Women's perceptions of their partners' gender attributions and their relation 
to violence: misogyny 
Men's misogynistic ideas 
This section is dedicated to discussing an important theme which emerged in 
womenýs interviews, "the husbands' misogynistic ideas". This is done by examining 
women's perception of their husbands' gender attributes, their husbands' 
expectations of them and their perceived entitlements, which could lead to violence. 
In 1989 Joan Smith published her book Misogynies, in which she argued: 
"The discrimination and denigration and violence that women suffer are no 
historical accident but linked manifestations of this hatred [hatred of 
women]; I inhabit a culture which is not simply sexist but occasionally lethal 
for women. Misogyny wears many guises, reveals itself in different forms 
which are dictated by class, wealth, education, race, religion, and other 
factors, but its chief characteristic is its pervasiveness... in this culture, the 
penalty for being a woman is sometimes death"(1989: xi). 
Women in this study reported their husbands' misogynistic prejudices: terms 
such as "You don't understand", -You don't know", "You're irrational" or "You're 
an idiot" were frequently used by the men. They admitted that their husbands 
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generally believe women's ideas and opinions should be overlooked. They said their 
husbands thought of women as inexperienced, irrational, and not socially intelligent 
enough to be able to handle and manage the affairs of the outside world. Moreover, 
for them, men generally deemed women "men's property", inferior, emotional, 
corrupt (fased) and chaotic (fetneh). Mahnaz, 43, stated: 
"My husband says all women are fesad [corrupt] and fetneh [chaotic], and 
they're not human beings. " 
Men also thought of women as nalve, shrewd, disloyal and untrustworthy, 
and as having no worth: "He doesn't value women, in general. " Overall, according 
to the majority of women, their husbands believed that women must be controlled 
and supervised because they cannot be decisive, and are not experienced and 
intelligent enough: 
"He doesn't think women have any social intelligence - even if they are 
highly educated, they're not experienced enough, they don't know how to 
behave and they're easily fooled. " 
These men viewed women as their property. Shaghar had a BA in English, 
and her husband had a BA in Law. He told her: 
He said to me, 'A woman is only the servant of the child, and you are 
my property. ' According to him, when I said 'Yes' at the time of contracting 
marriage I became his property, and I must listen to whatever he says... He 
reads these negative things about women in his theology [elahiat] books, and 
believes that women marry men because they can't make decisions in their 
life, and men marry them because they need somebody to do their work: 
cooking for them, washing their clothes... My husband and his family believe 
the child belongs to them. If I want a divorce, they'll take my child away. 
They think, in an old-fashioned way, that the mother doesn't have any role in 
creating the child, and the baby comes from the man. My husband's family 
believes that the owner and the guardian is the father, even if the law gives 
the mother the right to look after her child for the first seven years. " 
Mahin, a 55-year-old woman farmer, said: 
"My husband says I became his property when we contracted our marriage, 
and I am rightfully his [hagh-e man hasti], and he can do whatever he 
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wants... We have a saying: They asked a man, 'Who can you dominate in 
5 134. )5 the market? , and he said, 'I dominate my wife at home' 
The above examples show that husbands' perception of their wives lies at the 
heart of violence against women. Mahin's husband thought that he owned her and 
could do whatever he wanted with her. He believed it was his right to beat, abuse 
and even kill her, to keep or divorce her, and "It's nobody's business". As 
mentioned earlier in the context of male sexual jealousy, from a feminist viewpoint 
(Dobash and Dobash, Wilson and Daly, 2005), viewing women as the property of 
men is recognised as an expression of a societal norm, which in turn is accompanied 
by other ways of imposing control on women's lives. Mahin's husband's view of her 
as a "piece of land" appeared to be one of his main reasons for using violence 
against her, and his perception of marriage as the "ownership" of his wife provided 
him with justification. The famous saying, quoted by Mahin above, reveals the very 
important concept that it is culturally legitimate to beat your wife, even though you 
may not beat other people, such as colleagues and friends. Mahin reported that she 
once disobeyed his order to work on his parents' farm: 
ý6 ** He put a knife to my neck and said, 'Why didn't you wash my mother's 
clothesT Another time he would say, 'Why didn't you go to my father's 
field to work? "' 
According to these women, men's perception of marriage revolved around 
their sense of ownership. The same perception, however, was not held by women. 
They viewed marriage as a partnership - hamsary - eating, working, spending and 
sleeping together, and even sacrificing one's own needs in favour of the other. For 
instance, when the women were asked, "What is the meaning of marriage to you? ", 
they said: 
"It means sharing everything together - happiness, sadness... " 
4( *** If I sacrifice things 
for him he should do the same for me. It must be 
two-sided... " 
"... They agreed to live under one roof" 
134 See glossary for the Persian equivalent of this proverb. 
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I said to him, we are husband and wife and happiness means working, 
sleeping, laughing, and living together. " 
Only one of the young women regarded marriage as ownership: 
Negar: "Putting someone's name in your contract and feeling that he belongs 
to YOU. " 
Negar was alone in viewing marriage as property; however, it is important to 
note that she used the word "belonging" and not "owning". What I could infer from 
her views, in general, was that it was very important for her to ensure that her future 
husband (her promiscuous present fiance) would belong to her one day by signing 
the marriage contract. This is so different from men's point of view. While for 
women marriage means belonging, partnership, sharing each other's happiness and 
miseries, loving one another, eating, sleeping, working and earning and spending 
together, men perceive marriage as owning, or viewing and using women as their 
property. Negar came to the conclusion, however, that men think differently: 
"... He has to make sacrifices for me too, but it isn't always like that. Some 
men are really stubborn and they don't listen to you. " 
Moreover, as reported earlier, in the section addressing their roles, a 
mother-in-law also views her daughter-in-law as her son's family's property. It is 
reported in this research that these views could lead to violence against women. 
Women also reported their frustration at being ignored, and being viewed as 
cheap labour. This made them angry and ultimately led to more arguments: 
44 '** He thinks a woman should be thinking about her own business - her job is taking good care of the house, keeping the kids quiet and when her 
husband comes home she must prepare a good meal and be warm and 
pleasant. " 
Marital relationships are not perceived as a mutual partnership as much as 
women would like: 
"--- So, why do they call it hamsary,...? " 
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The above question was raised by a number of women. Their expectations of 
the marriage implied being a hamsar, or an equal companion. They complained that 
they suffered from being excluded and ignored by their husbands. Having a degree 
or being educated and working hard did not improve their husbands' way of 
thinking about their nature. One of the women found it very unfair; she told me: 
"I can't believe it's Islam or God who says, 'Obey your husband in every 
way', or that men are superior to women. I firmly believe in God, but I don't 
think it's fair at all. " 
The above statement was from an educated housewife who was interested in 
reading articles and magazines about women. She acknowledged that her reading 
135 helped her a great deal in raising her awareness . She said she sometimes even 
shared her information with her husband, which helped her a great deal because he 
seemed interested, and occasionally listened to her and admired her. He was 
interested in intellectual arguments: 
"He likes intellectual people - he wants to know what they are saying... " 
By reading and gaining information and sharing it with her husband, she 
impressed him and gradually earned some respect. After she had tolerated his abuse 
for a number of years, he finally admitted that he had behaved badly: 
"He said he doesn't know why he did what he did in the past. He asked me 
why I didn't leave him. He confessed to me that he did everything to scare 
me off. banging his head against the wall, threatening to kill me or bum the 
house down, and beating me severely... He told me he could prevail over me 
because I was very gullible and naYve. When I married him I was only 16, 
and he was 15 years older than me. How could I know ... T 
She had gradually learnt not to believe him easily. He eventually decided to 
transfer part of his pr operty into her name, in order to prevent his wealth passing to 
his own family. He did it because he did not want his wife to be destitute or remarry, 
135 She said, "We need people like you [she was referring to me] in Iran very much". Her statement 
made me feel really guilty, although I had made it clear before the interview that I could not do more 
than listen to them, and they had accepted that. After the interview, in any event, they were happy 
that they had found somebody to listen. 
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which could lead to her loss of the custody of their only daughter. Marrying a young 
girl has some advantages for mature men, including, as shown above, greater scope 
for controlling women, who are "gullible and naYve". This attracts some men to the 
option of marrying younger women. To justify their action, they argue that due to 
their wives' naivety, they must have total control over the affairs of the family, and 
women must submit to them. Any resistance from the woman leads to the use of 
violence by the husband. 
Only recently, since the raising of some debates in relation to women's rights 
in Iran by feminists and women activists, there has been a movement towards 
rethinking misogyny in the interpretation of the religious texts, and calling these 
negative images of women un-Islamic. Islamist feminists argue that men and women 
are equal in the eyes of God, according to a number of verses in the Qur'an, and 
stress the Prophet Mohammed's dear love of women. There has been a movement to 
clarify the rights of women in Islam through the media, especially radio and 
television. Those who were able to read magazines and newspapers told me how 
these helped to raise their awareness of their rights. In one particular interview, a 54- 
year-old illiterate woman told me that she had learnt many things from the radio. 
That, however, had not pleased her husband because she wouldn't do her job as 
usual; she demanded her maintenance and ojrat-al mesl rights. Although this gave 
her a little negotiating power, her husband's authoritarian regime in the household 
generally remained intact. He still had total control over her earnings (she had some 
rice fields), lifestyle and personal relationships with her own family; for her it had 
been like that since the beginning. While women's awareness of their rights brought 
them small victories, raising these issues created more arguments and tensions in 
some families' 36 . Another woman who had the same experience said: 
"I heard on the radio that I could ask for my mahrieh at any time. I just 
wanted to scare him off - that's why I tried to claim it. It made my husband 
really furious, and he didn't talk to me for a while and ordered me to change 
my mind, and finally I did. He threatened me that he would go and get a 
second wife, or he would travel to Syria and sleep with Syrian girls 137 . He 
got worse - that's why I stopped pursuing my rights, because at the end of 
136 As a result, there were some attempts to ban the raising of these issues in the media. 
137 Travelling to Syria is very common in Iran, as the Shrine of Hazrat-e Zaynab (a holy female figure 
in Shia Islam) may be found there. Those who had travelled to Syria told me that a number of 
brothels can be found where men can have easy access to women. Brothels are illegal in Iran. 
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the day I want my marriage to work, and I don't want to get divorced. I have 
to think about my daughter - who will marry her if they know her mother is 
a divorcee? " 
There are other examples of this kind, where women's attempts to attain 
their rights failed. There are a few points in order here: first, although there were 
numerous attempts by feminist Islamists to challenge the patriarchal system by 
arguing about women's rights in Islam (Afshar, 1998,1994), their efforts did not 
necessarily improve conditions for women. Moreover, these arguments created an 
environment of false conceptions of women's authority, or zan-salary. This will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that there is quite a large body of sayings 
(ahadith) which implicitly or explicitly express negative and misogynistic ideas 
regarding women (for instance Ghazali or Imam Ali's sayings as quoted in Chapter 
2). 
From the above examples, it becomes clear that men's misogynistic beliefs 
lead to violence, and moreover, men act in their institutional roles. The conformity 
to male sex roles, as Scully and Marolla (2005) argue, "... encourages males to 
associate power, dominance, strength, virility, and superiority with masculinity, and 
submissiveness, passivity, weakness, and inferiority with femininity". 
Furthermore, the concept of "polarity", the belief that men and women are 
inherently different and on two opposite sides was employed largely by men to 
justify their actions. In their husbands' view, women are weak and wicked, which 
leaves men strong and right. 
On the other hand, according to the women's accounts, their husbands' 
authoritarian behaviour and interference in every detail of their lives, their 
self-righteousness, and lack of self-control, short temper, and inability to take 
criticism were significant factors in creating tension and violence. The women 
acknowledged that they did indeed have "different opinions", but "lack of 
communication and negotiation", "misunderstanding or not understanding" and "not 
feeling comfortable" with their husbands led to "big arguments", "disobedience" and 
finally violence. 
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Women's misogynistic ideas 
During my work, young women who were in the early stages of their married 
lives frequently told me that women can and must use their feminine power to 
prevent conflict. In their opinion, women who cannot do so are not competent or 
clever enough. More particularly, a group of young women in their early twenties, 
with whom I had the chance to have more lengthy conversations, talked about their 
points of view in this regard. From the beginning and throughout their 
conversations, they were trying to make the point that, all in all, it is women's fault 
if they get beaten, and "They deserve it", either, in their belief, by "not leaving the 
situation", or by "pushing men to the edge" and "not knowing when to stop the 
argument", or for "not being political enough" to handle the situation. Some 
believed that women are "simple-minded", "corrupt", "traitors" and 
"untrustworthy". One, Negar, said: 
"If a man is suspicious about women, it's because some women are really 
corrupt, and that's why boys marry very late - because women are getting 
corrupt. " 
As Joan Smith has pointed out (1989: xi), misogyny can also be seen in some 
women. She maintains: "Nor is woman-hating found only in the male half of the 
human race. We are all exposed to the prevailing ideology of our culture, and some 
women learn early that they can prosper by aping the misogyny of men; these are the 
women who win provisional favour by denigrating other women, by playing on 
male prejudices, and by acting the 'man's woman"'. 
Moreover, as I discussed in the relevant section, mothers-in-law sometimes 
incite their sons against their wives "by playing on male prejudices". 
These women believed that however bad the situation,, it is up to women to 
take the initiative into their own hands. They had some ideas about how that could 
be done. They called it "female politics" or, in Persian, siyasat-ha-e zananeh. 
Women's actions: female politics 
Throughout this chapter, in different sections, the ways in which men use 
violence against their wives to coerce and intimidate them, and to establish control 
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by conveying rules to regulate female behaviour, have been discussed. According to 
the women's accounts, what men wanted to control was not limited to a particular 
behaviour, but varied from going to work or to their parents' house, parties or 
weddings, to the way they were dressing, using make-up and socialising with their 
friends or other male friends and relatives. The degree of men's control, however, 
depended on the women's reactions to it. In response to this regime implemented by 
men, women reported a variety of emotions and feelings: anger, resentment, low 
self-esteem, low self-confidence, frustration, sadness and depression (some were on 
medication). The women adopted different behavioural strategies pertinent to their 
circumstances, such as silence, resistance, submission, seeking help from outside 
such as going to family, seeking refuge in holy places, going to experts and/or 
obtaining prescriptions for anti-depressants. Some of the women decided to leave, 
and to terminate their marriages. These women's husbands were either addicted to 
drugs or convicted and serving jail sentences. Most, however, were ready to tolerate 
and sacrifice. Some actively, or, as they put it, "politically", attempted to control 
their controller by pretending to be submissive, and by being political and 
diplomatic. Connell (1987) calls this "emphasized femininity". As Hird puts it, 
"[This] form of femininity includes gender boundaries. When girls and women 
pretend they are stupid in the company of males, they are practicing emphasized 
femininity" (Hird, 2002: 116). The young women in this study agreed that they used 
their own "emphasised femininity": 
Zivar: "A woman should behave politically: fool the husband and do 
whatever she wants. We leave the big decisions to the men. We pretend that 
they're very important, and we listen to them and do what we want. Look, 
we ýre at the seaside now. We left them at home [with laughtefl! " 
Negar: "A woman always has to pretend, "Yes, you're the master" - that 
makes men happy and then they do whatever you want. " 
Nasrin: "Sometimes it's good to get permission for trivial things, just to give 
them the feeling that they're important. " 
These women strongly believed that women are so powerful that they can 
find cures for all the ills of the family, and are capable of taming their men. As 
Nasrin said, 
"A woman has enormous power. She can change everything - she just needs 
to be very clever. " 
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These young, well-off, educated women believed that since men -naturally 
yearn for patriarchy", their "sobriety and totalitarian behaviour" could **lead to 
violence"; therefore "women need to manage it". Women must use their own power 
to create "Peace and quiet". They explained it as follows: 
Homa: "A women must be well-mannered, kind and diplomatic. She should 
treat her man with love, and she must enjoy it too. It's really easy to create a 
comfortable life, even if you have to live in a little cottage. A woman can 
really do that... " 
Nazi: "A woman should sacrifice a lot, and ignore lots of her own needs. it is 
the woman who has to forgive and forget. " 
Homa: "But a woman should keep the boundaries, and mustn't let her 
husband beat her. Some women are stubborn and won't come down, and 
they make their husbands beat them. It's because they're out of character and 
incompetent... A woman who has an adulterous husband should leave him 
immediately. It's her fault - she can't satisfy her husband. Even if you're 
very ugly, you can keep your husband happy. " 
As Homa, a 23-year-old newly-married woman, stated above, women must 
not be so demanding, and must accept less; otherwise, it is they who are 
"incompetent". No matter how hard the situation is for the woman, she is the one 
who can control it, and it is "her fault" that her husband treats her badly. She can 
"cure" him. In my women participants' opinion, women should seek and gather 
adequate information before marriage, and must not put too much pressure on their 
husbands. If the situation gets out of hand, they must get a divorce. Moreover, they 
must ensure they do not become pregnant. This group of young women agreed: 
"... It's the woman's fault, never mind how bad her husband is... " 
Moreover, they believed that a woman must take the initiative. It is her job to 
find out her man's boiling point as well as his weaknesses, and prevent the argument 
advancing ftirther into violent conflict: 
"One could find out soon that each man has a weak point as well as a boiling 
point. A woman needs to know when to stop, and not to make him very 
angry, triggering his aggression. I can understand this in my partner. I stop 
before he gets really mad. He thinks I'm very diplomatic [by not revealing 
her anger when she is really angry]. - 
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However, these women did not have a clear idea of the role of men. They 
believed that men's authoritarian behaviour and stubbornness are in their nature. By 
adhering to this idea, they dismissed men's active participation in trying to avoid the 
conflict. Women, however, must not be the passive receivers of men's natural 
aggression. They should be actively involved, and use all the different strategies 
available to them, even if that includes ignoring or hiding their intelligence or pride. 
It is not important if a woman breaks her pride to save her man's pride in front of 
others: 
"The woman should pretend she's broken. Why should a woman break her 
husband's pride in front of everybody else? Explicitly [zaheran], she shows 
others that she has a domineering male figure in her life and obeys her 
husband, but, implicitly [batenan], she knows that she's really the powerful 
one, who is managing everything and running her own life. A man shouldn't 
lose his pride. " 
"I'm going to marry soon. I asked my boyfriend whether he would ever help 
me with washing up etc. He asked me, 'What do you do all the time at home 
and what about being a "patriarch" [mard salar]? ' I told him, 'You're the 
master, and washing the dishes doesn't damage your supremacy. ' Then he 
said to me, 'You know how to fool me. Fine! I'll wash the dishes and do the 
hoovering. "' 
By not challenging the dominant discourse, the one that perpetuates the 
mainstream structure of power/knowledge, institutional arrangements and discursive 
formations, women leave the regulatory ideals of gender identity and gender 
relations intact. The more women talk in terms of these discourses and show belief 
in them, the freer they become; this shows the paradox of zansalari alongside 
mardsalari. I frequently came across people (men and women) who declared, with a 
sense of irony, that Iranian society is dominated by women, rather than men. This 
statement might have been an attempt to convey the message that women are not 
mere passive victims in the field of gender relations, or it could reflect a social fact. 
As long as daughters, wives and mothers show their allegiance to the main 
discourses of gheirat-effat, use their feminine charm and sexuality in a subtle and 
political manner and do not challenge the headship of men directly, they are left to 
rule, even in many big decisions. One of the women, Faranak, said: 
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I respect him, and convince him that he's the man of the house, and I 
appreciate his authority. Then he becomes softer and gives me some credit, 
such as putting things (house, land) in my name. I use a bit of psychology - if I asked him for something directly he wouldn't give it to me. " 
Faranak, however, was not at ease with her double identity. She did not have 
any respect for her husband in her heart. After many years of abuse she did not feel 
love for him; she was mainly concerned about her only daughter, whom she was 
trying to protect. To justify herself (and possibly to convince me, as her listener) she 
stated: 
44 ** An this country women are miserable - men are the ones who have all the 
rights and we are all victims. " 
Faranak, like any other woman in this study, wanted to be a partner or 
hamsar for her husband. She, however, had to be a subservient wife. At the same 
time, she was a mother who was obsessed with maximising her only child's chance 
for success in life. She also had another identity, as a woman who felt uneasy with 
her own dishonest feelings for her husband. To sustain a stable, coherent identity 
from these disjunctive identities, she was experiencing conflicts and anxiety. As 
Hird argued, "Individuals usually attempt to assimilate, compartmentalize, or ignore 
the disjunctures in performances, which silences diversity" (Hird, 2002: 117). 
In the spirit of the necessity of acting politically and attempting to subvert 
the power structure of marriage to serve their own interests, young women in 
particular attempted to develop a strategy where the woman, according to the role 
envisaged in the orthodox formulation of marriage, fully plays the part of a sex 
provider. But in order to be a high-class and up-to-date sex provider, they convince 
their husbands that they need to stay fit and fresh. For this to be achieved, they fully 
embrace not working outside the home, and fon-nulate a package that requires them 
to attend fitness clubs, spirituality and yoga classes and swimming sessions. They 
will routinely use the services of make-up and hairdressing shops, stay highly 
fashion-aware and use the latest entertainment gadgets in music and films, to be like 
stars of the entertainment and pornography industries: fresh, sexy and young. This 
lifestyle requires funding by the husband, who is expected to be the sole provider 
according to the orthodox marriage. For this, he may need to work long hours, 
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sometimes in two or three different jobs. This in turn puts enormous pressure on 
men, exhausting and consequently desexualising them. 
Parisa, a well-educated 25-year-old woman, said: 
Working is good because it makes you sociable and fills up your time ... I 
worked before and I don't like to work again, it's very difficult for me. I 
don't like to be restricted. I had to be at work at 8 in the morning till 3 in the 
afternoon. I don't like it. I like to spend my time in the gym, or in art or 
fitness classes... I can't stay at home. 
ZT: What if he has financial difficulties? 
Parisa: He has to give me money. 
ZT: How do you know he will give you money? 
Nasrin: There's no guarantee. You just have to fool him all the time, and 
give him a kiss! [Everybody laughs. ] 
Other women in the group reported that they do not like working, and prefer 
to spend their time beautifying themselves. Additionally, they need to decorate their 
houses and bedrooms according to the latest fashions in home-making. Satellite 
channels, illegal western mainstream channels, and pornographic films set the 
standards of what a modem sexual woman needs to have, to become and to do. 
Pornographic films, watched widely in Iran by people in all walks of life, 
have paradoxical effects on women. In the vast silence of mainstream social and 
public life in Iran, notions of a good and satisfying sexual life have changed; these 
films now set the standard, and men expect their women to be and act like 
mainstream film and music stars and female "porn" stars. While the younger 
generation of women tries to fully embrace the standards of female beauty and 
sexuality set by western entertainirnent and pornography industries, these put too 
much pressure on some middle-aged women, who are not mentally equipped to 
behave like "porn" stars in bed. For these women, satellite channels and adult films 
are a source of trouble (a 40-year-old woman told me that her husband watched 700 
television channels every night, until morning); they create expectations in their 
husbands of a pleasurable sexual life and an ideal female body. For them, the West 
is a source of continuous tension and friction in their marital life. Western products 
exert corrupting influences on their husbands and sons, and this is translated into 
their increasing religiosity. This in turn leads them to embrace the orthodox-based 
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version of Islam with even more enthusiasm, as there is no other widely elaborated, 
developed and accessible version of Islam. The orthodox jurisprudence, on an 
individual level, acts as a "channel" through which an approved behaviour can be 
endorsed. It is a plan for acting on an attitude: it makes the transformation of an 
attitude into a behaviour. On a collective level, the orthodox jurisprudence provides 
an institutional support for making things happen, utilises procedures for achieving 
social goals, and inspires "gatekeepers" 138 willing to execute policies: symbolically 
and practically, orthodox jurisprudence stipulates the use of violence against 
women. 
Bizarrely, this interplay of modernity and the orthodox jurisprudence results 
in highly beauty- and fitness-conscious and sexualised women, alongside men who 
feel objectified (some said they felt they were treated like "pockets" in their family 
lives), exhausted, desexualised and ultimately unhappy, which in turn puts 
considerable strain on marital life. This enduring stream of pressure on women to be 
fully modem and highly sexualised, with a heightened sense of bodily appeal, and 
on men to fund their wives' fashion lifestyles, creates violence in marital relations. 
While it works for some women who have succeeded in attaining an easy and chic 
lifestyle away from the pressures of social and work life, for many others the 
strategy of embracing the role of the sex provider creates double disappointment and 
dissatisfaction. The heart of the matter is that in the structure of the orthodox 
formulation of marriage, in which women exchange sex for money, the nature of 
"sex") and "money" is not fixed but determined dynamically by modernity. The 
paradoxical situation is that the structure was designed by orthodox jurisprudence, 
while the content is determined by modernity, which, as it reaches the indigenous 
population through consumerism and the entertainment and pornography industries, 
defines the meaning of both sex and money. 
Conclusion 
Due to the complex picture of the social reality of gender relations in Iran, in 
which the orthodox jurisprudence discourse is the official discourse in currency and 
138 Nisbett and Cohen, 1996: 72 
236 
its supremacy is continuously challenged by modernity and popular culture, there 
cannot be a simple solution to the problem of domestic violence against women. 
It seems that the orthodox jurisprudence serves as the breading ground and a 
priori of social interaction through providing sanctions. In this context other factors 
can act as triggering factors. As women themselves pointed out, it could be an early 
childhood experience of violence (a circular argument), dire economic conditions, a 
tense situation following the birth of a child, family complications, the interference 
of others and, maybe most important of all, the disharmony between the mindset of 
wife and husband -a mismatch of expectations and ideas caused by other models of 
marital relations originating from modernity and popular culture. Furthermore, 
women referred to the mismatch in cultural differences (Rashti versus non-Rashti), 
gender differences (irrational, emotional versus rational, logical) and differences in 
social status (cultured versus uncultured) as the triggers of violence. 
On the basis of women's distinct experiences, three types of women could be 
identified in this study. All experienced violence in different forms and shapes. 
Some, especially the farmers, were exposed to brute forms of physical violence. 
Others, mainly middle-class educated women, reported that they had been beaten a 
few times, but not battered. Most of the women viewed battering, but not beating, as 
violence. Physical violence was always accompanied by psychological violence, 
which was found to be more complicated and more diverse. While economic 
violence was also reported by a large number of interviewees, sexual violence was 
only reported by a few. This could be partly due to the difficulties in conveying and 
discussing matters related to sexuality and partly due to women's attitude to sexual 
submission and shame. They thought sexual forcefulness was part of the deal. One 
group of young, upper-middle-class and highly-educated women were very open 
and alert to men's sexual needs, and to the importance of sex for men. These women 
embraced sex wholeheartedly; they were aware of their own sexual needs, and 
actively sought sexual adventures with their partners. They were also trying to stay 
fit, and were obsessed with beautification and cosmetics. These women, who 
attempted to beat men at their own game as a coping strategy, and who turned men 
into "pockets", are the "porn generation". 
In the light of male supremacy, supported widely by legitimised discourses, 
however, there is no physical sanctuary and no discursive sanctuary provided for 
women. The discursive homelessness is at the root of the helplessness and 
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hopelessness of Iranian women; at the root of lack of social and institutional safe 
houses is the lack of discursive homelessness. In the event of lack of sanctions and 
sanctuary, and in the face of utter despair and hopelessness, women vent their 
frustrations and anger in different ways, according to their different contexts and 
individualities. The coping strategies available to them included self harm, suicide 
attempts or suicidal thoughts, frigidity, silence, diplomacy (deraz-lafand 139 ) and 
secrecy. The associated range of emotions and feelings emerging in them were sabr 
(tolerance), sacrifice. They gained power through theses strategies. Women gain 
power through redirecting the official discourse in their own favour. They creatively 
employ the available discourses of piety, beauty and motherhood in different 
contexts in their own favour,, while leaving the formal structure intact. Nevertheless, 
as soon as men feel their formal authority is challenged, the boundaries of their 
tolerance are transgressed and they are taken for a ride, they can activate that 
structure in their own favour. Sometimes the major implication of these subtle 
"battles" over power is mutual dissatisfaction with the lack of love and absence of 
mutual adoration, and many incidents of Petty crime and misdemeanours against 
each other, with the sudden eruption of a huge, explosive magnaof violence. The 
mere outcome of the mutual manipulation is dissatisfaction in family life, where 
there are no or few cases of genuine mutual validation and respect. I witnessed so 
many cases of couples in a state of cold war, which eroded their quality of life, who 
had become accustomed to the situation, naturalised it and saw no alternative to it. 
139 This term was introduced to me by a cleric. It means "the long rope". 
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Chapter Six: Men's Perceptions and Understanding of Domestic 
Violence 
Introduction 
One of the aims of this study is to investigate domestic violence from the 
different viewpoints of the main parties involved: women, men and the judicial 
system. This chapter explores the viewpoints of the male participants: their thoughts, 
feelings and actions regarding domestic violence. I felt that the experiences of men 
would increase my understanding of the issues highlighted in my research with 
women. In the first section I deal with different types of violence utilised by men, 
according to their accounts. The reasons behind domestic violence are discussed in 
the next section. Men touched upon the different factors involved in generating, 
legitimising and sustaining conflict in domestic life. I categorised these themes, 
which were found to be common amongst male participants in this study, into two 
groups: external (social and cultural) and internal (personal) factors. 
Physical, psychological and economic violence 
An analysis of the interviews revealed that the men used physical, 
psychological, and economic violence in order to control their wives. Of the 14 men 
I interviewed, nine told me that they sometimes beat their wives, while the other five 
did not mention anything regarding physical violence; however, two of these men's 
wives did state in their interviews that although they had not beaten them in recent 
years, they had beaten them in the past, and instead now inflicted psychological and 
economic violence on them. In previous chapters, it was clarified that physical 
violence under the rulings of the orthodox jurisprudence is considered unlawful 
when it leads to paying diya as a result of the infliction of visible injuries. In the 
men's interviews (as well as in the women's interviews), however, it became 
apparent that men were careful not to leave any bruises or marks. A technician said: 
ZT: How do you beat your wife? Do use your fists or ... 
? 
S: No, if I beat her like that I have to pay diya. When I beat her I'm careful 
not to leave any bruises or injuries behind, and not to spend money as a 
result [with laughter]. 
ZT: How? 
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S: One should find the right way, and discover her weak spots. Every person 
has her or his own way - if you find it then you can have a iride. 
ZT: How do you beat her without leaving bruises? 
S: Beating doesn't mean that you smash her. 
ZT: So, violence is not only beating? 
S: Sometimes I use other ways, for instance denying her money so she can't 
go to parties, buy clothes, or go to her parents' house. 
Mr S. had a history of a violent relationship with his wife throughout his 
married life. They even ended up in court, his wife complaining about his infidelity, 
his violence and his attempt to murder her. Although there was a charge against him, 
he was set free on bail, and his wife was persuaded by the court and family members 
to drop the charges against him and go back to her life. Mr S. uses not only physical 
violence to intimidate his wife, but also economic violence by not providing for her 
needs. In addition, he puts psychological pressure on her by not letting her go out of 
the house, even to visit her parents, go to a party or go out shopping. He stated that 
most of the time he ignored his wife and did not listen to her: 
140 S.: ... One ear 
is dar [door], another is darvazeh [gate] I don't care and 
don't listen. She gets used to it. 
ZT: So you ignore her. 
S: Yeah, and she gets tired of it. 
The range of psychological violence reported by Mr S. and other men in this 
study varied from not letting the woman go to her parents' house or to parties, 
ignoring her (not talking to her or letting her participate in his decisions), not taking 
her out to dinner, threatening to divorce her or marrying another woman, delaying 
small jobs at home (such as repairing things), and so on. Women interviewees 
reported these forms of behaviour too. 
Mr S., along with other male participants, described common forms of 
economic violence such as not giving money to his wife to buy personal things, 
ceasing to pay her maintenance, not allowing her to work even though she is 
qualified, and stealing her money. 
140 This is a proverb: "Letting something in through one ear and out through the other. " 
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With regard to sexual violence, I could not ask my participants to talk about 
it directly. When interviewing the participants' wives, I heard that this is often a 
cause for tension, and men become agitated when their wives are not sexually 
available to them. Only one of the men discussed sexuality, and his uneasiness with 
his wife's cold behaviour. He believed that: 
"If a woman satisfies her husband sexually, there won't be any perverted 
behaviour... She normally uses sexual matters to upset me. She did so right 
from the beginning of our marriage, and still does, but I do my best to please 
her. If she isn't happy with it, she must say so. " 
No other man talked about his problem. This shows that women generally 
counter men's disregard and disrespect for them by being "cold" in bed. In order to 
open up a discussion on sexuality, I mainly used the word tamkin, which was widely 
known by men (and not by women). In one case, a man told me that he did not have 
any problem (his wife said the reverse), but at the end of an interview he told his 
wife: 
"If you don't tamkin [submit], I shan't give you your maintenance, and I 
shan't give you permission to go out. " 
He told me proudly that he knows his rights very well. 
The reasons behind violence, from men's points of view 
In response to my question on why they use violence, men's answers often 
referred to the "control" of women: 
ZT: What do you think about beating women? 
S: If you don't beat them, you can't keep them. 
In the above passage, Mr S. is referring to his reasons for beating his wife: to 
"keep her quiet" and "put her in her place", and then to "have a ride". Or, as 
someone else said, to "teach her a lesson and show her who's boss": 
"I beat her to teach her a lesson, to make her afraid of me, to make her grow 
up [adam beshavad]. '" 
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The person who made the above remark said that beating his wife had a pay-off for 
him: 
"She came around later and even loved me more. She didn't even get upset - it's as if I needed to do it to make her grow up. Perhaps she thought I'm a 
nerd and not a man. " 
For the mentioned person, beating a woman was proof of his manhood and a 
sign of masculinity. More importantly, he was surprised that his partner did not even 
44get upset" and "even loved [him] more". He might perhaps have exaggerated the 
story, but it is likely that women's attempts directed at normalising the relation 
quickly, and minimising the pain of the violence, send the wrong message to men: 
that violence works. Women desperate to save their relationships may unwittingly 
encourage men to use more violence as a strategic tool for control. 
Some of the men, however, did not directly admit that they used violence as 
a means of keeping their wives quiet. Violence was not used instrumentally to 
achieve women's submission; rather, men were made to use violence because of 
economic, social and cultural factors, they claimed. Some of the external factors 
highlighted in the interviews were women's high expectations (cheshm va 
ham-cheshmi) for a prosperous life, families' interference in couples' affairs, 
women9s irrationality and so on. These men sometimes alluded to internal factors 
such as lack of self-control, stress, tiredness and a lack of mutual understanding. As 
these cluster concepts are inter-related, I shall discuss them in an integrated manner. 
The role of societal norms regarding the legitimacy of violence 
A number of men in the study placed the emphasis on religious teachings in 
their attempts to justify beating their wives. One man told me: 
"In the Qur'an, it is said that men can beat their wives, while women aren't 
allowed to beat their husbands. " 
Religious teachings, as H. said, were found to be a detennining factor in 
men's attitudes and behaviour. When interviewing men, I have noticed that 
whenever they wish to give legitimacy to their views, they generally employ Islam 
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and Islamic discourses. I also found a sharp contrast between their knowledge of 
t eir own rights and women's knowledge of theirs. Here are some examples: 
"H: Look, we have differences. We men think that we must have the first and 
the last say - we always think like that. If we want to say to a woman or a 
girl that we like her or like looking at her, despite having a family of our 
own, we allow ourselves to do that, but we don't give the same right to our 
women. 
ZT: Why is that? 
H: Because it's in our nature. They consider themselves superior. I tell my 
wife that I'm free to go to another country to seek other women and have a 
good time, but she can't. 
ZT: So a woman can't because she has no right and isn't free? 
H: Correct, women don't have the right. Law, orf (customs) and sharia tell us 
so, don't you agree? 
ZT: Well, that's interesting! 
A: But there are some other points, these characteristics (mentioned in the 
above passage) are natural [ersi]. For instance Islam gave us the right to have 
four wives [his wife interrupts angrily, telling him to go to hell], I know 
these things. In addition, we can have 70 temporary marriages. I'm not really 
sure about the number [laughter] - an indefinite number perhaps! 
H: It is said to men that you can have four wives, but women are told, "You 
don't have the same right. You only can marry one man. " The law says it, 
Islamic law says it. 
ZT: I've read the Qur'an. It says you can, but the verse doesn't end there. It 
says you have to act justly. Do you think you can be fair to all your wives? 
H: No, we can't, especially when it comes to managing women and 
children's affairs. We don't accept that law. But the point is, despite not 
being practically feasible the interesting point is that the right itself is fully 
recognised for men, and not women, by our Islam. If a woman looks at other 
men, she can be killed. If my wife looks at a strange man with lust, in my 
opinion, I can kill her - but I have the right to look at another woman 
lustfully. " 
The extent to which men's negative attitudes about women and their 
role-expectation in intimate relationships can influence their behaviour is an ongoing 
debate. A number of authors suggest that too little attention is given to changing 
attitudes regarding the permissibility of violence against women (Davis, 1987; 
Gondolf & Russell, 1986, Hart, 1988); instead the focus is more on the role of 
243 
cognitive styles and their mediation on women battering. A feminist analysis 
criticises the cognitive approach by arguing that men are "socialised" into power and 
control over women. Moreover, violence is a central device to fortify and cement the 
hierarchical relations of power and control (Bograd, 1988; Walker, 1981). 
Eisikovits, Edleson, Guttmann and Sela-Amit (1991), in their study, showed that 
abusive men held more negative attitudes than non-violent men towards women. 
Within the process of socialisation, religious discourses play a central role in 
forming the hearts and minds of believers. As reported in the above passage, H. and 
A. alluded to their rights to practise polygamy, to be lustful towards other women 
and to kill wives they suspect of adultery. They believe these rights are "well 
recognised" by "[their] Islam", and are given to them by "law, orf and sharia", and 
they emphasise that "Islamic law" does not bestow the same rights on women. In 
saying, "The law says it, Islamic law says it", they were trying to shrug off any 
responsibility, as if it was not their fault that Islam recognises these rights for them, 
that they were not the perpetrators here, that when it comes to practice they do not 
exercise their preserved rights. They instinctively distinguished the image-making 
functions of the jurisprudential rulings and customs from the law-making functions. 
What they would use strategically in their daily negotiations with women was the 
emphasis on their own superiority in marital relations; otherwise they would not 
wish to act upon them. They shrewdly appreciated the symbolic value of this set of 
rights, rather than their practical values. In the complex context of Iranian social 
reality, the symbolic value, ironically, offered them more strategic advantages and 
practical benefits than the practical value per se. By resorting to the legitimate 
discourses of religious teachings, they would attempt to solidify their privileged and 
superior positions, and establish the unquestionable right to have "the first and last 
say", and to silence any hints of resistance. 
The role of popular culture in men's gender attribution and violence 
In another interview, H. also alluded to the process of socialisation of the 
men in tea-houses: 
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"Our culture is produced in the tea-houses 141 where men talk about women, 
especially those who are vulgar and go astray, or have done something 
wrong or go out a lot and things like that. I personally don't want to hear 
anything about my wife in there - it's embarrassing. That's why she has to 
be careful about the way she talks, walks, dresses and other things. " 
In this passage, Hashem touched upon the role of tea-houses in the 
subjectification of men through discursive practices. As he said, women's manners, 
acts, looks and behaviour, all of which are closely related to their sexuality, are the 
focus of discussion in these male gatherings. The tea-houses are the public gaze 
which controls and regulates women's activities outside their homes, and which 
could spawn men's suspicion and provoke aggression towards their wives, daughters 
and other females in the household. In the previous section, I also reported how 
Hashem and Ali employed the concepts of sex and sexuality to make their points. It 
is evident that men's conception of sexuality coupled with its associated series of 
rights and obligations play a major role in inciting violence against women. 
There are, of course, other places and occasions where men congregate, such 
as mosques, religious processions, and family talks. In these gatherings, men 
exchange information and ideas on different subjects, including, as Hashem said, 
women's affairs in general and their personal problems in particular. Meanwhile, 
they practise and reinforce different discourses on femininity, masculinity, and 
gender positions. Hashem said that he did not like to hear any unpleasant news about 
his own wife as it was "embarrassing", and he would therefore place more 
restrictions on his wife, to ensure that she behaved more "chastely". He believed that 
he was under pressure and surveillance from society, and he in turn would put 
pressure on his wife and children. This reveals the power of gossip in keeping 
women on the right path of the gender division of labour envisaged by the structures 
of power and knowledge in Iranian society. 
Another man, Hessam, said that although he likes to be kind to his wife, as 
he put it, "The masculine world rejects us if we are nice to our wives. " For him, men 
like himself were the mere conduits of pressure from society to women. Hessam 
believed that these pressures and restrictions on women at the beginning of the 
marriage create many disputes between couples. As he said, 
14 1A tea-house is a place where men gather to drink tea and smoke cigarettes. 
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"At the beginning of the marriage, life is so sweet and the husband and wife 
are so happy together, but gradually, as a result of men constantly ordering 
their wives about and dictating what they can do and what they can't do on 
such issues such as dress code, manners of sitting manner, laughing and 
walking, and families' interference in these matters, they become cold 
towards each other. The husbands do 90 percent of the ordering, and women 
only object when they're humiliated in front of others. Imagine a world away 
from family relations and all these troubles. Men and women could live in 
perfect peace, tranquillity and harmony. " 
Between the romantic beginning and the tragic end in the tale of marital 
relations, Hessam put most of the blame on the outside world for the restrictions 
imposed by wider society on both men and women, which generate rows between 
husbands, wives and their families, and ultimately kill the passion in an intimate 
relationship. As we see from these assertions, the marital relation in Iran is mediated 
by powerful others, families and tea-houses (representing the wider community). 
He. however, did not endow any agency to himself or any other force regarding the 
task of making the desired changes or reversing the doomed destiny of marriages in 
the orthodox order. He felt more like a victim and passive receiver of societal rules, 
and was afraid of being rejected by the masculine world if he deviated from the 
norms. For men there is, however, something to be gained in this show of passivity 
to the forces of history: the reward is social superiority over women; as Brittan 
argues, "[Men] are not simply the passive embodiments of the masculine ideology" 
(1989: 68). 
Hessam knew that if he wanted to make any change at all, he must disobey 
the rules governing his life and reinforced by families and communities, and was 
fully aware of the consequences of such choices (such as being ostracised and 
isolated), for which he was not ready to pay such a high price. He chose not to be 
rejected by powerful others. The only avenue open to him was to adopt a double 
identity (to be kind to his wife at home in secret, and tough outside), and he left the 
task of finding "perfect peace, quite and harmony" in marital relations to the 
imagination, which of course "cannot be found in this world". 
The fascinating question for me is the matter of individual agency and 
responsibilities. For Foucault, responsibility stems from freedom that is discursively 
situated: it exists in discourses that offer tools and vocabularies that persons can 
utilise in creating themselves as responsible. ethical and political, but always 
246 
discursive, subjects. Foucault thus reintroduces ethical and political agency without 
falling back upon notions of human essence and Truth. He creates a theoretical 
framework within which to conceptualise ethics and politics in terms of a critical. 
creative ethos (Taylor and Vintges, 2004). 
Foucault is careful to stress that subjectification (the process of creating a 
subject) and subjectivisation (the active process of making a new subject out of what 
is inherited from the process of subjectification) are not to be distinguished in terms 
of unfreedorn and freedom: the "passive" subject of subjectification is not, he 
claims, "unfree", but is "constituted as a subject in relation to and over against" 
discursive procedures of normalisation and individualisation; similarly, the "active" 
subject of subjectivisation, who " constitutes itself ... through practices of the self, " 
is beholden to "practices [that] are nevertheless not something invented by the 
individual himself. They are models he finds in his culture and are proposed, 
suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group" 
(Foucault, 1997: 291, cited in Exit Woolf by Stephen M. Barber, in Taylor and 
Vintges (ed. ), 2004: 61). 
All the men I interviewed were trying to tell me that their belief system and 
identity is built Upon their culture (the orthodox jurisprudence), their society (orfi 
and their social group (peers). They were actively resorting to a form of historical 
determinism, perhaps to free themselves from the guilt associated with responsibility 
and autonomy and to portray themselves as reluctant kings in the kingdom of men. 
They, the sympathetic ones who expressed at least a faint desire for change, were 
using the historical analysis of the social order to deny themselves any effective 
fl- 142 forms of agency . Ironically, they were 
demonstrating their agency in an active and 
reasoned denial of agency. I also sympathised with them to some extent, as they 
were not equipped to make such a revolutionary change in their lives. What I 
detected was again a sense of discursive homelessness operating at this juncture in 
the honest men (and women) who had some vague hints of a better world of gender 
relations but could not envisage a realistic way out of their predicament, and did not 
find a coherent alternative powerful enough to act as new regime of truth enshrining 
their whole social beings and social interactions. This was a fascinating and puzzling 
142 They could not be kind to their wives because the "masculine world" would reject them, It is not 
clear how much these men were fully aware of the regime of truth of their symbolic world. What is 
clear is that they were not making any effort to change the situation, perhaps because they were, 
overtly or covertly, delighted by the fact that they have the power to rule. 
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discovery for me. I will come back to this difficult but critical topic 
143 in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. 
Male threatened-ego: being a zan-zalil 
In my interviews with some of these men (and later on when I was 
transcribing and analyzing the interviews), I noticed that what really hurt men more 
than anything else is their threatened-ego. Men admitted that they were afraid of 
women taking control, being in charge, or even wanting to have a voice. They 
reported that they were very concerned about women wanting to put their feet into 
men's traditional and well-kept territory: 
SH: "In the old days there was only one voice in the family, and that was the 
man's, but now I think women want to have a voice. I had some problems at 
the beginning of my marriage, and then I realised that my wife wanted to 
express herself. Women of the old generation, like my poor mother, had no 
control over their own lives - even their marriages weren't in their hands. " 
SH was referring to one of the challenges facing Iranian men in the new era. 
A traditional man did not have the pressure of today's modem man. Women of his 
mother's generation did not have too much choice: their marriages and their lives 
were, in effect, always in someone else's hands. But the modem generation of 
women, like his wife, want to have a voice, and this makes men even more 
frustrated, challenged, and threatened. The orthodox model ordains man's headship 
of the family as divine, while modemity denies them such a position. That seems to 
be at the heart of men's threatened ego. 
In some interviews,, men tried to convince me that they are under pressure 
from the society at large. If they are tough, rough and macho it is because: 
H: "... Society looks down on a man who helps his wife to do things at home 
such as cooking, washing, looking after the children, or who even just shows 
signs of caring about his wife. Showing respect to her is a sign of weakness - 
they call such a man zan-zalil. - 
143 This is not merely an academic curiosity for me. I realised that the position one takes on the issue 
of agency has practical implications for the lives of many men and women on the ground. 
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Zan-zahl (or the current version of it, zizi) is a label given to men who are 
under the control of their wives, and is used widely to humiliate those men whose 
wives are in charge. Both men and women who are not following the traditional 
power relationship in the family must be careful in presenting themselves as such. In 
the orthodox formulation of marriage in Iran, there are no legitimate discourses for 
women to have power. Legitimacy has been bestowed in our culture historically 
through orthodox jurisprudence, which in turn functions through religious rituals, 
ceremonies and religious practices, which are deeply rooted in people's hearts and 
minds. The image inscribed by the orthodox jurisprudence is one of the gender 
division of labour. Modernity comes as a challenge and as a destabilising force: 
modernity per se cannot and did not replace the incumbent regime of truth in Iran. 
Equality between men and women must have deep roots in religious practices, 44 . 
Almost all of these men believe that women are not made to have power. For 
them, a number of factors are involved in making women lose ground in society. 
First, women" s deficiency in holding on to power: 
"... If you care about them or give them power, they get spoilt and they don't 
know how to handle it, and it ends in disaster. " 
According to these men, women's inadequacy in using their power when 
they have it leads them to abuse it, and that is what men said they were most afraid 
of 
Secondly, it was claimed that women are not as experienced as men in 
managing social affairs. A 47-year-old man (Kamran) who had a high degree in 
politics told me: 
"No matter how highly educated a woman is, due to her lack of experience in 
public life, she cannot be as efficient as a man. She just doesn't have the 
courage or knowledge to manage the affairs of society. " 
He ended his argument by saying, "A woman's place is either in the bathroom or in 
the kitchen". 
The above passage shows that men are generally highly sceptical or even 
cynical about women's ability in managing the delicacies of power in the social 
realm. Women are the prisoners of their historical deprivation, and their under- 
privileged past further deprive them of running "the affairs of society". Thus, 
144 1 shall address this issue further in the conclusion of this thesis. 
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women should once again return to their traditional, historical -spaces" of kitchen 
and bedroom. Kamran referred to the "bathroom" rather than the -bedroom": it is 
very important to note that according to Islamic purification rituals, men and women 
must purify themselves after having intercourse. This is due to the need to become 
clean for praying. Therefore, in Kamran's subconscious, these two spaces are 
closely associated. 
Overall, Kamran employed the dichotomy of "time" and "space" to 
demonstrate women's inadequacy for any social engagements. Other men held the 
same idea. They believed that women, in general, are not only inefficient due to 
being inexperienced, but are also "fooled easily - they get seduced and become 
morally corrupt". Furthermore, they are deemed more emotional, irrational, less 
experienced, and conservative, with no appetite for risk taking. However, the men 
also believed that women perform their duties at work more effectively than men, 
and are not easily corruptible. This is because, as H. and A. said: 
"... They're scared to take risks - they're rule-orientated even when the rules 
work against their institutions or government bodies. They don't care - they 
do their jobs without any flexibility. " 
The same women, however, can become corrupt morally. This shows that 
men are more concerned about their wives' morality in terms of sexuality than their 
financial corruption. While women do not become corrupt socially, are not 
"flexible" and do not bend on demand (due to their being afraid and having low self- 
esteem), they would do so if other men in the workplace tended to fool them and 
abuse them sexually. H. reported that one of his female colleagues, whose beauty 
was 44very impressive", had to leave her job because "her boss's" eyes were after 
her" and she did not want to be disgraced. Mr H. was trying to justify his decision 
not to allow his wife to work outside the home: 
H: "I have my own justification for that. In our office, for instance, we have 
some secretaries who are working for a number of reasons, to help their 
husbands or to take care of their elders, and they need the money, but she is 
somehow under pressure by her superior [meaning that her boss had some 
sort of direct or indirect sexual advance towards her or she was left with that 
impression or had the feeling that she was pursued by her boss] and that 
stops them from working. " 
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Mr H. (and other men in this study) reported their consuming concerns about 
social insecurity (sexual harassment, fear of rape and abduction) and fear of scandal 
in public (abero-reezi), and how, due to their sense of gheirat (honour) and ta-asob 
Oealousy), they imposed more restrictions on women. In earlier chapters I discussed 
men and women's concerns on various news items and rumours in their 
communities in relation to the rape and abduction of women and girls. It is not clear 
whether the fear of crime had any substance, but a report on the objective rate of 
sexual crime in Iran in 2005 stated that the county of Gilan has the fourth highest 
incidence (after Tehran, Gazvin and Semnan) of the defloration and rape of virgin 
girls (ezale-h bekarat or tajavoz-e be ony) 145 . In total, as a result of the family, 
17,000 Iranian women were tested, amounting to an annual rate of five in every 
10,000 women experiencing this hideous crime. In Gilan, eight out of 10,000 girls 
were reported to be tested for this particular crime. However, the report did not 
include any statistics on the rape of other women (non-virgins). 
Distrusting the government security forces, men take the initiative into their 
own hands to protect their namus (honour). Some resort to very strong measures 
such as forbidding, punishing, and confining their wives and daughters. Men 
reported that they liked their wives to wear "a good hejab", and not to be 
"provocative" by wearing bright, tight, or see-through clothes. News, or rumours, 
allowed men to put pressure on their wives to cover themselves for the sake of their 
own security. One of the men in this study demanded that his wife wore a full hejab, 
and would not let her go anywhere alone. He believed it was too dangerous for her. 
He told me the most gruesome stories about women being kidnapped, raped and 
murdered. He had heard these stories from his friends, all taxi drivers (the 
widespread discourse of danger). It appeared that even a few cases would provoke 
the whole community into taking strong measures to restrict women even further. 
As society becomes more westernised and liberal, as demonstrated by the 
widespread use of make-up, the emergence of loose forms of the hejab and 
widespread use of pornographic films, and the visible presence of women in all 
walks of social life, fear of crime and lack of public safety for women is becoming a 
growing concern for families. Fear of public violence (rape, abduction, harassment, 
and so on) is rapidly becoming part of the public discourse on women's freedom of 
movement and social interaction. I encountered it time and again in people's 
145 http: '/maq. ciooya. ws/cqi-bin/gooya/mt-tb. cqi/29327 (Tuesday, 23 Esfand (Persian calendar), 1384) 
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assessment of the ever-changing social atmosphere of the country. People would 
frequently express their assessment of the situation in statements such as "Things are 
turning for the worst", or "Things are becoming scandalous". This has profound 
effects on the further confinement of women: families resort to the logic that if 
female members of their families are not accompanied by a male relative, they are 
likely to be exposed to grave danger. In parallel with the fast-growing liberal and 
modem discourses in the country, women demand more freedom of movement, 
autonomy, and independence. These two opposing and mutually interdependent 
discourses (the discourse of public danger and the discourse of women's 
emancipation) cause tension and rows within families. These tensions in turn 
translate the actual and perceived fear of public violence against women into 
domestic violence against them, as families demand and introduce tighter 
restrictions on women's dress and freedom of movement. 
This trend is toward minimising women's presence in social life, unless it is 
in safe familial networks. Shahin, a 38-year-old businessman, said that because 
police forces or security guards are incompetent to protect women, it is up to men to 
take action. Shahin wanted his wife to dress more conservatively and use little or no 
make-up, and not to behave in a loose manner. Even all these precautions may not 
work, according to him: 
"In our society, everything got mixed up. Before, you knew who was a bad 
woman and who was good. Now, even if a good woman stands by the road 
waiting for a taxi or savari 146 . at 
least fifty cars stop for her. A good woman 
doesn't feel secure. " 
There are important points in the above passages revealing the dynamic 
nature of gender relations in Iran, and how it produces public and domestic violence 
against women. In the new public atmosphere, the clear demarcation between 
"good" and "bad" women is increasingly blurred, and this exposes all women to 
public crime and impropriety. According to men, this makes the public sphere a 
minefield for women. Shahin claimed to be a liberal man. In his early youth he 
enjoyed having several relationships with different girls. For marriage, though, he 
preferred to marry a -quiet girl". He stated that he dislikes women who are 
146 There is a tradition of ordinary people using their cars to serve as taxis, and economic hardship 
seems to have opened new avenues for gender relations laden with unprecedented hazards and 
opportunities. 
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outspoken and forthright. His wife was a highly-educated nurse. However, he did 
not like her to go to work. He did not let her go to friends' parties (it emerged during 
my interviews and observations that going to parties is becoming a constant source 
of familial tensions and quarrels). Wherever she wanted to go, he would drop her off 
and pick her up at a specific time and place. He put the blame on the government's 
incompetence to create an atmosphere of public safety. In his opinion, he was 
protecting his wife from danger. Another interviewee reported similar patterns in his 
protective and obsessive measures. 
These men claimed that in another time and place, they would have behaved 
differently, and would have given their wives more freedom. However, the issue of 
male sexual jealousy (gheirat, ta-asob), namus (honour, to ensure the exclusive use 
of one's wife's sexual faculties) and fear of scandal (abero-reezi) were found to be 
far more important for men in demanding and imposing more restrictive forms of 
hejab and more conservative mode of women's participation in social life. Men 
employed the moral-psychological discourse of gheirat-effat (jealousy/modesty) 
largely to explain why they demanded "appropriate hejab" 147 . A. explained this as 
follows: 
ZT: Do you let her go out? 
A: It depends where she wants to go. Not everywhere. She can go with her 
father, brothers, or I can drop her off because I want to protect her from 
danger. 
ZT: Do you have any problem with her hejab? 
A: It depends on how well she covers herself If she wants to wear something 
that exposes her body, I have a problem with that, because of my gheirat and 
my reputation within our community, ... 
but I trust her, because she isn't like 
that. 
Earlier in this chapter I discussed how men reported their concerns over 
social scandals and the centrality of reputation (aberoo) in the social interactions. 
Men were deeply concerned to keep their wives and daughters from the harm of 
being the talk of the town for imaginary or real reasons, which could endanger their 
individual and familial reputations. 
147 The form of hejab worn in Iran varies from a garment which covers its wearer from head to toe to 
a loose gown. 
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Like every other man in this study, Mr. A. felt obliged to look after his 
namus. Another man in his early sixties also explained to me that he "became very 
gheiraty", and found it hard when he saw his wife (in her late fifties) greeting their 
young sons' friends at a gathering. He told me that he knew his wife acted 
innocently and did not have any "evil thoughts", but he still felt jealous. 
Sexual differences 
Why is the hejab so central to the social presence of women in Iran? One of 
the reasons men always touched upon was the notion of gender differences in 
sexuality. In their opinion, because women are sexually attractive and provocative, 
they should wear the hejab. Only in this way, they thought, could women protect 
themselves and society from moral corruption. (They, however, dismissed any idea 
that men might be sexually attractive to women, and the need for them to behave 
equally chastely. ) Throughout my interviews with women and men, I was 
confronted with the dichotomy of bad woman/good woman. I was told about some 
"bad women", who were lustful and who were after men to sleep with. Thus there 
were some women who, despite having to face extreme difficulty and hazards, were 
ready to take risks and follow their desires. My male participants never thought that 
women could have sexual desires as strong as men's. One of them expressed his 
sense of surprise and shock at such a suggestion. Generally, these men believed that 
pious women would not have such feelings; only some "bad women" who are lustful 
do. While they maintained that it is only natural for men to be attracted to women 
sexually, they could not reserve or imagine the same desire or right for women. The 
image of a lustful woman fills these men with rage: 
E: It's very natural for men to be attracted to women. A man wants his wife 
to be loyal to him, and if he finds out that she is committing haram [a 
religiously illicit act], he can take appropriate action. " 
When I asked these men what they thought about their wives' duties towards 
them, they always referred to sexual matters by alluding to the term tamkin, or 
"satisfying their husbands' needs", in one of their answers. But when I asked them 
about their duties towards their wives, they said something along these lines: 
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E: "A man should provide for his wife, as far as possible, things such as 
clothing, food, and entertainment. If he doesn't, he is irresponsible. " 
The men believed that a man's duty to his wife is to pay her nafagheh. They 
never felt that they should satisfy their wives' sexual needs. Sexual relationships to 
them were a one-way street. While men are needy and selective, women do not have 
too many sexual feelings; they are passive, and do not think or feel sexually. Mr E. 
believed that a woman should cover herself in order to stop men's lustful gaze and 
ensuing harassment. To prove his point, he recalled a recent event: 
"I was sitting on the back of my friend's motorbike, and we saw a girl with a 
red and tight mantu... " 
He described how the "girl's buttocks" grasped their attention, and how these 
were "grabbed" by his friend while they were riding the bike. In his opinion, his 
friend (in his late fifties) was not the guilty one; she had provoked him, and it was 
therefore "her fault": 
"If a girl goes out in tight and bright-coloured clothes 148 and gets men's 
verbal or sexual abuse, it's her fault. It's like when you make kebabs - the 
delicious smell makes you want to eat them. " 
The contradiction was in the fact that while people are ready to pay for 
"kebabs" or wait politely and patiently to be offered them, they would not do the 
same to gain access to an attractive women. They give themselves the right to 
sexually abuse her. Meanwhile, I wanted to know whether men's fascination with 
female beauty could be prevented by the hejab. Mr E. believed the answer to be 
"No". He said: 
"Men still use their imagination - you'd be very surprised if you knew what 
sorts of things go on in men's imaginations. " 
The logical implication of the traditional model requires women to be 
secluded, segregated, or desexualised in social interactions. However, modernity 
challenges this model by introducing women's active participation in society. This 
ideal desexualised social order, and the fact that modernity has a strong presence in 
all aspects of life in Iran, represents a source of perpetual tension in social life, 
148Recently, tight and coloured mantues have become fashionable and widespread in Iran. 
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which in turn translates into domestic violence against women. The ubiquity of 
sexual fantasy, and the fact that men hate their wives and daughters to be the 
subjects of other men's sexual fantasies, has a significant effect on the ideal model 
of social order. One of the reasons these men were not willing to send female 
members of the family to work was that they did not want their wives to be the prey 
for men's lustful thoughts, gazes, or acts. They believed this could create tension in 
their personal and social lives. 
Mr N. recalled a case where one of his female colleagues, despite not by any 
stretch of imagination being categorized in any sense sexually attractive, was 
subjected to an assault by one of the married men. This shows the presence of sexual 
harassment in the workplace, and how this, in the context of the prevalent discourses 
of morality and honour attached to the presence of women, can become problematic 
for society at large, the family, men and women themselves. 
Consequently, the women in this study had to stay at home and become 
dependent on their husbands. Women accepted their roles as housewives, and men 
were expected to deliver their part of the deal: being their households' sole 
providers. This in turn created new problems for the family. Men complained that 
women's needs and demands were too high, and that they became very materialistic. 
It was perceived that a vicious circle of competition over possessions between 
people, especially women at work. They called it cheshm va ham-cheshmi ("keeping 
up with the Joneses"). This takes us to our next theme. 
Cheshm va ham-cheshmi ("Keeping up with the Joneses") 
One of the most important themes that emerged frequently as one of the 
sources of rows in the family was cheshm va ham-cheshmi 
"H: ... cheshm va 
ham-cheshmi, because they see some of their friends 
having these things. The friends have sisters, and they borrow their 
jewellery, or hire it from the jeweller's. Women who don't know that go 
home and start a row. " 
Men strongly believed that this was one of the major problems in their lives, 
ultimately resulting in marital quarrels. I wanted to explore further what men 
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thought of the roots of this particular behaviour on the part of their wives. They 
pointed to some of the reasons: 
H: Because they want to show off. 
A: I think people who have weaknesses in terms of scientific achievements 
tend to compensate for them by showing off their dresses and jewellery, but 
we have a lady doctor who doesn't wear pearls or even an ordinary gold 
necklace. 
In these men's view, the women wanted to shine, and because they were not 
qualified academically 149 they used other available strategies. They disregarded the 
fact that independent, qualified working women did not need to show off, but others 
might. Mr A. explained: 
A: "I think those who are well educated and good earners can afford it. 
They're not dependent on their husbands. " 
The above passage shows the contradictions in Mr A. 's way of thinking. 
Earlier in this chapter I reported that neither Mr A. nor Mr H. allowed his wife to 
work independently. If they allowed their wives to work, the women would not have 
to show off. Nevertheless, men blamed their wives' inadequacy for not being 
independent, and for relying on their husbands' wages, and women's natural 
jealousy towards others, which makes them want to "keep up" and demand more 
from their husbands. When interviewing women, I encountered the same argument. 
Women complained about their husbands' competition over "more manly things". 
Inspired by that observation, I asked them: 
ZT: Don't you think men also have cheshm va ham-cheshmi? 
A: It's like when I don't have a new car I really want to have one, but when I 
buy it it's not very precious for me. We men don't talk about our wives' gold 
and jewellery, or about our clothes. When I see Hossein, for instance, I tell 
him about the new property I bought, or something like that. 
ZT: So you mean men and women talk about different things? 
A: That's right. Men care about cars, mobiles and real estate. 
149Acquiring academic qualifications is considered respectable and valuable for men, and in 
particular for women. It even facilitates girls' marriages. 
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H: That's right. When I see one of my colleagues in a Zantiya'ýO, I feel 
jealous. We'd like a better car or a better house. But we try to get them. We 
don't have a row about it. 
ZT: Because you work and have money, you can afford to buy whatever you 
want. 
H: Correct! 
ZT: What about your wives? How can they get what they want? 
In answer to my question, H. and A. attempted to back up their arguments by 
referring to available discourses on gender differences and men's superiority and 
advantages over women, as bestowed by "sharia, orf and law" (I discuss their 
arguments in other sections of this chapter). Meanwhile, as the sole earners of the 
family, they were required to manage the family finances. They did not, however, 
like to share resources with their wives (a matter also rose by women: see previous 
chapters). Only they could decide how much money could be spent, and where and 
when. This was one of the main causes of fights between spouses. Since men held 
the power, the only strategic tool in the women's hands was either constant nagging, 
or trying to save up by asking for more jewellery. 
Women's obsession with jewellery was not just for beautification. In the 
context of Iran's embryonic financial market, the purchase of jewellery is seen as a 
financial investment for the future. By acquiring gold, women believe they can 
guarantee a secure future for themselves. Their economic insecurity leads them to 
demand more precious stones from their husbands. It is culturally acceptable to buy 
gold at the time of marriage, and at any time during married life. Women use their 
gold in different ways, either for their children's education or for their husbands' 
financial investment; or they may keep it as an insurance policy against 
unpredictable events such as divorce or their husbands' death. However, men in this 
study formulated their wives' behaviour not in terms of female subject positions or 
insurance policies, but in terms of their inherent irrationalities and constitutional 
weaknesses, in order to further enhance, either consciously or subconsciously, their 
position in the family as the only guardian of sense and reason and their grip over 
the major affairs of the family. 
150 A desirable (and expensive) model of car currently sold in Iran. 
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Men subconsciously applied Butler's performance theory (1990). according 
to which the subject positions on offer to men are totally different from those 
available to women. While women are obsessed with clothes, jewellery and so on, 
men are not passionate about them. Instead, men have strong desires for masculine 
items such as cars, electronics, gadgets and so on. The gender division of labour 
determines the subjects of interest in men and women. Due to their gender roles, 
men are more involved in economic and financial activities in the outside world, and 
women are generally more concerned with tasks within the home, such as decoration 
of the house, the appearance of family members and so on. Meanwhile, these men 
believed that women were naturally jealous, but rejected their sense of competition 
as jealousy or "keeping up with the Joneses". There is asymmetry between men and 
women; while women rarely chastise their husbands for their competitiveness or 
cheshm va ham-cheshmi, men do find fault with their wives. In contrast to women's 
perception of themselves,, men maintained that women do not think about the future, 
and accused them of being myopic and unrealistic. They described their frustration 
and anxiety: 
A: Men's natures are different from women's. Iranian men always worry 
about financial security, among other things. All these 25 years, I've never 
had a peaceful mind... We don't have psychological and financial wellbeing 
[he talked about high costs of living and difficulties in finding work]. I have 
all these problems, and you expect me to be calm and talk nicely to my wife 
and children! Is that possible? There's no stability in our country - we can go 
bankrupt overnight. 
H: We're living below the poverty line. My question is, as we earn so little, 
and do our best to provide for our families and do everything for them, why 
do women demand more and more things from us - more than we can 
afford? Why do they expect so much? Why don't they calculate how much 
we earn and how much we spend? We have all these pressures in our 
workplace - why don't they even thank us? 
The men's wives explained that their demands were not excessive, and that 
they did appreciate their husbands' efforts, but, they had some good reasons to 
believe that their husbands were not telling them the truth about their income, and 
had other priorities, such as investing their money in economic activities without 
even consulting them. The women were left in the dark over the financial affairs of 
the family. Men were afraid that if they told their wives the truth of their financial 
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position, the women might react unsympathetically. This shows the strategic 
management of information by both men and women in the marital interaction: 
A: We don't tell our women everything, because they can't digest it. If I told 
my wife how much I earned in my business, she would demand something. 
while I have to think about another business. Secondly, if we tell them 
everything, then they use it against us and blame us. Sometimes women hide 
things from their husbands too, such as how much property they have, their 
savings, the people they helped. Women do things behind their husbands' 
backs that men can never imagine. 
F [A's wife]: Don't you think you made us do this and hide things from you? 
H: That's true. It's because we're unable to take the truth. 
H. admitted that when it comes to digesting the truth, even men find it hard. 
Men frequently deprive women of the information they share with other men. For 
instance, A. said: 
"I don't want to say this in front of my wife, because she might wise up... 
We men have some information we don't want to share with our wives. 
Because we're working outside, we hear about different events. I swear to 
God that I saw with my own eyes one of our friends beat his wife with a 
cable - he broke her arm. I got upset and told him, "It's unfair [bi-ensajl! 
Are you an animal, beating your wife like that? " We told her to go to court - 
we couldn't advise her in front of her husband. He was being unfaithful to 
her, didn't give her any maintenance [nafagheh] and beat her severely - he 
was very cruel. The court convicted him because we were witnesses [A. and 
another man]... Then the judge put him in jail. " 
By telling this story A. became worried that his wife might use this information 
against him, and immediately added: 
"But if my wife goes to court and complains, the court will ask her and me to 
bring three witnesses. I can prove that I pay nafagheh and don't beat her 
severely. There are different types of beatings, mild or severe, beating or 
battering. Overt injuries mean leaving some bruises or marks on the body as 
a result of beating, such as breaking, ripping, slitting. Now, my wife can go 
and demand her mahrieh, but in return I'll tell her, 'I know my rights, I 
studied them, and you're not allowed to go outside without my permission, 
or do this or that. "" 
The above passage shows A. ' s knowledge of his rights and his wife's rights 
(mahrieh, nafagheh). He mentioned different types of physical abuse, and 
260 
understood their respective legal significance. He also demonstrated an 
understanding of how to strategically approach the current system of rights and 
obligations, in order to maximise his own interests while keeping his wife's in 
check. Moreover, the above passage shows that while men are quite aware of their 
rights, and demonstrate the dexterity to employ resources available to them in their 
wider social setting (as a result of working outside, and socialising with other men 
and women), women instead are left to their inferior positions in the structure of 
marriage and, in turn, try to employ the resources available in family life. Men use 
women's lack of information as a way of controlling them (the politics of 
information): whoever has more strategic information can take charge. Women 
instead try to improvise, and, without touching the current marital structure, to 
subvert the power relations in their own favour, or to shape the family's affairs in 
their own image. Mr A. described the marital structure in his culture, and its 
differences from western culture, as follows: 
ZT: You think your wife is under your supervision, then? 
A: Yes, we're not living in a European country where women can live 
independently. In England, men and women live as partners - they don't 
even get married, they can get divorced easily, or they separate. In this 
country, things are connected firmly together. A man can get separated, but it 
certainly isn't easy for a woman. She must have something to rely on. Only 
then can she avoid trouble. 
ZT: Why do you think men and women have different duties, and why is 
your wife under your supervision? 
A: Because I'm paying her maintenance. I'm giving her expenses - not 
somebody else - not her father, or my father - and she needs me to give her 
maintenance. The same is true with me. I need her to prepare lunch and 
dinner for me. " 
Mr A. was drawing attention to the cultural differences between his society 
and a western one. This constant comparison is itself a fact of life in Iran, where it 
has become a constant source of tension there. In his belief, one must play according 
to the role one has been allocated. Because he was living in Iran under sharia 
rulings, he must live according to expectations comparable with his society (his 
symbolic order). In his opinion, an Iranian woman cannot live independently under 
current conditions: she is not as free as a western woman. According to 
him, an 
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Iranian woman must have someone to support her (a husband, brother or father). Mr 
A. identified himself as a liberal, westernised man; however, he found it difficult to 
import some elements of liberal western order into the orthodox symbolic order. He 
felt it was fair to expect his wife to fulfil her duties (tamkin and submission) because 
he was doing his as he was taught: paying her nafagheh and living expenses. 
According to men, the only way for women to attain peace and security in marital 
relations was to employ female strategies, and keep to their designated traditional 
gender roles. 
Lack of female politics: sex, food and pleasure 
One of the themes that repeatedly emerged in this study was that men wanted 
their wives to be more "political" or "diplomatic" in their relationships. If women 
want their husbands to heed their wishes, they must entice them to do so. According 
to men, women must be sweet, loving, and sexy. When I asked one of the men to tell 
me why he did not care about his wife's demands, he said: 
My wife is very stubborn. She isn't political at all. If she knew how to fool 
me (kharam konad), I'd do whatever she wanted. She just has to know how 
to say, Pishi, pishi, kharam mishi? ('Pussycat, pussycat, will you be my 
donkey? ') 151 . Then I'll 
be a good donkey [laughs]. 
Therefore, women should not request something directly from their 
husbands. A number of women also reported that they usually get whatever they 
desire after having sex. Women said that sex was the most effective and often the 
only weapon to get whatever they desire. Men often complained that women's 
coping strategies (selling sex for favours, strategic use of sex) were childish. Mr N. 
pointed to those women who frustrate men in their sexual desire by not submitting to 
them. He believed: 
"She has to serve me and keep me happy. Men have other options - they can 
get it from other sources. " 
Mr H. added: 
15 1A literal translation of a Persian expression which means something like "Tell me you love me, 
and I'll do anything for you. " 
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"Men always have more opportunities to do these things. There are many 
beautiful, chaste, rich, and honourable ladies who only want to have a 
husband, don't you agree? " 
This perception of having options (for sex) confirms women as those who 
must serve, while this option is not available to them. The cost and benefit of sex 
appear to be calculated according to the formula that one side uses the threat and 
actual course of action of returning to the market for sex, while the other uses sex as 
a strategic weapon to gain favour. This ultimately creates dissatisfaction and tension. 
As Hollis believes, 
to make rational agents into what Amartya Sen has termed 'rational 
fools' condemned to self-defeating choices and self-destructive social 
relations" (1996: 6) 
In the context of gender relations, institutional marriage and supportive and 
associated discourses act as historical forces in formulating men's and women's 
sexual roles. However, women react differently to their designated roles. While 
some resist the unrelenting demand of their husbands for sex, others migrate to this 
side of the line, and instead of resisting it embrace it wholeheartedly. These women 
are managing to defeat men in their own game. Why this difference in strategy? 
Why have different generations and types of women resorted to different types of 
coping strategies in the management of marital relations? It appears that the 
widespread consumption of pornographic films has managed to stimulate part of the 
new generation of women to free themselves from the shackles of modesty in the 
marital relation, and to take charge (this, however, needs to be investigated further). 
Paradoxically, pornography has also assisted in perpetuating the orthodox structure: 
the orthodox jurisprudence and the pornography industry become mutually 
beneficial. Orthodox marriage has restrained sex in private relations, while 
pornography has helped to bring the details and importance of sex into a wide range 
of Iranian households, and especially to women, many of whom watch adult films 
and exchange them. This seems bizarre, but shows the dynamism of social life 
generating new alliances and forging new forms of co-existence and co-operation 
deemed impossible theoretically. In my discussion with a 45-year-old man, he 
referred to society's obsession with sex. I asked him what the reason behind this 
was: 
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N: Our society has become obsessed with sex since these akhonds [clerics] 
came to power. They broke the social taboos by actively introducing people 
to the possibility of sigheh [temporary marriages], using public platforms to 
promote the ahkam [religious rulings] in relation to sexual relationships. " 
Although Mr N. focused on the role of religious teachings, he may have 
disregarded the fact that throughout history, public platforms such as mosques were 
used widely to propagate the sexual ethics of orthodox religion. What is new is the 
widespread consumption of pornographic films introduced by modernity and 
capitalism, reinforcing the centrality of sex in the formation of gender relations. 
Orthodox rulings encourage women to be highly sexual in their marital 
relationships, to be able to fully satisfy their husbands; this means that the orthodox 
jurisprudence has sought to free women in intimate relations. Orthodox teachings, 
however, confronted a strong public wall of resistance. Now pornographic films 
have broken that barrier, and created highly-charged sexual women who have acted, 
to some extent, as the orthodox jurisprudence wished: as willing participants in bed, 
who satisfy the needs of their husbands. But this has not produced the traditionalists' 
ideal couple: one the provider of sex, and the other of material security. Two 
anomalies are still in place here: one is the fact that some women place more weight 
on their own sexual pleasure, and complain about their men's inability to fully 
satisfy them, and the other is the fact that the hardship of providing for a family on a 
single wage in the modern market system has exhausted men and made the orthodox 
jurisprudence ideal model almost totally irrelevant to the everyday social reality of 
both partners working. This dynamism culminates in an endless marathon of mutual 
marital dissatisfaction, sexual frustration, and spiritual impotence. There is the sense 
that what you believe in does not work in practice, and what is prevalent in practice 
has no discursive legitimacy. 
Some interviewees came to the conclusion that one of the main factors in 
creating fights between the couples was their unfamiliarity with each other's world. 
The women do not know what normally happens in their husbands' workplaces, and 
the men do not know what is happening inside their homes: 
A: "Most of our difficulties occur because we don't know each other's 
world. She doesn"t know my working conditions, and I don't know hers. If I 
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came home and worked with her at home, I could understand her problems, 
and if she came to my shop and worked with me, she'd find out about mine. 
I'm not intentionally avoiding it [housework]. I don't have enough time to do 
it, and she thinks I'm lazy. " 
Men, of course, did not like the idea of having their wives around after all; as 
they said, they had some secrets they did not like to share with their wives. More 
importantly, they did not want their wives to be in contact with any other males. On 
the other hand, they found it tough to work at home. As one of them said: 
H: "I go to work, and when I come home thirsty and hungry, I expect my 
wife to cook my favourite meal. I come home for the sake of that food 
honestly. A man goes home for the sake of something, but if he can't get 
what he wants, then of course he gets angry. It's not in my hands - it 
happens automatically. It's in men's natures that sometimes they say 
something and then think about it, although sometimes they think and then 
act upon it. It's because they're worn out as a result of working hard. But 
some women talk first and then think about it, and they don't talk to you for 
a few days. We're not like that - we reconcile sooner than them. My wife 
didn't talk to me for about two months. " 
Hossein said that he finds his happiness in the good food 152 his wife cooks 
for him. He explained to me that he had a big she wife stopped talking to him for a 
long time, he could not understand why. He simply thought that it was her duty to 
cook whatever he wanted, and she had no right not to do so. When it comes to 
women's rights, some men completely forget about the orthodox discourses and 
women"s rights in the orthodox jurisprudence. Hossein did not know that it is not his 
wife's duty, according to orthodox law, to cook, clean or even look after the children 
(women themselves were not aware of their rights). But he mastered the details of 
men's rights fully. This illustrates that men pick and choose those discourses which 
serve their interests best, and use them largely to justify their actions and disregard 
those which are not beneficial to them. H. also used the discourses of gender 
differences by using dichotomies of rational/irrational and malevolent/benevolent. 
While men think first and then act, women act and then think; women are malicious 
because they prolong their reunion after the fight. This makes men rational and 
women irrational. But H. contradicted himself by saying that when he is angry he 
acts "automatically" without thinking, because of his "nature". 
152 His favourite dish was baghili ghatugh, a local dish in Gilan and a famous meal in Iran. 
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All of my male participants, except one, maintained that the perfect 
happiness, for them, was to locate themselves in the traditional gender division of 
labour: men work outside and women work inside the home. They wanted their 
wives to be more content, submissive, quiet, supportive, and dutiful: good and 
compassionate mothers and wives. However, they were surprised that the reality did 
not match their needs and expectations. Most of these men put pressure on me to 
give them some advice on "fixing" their relationships. Due to the ethical 
requirements of the research, I could not do so. The best I could do was to refer them 
to a family consultant or psychologist. But they generally felt that they would rather 
not go. Most of them thought spending money on professional help was pointless: 
they boasted that they knew everything. Moreover, one of these men was very 
concerned about confidentiality; he thought that if he went to one of these places, 
they would set up a file on him, and this was a major threat. One of the options for 
women to obtain a divorce from their husbands is to prove their insanity. Perhaps 
one of the reasons they wanted me to help them was that I could not pose any danger 
to them in this respect. Meanwhile, despite all of the difficulties I experienced in 
listening to their opinions of, and feelings and behaviour towards, women in general 
and their wives in particular, I was able to listen to them without judging them. This 
surprised my women interviewees, one of whom asked me, "How could you just sit 
there and say nothing, when they were talking rubbish? " 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to report and reflect on men's views in 
relation to domestic violence against women. More than half of the men I 
interviewed admitted that they used physical violence as a means to control their 
wives, to "put them in their place", to teach them a lesson and to "show them who's 
boss". Moreover, almost all of them acknowledged that they used psychological and 
economic violence to restrict and punish their wives, and to retaliate against them. 
They reserved for themselves the right to control their wives. They did not believe, 
however, that they could employ the same strategies in their public relations with 
colleagues, managers, friends, and neighbours. They reported a sense of ownership 
over their wives. The wife belonged to the husband, who had the right to manage her 
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affairs, her relationships, and her life in general. This was also reported by a number 
of the women I interviewed, and I have shown how this could lead to more violence 
against women. 
It was interesting to discover that some of these men, who were not even 
practising their faith, were using religious discourses frequently to legitimise their 
abusive behaviour. They mainly referred to those sets of rights bestowed on them by 
4'orf, sharia and law". Interestingly, men were more aware of their rights than 
women. It became clear that men used their knowledge to acquire their wives' 
submission,, and that they were unwilling to share information in their possession 
(economics of information), in order to place a halt on their wives' expectations. In 
Chapter 21 discussed the critical impacts of image-making and law-making 
functions of the orthodox jurisprudence on women's lives. As the men in this study 
reported, the law-making aspect of orthodox jurisprudence provided them with 
certain rights. But as some of them maintained, the mere fact that they were given 
these rights was "telling us something", that they are considered superior over 
women, that women are inferior compared to them. Mir-Hosseini (1999) also 
inferred the defectiveness or inferiority of women by observing the ways in which 
the orthodox jurisprudence deals with women's legal rights and their status in the 
family and in society. 
Meanwhile, men used the gender difference discourses to justify the way in 
which they viewed women. In their opinion, women are, by nature, less logical and 
rational and more emotional and unsettling, inexperienced and ignorant, superficial 
and shallow, seductive and fetneh, and gullible and naYve. This negative thinking 
places women in a more vulnerable position, as it has a profound effect on men's 
behaviour (women also referred to men's misogynistic ideas, and how these affect 
their perception of women and consequently their behaviour). 
Men also referred to the role of their peers and society in deten-nining their 
behaviour towards their wives, from their concerns over the wearing of the hejab to 
their relationships at home. They said they were obliged to play the gender role 
affirmed by social norms, without which they risked isolation or ridicule by the 
masculine world. They voiced their concern about social scandal (aberoo-reezi): 
society's ears and eyes are the extended hands of the orthodox jurisprudence in 
regulating believers' behaviour. They did not see any agency for themselves. They 
portrayed themselves as passive receivers of the non-ns imposed on them, who are 
267 
either compelled by women to be aggressive, or forced by society to play according 
to their gender positions. 
Men's perception of the sexual differences between them and women led to a 
very important notion that, in their belief, women are the main providers of sexual 
services. While they regarded their own sexual needs as urgent, they generally 
perceived women's sexual needs as limited. The men's wives, fiancees, and 
girlfriends are the women who must satisfy them, and if they will not, the men will 
gain access to satisfaction from other sources legitimised by the orthodox 
jurisprudence. 
The tension between modernity and the current traditional discourses could 
be detected in the men's narratives. It seems that they were conceptualising the 
complexity of their lives. The irony is that the more liberal society appears to 
become in Iran, the bolder and more intense the religious backlash, and the more 
"westernised" Iranian society appears to become, the more likely men are to return 
to religious discursive and non-discursive practices. 
Most of the findings in this chapter are in line with the data and analysis 
provided by women in the previous chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
After contemplating the theoretical and empirical aspects of the root causes 
of domestic violence in Iran at length, I feel that the remarks made by one of my 
interviewees succinctly capture how the task of explication of domestic violence 
should be approached in the context of Iranian society. He maintained that 
disharmony between man and wife, and not economic hardship or any other 
factor(s), can lead to domestic violence. In the concluding section of this thesis, I 
will attempt to elaborate on this remark, and demonstrate how it can lead us to a 
better understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence in the Iranian context, 
using available theoretical and empirical materials. Disharmony in marital relations 
emerges as a result of the orthodox model of the marital contract and the conjugal 
relationship is seriously challenged by alternative models of gender relations. When 
couples and their close associates, family members and related societal institutions 
do not share the same fundamental model of proper marital and gender relations, 
their interaction becomes problematic. Jewkes (2002) touches upon the way in 
which women's inability to fulfil gender roles imposed by the regime of masculinity 
results in violence against women. In the context of the overwhelming power of 
men in Iranian society (in terms of formal structures and institutions), the tension in 
the relationship trickles down to the rest of women's marital interactions, more often 
than not, in the form of domestic violence against women. I hope the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of this study have shed light on the components and basic 
assumptions of the orthodox model of marriage, how this comes into conflict with 
alternative models of marital and gender relations in the minds and hearts of Iranian 
people, and how all of these tensions manifest themselves in domestic violence 
against women. 
This two-tiered study contributes to the literature on domestic violence in the 
theoretical realm by applying the economic theory of contracts to the orthodox 
construction of the institution of marriage in Iran, and in the empirical realm by 
interviewing three groups of people directly involved in domestic violence against 
women in Iran. In the theoretical section I critically reviewed the literature on the 
orthodox formulation of marriage and domestic violence. I endeavoured to 
demonstrate that the structure of orthodox marriage leads to a Japanese-style full- 
time and lifetime labour contract which culminates in potential control being exerted 
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over all aspects of women's lives, from dress to work and from sexual to social 
relations. This functions through two conditions of exclusivity and promptness, 
having the potential to produce violence against women when it comes into conflict 
with the process of modernisation, which requires the active participation of women 
in social life. The requirements of active female participation may come into conflict 
with the codes of conduct invoked in the orthodox formulation of marriage. By 
applying the economic theory of contract (Pateman, 1989), it is possible to predict 
that the core of orthodox marriage (an exclusive exchange of sex on demand for 
financial provision) may, in the context of a legalist-based type of historical 
rationality (Rula Jurdi Abisaab: 2005), imply that the marital relation is transformed 
from the relationship between two independent and autonomous subjects to 
panoptical control of one subject, men, over the other, women. This in turn may lead 
to domestic violence, due to the demands of modem life. Compulsory veiling is a 
perfect example of the far-reaching implications of traditional marriage and its 
associated discourses acting as a constant source of private and public violence 
against women 153 , as manifested 
in the criminalisation of "women's style of dress, 
hair, make-up and even walking in public" (Kusha, 2003: 25 1). One of the questions 
explored in the empirical arm of the study was to investigate the extent to which 
predictions of the economic theory of contract matched the reality of marital 
relations in Iran, as perceived by actual participants. 
153 Kusha (2005: 250) reports: "An example is the 'Regulatory Code for Executing the Law in respect 
of Non-veiling and Mal-veiling and Vulgar Dress' (Ain-nameh-e Ijraiy-e Mawadd-e Qanuni dar 
Rabeteh ba Bi-hijaabi wa Bad-hýaabi wa Lebaashaay-e Mubtazao: 
Article 1: Categorisation and definition of types of mal-veiling (bad-hyabi) that would engender 
arrest (jalb) and arraignment before judiciary authorities ... : A. Unveiling related to head (bad- 
hýabiy-e sar), I- Showing part of the hair in a theatrical (namayeshi) or vulgar (zanandeh) manner; 
2- Facial make-up with lipstick, eye shadow in a vulgar fashion. B. Unveiling related to trunk and 
legs: I- Wearing dresses that do not cover parts of the body; 2- Wearing net-like or transparent 
dresses; 3- Wearing dresses that would be provocative (tahrik-aamiz) by showing the curves of the 
body; 4- Wearing tight trousers without a tunic (manto); 5- Wearing leg transparent knit stockings 
without pants or tunic; 6- Wearing dresses that carry signs, pictures or vulgar writings contravening 
Islamic morals. ... Clarifications: I- The Shari 
[Sharia] limit in coverage (hadd-e pushish-e shari) is 
coverage of the whole body other than the facial round (qurs-e surat) and the hands up to the wrist; 2- 
This is applicable to men too, wearing vulgar dress contravening public morals (iffat-e umumi), or 
expressing vulgar culture (farhang-e ibtizal). Cases that would engender warning (tazakkur) and 
imploring (irshaad) and finally written reprieves (taahhud-e Katbi) and as follows: A. Showing of 
hair other than those in Article 1; B. If the length of the hair makes it apparent from under head- 
cover; C. If certain bodily movements (harakat-e mukhtalifih-e badani) were to cause unveiling; D. If 
unbuttoning were to expose parts of the body". 
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The empirical arm of this study explores the issue of domestic violence along 
three broad questions: What constitutes domestic violence? What causes it? And 
what sorts of remedies are plausible and feasible? Utilising the reflexive 
methodology, the empirical study investigates the nature of violence as it is 
perceived in its local and specific manifestation, what are deemed the causes of it 
(what alternative explanations were suggested? ), and what remedies are considered 
possible and feasible. 
What constitutes violence? 
On the subject of the definition of violence and types of violence, what could 
be identified throughout the interviews was the distinction made by the participants 
between beating and battering, and between physical violence and psychological 
violence. The common discourse was that low-level beating could be either an 
acceptable or, realistically, an unavoidable part of the social reality of women's lives 
in an Iranian context, provided it did not reach the level of sustained severe beating 
(battering). There was a sharp contrast between my perception, as the researcher, of 
violence (for me, even one single punch or push or slap was a clear example of 
domestic violence), and that of my participants, who understood my position but 
found it too idealistic and utopian. I learned to avoid generalisations and 
universalism, and learned the feminist points on "difference" in women's lives and 
views, following De Groot and Maynard's identification of the two important 
concepts of differentiation and variation among women (1993). 
Different women with different educational backgrounds and biographies 
prioritise different aspects of violence according to their own specific situations. I 
learned to suspend my judgement and meet each and every one of them in their own 
territory and their own space and time. 
A distinction was frequently made between physical violence and 
psychological violence. What was deemed the true face of domestic violence was for 
the most part physical form of it. The importance of psychological abuse (abusive 
language, bullying, ignoring ... ) and 
its implications for women's mental and 
physical health (depression, aggression, suicidal thoughts and so on) are disregarded 
in Iranian legislation. Economic violence in the form of not providing for the family 
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was fully recognised, but only in cases where women did not stop performing their 
part of the contractual agreement (sexual submission). Sexual violence, such as 
marital rape, was not generally conceptualised. Most women view submitting 
sexually to their husband as part of their deal in the marriage contract. Aggressive 
sexual relations (for example sodomy) are, however, regarded as unacceptable. 
Social violence in the form of placing restrictions on womenýs freedom of 
movement, association and socialisation was treated with reservations, in the sense 
that it was doubtful whether it should be classified as a form of violence. If the 
woman is nashezeh (disobedient) and endangers her family's reputation, and her 
behaviours and manners are likely to expose the family to social scandals imposing 
restrictions on women's social interactions was deemed acceptable, while excessive 
and obsessive forms of social constraint were considered unacceptable, and 
recognised as examples of domestic violence. 
In most cases, what is perceived to constitute violence was consistent with 
the core definition of orthodox marriage and the orthodox legalist approach to the 
definition of violence, which operationalizes it in terms of visible signs on the 
physical body and addresses it under the legal topic of diyeh (blood money). There 
were, however, significant deviations too. This leads me to the conclusion that 
violence is in the eye of the beholder. As different beholders reside in different 
historically-formed epistemic terrains, the priorities, preferences and measurement 
of domestic violence may differ a great deal. Violence has no common essence: for 
different women (and men) in different contexts with different biographical history 
and at different periods of their lives, violence does not mean the same thing. For 
one woman, beating was not important, but the verbal abuse of her late father was 
extremely painful. For another, the constant repetition of "You're an idiot, you don't 
understand" was unbearable torture of the soul: for an illiterate woman (with highly 
educated children), these statements by her husband (a teacher) were a constant 
source of humiliation and degradation. For other women, the constant petty crimes 
and misdemeanours of their husbands in ignoring their little requests for essential 
repairs to different parts of the house was a constant source of psychological 
violence. For others again, the constant interference of their fathers and husbands in 
their dress and social interactions, and incessant inquiry about their whereabouts, 
was a source of total despair, leading them to commit suicide or to frequently 
contemplate suicide. This leads me to conclude that violence is part of the 
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Wittgensteinian "language game", taking different meaning and functions in 
different contexts. Violence, depending on the context, may take subtle forms or 
brute forms; women can be driven into self-harm and suicide by their husbands 
through the accumulation of a set of unnoticeable and immeasurable postures and 
gestures, without any hand being laid on them. The common thread between the 
multiplicity of violence is only a type of Wittgensteinian family resemblance 
(Popkin, 2006). The various forms and shapes violence can take, sometimes 
manifesting itself in subtle and complex forms of meanness of spirit, may lead me to 
another conclusion that taking a legalist approach and attempts to ban recognised 
forms of violence such as physical violence or swearing may not work in practice, as 
long as the fundamental philosophy behind gender inequality and female inferiority 
remains unchanged. This is so because the spirit of inequality may resurface in new, 
subtle and unexpected forms: in bullying and teasing postures and gestures, and in 
being ignored, sidelined or silenced, and other infinite and unpredictable tricks 
embedded in verbal language and bodily movements which may lead women to 
despair, self-harm and even suicide. 
What causes violence? 
The following categories were frequently believed to be the root causes of 
domestic violence: 
Economic hardship 
Many participants touched upon the role of economic upheaval in 
contemporary Iran as the cause of violence against women. For them, too much 
pressure put on men in the context of economic scarcity is the reason for their anger, 
which they externalise on their female companions. Similarly, Sartre's theory of 
violence seeks the roots of violence in material scarcity (2006: 339). However, 
material scarcity does not by and of itself lead to violence. It can trigger a wide 
range of different reactions, from community sharing to extreme selfishness. Many 
societies pull together at the time of natural or man-made calamities. What seems to 
condition people and societies to act and react in specific ways is the historical 
regime of truth comprising archive of discursive formations and discursive practices 
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(Foucault, 2001). As Arkun (2001) put it, social reality in all its different forins is 
constructed in the framework of sacred and truth. Historical rationality in the form 
of the situated realisation of sacred and truth can act as an a priori condition of 
possibility for everything in social life. For instance, historical forms of rationality 
can bestow a sense of reverence on cows in the context of Hindu history (where 
cows are regarded as sacred), and their specific manifestation of sacred and truth 
allowing nobody to even think of killing and eating a cow, even in a state of extreme 
hunger. While for others who live and breathe in different epistemic framework with 
different senses of truth and sacredness, killing a cow in normal times (let alone in a 
time of economical hardship) is considered legitimized and rational. 
In this context, the historical regime of truth in Iranian society allows men to 
use economic hardship as an adequate excuse to inflict violence on women. The 
following example directs us to the fundamentals serve as the historical a priori of 
violence against women.: when I asked one woman whose perception was that 
economic hardship causes men to beat their wives why men do not beat their cows, 
for instance, she replied that it is sinful and cruel, as the cow is speechless 
(powerless) but a woman is not; as she put it: "She at least can swear, beg or cry. " 
Beating one's wife is not, therefore, perceived as a "sinful" act. 
Cultural and educational differences 
Some of the participants in the study referred to differences in the regional 
background of the marital partners as the main cause of domestic violence. For 
them, partners from different regions of the country generate different expectations 
of gender roles and positions, and when these are not fulfiled, the conflict is 
triggered and violence occurs. Moreover, a number of women believed that where 
the level of education of the female partner was higher than that of the male partner, 
his sense of superiority was severely undermined, and he would consequently feel 
threatened and unappreciated, which in turn would make him lash out and try to 
restore his authority over her through violence. Many highly-educated women 
tolerated violence in their marital relation in an attempt to avoid scandal and gossip, 
and to avoid the breakdown of the marriage and becoming a divorcee, as this would 
bring shame on them and make them prey to social and familial harassment and 
mistrust. In the event of divorce, women's whole social network is likely to break 
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down, as other women see them as potential rivals and threats to the survival of their 
own marriages; and men view them as safe sexual prey and lone and isolated figures 
who might easily become victims of the sexual advancement of men in the family or 
in wider society. Even when a divorcee builds a high wall around herself, she still 
cannot avoid the torrent of gossip and suspicion. As it is fairly apparent in this 
example, it is not cultural or educational difference in itself which makes women's 
lives miserable and painful, but a chain of causes related to the discourses of 
masculinity and femininity, regional stereotypes, the discourse of gheirat-effat, the 
sense of shame for a divorcee, and the tolerance of sexual and verbal harassment of 
women in general and divorcees in particular. What in essence is operating is an 
entire symbolic order, with its associated structures of power and its constructed 
subjectivities, which is working against women. Specific contexts provoke specific 
causes as the triggering factor, while the entire symbolic order serves as the fertile 
ground for violence against women. This accords with the analysis offered by one of 
my clerical participants, who made an important distinction between triggering 
factors and background factors acting as fertile ground for violence. 
Gender segregation 
A number of participants in the study stressed the fundamental role of the 
widespread practice of gender segregation in causing violence against women. 
Gender segregation, implemented from the early stages of life in the family and 
beyond, mainly through the code of Mahrameyat (socialisation without hejab with a 
legitimate circle of close relatives), forms women's subjectivities as vulnerable and 
fragile, in need of being protected and being allowed to act in protected and safe 
spaces. This puts safety at the forefront of a woman's mind, and her family's minds, 
in a way that conditions them to feel a great need for bodyguards in all realms of 
public and private lives. A typical example of this in this study was the case of a 
professional legal female consultant, who even in her fifties felt it was unsafe to 
travel alone to another city. This prevents women from ever becoming independent, 
and puts them under the shelter and protection of men. This in turn gives men the 
power to dominate as the ultimate protectors, and it is very probable that this will 
lead to their abuse of power and violence against women. Men become the 
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custodians of women, and women in need of full-time surveillance, supervision and 
protection. As soon as women step out of their designated territories, they are 
warned and punished. In a wider context, violence against women is a symptom of 
the Iranian psyche, and erupts at the interface of two large historical forces. One is 
related to the history of salvation (Arkoun, 2002), which in its historical realisation 
demands that women are secluded and segregated from men in order to perform a 
specific role in the order envisioned by the religious orthodoxy. Another force is 
associated with globalisation and the growth of global capitalism and modernity, 
demanding the active participation and presence of women in the social and 
economic life of the nation, to achieve progress and welfare. In a sense, violence 
against women is the result of the battle between historical forms of salvation, and 
progress inside each and every Iranian mind and in its social institutions and 
discursive practices. Historically determined forms of salvation require seclusion 
and segregation, while progress and modernity call for integration and participation. 
Iranian history illustrates that none of these forces can totally dominate the other. 
While the aim of the Shah's modemisation project was to launch the forces of 
progress and defeat the forces of salvation, the purpose of the 1978 revolution was 
to restore the dominant position of salvation in the narrative repertoire and the 
regime of power of the nation. As social realities of Iranian life in the modem era 
testify, none of these forces can totally defeat the other, and as a result the one in 
defensive position always destabilises the other. Violence against women is one of 
the manifestations of this perpetual conflict in the psyche of the Iranian nation. 
Psychologism 
Another widely identifiable pattern in the accounts of the participants was 
the search for the roots of domestic violence in the psychology of the individual, 
whether in his biography or in her social psychology, or in his nature and instinct, 
and to remedy it through the education of women. 
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Individual psychology 
A number of participants believed that the roots of violence against women 
might be traced to the psychology of particular individuals who embark on beating 
or abusing their wives or daughters. For them, domestic violence was a personal 
matter and not a legal, political or even social issue; the biography of an individual 
could explain his tendencies toward violence. For them, the individual psyche was a 
realm of wilftil action in which people decide to become violent or not. According to 
this point of view, social and religious factors work equally on all. Why, then, do 
some become violent to their wives and others not? This pushes the scale towards 
those factors which affect individual differences rather than social or religious ones. 
I will comment on the merits of this approach further on in this chapter. 
Keeping up with the Joneses (conspicuous consumption) 
Many of the men and women in my interviews saw the tendency to excessive 
consumption as the main cause of familial conflicts which culminated in different 
forms of domestic violence. The chain of events would be: a woman demands a 
large variety of conspicuous goods and services from her husband; the man either 
ignores her demands because of the mismatch with his own priorities, or cannot 
afford them; the woman nags constantly; the man becomes frustrated and feels either 
inadequate or under constant pressure to earn more money, and this sends him into a 
rage, which sometimes manifests itself in domestic violence. This explanation 
ignores the core of orthodox marriage and its implications: men are required to 
provide for their wives in exchange for a constant stream of sex. As elaborated in 
the orthodox jurisprudence texts every woman must be provided for financially 
according to her social and class status. The jurist textbooks and religious orthodoxy 
stresses that women are entitled to the same standards of life provided for them in 
their pre-marital settings. This formulation ignores one of the main features of 
modem social life: vertical mobility. The orthodox formulation presupposes a stable 
economy where there is no or little vertical mobility, while modem capitalism is 
based on and fully encourages vertical mobility. The modem market system 
encourages everyone, including women, to want more. When this force is put 
alongside the orthodox formulation of marriage, where the man is deemed the sole 
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or main provider, the meaning of the term "provision" changes all the time, and 
what was deemed enough a few years ago may not be sufficient now. The fact is that 
the orthodox presumption of a stable economy producing a stable status for people 
of different classes is under severe attack from the inherent dynamism of global 
market economy. 
The sum of all these forces culminates in putting extraordinary pressure on 
men to deliver a better life, while the meaning of "better" is changing all the time. 
The interesting point to note is that from the other side of the equation of the 
orthodox marriage, things are also changing rapidly. The force of conspicuous 
consumption is fuelling a huge male demand for a better sexual life and higher 
standards of beauty. The force of "keeping up with the Joneses" is changing the 
standards of beauty and of a good sex life. Women are under pressure to keep up 
with the standards of beauty set by female models and female singers that are fed 
into Iran via satellite channels widely available throughout the country, and to 
"perform" more satisfactory in bed, with the standards of a "good" and exciting sex 
life set by pornographic films, which are again widely available either in CD and 
DVD format and through satellite channels. The female interviewees in this study, 
especially the middle-aged and younger generation, felt they were under enormous 
pressure to make themselves fitter and more beautiful, and to deliver a better sex life 
and show an increased appetite for sexual intercourse (away from the frigidity 
common to "modest" women). While some of the middle-aged female interviewees 
felt uncomfortable with this trend, and maintained that these things were out of 
bounds for them and their age, some even found their husbands' demands 
outrageous and unethical. The female interviewees from the younger generations 
seem to have embraced this new trend, and to have dedicated themselves to the arts 
of beauty and lovemaking, which in turn places more pressure on family resources 
and ultimately on men themselves. 
In some senses, men are becoming the new losers in the unequal formulation 
of the orthodox marriage equation. Whether you start from men's duty to deliver a 
better life, or from women's duty to deliver a better sex life, the pressure on both 
sides of the equation is translated into more financial demands on men, forcing 
many of them to have two or three jobs, so that they become exhausted, and 
ultimately lose their appetite for the one thing they are supposed to desire most of 
all: sex. The summary is that "keeping up with the Joneses" is the engine of 
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economic growth in the modem market system, and can potentially deliver a better 
material life for all, but is not allowed to perform its magic in the Iranian context 
because of the inherent inequality in the orthodox marriage. A more equal 
construction may legitimise women's participation in the workforce and their 
sharing of the burden of providing for the family, and make both parties strive for a 
more fulfiling sex life. 
The discourse of instinct and desire 
One of the most self-evident facts of life for Iranian people, which frequently 
emerged in the study, is the belief in the fact that God made male and female human 
beings significantly different in terms of their sexual desires and their physical 
capabilities, turning men into beasts (literally) in the realm of sex, and women into 
figures with very fragile and weak emotional constitutions designed to provide sex 
and care, and to nurture the emotional wellbeing of the family. One is constructed to 
be a rational beast, rational in the management of social life and a beast in the realm 
of sexuality, and the other to be an emotional angel, emotional in the familial and 
sexual life and an angel in terms of being constitutionally kind and sacrificial. The 
common pattern emerging throughout the study was the endemic discourse placing 
women at home and men at the heart of social life. This discourse of instinct and 
desire perceives the modem order, where women are required to participate in all 
aspects of social life, as a heresy and an unnatural innovation which ruins the 
welfare and moral health of the nation and humanity at large. 
As such, for this discourse the presence of women in social life is unnatural 
and a forced necessity, and sooner or later they had better go back to homes. This 
causes some of the most severe conflicts in families, and culminates in men using 
violence against women in the form of forcing them to give up their jobs, restricting 
their movement and social networking, and ultimately even using physical violence 
and psychological violence when the women are perceived to have behaved 
irresponsibly or, through their manners or conduct, to have placed the family's 
reputation at risk. The discourse of instinct and desire is a strong part of the 
conceptual scheme of leading to women's oppression in Iran. It is almost 
unshakeable, and as self-evident as the fact that night comes after day. What the 
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feminist movement needs is a well crafted socially-constructed theory of instinct and 
desire embedded in the religious terms and teachings, to shake the unquestionability 
of this fundamental discourse. 
Un-Islamic behaviour 
One of the themes emerged in the study was the incessant attempts to explain 
the miseries and calamities experienced by Muslims as the result of their own 
infidelity to the religious codes of conduct and lifestyle. In this perspective, if there 
is tension and chaos in the family, it is because either one party in the conjugal 
relationship is deviating from the right path, as set by religious rulings and 
teachings, or both parties are deviating. In this framework, for the family to work 
smoothly and according to God's will, and to bring everyone peace in this world and 
salvation in the next, men are expected to be kind head figures of their families, and 
women their nurturing and sacrificial followers. The model constitutes two 
elements: a kind and God-fearing master, and a faithful and obedient follower. If 
either party deviates from this model, trouble, including violence, will creep in. If 
the woman, under the influence of "feminist poisons", as one of the interviewees put 
it, decides to take charge and challenge her husband's headship openly, and loses her 
traits of forgiveness, patience and gentleness, things will start to go wrong for the 
couple, the family and society at large. If she decides to confront the wrongs in her 
husband's character and behaviour openly and straightforwardly, she invites trouble 
into her family, as, it is claimed, in our culture this is not the way for her to address 
him. She must show the qualities expected of her, be ready to make sacrifices, and 
above all be diplomatic in her approach. If she fulfils her role, she can become "the 
master of the master" (as another interviewee put it). At the same time, if the man 
forgets to be a kind and generous master and abuses his power in the family, he is 
clearly deviating from the perfect example set by the Infallibles and the grand 
religious jurists, who were always kind to the women and children of the household. 
Physical violence in this model is seen as the very last resort, and should, 
even in the event that it is used, take a symbolic form to send a message rather than 
actual infliction of severe punishment. To force one's wife to return to the right path. 
ignoring her and starving her should be tried first. This classification endeavours to 
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keep people in the framework of the literature and the conceptual scheme of the 
religious orthodoxy and its regime of truth, not bestowing any legitimacy upon 
discourses such as human rights, feminism and liberalism. Within this type of 
formulation, conflicts are always resolved using the conceptual schemes provided by 
the mainstream structure of power and knowledge, which allows people to return to 
the familiar territory of the religious orthodoxy, to acknowledge their wrongdoings, 
confess their sins and climb the ladder of existential transformation and fulfilment it 
provides. Once again, this discourse provides grounds for conflict between 
modernity and religious orthodoxy. Modernity invites equality in human relations 
and "truth to oneself', while the religious orthodoxy views a couple's marital 
relations in terms of master and follower: one party is required to be a good master, 
and the other a diplomatic follower who avoids any open expression of discontent. 
This clash of models invites marital conflicts, which in some cases may develop into 
violence against women. 
Women's ignorance orfault 
Closely related to the previous theme is another which frequently appeared 
in my interviews with males and females alike. It was frequently stated that where 
violence was inflicted on women, the women themselves were to blame, either 
directly or indirectly: either they totally lost the plot and tried to be like men, or their 
reactions to men's misbehaviour were seen as misguided and the key to inviting 
violence on themselves. Even female interviewees, time and again, blamed women 
for the domestic violence they suffered. This is an astonishingly stubborn view, 
expressed by almost of the parties involved, which denies social agency to men but 
stresses it vehemently for women. For the majority of women I interviewed, women 
should behave wisely, know the sources and forms of their power, and use it to their 
advantage. For them, women's power lies in the realm of sex, and in their ability to 
"fool" men with their gentle ways. They believe women can indirectly dominate 
men and make them behave as they wish, provided that they use their "soft" and 
"hidden" strategies to tame men's wild and beastly nature. They opined that direct 
attempts to challenge and change men are a wrong strategic choice for women. They 
believed that women are adequately equipped to master the master, and need only be 
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cunning: "Let them believe they are in charge, but allow women to be the real force 
behind the scenes. " This type of statement was common in the interviews. 
Even men invited women to be cunning in their relations with them. They 
believe this satisfies both men and women, and removes all trace of marital conflicts 
and disharmony: men feel in charge and unchallenged, and women know that they 
are the real power behind the scenes. Men and women share power, but in different 
discursive frameworks. Many feel this is the secret of women's survival, and thrives 
in the Iranian context. It is obvious that when the structure is inflexible and rigid, the 
best way to circumvent it is to attack its content while keeping the faýade intact. 
This is the strategy of the weak when the structure of dominance is felt to be 
immutable, as when it is connected to the historical manifestation of the sacred and 
the true. 
In this context, one of the most striking and paradoxical features of Iranian 
social life takes shape: while all the official structures of society are male- 
dominated, at the same time, many believe that a strong type of female domination 
also prevails (one of the common themes repeated in this study). This paradox is 
resolved through the perfect realisation by many women that they may only become 
the masters of their lives and the lives of their families by pretending that they are 
the followers, as a result this delicate diplomacy they are left to become the force 
behind the scene. Thus, one may claim that, Iranian society is formally patriarchal 
and practically matriarchal. This is true to some extent. We have to acknowledge 
that the final say belongs to men, and their power is structurally constituted and 
discursively supported: men can strip women of their hidden power whenever they 
wish. That is why the discourse of zan-zalili was developed to counter the hidden 
power of women discursively and through the power of humour and stigmatisation, 
while the formal structure of power is left intact and can be activated when required. 
Women countered men's unquestionable discursive and structural power by 
developing cunning ways of taking charge of the destiny of the family, and men 
countered this with the discourse of zan-zalili, and the reactivation of their God- 
given rights at will. That is why women's power is very fragile and without 
discursive or structural support. 
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Lack of Education 
Closely related to the last two themes was the theme of some women's lack 
of cunning and shrewdness to find their way in the maze of the marital relationship. 
Those who advocated that women require education in order to be taught how to 
behave in accordance with the context in which they live, and to avoid importing 
lifestyles and ideas alien to it. This approach maintained that many women are easily 
influenced by the foreign (mainly western) model of marital and gender relations 
and try to imitate them, and thus invite conflicts into their lives. The women need to 
be re-educated, in order to become familiar with their own tradition and Iranian 
society's own specific way of doing things. This lack of indigenous re-education of 
women was viewed as one of the reasons behind the cases of violence against 
women. 
Interaction between religious orthodoxy, modernity and social reality 
One of the underlying themes identifiable from the analysis of the themes 
repeated throughout the interviews as the root causes of domestic violence was the 
conflict between religious orthodoxy, modernity and social reality. What seems to 
be causing domestic violence is the tension between alternative models of gender 
and marital relations. Ironically, there seems to be a macro level of cheshm-ham 
cheshmi in terms of best models available for gender and marital relations, and 
comparison seems to be a fact of life and a powerful social force at both micro and 
macro levels: comparison between the ethico-legal model of religious orthodoxy, the 
feminist equality model of the west, and the love-based model of Iranian literature 
(Annemarie Schimmel 2003). 
When it comes to the issue of justice in marital relations, the western model 
looms large, but when ethical issues comes to the fore, the western model loses its 
attractiveness and the orthodox model dominates. When the quality of the 
relationship is important, the model of Persian literature becomes the dominant one. 
The most powerful model, with deep roots in social reality of everyday life appears, 
however, to be the orthodox model, while the other two constantly challenge and 
threaten its dominance. As a result, in one context or on one discursive occasion, a 
person may migrate from one model to the other unconsciously. Living inside the 
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orthodox model, violence is formulated as the last of the last resorts; the model 
demands that men respect and cherish their wives ethically, and refrain from using 
violence against them, although the right to use violence as the last symbolic resort 
is reserved for them. 
The religious orthodoxy has managed, historically, to monopolise the realm 
of ethical truth, but lacks credibility in the realms of gender equality and love. while 
the western model possesses truth credentials in the realm of gender equality, and 
lacks credibility in the realms of morality and love. The marital relation developed 
in classical Persian literature is based on love, and is deemed weak in terms of 
morality and equality. All of these models have something to offer the Iranian 
psyche. It is interesting to note that a number of highly modernised female 
interviewees in the study wanted (and encouraged) their husbands to perform their 
regular prayers in the traditional fashion in the hope that they would as a result avoid 
drinking, lusting after girls, gambling and other vices. At the same time, these 
women wanted to activate the discourse of gender equality and freedom at any 
moment when they wanted to be fashionable, or to participate in weddings or other 
parties. In the latter cases, ironically their husbands wanted them to be observant of 
the codes of hejab and gheirat-effat, and to internalise these codes in order to 
preserve the family's good reputation. It is also interesting to note that the women 
desired relations with their husbands based on love, rather than on the exchange of 
sex for financial security. 
The modernized women activated these discourses when the context 
demanded. These women omen wanted their men to be observant of the religious 
codes of praying and, at the same time, to give them the freedom to pursue social 
pleasures, while men wanted their wives and daughters to be on the side of caution, 
to observe the codes of chastity and modesty and avoid being exposed to scandals, 
and, at the same time, to be open in their sexual attitude towards their husbands, and 
to beautify themselves for their husbands' pleasure. The nomadic nature of both 
parties' migration from one discourse to another filled their relationships with 
tension. Here we replace the objectivist quest for "a transhistorical or transcultural 
rationality" with "the thoroughly empirical and historical investigations into the 
many concrete 'rationalities"' that have shaped the contextual understanding of 
concretely positioned subjects" (Kogler, 1996: 5). Ironically, both the religious 
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orthodoxy and the West sexualise women, but in historically opposing ways: one by 
forcing clothes off, in subtle ways, and the other by forcing clothes on. 
Are Iranian men responsible? (Whose fault is it? ) 
One of the main questions regarding the nature of gender relations in Iran in the 
future is related to the responsibility of men in cases of violence against women. Do 
Iranian men deliberately and willingly inflict pain and suffering on women, or are 
they the mere conduits of forces beyond their control? Where is the borderline 
between the structure and the individual responsibility and agency regarding 
violence against women? What is the role of individual choice? Do men 
intentionally decide to become violent towards their wives, or do they only perform 
the sub ect positions made available to them? These questions are fundamental in 
determining the nature of gender relations in Iran. If men were viewed as oppressors, 
the reaction would be different from when they are viewed as victims. Many in 
religious circles accuse feminist scholars and activists of instigating a battle of the 
sexes in Iran, culminating in the collapse of family and the Iranian social fabric. I 
observed in the media a widespread attack directed at feminist teachings and their 
immediate danger for the stability of gender relations, the institution of family and 
the foundations of society at large. The accusation is so strong that many buy into it, 
and view the feminist approach to social reality as poisonous and destructive. That is 
why I felt obliged to address the issue here. 
Freedom, agency and responsibility 
Who is responsible for the prevalence of domestic violence in Iranian society? 
Are men the perpetrators of vicious acts of violence against women, or are they 
themselves the victims of a particular regime of truth, and more widely a clash of 
alternative regimes of truths? "The question whether the 'executors' of power are 
true agents or mere conduits, as [Foucault] sometimes claimed, remains debatable. 
... the strategies, 
the networks, the mechanisms, all those techniques by which a 
decision is accepted and by which that decision could not be taken in the way it 
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was" (Flynn; 2003: 246-47). Can we categorise men, or those who teach them to 
maltreat women, as intentionally and willingly engaging in acts of violence against 
women? Can we treat them as autonomous and responsible agents of their own 
narrow self-interests? Can we formulate the issue in terms of conflicts of interest 
between men and women, and demarcate the line between perpetrators and victims? 
If men's wills are at fault here, then as Nietzsche asked, "Who wills the will? " Can 
we not treat the realm of self, with all its phenomena - will, intention, reasoning and 
emotions - as the product of the interplay of historical forms of power and 
knowledge? 
The question of the realm of intentions, decisions and who has power was not on 
Foucault's agenda. As a result, questions such as these were not at the forefront of 
his analysis: "Who has power? What is going on in his head?; and what is he trying 
to do, this man who has power? "(Foucault, 2004: 28, cited in Flynn; 2005: 247). In 
this framework, the individual is seen as the conduit of power: "The individual is a 
relay: power passes through the individuals it has constituted" (ibid., 30, cited in 
Flynn, 2005: 248). The issue of individual intentions, agency and responsibility is 
secondary to the functioning of the historical field of power/knowledge structures. 
The notions of individual responsibility and autonomy gain their meaning inside a 
historical, epistemic structure. The archive of historical discourses in currency in a 
society determines the meaning and limits of freedom, agency and responsibility. In 
a symbolic order where homosexuality, for instance, is discursively and structurally 
condemned, those who deviate from the norms are deemed irresponsible. In classical 
Greek society, homosexuality alongside heterosexuality was deemed normal, and in 
that context homosexual relations were not seen as irresponsible. The notions of 
choice, agency, freedom and responsibility find their actual meanings and real 
manifestations inside a historical regime of truth. 
The logical implication of this logic is that domestic violence is legitimised 
in the hegemonic regime of truth in Iran. As a result, the notion of men's 
responsibility in routine cases of violence against women cannot be applied, as it is 
framed under the rubric of reasonable chastisement, and deemed legitimate when it 
is proportionate and is exercised to protect the moral heath of the family and society. 
When the limits are transgressed, as in cases of battering, it is categorised as un- 
Islamic and irresponsible. Another example is the discourse of reasonable 
chastisement of children for their own sake. For a person who lives and breathes in a 
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regime of truth endorsing the use of corporal punishment against children, the act of 
chastisement itself cannot be viewed as irresponsible, as the person does not find it 
unacceptable. Humility, another example, was categorised as slavish and weak in the 
ancient Greek symbolic order, while in the Christian religious symbolic order it has 
been praised and encouraged; in one order, acting humbly was deemed an 
irresponsible act for people of power, while in the other it was seen as the height of 
responsibility. 
Charting the topic of violence along each of Foucault's three axes, in an 
"axial reading" of violence, illustrates the relations between knowledge (an 
ensemble of rules for the formation of discourses, together with a set of discourses) 
and violence, power (normalisation, gheirat-effat as an enforceable set of moral 
codes through social and legal sanctions, scandals and reputation) and violence and 
subjectivity (self-policing, senses of guilt and shame, the internal gaze) and violence 
and the ways in which men's and women's subjectivities are constructed on the 
basis of the historical materiality of the structure of power and knowledge. As long 
as a native and indigenous alternative structure of power and knowledge is not 
offered, and does not find widespread acceptability and prevalence in everyday life 
in Iran, it is hard to find Iranian men responsible for acts of violence against women 
in their lives (unless they transgress the consensual lines drawn for them by the 
religious discourses). It is wrong to judge a rival form of rationality (the religious 
orthodoxy in Iran) with standards of western rationality, as the two are 
incommensurable and there is no universal set of meta-values with which to judge 
every type of rationality (Kogler, 1996). The religious orthodoxy in Iran accuses the 
West of moral decadence and cultural imperialism, while the West accuses the 
Middle East of oppression of women and despotism. Neither is justified in its 
criticisms of the other, as each is attempting to judge the other on the basis of its 
own historically- formed and incommensurable internal set of conceptual scheme and 
regime of truth. 
The view that sees men as another victim of the historically contingent but 
deeply rooted structures of power/knowledge/subjectivity paves the way for a 
compassionate approach to gender issues in Iran and the players involved, and 
makes them aware of the historical forces at work in constructing the institution of 
marriage and associated discursive formations and the power/knowledge structure, 
and may help to wield forces to change the foundations of the gender relations for 
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the better, rather than becoming entangled in the "blame game" and the web of 
mutual hatred and mistrust. it is notable that men may even enjoy the privileges 
bestowed on them by the religious orthodoxy, but should be notified that they may 
turn out to be the main losers in this whole game, as they are deprived of quality of 
life in their marital relations, a quality constructed on the basis of reciprocity. 
mutuality and love. As we saw in the interviews, in the social reality of 
contemporary Iran, many men are becoming the main losers in the "sex for money" 
equation. They are becoming the main losers both in terms of social power and 
privileges and in terms of their own souls. 
Emotional economy 
A related issue which has served as a constant source of confusion 
throughout this study is the internalisation (psychologisation) of the causes of 
violence: searching for the roots of violence in the individual psychology of couples, 
men and their childhood experiences, their lack of self-mastery and their indulgence 
in un-Islamic behaviour, and women's lack of chastity and shrewdness, naivety and 
credulity and greed for material wellbeing. In parallel to these blame games, and 
maybe as a result of them, the women frequently expressed disempowering sets of 
feelings such as guilt, shame, a heightened ethic of responsibility in regard to the 
care of others and the maintenance of relationships, harsh self-recrimination, 
anxiety, depression and hopelessness, and a sense of worthlessness, inadequacy or 
insecurity, and so on. It is potentially liberating to allow women (and men) to see 
that their emotional economy and psychological make-up and constitution are the 
unconscious product of historical forces of power and knowledge embedded in the 
details of their everyday lives. An alternative regime of truth would allow them to 
see, talk and act differently, and to enjoy the emergence of a more empowering and 
joyous psychological make-up. Unfortunately, my observation showed that the 
widespread use of traditional psychology in Iran may serve as a counter-productive 
force in the lives of women, with its stress on the individual, the autonomous self 
and the ethic of responsibility, without acknowledging the power of historical forces 
in shaping people's lives both inside and out. 
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What remedies are available? 
Violence as a cluster concept is closely related to a host of other concepts 
such as self, rationality, truth, responsibility, freedom, morality and religiosity. As 
Arkoun (2002) put it, societies may have many regimes of truth, and the hegemonic 
regime of power and knowledge may be destabilised by alternative and rival regimes 
of power and knowledge, with their corresponding cluster concepts and conceptions. 
Different symbolic orders prioritise values differently, and conceptualise facts and 
reality differently. In this context, it is paramount for us, in our enthusiastic and 
desperate attempts to eradicate domestic violence, to exercise caution, and to be 
careful to verify what works and what does not work in the context of the Iranian 
symbolic order. We can categorise the strategies available in two sets: short-term 
strategies (diplomacy/loyalty, voice, exit) and long-term strategies (a fundamental 
change in the background of social meaning and interaction). 
Short-term strategies 
The very short-term strategy can be summarised in one of the main themes 
that frequently emerged in this study: diplomacy. In the framework of this strategy, 
one must prove one's loyalty to the hegemonic discourses by fon-nulating one's 
request in the hegemonic literature. We can call this approach the "loyalty" strategy 
or the "diplomatic" strategy. In the private lives of Iranian women, this does not 
mean challenging the power of the men in their lives directly, but working behind 
the scenes to further their own agenda, and women seem to have some degree of 
success in this realm. In the realm of theoretical work, the diplomatic approach 
needs to be translated into reframing feminist demands for gender equality, in the 
language of the traditional jurisprudence, by keeping the orthodox literature intact. 
One recent example is the case in the Iranian parliament where the conservative 
female deputies managed to pass a bill reducing the retirement threshold for women 
to 25 years of work by using the language of the orthodox jurisprudence. They 
formulated their campaign in terms of the need for women to go back to their 
rightful place, home. as soon as possible (Zanan magazine, 2005: 21-25 
154) 
. Another 
151 'Let's make sacred the contents of the safe (chaste) houses as well as its names', reporting 
issues 
relating to women in the Iranian parliament. 
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example is the request put to Ayatollah Khomeini (Mir-Hosseini, 1999) to address 
the plight of many Muslim women who were suffering under tyrannical husbands 
who abused their powers in the family. The request was not formulated in terms of 
women's equal rights to divorce, but of the suffering of Muslim and sacrificial 
women of the Islamic revolution at the hands of many cruel men, who abused and 
maltreated them. Ayatollah Khomeini strove to come with an innovative solution in 
the framework of the orthodox jurisprudence, by implicitly offering the annulment 
option (declaring their husbands insane and annulling the marital contract as a 
result) in cases of abusive relations, rather than granting women the right to divorce 
their abusive husbands. Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel peace prize winner and feminist 
activist, seems to have been working inside this loyalty strategy, as she indicated in 
her memoir (Ebadi: 2006). 
Another short-term strategy which has emerged in the Iranian social reality 
and has been adopted by those who cannot accept to behave diplomatically and 
perceive diplomacy in private relations or social exchange of ideas as dishonesty is 
to raise their voices or to exit (Hirschman: 1972). Those who choose to raise their 
demands for gender equality through the discourses of feminism and human rights, 
and through resorting to international treaties, conventions and institutions, and to 
straightforwardly challenge the religious orthodoxy or question the power of men in 
their private lives may pay a heavy price for their honesty and bravery. But they may 
find that when their views become widely popularised, some, in fragments, will be 
reformulated in terms of the orthodox literature and incorporated in the larger 
scheme of the religious orthodoxy and mainstream structure of power/knowledge, 
but with an accentuated orthodox twist and flavour. The exit strategy (adopted by 
many feminist activists such as Karr) leads to immigration to western countries. This 
option may have liberating effects for the immigrants themselves but their effect on 
internal dynamism of the rival discourses inside the country seems to be highly 
limited. 
In practical terms, in the current situation, two policy initiatives come into 
mind for the short term (both of which must be formulated inside the loyalty 
strategy). One of the effective components of the diplomatic strategy may be the 
concerted efforts to persuade religious leaders and clerics to advocate the outright 
abolition of violence (without any ifs and buts) in marital relations in their audience 
with people. This can be justified not on the basis of the feminist principle of 
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equality (which is unintelligible to the religious orthodoxy), but of practical 
considerations such as the reputation of Islam and the religious order in Iran in the 
international setting. As we mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis, it is an integral 
part of the methodology of inference in the orthodox jurisprudence to heed practical 
considerations and temporarily suspend some of the primary rulings. Another 
effective step might be to persuade the parliament and judicial system to introduce 
two types of marital contracts to couples who intend to get married: one based on 
the traditional model, and another on the equality model. In the equality model, 
every aspect of marital life, from sex to finance, should be addressed in terms of the 
spirit of equality and reciprocity. This extra option allows highly independent, 
educated and employed women who believe in gender equality (with future 
husbands who share their beliefs) to have a footing in the system and a formal 
structure in which to shape their relationship. Furthermore, this arrangement 
(offering two options) does not force the equality model on those who still, for 
whatever reason, wish to live within the traditional model. 
Furthermore, priority should be given to women's safety and recovery, rather 
than the rehabilitation of offenders. In the context of Iranian culture, sanctuaries 
(safe houses) should be arranged all over the country for women suffering from 
domestic violence, but crucially they should be under the general supervision of 
genuinely charitable figures with an excellent reputation; otherwise they may raise 
suspicion and cause more problems than they solve. Additionally, re-educating and 
re-socialising the perpetrators to accept accountability for their violence through a 
formal criminal justice system and informal mediation should be considered 
(Hamberger and Hasting 1993, Healey et al. 1998). There must be a systematic and 
proactive co-ordination between the communities and the policy-makers to advance 
these goals. However, I suggest that for any intervention in the context of 
rehabilitation of offenders, an interdisciplinary approach should be used alongside 
the feminist model. 
Long-term strategies 
In the long term, the spread of the discourse and practice of gender equality 
in all walks of life will do the most to reduce domestic violence drastically. This 
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cannot be achieved without a wholesale change in the structure of 
power/knowledge/subjectivity. Susan Hekman (1999: 121-149) alludes to the work 
by John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995), and calls this structure 
"the Background". She perceives the "hegemonic masculinist discourse" (Susan 
Hekman, 1999: 121) as the Background. In the Iranian context, the orthodox 
jurisprudence is the Background. The drastic change in the Background requires the 
emergence of a society of "inside outsiders" who practise and believe in gender 
equality, and are able to legitimise it as an integral part of a wider regime of truth 
covering all aspects of life, work and language, and gaining acceptance and 
appreciation in all walks of life. This alternative way of being and seeing debases the 
religious orthodoxy, and gradually replaces it with a viable alternative. "Such an 
argument would entail the substitution of one regime of truth for another as opposed 
to "increasing the sites of resistance" to privileged knowledges" (Law and Madigan, 
2004: 100). 
One of the preconditions paving the way for the emergence of such a viable 
alternative, as Hekman (1999) suggests, is the detailed and scholarly analysis of the 
workings of the religious orthodoxy through rigorous research not in combative but 
in compassionate spirit. The religious orthodoxy is socially unconscious of the 
Iranian people, and the complexity of its workings at different levels of social life is 
widely hidden from them as they live and breathe in its atmosphere (the 
Background). Religious orthodoxy and its philosophical foundations are largely 
"expressed both in the oral literature and actions of the people. Thus a great deal of 
philosophical material is embedded in the proverbs, myths and folktales, folk songs, 
rituals, beliefs, customs, and traditions of the people, in their socio-political 
institutions and practices" (Gyekey 1995: 13) The religious orthodoxy, as Foucault 
puts it, "maintains itself ontologically inasmuch as it has already marked off the 
framework and reality within which one is capable of responding affirmatively or 
negatively to something: 'What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is 
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse. "' (Foucault, 1980: 119, cited in Flynn; 2005: 99) This kind of effective 
power "can no longer be (exclusively) analyzed with such juridical concepts as the 
oppression of the ruled or the rulers' possession of power; rather a vocabulary is 
required that is to grasp the pervasive and real ity-co nstituti on dimension of power" 
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((Foucault, 1980: 119,, cited in Flynn; 2005: 98). It "invests them, is transmitted b. N" 
them and through them" (Foucault, 1979: 26-27, cited in Flynn; 2005: 99). 
With such a grip on the social reality of Iranian life, the most effective way 
to address the religious orthodoxy does not seem to be the loyalty strategy of 
piecemeal legal changes adopted by many feminists in Iran. In confrontation with 
the legalism of the religious orthodoxy, the Iranian version of feminism seems to 
have adopted a legalist face, and in its attempts to alleviate the women's ordeal in 
Iranian context it has selected the option of putting pressure on religious orthodoxy 
to gain some ground in terms of legal changes in favour of women 155 : examples are 
the right to divorce, limited right to custody, forcing men to obtain their wives' 
permission in the case of a second marriage, and putting pressure on authorities to 
appoint women judges. This strategy may have limited success in marginally 
improving women's lot, especially for those women who already have access to 
financial or discursive resources and are able to take advantages of the new changes. 
Some, such as the professional brides who obtain the right to divorce, combine it 
strategically with the right to demand mahrieh before consummation, and make a 
career of marrying rich men and divorcing them after receiving mahrieh, may even 
abuse them. But by and large, these changes would not serve the majority of women, 
who have no access to good legal advice, or whose cases are not even referred to the 
judiciary and whose family culture is still shaped by the primary rulings of the 
orthodox jurisprudence in its image-making functions. As a result, their suffering is 
mostly due to the image-making function of the default rulings of the religious 
orthodoxy, which portray women as namus (honour), weak and in need of 
protection. This strategy keeps the unequal nature and structure of orthodox 
marriage intact. 
Furthermore, without a wholesale change in the philosophy and spirit of the 
law, these ad-hoc changes create conflict between the orthodox jurisprudence as one 
of the main sources of the law and the new laws passed under internal or external 
pressures, and therefore generate uncertainty and tension in the legal system. With 
regard to the decentralised nature of the structure of the religious authority (Mir- 
155 As Ebadi put it, "Women in Iran are terrorized. We are facing discriminatory laws as well as 
family violence. These laws represent the biggest problem. If laws were Just, violence would 
diminish. This is why the fight against laws that discriminates is given priority. " ('Iran: Women are 
terrorized', in an interview with Ina Tin (2004), editor of AmnestyNytt, Amnesty International 
Norway's magazine). 
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Hosseini 1999), these new restrictions are always deemed inconsistent with the 
default position of sharia law for some of the marjas (top jurists), lacking religious 
legitimacy as a result. The result is that many of these changes mainly serve 
rhetorical purposes for the religious orthodoxy in national and international settings, 
rather than creating a major push for change in the life of ordinary people in Iran. 
One perfect example (Mir-Hosseini, 1999) is the case where, after facing many 
complaints from the judicial authorities of the abusive ways many Iranian men 
treated their wives, Ayatollah Khomeini came up with a legal alibi (outright 
annulment of the marriage contract, probably by declaring abusive men insane) to 
free women from the chains of abusive marriages, but could not announce it as a 
formal legal change due to his fear of the mainstream marjas who would probably 
have ex-communicated him, since he was playing with the fundamentals of the 
orthodox formulation of marriage. This is just one example of the constant tension 
between the religious orthodoxy and its set of default rulings on the marriage 
contract, and new laws with their combination of the orthodox rulings and secondary 
progressive piecemeal changes in the rulings, due to internal feminist pressures or 
external international pressures. Without a wholesale change in the religious 
orthodoxy and the creation of the society of outsiders inside the larger society, the 
small changes here and there in the law will have limited success in achieving real 
change in the life of ordinary people. 
Another criticism which can be levied at the campaign for piecemeal changes 
in the law is that it can backfire in the face of the victims, in cases where the 
philosophy and spirit of the old law or social norms is still alive. The men and 
women in this study frequently reported that men resorted to ever more complicated 
and subtle methods to inflict pain and harm on women without leaving any obvious 
mark on their bodies. These subtle methods could in many cases drive women to 
suicidal thoughts and madness. Three more examples are provided. One is the case 
of honour killing in the Iranian county of Khuzestan 156 , which the authorities tried to 
prevent by putting all of those involved in prison, and promising a very harsh 
punishment for those who embark on such acts. A counter- strategy emerged after a 
while: families who wanted to embark on the honour killing of their own daughters 
or wives hired strangers to kill them in contrived car accidents (a form of contract 
killing). As the legal punishment in the event of a car accident is the payment of 
156 ISNA: Honour killing: hitp: //www.. isna. ir/Main/FullNews. aspx? SrvlD=Legal&Ndate=10-06-2004 
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diya by the killer, no serious harm would come to the driver, and the opinion of the 
victim's family in court is also paramount. The families promised handsome rewards 
to the killers, and killers were set free. While the namusIgheiratleffat discourse is 
still alive, the ad-hoc changes in the law may provoke people to come up with more 
innovative options to implement their old way of life, and use the capacities of the 
law against itself. Another example is in Turkey, where due to external pressure 
from the EU, a law was passed banning honour killing, but the practice re-emerged 
in a new form, in the case of forcing girls who had had illicit sexual relationships 
with boys to commit suicide: "A spate of 'honour' killings in south-east Turkey are 
disguised as suicides" (Time Magazine, 2006 157). Another obvious example is the 
case of women judges being appointed: even if they officially become part of the 
judiciary system, if they have to function in a male-dominated and philosophically 
anti-women organisational culture, they will lose control in practice and become 
only puppet figures without real and actual organisational power, fulfiling merely a 
rhetorical function (especially in an international setting). 
Voice and exit strategies also suffer from serious shortcomings. Feminists 
and others frequently raise objections to the injustices inherent in the orthodox 
jurisprudence. But as touched upon earlier, the orthodox jurisprudence constitutes 
the Background: a historical a priori for intelligibility and social meaning: making 
sense of things, giving meaning to categories of sense and nonsense, false and true, 
just and unjust and so on. The way not to change the Background, as Hekman (1999: 
121) put it brilliantly, is to "advocate changing social meanings by claiming that 
they are in absolute sense 'wrong' and replacing them with understandings that are 
'true' and 'right"'. She adds, "When feminists proclaim their 'truth', it comes out 
157 Time magazine Sunday, May 28,2006 
http: //www. time. com/time/searchresults? N=O&Ntk=NoBody&Nty=I&Nr--OR`/`28p record type%3 
AArticle%2Cp record type%3Ablog%2Cp record type%3AOther%29&Ntt=Turkey-honor+killing 
Time Europe Magazine I World I Notebook I Turkey Dishonorable Deaths 
"As part of its bid to meet E. U. standards, Turkey last year approved legislation making 'honor 
killings' - the practice of men killing their female relatives for perceived immoral behavior - 
punishable by life in prison. But a growing number of female suicides in southeastern Turkey, the 
country's poorest and most conservative region, this year has raised suspicion that women are now 
being forced to kill themselves to spare their male relatives ajail terin. In the province of Batman 
(pop. 500,000) hospital records show there have been 31 attempted female suicides this year, already 
more than last year's total, and five women have died, although the total number of actual suicides is 
impossible to document. 11 
'Women are locked away in a room with a rope and put under pressure. Or they might be forced to 
take rat poison, ' says Nebahat Akkoc, founder of Ka-Mer, a women's rights group in Diyarbakir. the 
regional capital of the south-east. Last week the U. N. sent Yakin Ertijrk, rapporteur on violence 
against women, on a fact-finding mission to investigate the suicides. 
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sounding like nonsense in the terms of abstract masculinity, which is, of course, 
precisely what it is in those terms. ... We must first alter the criteria of what it 
makes sense to say before we can proclaim another 'truth' and expect it to be heard; 
we must, in Wittgenstein's metaphor, shift the riverbed of thought" (Hekman, 1999: 
137). In the context of Iranian society, the only long-term and viable challenge to the 
orthodox jurisprudence can emerge in the framework of religion: not in the form of 
new interpretations of the religious texts and experiences, but in the form of a 
religious-based faith and lifestyle. Hekman opposes the famous dictum that "the 
master's tools cannot dismantle the master's house", and believes that "... it is only 
the master's tools that can dismantle the master's house. Attempting to fashion our 
own tools is both unfeasible and counterproductive" (Hekman, 1999: 146, emphasis 
original). The liberal and feminist discourses and the discourse of human rights are 
alien to the riverbed of thought in the Iranian context; the essence of equality and 
justice should be found and formulated and lived in the religious language, literature 
and life in the wider context of "the history of salvation", as Arkun (2002) puts it. 
This is feasible because, as Hekman puts it, "The Background, the master's tools, is 
neither monolithic nor static; there is a lot of 'give' in it" (Hekman, 1999: 146). 
In summary, the long-term strategy has two tiers: an academic and non- 
combative analysis of the Background and the development of a viable alternative 
based on the Background, the Master's tools. Alongside the first tier, the detailed 
analysis of the myriad ways in which sexuality in conceptualised, normalised and 
subjectivised in the Background is highly important. As revealed in this study, 
sexuality is the connective theme between the sacred and the violence. Furthermore, 
all aspects of the orthodox religious life and language, from rituals to proverbs and 
emotions, should be the subject of detailed analysis. With regard to its critical 
significance in the gender relations in Iran, the issue of agency and responsibility 
versus determinism and blamelessness requires further detailed empirical, theoretical 
and philosophical analysis. Alongside the second tier, how an alternative can 
smoothly emerge in the indigenous context can be learnt through a detailed analysis 
of Sufism, which emerged in the Background and found a widespread following. 
although in a totally different historical context. Furthermore, ways have to be found 
to practise new ways of being and living, and to use these new discursive and 
non-discursive practices in the process of subjectivisation of men and ýN-omen. What 
we ultimately need is new forms of structures of power, knowledge and subjectlvitý'. 
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Appendix A: Three-dimensional axes of power, knowledge and subjectivity (next 
page) 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for women, men and judicial officials 
Women 
1. Family Background 
Tell me about your life in general. 
How long you have been married? 
Do you have any children? How many? 
How old are you? 
Have you studied? 
What degree do you have? 
Are you working? 
Does your husband work? 
What is he doing? 
How old is he? 
2. Family relationsip 
Could you please tell me about your marriage? 
Could you please describe your relationship with your partner? 
Could you describe his behaviour when you are having a family dispute? 
What do you do? 
Could you tell me about your understanding of the situation? 
What do you think about the reasons behind his behaviour? 
How do you feel? 
Do you want to add anything at all? 
Men 
Family background: 
May I ask how old are you? 
How long have been married? 
Do you have any children? 
Are you working? 
What is your job? 
Have you studied? 
What is your degree? 
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Does you wife work? 
What is her job? 
Family relations 
Could you please tell me about your relationship with your wife? 
Could you tell me how do you handle the conflict in your family? 
Could you describe your understanding, perception of the situation? 
How do you feel? 
What do you think are the reasons behind any conflict in the family? 
Do you want to add anything? 
The Judges: 
May I ask you about your age, degree and legal experience? 
Could you please tell me the court procedure in handling cases in relation to 
domestic violence? 
Is there any specific law regarding physical violence? 
Is there any rulings acknowledging the psychological violence? How about sexual 
and economic violence? 
What does court do in relation to those types of violence mentioned above? 
What do you think is the cause of domestic violence? 
How does the law protect women suffering from their husbands' abusive behaviour? 
What are your recommendations in relation to issues raised by domestic violence? 
Do you want to add anything? 
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Appendix C: The women interviewees characteristics 
Name Age Marital 
status 
Number 
of 
Children 
Job Education Duration 
of 
marriage 
I Rudabeh 30 Married 0 hairdresser Diploma 10 years 
2 Ahktar 15 Seeking 0 housewife High school I year 
divorce 
3 Shahrooz 21 Seeking 0 housewife Diploma 5 years 
divorce 
4 Parvaneh 17 Seeking I housewife High school 5 years 
divorce 
5 Bahar 25 Seeking I housewife BA in 5 years 
divorce literature 
6 Katayoon 39 Married 2 Civilservant BA in ? 
sociology 
7 Saghar 35 Married I Teacher BA in 4 years 
English 
8 Yaas 23 Married 0 shopkeeper Secondary 8 years? 
school 
9 Firoozeh 36 Married I shopkeeper Diploma 14 years 
10 Irin 39 Married 2 Housewife Diploma 10 years 
11 Kobra 40 Married 4 Farmer/ Illiterate 30 years 
housewife 
12 Roghayeh 75 Widowed 11 Farmer/ Illiterate 60 years 
housewife 
13 Nasrin 25 Engaged 0 Midwife BA in 5 years 
midwifery 
14 Parisa 25 Engaged 0 Housewife Upper 2 years 
diploma 
15 Negar 21 Engaged 0 Housewife Upper I year 
diploma 
16 Homa 23 Married I Shopkeeper Upper 3 years 
diploma 
17 Nazi 21 Engaged 0 Student BA 2 years 
18 Gilan 27 Married 0 Housewife Diploma 8 years 
19 Mahin 55 Married 9 Housewife/ Illiterate 30 years 
farmer 
20 Khorshid 52 Married 8 Housewife/ Illiterate 40 years 
farmer 
22 Zari 42 Married 2 Housewife Diploma 20 years 
23 Jila 41 Married 2 Housewife/self Diploma 25 years 
employed 
24 Kolsum 68 Married 12 Housewife/ Illiterate 57 years 
farmer 
25 Goli 50 Married 4 Housewife Primary 35 years 
26 Shabnam 35 Married 2 Housewife Diploma 17 years 
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27 Soraya 25 Married I Housewife BA 3 years 
28 Khadijeh 42 Married 5 Housewife Illiterate 28 years 
29 Fariba 45 Married 4 Housewife Diploma 23 years 
30 Shahin 39 Married 2 Housewife Diploma 14 years 
31 Mar an 20 Seeking I Housewife High school 2 years 
divorce 
32 Katy 25 Seeking I Civilservant Diploma 5 years 
divorce 
33 Faranak 38 Married I Housewife Diploma 16 years 
34 Fahimeh 43 Married 4 Housewife Diploma 19 years 
35 Farah 21 Seeking 0 Housewife High school 6 years 
divorce 
36 Raana 57 Married 6 Housewife/ III iterate 43 years 
farmer 
37 Mahbubeh 30 Seeking 0 Student MA 10 years 
divorce 
38 Zivar 35 Married 2 Civilservant BA 10 years 
39 Fatimeh 34 Married 2 Teacher BA 8years 
40 Esmat 25 Married 0 Housewife Diploma I Year 
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Appendix D: The men interviewee's characteristics 
N Name Age Marital 
status 
Number 
of 
Children 
Job Education Duration 
of 
marriage 
I Amin 40 Married 2 Businessman Diploma 17 Years 
2 Hashem 41 Married 2 Civilservant Upper 21 Years 
Diploma 
3 Shahin 38 Married 0 Businessman Diploma 3 Years 
4 Saeed 35 Married 0 Businessman Upper 6 years 
diploma 
5 Nima 45 Married I Civil Servant BA 5 years 
6 Hadad 39 Married 2 Civil servant Upper 20 
diploma 
7 Hessam 38 Married 2 Technician Upper 18 
diploma 
8 Aziz 25 Married 0 Taxi driver Upper 2 years 
diploma 
9 Akbar 34 Married 0 Technician BA 3 years 
10 Golam 57 Married 5 Builder Elementary 30 
11 Egbal 61 Married 5 Teacher Upper 45 years 
diploma 
12 Kamran 45 Married 2 Lecturer MA 20 
13 Reza 55 Married 2 Taxi driver Secondary 30 
14 Bijan 23 Seeking 0 Unemployed Diploma 3 Years 
divorce 
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Appendix E: The structure of power in Iran 
ELECTED INSTITUTIONS UNELECTED INSTITUTIONS 
E LECTU RAT 
rý 
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PRESIDENT 
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CABINET 
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PARLIAMENT 
SUPREME LEADER 
ARMED FORCES 
HEAD OFJUDICIARY 
EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL l+j 
GUARDIAN COUNCIL 
ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS 
KEY: -+Directly elected -+Appointed or approved -+Vets candidates 
SUPREME LEADER 
Ayatollah Khamenei has been Supreme Leader since 1989 
The role of Supreme Leader in the constitution is based on the ideas of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who positioned the leader at the top of Iran's political power structure. 
The Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appoints the head of the 
judiciary, six of the members of the powerful Guardian Council, the commanders of 
all the armed forces, Friday prayer leaders and the head of radio and TV. He also 
confirms the president's election. The Leader is chosen by the clerics who make up 
the Assembly of Experts. 
Periodic tension between the office of the Leader and the office of the president has 
often been the source of political instability. It increased during former president 
reformist Mohammad Khatami's term in office -a reflection of the deeper tensions 
between religious rule and the democratic aspirations of many Iranians. 
ARMED FORCES 
The armed forces comprise the Revolutionary Guard and the regular forces. The two 
bodies are under a joint general command. All leading army and Revolutionary 
Guard commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader and are answerable only 
to him. The Revolutionary Guard was formed after the revolution to protect the new 
leaders and institutions and to fight those opposing the revolution. The 
Revolutionary Guard has a powerful presence in other institutions, and controls 
volunteer militias with branches in every town. All key army leaders are appointed 
by the Supreme Leader. 
HEAD OF JUDICIARY 
The Iranian judiciary has never been independent of political influence. Until early 
last century it was controlled by the clergy. The system was later secularised, but 
after the revolution the Supreme Court revoked all previous laws that were deemed 
un-Islamic. New laws based on Sharia - law derived from Islamic texts and 
teachings - were introduced soon after. 
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The judiciary ensures that the Islamic laws are enforced and defines legal policy. It 
also nominates the six lay members of the Guardian Council. The head of the 
judiciary, currently Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi, is appointed by, and 
reports to, the Supreme Leader. In recent years, the hardliners have used the judicial 
system to undermine reforms by imprisoning reformist personalities and journalists 
and closing down reformist papers. 
EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL 
The Council is an advisory body for the Leader with an ultimate adjudicating power 
in disputes over legislation between the parliament and the Guardian Council. The 
Supreme Leader appoints its members, who are prominent religious, social and 
political figures. 
In October 2005, the Supreme Leader gave the Expediency Council "supervisory" 
powers over all branches of government - delegating some of his own authority as is 
permitted in the constitution. 
It is not clear exactly how much this will affect the Council's influence, although 
observers say it is likely to strengthen the position of its present chairman, former 
President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was defeated in the 2005 presidential elections 
by Mahmoud Amadincjad. 
GUARDIAN COUNCIL 
This is the most influential body in Iran and is currently controlled by conservatives. 
It consists of six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists 
nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament. 
Members are elected for six years on a phased basis, so that half the membership 
changes every three years. 
The council has to approve all bills passed by parliament and has the power to veto 
them if it considers them inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law. The 
council can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, the 
presidency and the Assembly of Experts. 
Reformist attempts to reduce the council's vetting powers have proved unsuccessful 
and the council banned all but six of more than 1,000 hopefuls in the 2005 elections. 
Two more, both reformists, were pennitted to stand after the Supreme Leader 
intervened. All the female candidates were blocked from standing. 
ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS 
The responsibilities of the Assembly of Experts are to appoint the Supreme Leader. 
monitor his performance and remove him if he is deemed incapable of ftilfiling his 
duties. The assembly usually holds two sessions a year. 
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Although the body is officially based in the holy city of Qom, sessions are also held 
in Tehran and Mashhad. Direct elections for the 86 members of the current assembly 
are held every eight years and are next due in 2006. 
Members are elected for an eight year term. Only clerics can join the assembly and 
candidates for election are vetted by the Guardian Council. 
The assembly is dominated by conservatives such as its chairman, Ayatollah Ali 
Meshkini. Former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who lost the 2005 
presidential election to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is deputy chairman. 
PARLIAMENT 
The 290 members of the Majlis, or parliament, are elected by popular vote every 
four years. The parliament has the power to introduce and pass laws, as well as to 
summon and impeach ministers or the president. 
However, all Majlis bills have to be approved by the conservative Guardian Council. 
The first reformist majority was elected in 2000, but this was overturned four years 
later in elections in 2004. Many reformist candidates were banned from standing. 
In May 2004 the newly-elected conservatives nominated academic Gholamali 
Haddad-Adel as their speaker. He is the first parliamentary speaker who is not a 
cleric, although as his daughter is married to one of Ayatollah Khamenei's sons, he 
has a personal connection to the Supreme Leader 
CABINET 
Members of the cabinet, or Council of Ministers, are chosen by the president. They 
must be approved by parliament, which in 2005 rejected four of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad's initial nominees for his hardline cabinet. Parliament can also 
impeach ministers. 
The Supreme Leader is closely involved in defence, security and foreign policy, so 
his office also holds influence in decision-making. Reformist ministers under former 
President Khatarni were heavily monitored by conservatives. The cabinet is chaired 
by the president or first vice-president, who is responsible for cabinet affairs. 
Mr Ahmadinejad's cabinet contains only two clerics and no women. Mohammad 
Rahmati, minister of roads and transport, is the only minister remaining from Mr 
Khatami's cabinet 
PRESIDENT 
The president is elected for four years and can serve no more than two consecutive 
terms. The constitution describes him as the second-highest ranking official in the 
country. He is head of the executive branch of power and is responsible for ensuring 
the constitution is implemented. 
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In practice, however, presidential powers are circumscribed by the clerics and 
conservatives in Iran's power structure, and by the authority of the Supreme Leader. 
It is the Supreme Leader, not the president, who controls the armed forces and 
makes decisions on security, defence and major foreign policy issues. 
All presidential candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council, which banned 
hundreds of hopefuls from standing in the 2005 elections. 
Conservative Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005 after 
he defeated former president Akbar Hashemi Rafasanjani in a second round run-off 
poll. Mr Rafsanjani complained of an "illegal" campaign to discredit him. Mr 
Ahmadinejad is Iran's first president since 1981 who is not a cleric. 
Mr Ahmadinejad replaced reformist Mohammad Khatami who was elected president 
in May 1997 with nearly 70% of the vote. He failed to get key reforms through the 
Guardian Council and was hampered further after conservatives won back a majority 
in parliament in elections in 2004. 
ELECTORATE 
Of a total population of about 65 million, more than 46 million people - all those 
over 15 - are eligible to vote. Some eight million of them were born after the 1979 
revolution. 
Voter turnout hit a record high at 80% in the 1997 elections which delivered a 
landslide victory for reformist President Mohammad Khatami. Women and young 
people were key to the vote. 
But with disillusionment growing, only about 60% of the electorate voted in the 
final round of the 2005 election which brought hardliner Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to 
power. 
His humble background, promises to share Iran's wealth more equally and tough 
words on corruption proved popular with voters. 
This suggests that the desire for political refonn expressed by voters in previous 
elections has been eclipsed by concerns about poverty and job opportunities. 
Ref-. 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/sha. red/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/electorate. stm 
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Glossary 
aberoo (reputation) 
aberoo-reezi (fear of scandal in public) 
afsar (rein) 
ahadith (plural of hadith) 
amre be maroof va nahy-e az monkar (Leading Muslims to the correct path and 
preventing them from going astray) 
arasteh (smart) 
basij-e khaharan (mobilization force for sisters) 
baghili ghatugh (a local dish in Gilan; famous meal in Iran) 
bad-hejab (poorly veiled) 
baten (implicit) 
bekarat (virginity) 
borgha (body cover from top to toe) 
deraz-lafand (the long rope) 
del va pas (worries) 
diyeh, diya or dayeh (blood money) 
effat (chastity) 
elahiat (theology) 
ezale-h bekarat ya tajavoz-e be onf (defloration of virgin girls or rape) 
faskh (annulment) 
fetneh (chaos) 
fased (corrupt) 
gheirat (sexual jealousy, protectiveness) 
gheiraty (jealous) 
ba-gheirat (jealously protective) 
bee-gheirat (indifferent) 
gham (sorrow) 
ghesas (retribution) 
gunahkar (sinner) 
hadith (traditions of the Prophet and Shiia imams) 
Hejab (veiling) 
haya (modesty). 
hadd (Islamic punishment) 
hamsar (partner) 
haram (religiousely illegitimate) 
Utehad (independent reasoning) 
imams (Shiia infallible leaders) 
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Jahizieh (a newly married girl should be provided the furniture of her future's house 
or i ahizieh by her parents) 
kafan (refers to the white cloth used to wrap the dead body at the time of burial) 
khalvat (private space) 
kharab (corrupt) 
khula (virtually a divorce purchased by the wife from the husband for a price) 
kitabia (the people of the book- Christians and Jews , Zoroastrian) 
marja' taqlid (source of enlightenment) 
mahrameat (principle of being allowed to socialize without hejab with a legitimate 
circle of people) 
mahram (legitimate circle of people) 
na-mahram (non-relative man) 
mahrieh, mahr (the contractual payment to the woman for the consummation of 
marriage) 
MajUs (parlimant) 
MajUs Khebregan (the Assembely of Experts) 
MajUs Shorayeh Eslami (the Consultative Body) 
mardsalari (patriarchy) 
muta (temporary marriage) 
nafaqeh (maintenance) 
namous (sexual honor and reputation), 
nekah (sex, intercourse) 
nushuz (disobedience, rebellion) 
qjratolmesl (housework wages) 
orf (custom) 
pasdaran (revolutionary guard) 
ghesas (retribution) 
qiyas (comparison by analogy) 
ravayat (religious sayings) 
sabr (tolerance), 
savari (cars to serve as a taxi) 
shahvat (desire) 
shak-kardan (being suspicious) 
shakkak (the one who is suspicious) 
sharaf(decency) 
sharia (revelation, religious path) 
sigheh (temporary marriage) 
siyasat-ha-e zananeh (female politics) 
sunna (tradition) 
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ta-asob (bigotry, narrow-mindedness) 
ta-assoby or moto-asseb (bigoted, narrow-minded). 
talaq (dismission. or setting free) 
tamkin (submission) 
taslim (submit) 
taqlid (follow) 
Umma (the community of believers) 
Ulama (religious leaders/ scholars) 
Velayat-e Faqih (Political leadership- in the absence of the divinely inspired Imam 
- bestows on thefaqih or jurist who is the most qualified person to lead the 
community. This concept was introduced by Khomeini, the first leader of post- 
revolutionary Iran) 
zan-e bi-sarparast (a custodianless woman) 
zanan (women) 
zaher (explicit) 
zanzalil (hope] ess/powerl ess in front of women) 
zansalari (matriarchy) 
zina (adultery) 
zina-kar (adulterous) 
zinat (ornament, decoration) 
Persian Proverbs 
Ye goosh dar ast, goosh-e digar darvazeh: "Letting something in through one ear 
and out through the other. " 
Az shotor porsidand ke kojaye badan-e tu kaj nist? Shotorjavab dad hichja: "When 
asked, 'Which part of your body is not crookedT, the camel answered, 'Nowhere. "' 
Cheshm va ham-cheshmi kardan: "keeping up with the Joneses, or conspicuous 
consumption". 
Pishi, pishi, kharam mishi: (pussy cat pussy cat will you become my donkey) or 
"Say you love me, and I'll do anything for you. " 
Chah kan hamishejash tahe chah ast: "If you set a trap for someone, you could be 
caught in it yourself. " 
Shiram ra halalat nemikonam: "mothers who threaten to withdraw their blessing- 
T" L 
Khahi nashavi rusva hamrang-e jamat sho: "If you don't want to get into trouble, 
you need to be like others. " 
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Gorbe ra dam-e heh bayad kosht: "One must kill the cat at the bride chamber" (a 
common proverb indicating that in a strategic interaction, one must establish one*s 
authority at the very beginning). 
Az mardi porsidand dar Bazar zorat be che kasi miresad? Goft dar khneh be zanam: 
"They asked a man who you could dominate in the market. He said, 'I dominate my 
wife at home. "' 
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